Canadian peacekeeping is not what it used to be; in truth, it never was. Canada is probably the only country that has a monument to peacekeeping in its capital. Its location at the intersection of the translucent National Gallery, the Catholic lower town Cathedral, and the bunker-like new American Embassy more accurately reflects the peculiar mists that enshroud Canadian peacekeeping than does its name: "Reconciliation."

The monument evokes the image of the peacekeeper that persists in Canadian memory: the determined professional soldier possessing skill, civility, and humanity who separates the irrational forces of destruction, much as a strong referee would do in a bantamweight boxing match. The soldier has enough strength to push away the boxers and enough common sense to label good and evil, danger and safety. The image pleased Canadians, especially when they recalled the Nobel Peace Prize that Lester Pearson won in 1957 and the encomiums that successive UN Secretary-Generals bestowed upon Canada for beckoning to their calls of distress.

Between the ideal of public perception and the reality of peacekeeping operations fall many shadows. They descended in the last years of World War II when it became clear that the Great Powers would control international security through the United Nations Security Council. The Cold War meant that the Permanent Five on the Security Council remained divided. Without agreement, the hope for a United Nations force that would respond to violations of the Charter remained solely an ideal. When the North Koreans invaded South Korea, Lester Pearson, then Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, briefly thought that the UN force might have another chance. It did not: the response to North Korean aggression was a UN peace enforcement operation under

the command of General Douglas MacArthur of the United States. A distinct UN force became ever more unlikely as the Cold War caused even more skepticism about Soviet initiatives.

The first few Canadian peacekeepers served in Kashmir in the aftermath of the dissolution of British India and in the Middle East after the creation of the state of Israel. What gave strength to the notion of peacekeeping as vocation was the Suez Crisis of 1956. For the Canadian diplomats and their foreign minister, Lester Pearson, the terrain was ideal for a daring diplomatic initiative. With an able and helpful UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, and a division between Canada's major allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, Pearson put forward the proposal for a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first substantial peacekeeping initiative of the United Nations. The Nobel Prize followed, and the legend developed that Canada had created peacekeeping and that the Canadian forces were uniquely appropriate to such missions.

The legacy of Suez weighed heavily upon the Canadian forces, Canadian foreign policy, and Canadian prime ministers and foreign ministers. Suez was a good memory: an admirable Canadian general, E.L.M.Burns, commanded the UNEF that Pearson had inspired. The Canadian UN diplomacy in the fall of 1956 merited the encomiums bestowed upon it. As Jack Granatstein observed, after Suez Canadians "came to feel that peacekeeping was their métier." With strong support from public opinion, Canadian governments committed Canadian peacekeepers to the Congo, Irian Jaya, Yemen, and Cyprus and maintained a large presence on the International Control Commissions in the former French Indochina. When the Pearson government returned to office in 1963, the

peacekeeping role of the Canadian forces was central in the discussions accompanying the unification of the Canadian armed forces.

The decade after Suez has many parallels with the 1990s in its early intoxication with the possibilities of peacekeeping and activist Canadian diplomacy and the disillusionment that followed when high expectations confronted the inevitable reality of diplomatic and military quagmires. The Congo affair saw a popular and capable Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld turn the UN presence towards the construction of a new state through a UN military presence. As chaos prevailed, Hammarskjöld died in a suspicious air crash and the intervention failed. The Control Commissions brought increasing acrimony between Canada and India and, in time, an accusation that Canada was using its presence to spy for the United States against North Vietnam. Paul Martin, who had strong hopes for the leadership of the Liberal Party in 1964, took the lead in the Cyprus peacekeeping effort, but there would be no Nobel Prize because the Turks and the Greek Cypriots continued their confrontation. The final blow came when the Egyptians demanded that UN peacekeepers withdraw from the Sinai in 1967. With Pearson as prime minister, the Canadians protested but to no avail. The peacekeepers withdrew; war came; and the Middle East remained in turmoil for generations. The tarnish on the peacekeeping tradition was such that Pierre Trudeau shunned peacekeeping-"helpful fixing"-when he succeeded Pearson in 1968. Pearson himself privately considered peacekeeping to be a tool to be used judiciously and fretted as others employed it to gain diplomatic laurels. He warned Martin that Cyprus looked to be a permanent commitment and told him that role of peacemakers was to still turbulent waters, not to stand by when

they remained stagnant. Their presence, he warned, could then be an antidote to meaningful discussions rather than a catalyst.

These arguments had echoes in the 1990s when the Cold War collapsed. Canadians found themselves engaged in a variety of theatres as the Cold War's end brought regional and ethnic conflicts on all continents. During the Cold War, the Permanent Five on the Security Council had themselves avoided peacekeeping commitments, and UN forces were recruited from other countries like Norway, Sweden, Canada and India, which had strong military traditions and experienced peacekeepers. Despite his initial reservations, Trudeau had beckoned to successive UN calls for help as did Brian Mulroney, his successor. The UN peacekeepers themselves won the Nobel Prize in 1988 and Ottawa took some credit for the award (In this sense, the1992 monument staked a claim to part of the laurels). With the end of conflict between democratic capitalism and Soviet-led communism, the UN briefly seemed the best hope for new times. Seizing the moment, the UN defined a highly activist role that would require it to expand its role in peacemaking and peacebuilding as well as peacekeeping. Between 1990 and 2000 there were as many peacekeeping operations as in the 45 years since Suez. Faced with these demands, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) naturally turned to Canada with its long peacekeeping experience.

Canadians responded to the call, although there were some hesitations among Canadians on the left and even the UN Association of Canada when the Mulroney government supported the Gulf War peace enforcement action that had the sanction of the UN Security Council. This war, the UN Association of Canada declared, was not what it had understood to be peacekeeping. In one sense, the Association was correct:

the robust use of force against Iraq did not draw upon Canada's peacekeeping experience. In that peace enforcement operation, the air and sea forces were the principal Canadian contribution. This caused pause: the army had dominated peacekeeping; the other forces had mainly domestic and NATO responsibilities. Nevertheless, there were soon other peacekeeping missions that required ground soldiers, and both the Mulroney and Chrétien governments responded to the frequent calls from New York. While responding to the call, the Conservative and Liberal governments of the 1990s did not expand military resources. The Conservatives did recall troops from Germany and from Cyprus where it was recognized that almost three decades of UN peacekeepers had not ended the chill along the Green Line that separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots. These decisions, however, did not bring additional troops because the Canadian military were a major target in the budgetary reductions of the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, the Canadian armed forces had only 60,600 active duty personnel, and Canadian military expenditure was approximately 1.3%, half the world average.

The Suez dream of UN peacekeepers engaged in non-violent observation and whose presence prevented conflict crumbled in the nineties. Those problems, such as the Congo and Vietnam, that had disillusioned Canadians in the 1960s reappeared in stronger doses as Canadian peacekeepers were accused of taking sides between Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia. General Lewis Mackenzie argued cogently that his role in the Balkans reflected the traditional impartiality required of peacekeeping forces, but some Canadian journalists rejected these arguments. General Romeo Dallaire similarly received criticism from journalists and Belgian politicians because he did not actively intervene to halt atrocities in the Rwanda during the catastrophic collapse of UN

involvement there. Dallaire correctly pointed out that he lacked the necessary forces to deal with the rampant disorder; only a few thousand more soldiers would have prevented the deaths of tens of thousands. The UN and, in particular, the DPKO became a target for its failure to provide sufficient force to prevent the Rwandan genocide. Despite limited resources, the Canadian government did respond to a request that it send soldiers to Somalia, a failed state where many warlords struggled for the few spoils the barren land yielded. The Canadian Airborne, who were sent despite considerable reservation, had a distinguished combat history but one that made it unsuited for the challenges of so-called humanitarian intervention. The Canadians responded to looting and anarchy with tough measures that caused the death of a young Somali whose photograph became a symbol of the complications of peace operations in the 1990s and of the growing uncertainty about Canada's role.

That uncertainty persists. The Canadian War Museum, for example, puts peacekeeping at the centre of postwar Canadian military history, and politicians continue to celebrate the peacekeeping tradition. The approach reflects public opinion, which, polls consistently demonstrate, considers the tradition one of the principal components of Canadian identity. The War Museum, while acknowledging the tradition and the perception, does illustrate how peacekeeping became peacemaking in the 1990s. It displays a jeep riddled with over 50 bullet holes in which 25 Serbian soldiers ambushed two Canadian privates on New Year's Eve 1994. Other Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia fought the fiercest battle since Korea. The light armour and narrow mandates and rules of engagement of Canadian peacekeepers were inadequate or

inappropriate to the challenges. Moreover, Canadian decisionmakers did not consider adequately the nature of those challenges and the adaptation that must occur.

The choice of title of the report of the Somalia Mission of Inquiry, Dishonoured Legacy was controversial, but few took issue with its finding that "new peacekeeping guidelines, updated to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping, had not been developed or were not in use at the time of planning for the Somalia deployment." Canada, the report argued, wanted to participate in a curious UN-US peace enforcement operation with no clear role and, more remarkably, without the knowledge of US military planners that the Canadians would participate. In late 1992, Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, had even called General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, in de Chastelain's words, pointed out that "A role that was seen to be secondary would not sit well with the troops, with me, with the Government or with Canadians." Those considerations trumped the policy and operational analysis of the value of Canadian participation in that mission.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment went to Somalia with responsibility to "secure the environment" and to assist "humanitarian relief" efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). What makes the post Cold War environment for peace operations much different is the expansion of responsibilities and the major humanitarian aspects that accompany most missions. What was required went far beyond expectations and training, not only of the Airborne but of nearly all military personnel in the West. Conflict prevention was no longer largely a passive activity fulfilled by the presence of blue beret soldiers representing the interest of the UN and seeking peaceful resolution of disputes. Officers were expected to engage directly with local authorities and

individuals. They should negotiate differences and, if necessary, threaten action. The peacekeeper on the Sinai in 1960 faced much simpler times and tasks.

New times and tasks present four major considerations that should inform and determine Canadian peace operations in the future. The first is authorization of the operations. The website of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade begins its discussion with the statement that "The United Nations decides when a peace support operation is required, determines the mandate of the mission, conducts the planning of the force, and reviews the mandate as required." Yet when one turns to the list of missions one finds several that are "non-UN," particularly in recent years: IFOR in the Balkans in 1996-7 (1035 Canadians); MNF in Zaire in 1996 (452 Canadians); SFOT in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1996 (1269 Canadians) and two small policing and human rights observation missions in Guatemala and Haiti. These are not unprecedented; for example, the International Control Commissions were "non-UN" in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, the Balkan operations and American operations had NATO and OAS authorization. The Liberal government of Jean Chrétien has used parliamentary debates and hearings of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to give legitimacy to Canadian commitments while reserving the final decision to cabinet. The difficulties of the Canadian position became clear when the government took the stand that American action against Iraq required the authorization of the United Nations Security Council.

The argument was convenient, but it is weak since Canada had participated in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations that lacked UN authorization several times. One can argue, of course, that the Iraq case was different from the past, and it many ways

it was. However, it may forecast the future if the current divisions on the Security Council persist. In another sense, the argument rests on weak foundations: Canada has been a critic of the dominance of the Permanent Five on the Security Council since the UN's founding years, and it led attempts to reform the Security Council in the last decade. There were realist arguments of considerable substance for participation in the "coalition of the willing" (the Canadian economic dependence on the United States) and against participation (the damage done to the western alliance and the Westphalian tradition). There were also idealist arguments for participation (the human right abuses of Saddam Hussein) and against (the overwhelming opposition of the Islamic world and international opinion to the invasion). These arguments, however, did not often inform the presentation of the Canadian position.

More surprisingly, the Canadian position did not make reference to the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention that the Canadian government had created and whose report, Responsibility to Protect, was presented at the UN by the Canadian ambassador. The report was a liberal argument that sovereignty was not absolute and that human rights abuses could justify intervention. Although UN Security Council authorization was desirable, the commissioners recognized the obvious limitations of the institution. One of the commissioners, Harvard professor Michael Ignatieff, reflected the report's rationale in his support for the American intervention in Iraq. These traditional liberal arguments, with their roots in nineteenth century Gladstonian rhetoric, combine with twenty-first century Western security fears to make future interventions in failing more likely. For future Canadian leaders, legitimacy will be the critical question, one to which recent history provides a confused answer.

The “times” provide a clearer answer to the question of the nature of future peace operations. If one examines the current list of operations, (www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp) and the operations since 1990 (www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/missions-en.asp), one is struck by their variety, number, and growing danger. Air and naval forces are more often involved (for example, OP Apollo, the contribution to the war on terrorism), as are civilian police as in Haiti. In recent times, the demands placed upon regular personnel have required more extensive use of reservists in peace operations. Although the numbers of Canadian personnel involved in peacekeeping operations in May 2003 (approximately 2700) is considerably lower than it was in the early 1990s, one third of Canada’s deployable force is either preparing for, engaged in or returning from an overseas mission on any given day. Moreover, the decision to send 1800 Canadians to Afghanistan in the summer of 2003 will further strain Canadian capacity. Indeed, that commitment meant that Canada could not have contributed land forces to the Iraqi campaign even if the government had decided it was supportive. According to military analysts, the additional funding granted to the Department of National Defence in the last budget will mainly support the expenses of the Afghan operation.

That operation will present the new face of peace operations since the end of the Cold War, a face that stares more often at danger. Although there were peace enforcement operations during the Cold War, notably in Korea and the Congo, they were exceptional. Landmines and unexploded ordnance were the principal cause of peacekeeper casualties. Bosnia, Somalia, and Afghanistan have taken Canadians to far more dangerous terrain. American Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has correctly

described Afghanistan as "still" a combat zone. Canadians, of course, have already suffered combat deaths in Afghanistan, most famously in the "friendly fire" incident of April 17, 2002 when four Canadian soldiers were killed by a bomb dropped by a F-16 pilot. Canadian public reaction was strong and, in some cases, bore an anti-American flavour. It is very likely that death in combat would not have created such an uproar. Nevertheless, the incident does suggest that the Canadian public did not understand that "friendly fire" deaths are common in warfare and, secondly, that the United States military planners may see Canadian participation in complex operations as an unnecessary irritant.

Canadians may not always be needed or even welcomed, but the recent past suggests that future peace operations will be varied in character and more likely to place Canadian soldiers in harm's way. The Defence Department website contrasts strikingly with that of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in its emphasis on the demands that peacekeeping places on its personnel. Peacekeeping is described briefly on the Defence site on which "priorities" are listed as, firstly, protecting Canada; secondly, contributing to North American security; and thirdly, contributing to international peace and security. Foreign Affairs, in contrast, has a long essay on peace operations that reflects expectations of future and major commitments. Between means and end, there is a gap that increased funding for defence will only party fill. Canadians, the recent record suggests, should select their peace operations less often and more carefully.

The "times" have also brought new tasks for peacekeepers. The most striking and welcome change has been the greater responsibility of air and sea forces in peace

operations. This commitment promises to continue, although the naval commitment may interfere with domestic responsibilities. Professor Douglas Bland has recently warned that "If [the Americans] come to believe that we can't maintain adequate surveillance of the sea approaches to our end of North America, then they are going to have to do it themselves." Canada has relatively few ships and many sea approaches. Still, the peacekeeping burden is likely to fall mainly on land forces, and Canadian resources are clearly insufficient. The budgetary cuts of the 1990s left the Canadian army unable to cope with the requirements for overseas deployment. There does appear to be growing support for an increase in military spending not only among the general public but also among the new generation of political leaders. Yet the current defence minister is correct to emphasize that choices must be made if the Canadian military is to be an effective force in the twenty-first century.

Given that peace operations are likely to remain a major commitment, Canada must consider what it does well, what others can do better, and what we cannot do. In many ways, the Canadian situation parallels broader trends: developing countries can produce traditional goods more cheaply while advanced countries must find specialized niches. The same applies to peace operations. Canadians come expensively whereas other nations, many with extensive peacekeeping experience, can provide traditional peacekeepers more cheaply. Developing countries can make money from UN peacekeeping operations, and they should be encouraged to do so. Moreover, peacekeepers from developing countries should predominate in peace operations in the developing world whenever it is possible. And one wonders whether it is good use of resources to send RCMP officers at a cost of $250000 to carry out police training in Haiti

and elsewhere. Others come more cheaply and, probably, with better language and cultural skills. Also, the funds come from CIDA which further complicates the already over-complex lines of responsibility in Ottawa. There may be occasions where peacekeeping should not be left to the locals-for example, Russians in Central Asia or Nigerians in parts of West Africa-but a general rule should be that Canadians should not go where the locals can handle the task.

Canada has found some niches. The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is one such example, although it apparently lacked sufficient personnel to respond had it been needed in the Iraqi war. United States military officials have also commended the special forces who served in Afghanistan and the armoured vehicles produced by GM Canada. Eastern Europeans, who are assuming more responsibilities in peace operations, have claimed that the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre courses were helpful. Yet Canadians must carefully evaluate what their resources and talents are. One often heard during the Iraq war that the Americans and the British could make war but that Canadians could offer much for reconstruction.

It is not at all clear that Canada can or should offer as much as editorials suggest it should. In her study of the growing role of the American military in civic affairs throughout the world, Dana Priest quotes Machiavelli: "There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things." She describes what happened in 2002 in Afghanistan:

"The British had agreed to lead the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] operation. Now they wanted out, fast. The Turks, who had promised to take over

form the British, were slow on the uptake, and they would soon abandon the job too….The police in Kosovo weren't very effective, but at least they showed up. In Afghanistan they weren't even showing up." (Dana Priest, The Mission:Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military. New York, 2003; 391)

A British officer lamented that there could never be enough peacekeepers; American General George Joulwan told her, "I sense no stomach for what it takes to do this right." This summer the Canadians are "showing up." They, like their predecessors, are not ready to build a new Afghan nation.

The fourth and final consideration is the nature of "humanitarian" operations in the post Cold War era. The few "aid" organizations of the post World War II era have become an army of NGOs who arrive at the dawn of catastrophes and the twilight of wars. They were present in abundance in the Great Lakes area of Africa, and UN peacekeepers had responsibility for their safety. The relationship between soldier and civilian was not always good, and a major study commissioned by the UN and several national governments concluded that the NGOs role in that operation was often unhelpful. In Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance groups have complained that the enhanced role of the military in such tasks as distributing food, fixing water systems, and opening schools is inappropriate. Such groups have also have objected to the role of the military in reconstruction that, they argue, blurs the distinction between western civilians and soldiers, making the former a target in nations where the western military is resented. The situation in Iraq where the American officials are turning to private sector organizations to organize education and other traditional NGO functions has also attracted strong NGO criticism.

The Canadian military has had its own difficulties with NGO critics, especially in the former Yugoslavia where some NGOs tended to identify the Serbs as villains and the military tried to maintain traditional peacekeeping neutrality. The Department of National Defence has also responded to NGO and journalist criticism that peacekeeping is more complex and requires broader education by altering the training procedures for Canadian peacekeepers. One need only compare the curriculum of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in 1994 with its emphasis on more technical aspects of peacekeeping with its current interest in such questions as human rights and gender. Much is commendable, notably former defence minister Art Eggleton's program to require advanced education for officers. Nor can one argue that Canadian peacemakers should not become more aware of cultural differences. While admitting that peace operations are more complex and often involve humanitarian objectives, one must ask whether today's soldiers are being overburdened. In 1998, American Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy agreed to develop a joint gender sensitization curriculum for civil and military participants in peace operations. The report of the seminar where this curriculum was discussed states that "feminist scholars often represent or articulate views and arguments that are rarely considered by the peacekeeping or security communities." Moreover, "since this literature is usually intended to reach the clientele expected for this type of training, participants should be expected to 'stretch' in order to make this literature, as well as its insights and arguments relevant for themselves and their activities."

How far can the Canadian soldier stretch? At a recent Foreign Policy Dialogue meeting, an officer said that the Canadian soldier is stretched too far. One third of recent

peacekeepers are reservists; home life for regulars is difficult; many operations bring daily and mortal threats; yet new demands overwhelm. Let soldiers be soldiers first, he said in a comment that echoes Dana Priest's concern about the new tasks that the American military has taken up.

CONCLUSION

These four considerations present questions for the new leaders of Canada's political parties. The Canadian peacekeeping tradition is distinguished, and Canadians can take understandable pride in their contributions. Peacekeeping has placed strains upon the Canadian military but it has also brought public respect for the institution. Polls currently suggest (see International Journal, Winter 2002-3) that Canadians are more strongly supportive of "internationalism", but that support presents dangers. Canada's new political leaders should commit themselves cautiously; above all, they should resist the political temptations to wave the "blue beret". Canadian resources today are not the equal of Canadian ambitions, and waving the beret distracts the public and policymakers from confronting the serious questions about future Canadian participation in peace operations.

The first serious question is authorization of peace operations. The New Democrats would appear to insist that all operations have UN sanction while the Alliance shares the Bush administration's doubts about UN-based multilateralism. Most Canadians fall into the middle of the spectrum, favouring operations that are authorized by the UN or, in rare circumstances, by other multilateral organizations such as NATO. In a broader sense, the contrast between the hesitations so apparent on the Department of National Defence Website and the enthusiasms so obvious on the Foreign Affairs

websites betrays the uncertainties and hesitations that have marked government policy in recent times. It was unfortunate that the foreign and defence reviews of the mid-1990s took separate courses. Those who participated in the foreign policy review found it curious that so much time was spent on CIDA and so little on Canada's strategic interests. The current "mini-reviews" will not resolve matters. What would be useful would be a joint special review of the question of authorization or peace operations. What is the Canadian view of pre-emption? What legitimacy does NATO have beyond Europe? The current roadmap is in tatters, and a new one must be drawn soon.

Secondly, future Canadian governments should choose their peace operations carefully. There are many studies of which peace operations are likely to succeed and which will almost surely fail. Former American Ambassador Dennis Jett has compared peace operations in Mozambique and Angola, and has shown how the former succeeded and the latter failed because, in the case of Mozambique, the peacekeepers were well-prepared and equipped, the surrounding states cooperative, and the Mozambique population wanted peace. Lacking these three conditions, Angola peace operations collapsed. Clearly, information is precious and rare when the call comes for Canadian participation, but surely there are some standards that can be presented to Parliament and the standing committees. Today, the debates are marked by long hours, rambling discourse, and even a bit of patriotic gore.

Thirdly, what should Canadians offer when a legitimate call comes. Although the war on terrorism has introduced much uncertainty, the burden of peace operations is still most likely to fall upon Canada's army. The fact that Canada cannot consider a modest contribution to the Congo, much less to the Iraqi war, because of a commitment of 1800

soldiers to Afghanistan is unacceptable. At the very least, additional soldiers are needed; but what then? Other Western countries are also staking claims to traditional Canadian territory. Deutschland, an official German publication, declares in Winter 2003 that "the majority of Germans regard their country's participation in international peace missions as a moral duty." Germany, it points out, is now the second largest provider of troops for UN-mandated missions; at this writing, Canada is in the mid-thirties. If we choose niches, we should do it in consultation with countries like Germany and Norway who are likely to be making such choices themselves. Specialization is inevitable; over-specialization can lead to irrelevance.

Finally, the resurgence of Canadian internationalism marked by public opinion polls and books such as Andrew Cohen's While Canada Slept means that politicians will respond. There will be more funds for development assistance, for the military, and for diplomacy. For peace operations, abundance can create confusion and rivalry. In a recent letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to Canadians urging more support for the human security file, the Department noted that the file was in many hands, CIDA, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and even the Solicitor General (the RCMP). Too many hands in Ottawa means too many Canadians doing too many different tasks in the field. A NGO worker talks to the CIDA officer in the embassy who suspects the motives of the foreign service officer in the neighbouring office while the Canadian peacekeeper serving under UN, US, or NATO command does his or her work without much contact with Canadian officials-until trouble comes.

At this writing, 700 Uruguayan peacekeepers serve in the northeast Congo, a country where peace has remained elusive and where a Secretary-

General died. They face a daily barrage of mortars and grenades and desperately appeal for help, a call that the current Secretary-General echoes. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien has declared that Canada has a "moral" obligation to help, but Canada can supply only two planes. The Germans, who declare to pollsters that they have a moral obligation, are silent. France may help, but the neighbouring countries, notably Uganda, will hinder not help. Moreover, France knows that its past makes it a suspect actor in the area. Non-governmental organizations, many Canadians among them, are plentiful and need protection. And we remember Dallaire's words in Rwanda and what happened when new troops did not arrive. Yet two generations of Congolese have not created a state that can guarantee the basic requirements of security. The Congo falls far short of the standards of Ambassador Jett. Logic, then, says no; history, with reluctance, answers yes. For Canadian governments, the challenge is create an environment where Canada can make a choice. Today it can't.