



**G8 Security Sector Capacity Building
in Fragile States: Examining
Effectiveness and Coherence**

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Examining Effectiveness and Coherence**

By

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is commonly acknowledged that the incidents of civil war and other intrastate conflict are in decline. At the same time, vulnerable states, or states lacking the capacity to meet their obligations to citizens, and without a monopoly on force, offer a fertile ground for political violence, terrorism, drug-trafficking, contraband smuggling and a host of other crimes. These are generally linked together and viewed as mutually reinforcing, although some contend that the coincidence of terrorism, political violence, and crime does not necessarily establish causality. We argue that coordination in the security sector presents significant challenges in that it necessitates the patching together of rather disparate disciplines in the political, law-enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic domains. The capacity of recipient states to absorb donor assistance is discussed; our determination being that this is less critical to effectiveness and coherence than a range of hurdles facing donors, including accountability, coordination, leadership, and alignment of what they want with what recipients want. A review of G8 efforts in security sector capacity building leads to analysis of the use of “whole of country” approaches to address state fragility. Obstacles in interagency coordination are also examined, as are alignment and burden sharing, the latter two as potential assets in security sector capacity building that have been underutilized. In a final section, we review what can be learned from cases of successful coordination.

I. STATE FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, TERRORISM AND CRIME

1. It is, perhaps, emblematic of the age that a contested term has come to describe the object of so much thought and energy in contemporary global affairs. All states are to some degree fragile, thus it can be rightly argued that the term “fragile states” is merely a sub-category of a universal phenomenon. Yet, there is a distinction that matters between state fragility as a general condition and the particular attributes of so-called fragile states. The latter have a number of common characteristics that both undermine the welfare of their domestic population and that pose potential threats to global security, whether due to conflict, terrorism, or criminal activity. There is abundant evidence linking state fragility and conflict. The World Bank identified 26 states as fragile in 2006; all but two of these were conflict affected.¹ What these states most often lack is capacity, whether it is in the realm of governance, economic and social infrastructure, or security. Most often they lack capacity in all sectors simultaneously, because, it is argued, these weaknesses are both coincidental and mutually reinforcing. Thus, capacity building in vulnerable states necessitates well-calibrated, properly sequenced and carefully coordinated cross-sectoral engagement by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. As is the case with all complex organisms, the integrity of the system is contingent upon the health of every component. Stated more concretely, as in the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, “the political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others.”²
2. It is generally understood that civil wars, and other incidents of intrastate conflict, are declining; yet at the same time, weak and failing states are falling victim to a rising tide of organized crime, narco-violence, terrorism and piracy. Crime and terrorism are mutually reinforcing threats to state, regional and global security. They present difficult challenges to G8 member states at a time of diminishing resources that can be applied toward their amelioration. At the same time, policies that are piecemeal, episodic and uncoordinated can only buy time at best; they cannot affect the structural changes that offer a greater promise of long-term sustainable peace and security. It should be noted, additionally, that fragile states, with some level of effective governance, can also pose a grave threat to international security. According to a 2003 report by the Political Instability Task Force, a research group commissioned by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “terrorists operate in both ‘caves’ (i.e., failed states, where militant groups can exist with impunity) and ‘condos’ (i.e., states that have the infrastructure to support the international flow of illicit people, funds and information).”³
3. Clarity in defining weak or failed states is helpful. According to Robert Rotberg, “Failed states have two defining criteria: They deliver very low quantities and qualities of political goods to their citizens, and they have lost their monopoly on violence. Nation-states on the cusp of failure are either ‘weak’ or ‘failing’ – but not ‘failed.’ ‘Collapsed’ ought to be

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¹ See <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4672&l=1>, retrieved April 18, 2010.

² OECD (2005) “Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States”, OECD Paris, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf>, retrieved April 18, 2010.

³ Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Fragile States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Report, updated August 28, 2008, p. 6, <http://fas.org/sqp/crs/row/RL34253.pdf>, retrieved April 19, 2010.

reserved for geographical expressions without governments, such as Somalia.”⁴ The classic example of state failure and associated problems of terrorism, drugs, crime and piracy are Afghanistan and Somalia. The association of crime and terror has been described as follows:

Increasingly since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, organized criminal activities have become a major revenue source for terrorist groups worldwide. Building on the precedent set by narco-terrorism, as it emerged in Latin America in the 1980s, the use of crime has become an important factor in the evolution of terrorism. As such, the 1990s can be described as the decade in which the crime-terror nexus was consolidated: the rise of transnational organized crime and the changing nature of terrorism mean that two traditionally separate phenomena have begun to reveal many operational and organizational similarities. Indeed, criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other’s successes and failures, meaning that it is necessary to acknowledge, and to understand the crime-terror continuum to formulate effective state responses to these evolving, and periodically converging, threats.⁵

However, there are many critics of such a view who argue against equating coincidence with causality, adding that empirical evidence does not support lumping together drug trafficking, organized crime groups and terrorists. One study points out that “effective terrorist networks have requirements that are not always well served in failed states – communications technology and human and financial resources for recruitment, training, planning and logistics purposes, for example.” It refers to another study that noted the September 11 attacks, although originating in failed states, “relied on many developed states for its operation, including recruitment in Germany and Spain and the extensive use of banks in the United States.”⁶ It is also the case that as often as not recent incidents of terrorism point to so-called “home grown” terrorists, or would-be terrorists, whose origins are in Europe and North America.

4. It is not the purpose of this paper to delve deeper into the disaggregation of conflict, organized crime, terrorism, and piracy, only to flag this important consideration for further study and discussion. A promising line of inquiry may be whether coordination efforts should, for the most part, concentrate on each of these threats separately, keeping in reserve precious resources for more comprehensive cross-domain operations in areas of convergence between them.

⁴ “Disorder in the Ranks,” *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_disorder_in_the_ranks, retrieved April 25, 2010.

⁵ Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” *Global Crime*, Vol. 6, No.1, February 2004, p.130. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/Makarenko_GlobalCrime.pdf retrieved April 25, 2010.

⁶ See Minh Nguyen, “The Question of ‘Failed States’: Australia and the Notion of State Failure”, *Uniya*, March 2005, pp. 5-6, http://www.uniya.org/research/state_failure.pdf, retrieved April 25, 2010.

II. A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH: DONOR CHALLENGES

5. The necessity of adopting a “whole of government” approach to fragile states has been recognized by bilateral donors of the OECD, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and UN agencies. Such recognition is manifested in the OECD *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, and the Fragile States Group of the OECD/DAC, which under the leadership of Australia and France has endeavoured to advise donor governments on effective approaches to fragile states.⁷ The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission is designed to enhance capacity building through coordination of bilateral, multilateral and regional efforts. In the U.K., a Stabilization Unit (previously the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit) was established to integrate planning in support of countries emerging from conflict. The Australian government created a Fragile States Unit housed in the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), while the Canadian Government created a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) with an interagency advisory structure. The United States has established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), a partnership of eight executive branch agencies charged with building and maintaining an interagency civilian capacity to respond to the needs of countries or regions at risk of conflict or emerging from civil strife. This overview does not exhaust the inventory of whole of government efforts to build capacity in fragile states.
6. It is argued, and not without reason, that activity and effectiveness have not kept pace in whole of government approaches. As noted in one recent study:

There is little common understanding among agencies about what constitutes a fragile state, much less a common, government-wide strategic vision on priority objectives in weak and failed states. Individual governments often avoid frank debate over the goals of policy coherence in fragile states, in part because they are reluctant to confront the divergent motivations for their efforts. Integrated country strategies, based on joint country assessments and planning, exist more in theory than in practice.⁸

Another study locates the problem in such areas as manpower, resources, time-scales, and mission clarity. According to this study, whole of government (or joined-up in British parlance) approaches tend to be labour intensive and draw down substantial human resources at senior management levels, which may be required to forge consensus among, at times, contending departments. Pooling resources across departments poses its own challenges owing to differences in budgetary and administrative practices. Issues of departmental accountability also come into play. Worst case, “plans are made but are not matched by the necessary financial resources.”⁹ Perhaps most significant, development, political, and security actors tend to have different time horizons, with development agencies adopting a substantially longer-term approach to building sustainable peace. Militaries, perforce, operate on considerably shorter timetables. An

⁷ OECD/DAC, “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” DCD/2005/8/REV2.

⁸ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than The Sum of Its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States*, New York: International Peace Academy, 2007, p. 6,

http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/GREATER_THAN_THE_SUM%20E-Book2.pdf, retrieved April 18, 2010.

⁹ Mary Thida Lun, “Reconnecting joined-up approaches: Nation-building through state-building”, SPIRU Working Paper 25, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2009, p. 4, <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3256.pdf>, retrieved April 18, 2010.

additional hurdle arises out of differences between these disciplines in defining success, given variations in “departmental norms, objectives, mandates and targets.”¹⁰ Finally, unless there is a “single strong central authority or clear mission objective, individual departments can tend to pursue their own objectives under the label of a joined-up approach.”¹¹

7. Coordination within the security sector presents significant challenges in patching together what are political, law-enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic activities. All too many measures are redundant, and much touted initiatives end up being simply symbolic and not sufficiently substantive. The troubling fact is that diplomatic efforts do not always, and do not consistently, translate into cooperation at the operational level. Too often national interests and security concerns prevail over the coordination imperative. Coordination amounts to little more than information sharing, and even then there is reticence to share national information. The major fault line is between law-enforcement and intelligence. Law-enforcement and intelligence, in many cases, act independently of each other and the limits to their authority overseas does, at times, become blurred. There is also the fact that crime, although related to terrorism, has as its primary objective making money, whereas terrorism, although well aware of the value of money to advance political aims, focuses its energies on the latter. One distinction of note here is while negotiations might be possible with those who have a political agenda, there is no warrant or justification in law or reason to work out a political compromise or to reach a consensus with criminals. This discourse would change, of course, if terrorism were defined merely as criminal activity.
8. Security sector coordination also faces formidable obstacles in continuing incompatibilities in domestic laws and statutes across states. Differences exist as well in attitudes toward civil rights and liberties, toward privacy issues and toward vulnerability. On this last point, not all countries agree on the threats posed by terrorism, in particular, some poorer states view it as a problem primarily for rich, developed actors. The poorer states also do not have the capacity or resources to fulfil their obligations under the numerous international agreements and legal regimes that are imposed upon them by the developed world. Too many of the agencies and organizations assigned the task of coordination are understaffed and underfunded. It is also to be noted that many criminal activities benefit a much wider spectrum of society than outlaws and terrorists, thus raising thorny political issues that cannot be ameliorated through better coordination practice.

III. DRINKING FROM A FIRE HOSE: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITIES OF ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS

9. Concerns among representatives of G8 donor states and agencies who were interviewed for this study centred on the capacity of recipients to use assistance effectively in light of poor governance (or little governance, as governance is traditionally understood) and underdeveloped implementation capacity. Corruption was not far from the top on most respondents' lists. Lack of coordination and transparency, it was noted, allows less scrupulous recipients to play donors off one another and can act as an incentive for recipients to increase revenue by accepting aid from multiple donors for the

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹ Ibid.

same project, a tactic sometimes referred to as “constructive ambiguity.” Donors can exacerbate the problem by coming in too big and in fact providing more resources than are required; however, issues of concern that were raised centred almost universally on themes that had less to do with the absorptive capacity of recipients, serious though this issue may be, than on challenges faced by donors owing to shortcomings in:

- Accountability
- Alignment
- Benchmarking
- Burden-sharing
- Coordination
- Doctrine
- Leadership
- Resources
- Sustainability

10. G8 leaders are motivated by different interests; what is needed is greater clarity on what are common interests, and then on the way forward. This cannot be done on an ad hoc basis. There is a further need to decide who takes the lead. The G8 is composed of a fairly cohesive group of like-minded leaders who are able to reach a consensus on what is to be done in combating crime and terrorism, but what donor states want done is too often offered to recipients in a package form that the latter may not want, or may want only in bits and pieces. Recipients such as the AU and ECOWAS want financial resources to do the job themselves. Furthermore, developed countries tend to emphasize security first while recipients place a greater premium on development as the immediate requirement to address the fundamental threats to peace and security that are being faced at home. Simply put, their argument is that the frustrated expectations of the poor and marginalized are the greatest threats to security and the breeding ground for would-be terrorists and criminals. Security, from this perspective, rather than resulting from arms, military and police training, and related expenditures, grows out of development policies that address fundamental human needs, which are closely connected to sustainable development. This may be characterized as a modern variant of the guns versus butter debate, but it bears serious scrutiny given compelling studies that link underdevelopment and conflict.¹²

11. Capacity building, on the other hand, is subject to multiple interpretations. One government expert interviewed for this study asked, “Do we have agreement on what constitutes capacity building? Do we mean civilian capacity building, technical capacity building? Do we have a shared vision? How do we hold ourselves accountable?” The respondent further expressed the concern that “We have made too many promises and too many commitments.” Other respondents echoed similar concerns. At the UN, one senior official observed that G8 accountability regimes have been less than optimal: “There is a lack of accountability, no stock taking summit to summit, there is also a lack of infrastructure for continuity of effort. Each round becomes the hobby horse of the host nation.” Sympathy was expressed for security assistance recipients who face incoherent packages of support, and must grapple with different pools of capacity building offered in an uncoordinated fashion. Increasing accountability requirements by individual donor states present recipients with a dizzying array of differing requirements, regulations,

¹² See, Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

reporting and evaluation procedures. Questions arise as to who exactly has the lead in a specific sector among donor countries. Respondents asked, "Should the G8 admit it needs an administrative structure? Is the OECD DAC model worth looking at to find models for the security world? Do we need a 'SAC' (a Security Assistance Committee)?" A partial answer to the last question was provided by a respondent who offered that security assistance is incredibly difficult to coordinate: "Agencies as recipients and donors are accustomed to dealing bilaterally. They trust only their own networks."

12. All this is not to say that there is a lack of awareness of G8 shortcomings, or that steps have not been taken to address them. Additionally, there are clearly signs of success in such areas as border control, Interpol data sharing, aviation security and increased networking of financial institutions. In many cases the UN is offering an umbrella for cooperation and further legitimizing such efforts. Then there is the remarkable achievement of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in eliminating loose nukes mostly in the former Soviet space. The Africa Standby Force, the African Clearinghouse, the Global Peace Operations Support Operations Capacity Building (GPSOCB) Clearinghouse, peacekeeping and peace support training associations, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action, the Vienna Process, and various efforts at benchmarking, some more aspirational than others, underscore recognition of the need for better alignment across the various domains related to capacity building.

IV. G8 MEMBER STATE EFFORTS IN SECURITY SECTOR CAPACITY BUILDING

13. An exhaustive survey of G8 programs to assist vulnerable states to address security sector challenges is beyond the scope of this paper. What can be chronicled are initiatives representative of efforts to advance security through peacekeeper and police training, civilian capacity building, deployment, transportation and logistical support, counter-terrorism and anti-crime.¹³ G8 countries have supported a substantial network of peacekeeping training centres in various corners of the world, and in particular in Africa. The most extensive program for peacekeeper training has been the U.S. led Global Peace Operations Initiative Program (GPOI), which was established after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address gaps in international peace operations. To date, GPOI has resulted in the training of close to 70,000 military personnel from 73 countries. Forty-eight thousand trainees have been deployed to 20 operations worldwide. U.K. support to training centres in 13 countries has resulted in 12,000 peacekeepers being trained since 2004-05, while France has trained a significant number in African training centres as well as from 27 countries.
14. Police training has seen extensive engagement of G8 member states and the European Commission to provide technical and other support to Multinational Specialized Units, Formed Police Units, and Integrated Police Units. Through the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada has provided financial and technical assistance for police services in 15 countries. The Italian Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), with financial support from the U.S., has produced close to 2000 trainer graduates from 29 countries, including 900 from Africa. Funding and training for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana is being supplied by Germany, while

¹³ Much of this section draws on the "G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding", http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/PK_PB_Report.0.pdf, retrieved April 20, 2010.

Russia has also prepared important elements for deployment in Africa. France is engaged in the creation of an International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) in Cameroon, and the U.K. has been funding training centres in West and East Africa, including pre-deployment training for UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid operations in Darfur). Carabinieri/Gendarme-type and civilian police from G8 countries are training police in Afghanistan, the Middle East and the Balkans. Japan is underwriting a substantial portion of police salaries in Afghanistan and Iraq. Specialized police training in Europe is being supported by the EC with an eye to development of an EU rapid deployment capacity. G8 countries are playing leading roles in efforts at the United Nations to develop wider police peacekeeping doctrine.

15. Through its Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), Canada has deployed functional experts, diplomats, police, and corrections officers. Germany's ZIF Centre for International Peace Operations has trained and maintains a roster of 1,100 standby civilian experts for reconstruction and stabilization missions. As noted previously, the U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization's Civilian Response Corps has a specially trained cadre of active and standby personnel for such missions. Japan provides financial and technical assistance. It also launched, in 2007, a Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding, which has sent trained experts to Sudan, Timor-Leste, Nepal and Kosovo. Italy's Guardia di Finanza provides assistance in border control, customs and law enforcement. Russia, France, and the U.K. are actively enhancing interagency programs to build capacity and enhance deployability. In the framework of European Security and Defence Policy, EU crisis missions have been deployed in various hot spots and the EC is funding member state efforts to enhance civilian rapid response capability.
16. To facilitate peace operations deployment, G8 members at the Sea Island meeting (2004) committed to expanding global capability. The resulting transportation and logistics support arrangement (TLSA) has been employed to meet urgent transportation and logistics requirements in support of peace operations. Financial and in-kind contributions by donor countries has seen TSLA used to support the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) and in Somalia (AMISOM), the AU/UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the Multinational Force – Iraq (MNFI). G8 countries and the EU also provide bilateral support to UN and AU missions, including military and police experts, aircraft and armoured personnel, equipment and strategic airlift and logistical support.
17. Collective efforts to combat terrorism and crime have a rich history dating back over a decade, although 9/11 served as the impetus for most of the programs that have been initiated by member states. The Forty Recommendations produced by a G8 experts group, which came to be known as the "Lyon Group", and endorsed by the G8 Heads of State in Lyon (1996) was a milestone in the Group's efforts to combat transnational organized crime by filling gaps in existing international regimes and enforcement mechanisms. The Forty Recommendations were intended to ensure recognition of transnational organized crime in criminal law, enhance mutual legal assistance, improve extradition procedures and witness protection practices, recognize specific offenses, and increase police cooperation.¹⁴ The 40 recommendations identified what were viewed by the experts as key elements of transnational organized crime: "trafficking in drugs and

¹⁴ See, Amandine Scherrer, *G8 against Transnational Organized Crime*, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2009, p. 97.

weapons; smuggling of human beings; the abuse of new technologies to steal, defraud and evade the law, and the laundering of the proceeds of crime.” Additionally, there was reference to environmental crimes and corruption.¹⁵ Five Lyon Group subgroups created to implement the 40 recommendations concentrated on High-Tech Crime, Firearms, Law Enforcement, Migration, and Judicial Cooperation.

18. One month following the September 11, 2001 attacks, senior representatives of G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministries met in Rome to discuss steps to combat terrorism. The result was a combining of G8 efforts in crime fighting and anti-terrorism through creation of the Lyon/Roma group, which since inception has met three times annually in joint session. At the Kananaskis Summit (2002) six non-proliferation Principles were agreed to by G8 members to prevent terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials and equipment or technologies. Also adopted were measures to increase transport security.¹⁶ Subsequently, the G8 announced the creation of the Counter Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) (2003), and various measures for the prevention of terrorist and criminal acts, including criminalization and prosecution of terrorist-supported activities; use of advanced investigative techniques, such as the use of undercover agents, or audio and video interception and recording devices; cross-border sharing of national intelligence information; information sharing about asylum seekers and misuse of passports; port and maritime security; the introduction of biometric identifiers in travel documents; and securing airports against attack through the use of portable air defence systems.¹⁷
19. CTAG, the Lyon-Roma Anti-Crime and Counter Terrorism Group, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Secure and Facilitated Travel Initiative (SAFTI), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are key pillars of the G8 (and previously G7) response to terrorist and criminal threats. Corresponding UN departments, principally the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) and its day-to-day operational arm, the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other specialized agencies, and the large number of entities affiliated with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) round out much of the multilateral architecture of counter terrorism and crime prevention. There are, of course, a myriad of rather substantial bilateral and regional actors in this domain.

V. COBBLED AND JOINED: THE ROAD AHEAD

20. Effectiveness and coherence continue to present difficult challenges in G8 efforts to help vulnerable states address complex security challenges. In this paper we have located some of the sources of the problem in coordination practices of donor states and in the absorptive capacity of aid recipients. We have determined that the weight of evidence tilts more toward doctrine, leadership, alignment, benchmarking and other shortcomings among G8 member states. We have pointed to successes and we have identified administrative and organizational structures that have been developed to enhance

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁶ See, [http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd\[347\]=x-347-137751&als\[theme\]=Anti%20Terrorism](http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-137751&als[theme]=Anti%20Terrorism), retrieved April 25, 2010.

¹⁷ See G8 Justice and Home Affairs Communiqué, Washington, DC, 2004, Ibid.

coherence. In some respects there is something very fleeting about the G8: It is an effervescent occurrence that takes place in small towns once a year, generates high-minded, hortatory pronouncements on issues of great import, produces quick agreements, and just as swiftly disappears, leaving it to sherpas and sous-sherpas to clean up and follow up. Yet it has great prestige and enormous resources. It has convening power and bilateral and multilateral actors want to participate in its work and its committees do very heavy lifting in important policy domains between annual meetings. Perhaps this is all that can or should be expected.

21. Not content to leave well enough alone, we offer here a set of ideas related to effectiveness and coherence designed to generate thought and to stimulate further discussion.

22. **“Whole of country” approaches.** Fragile states often lack the capacity, across the board, in governance, economic and social infrastructure, and security. Such core deficiencies are closely linked and mutually reinforcing. Effectiveness and coherence in conflict prevention and management, crime fighting and anti-terrorism may necessitate that bilateral and multilateral donors adopt a comprehensive approach that instead of distinguishing between sectors, approaches capacity building in a holistic manner that simultaneously addresses political, economic and security needs. Whole of country is also meant to imply engagement with sectors of society that are representative of the population as a whole, not merely elite power brokers. Power elites in these societies control the levers of power and use them to advance in-group interests; they have shown a willingness to wage war against their own people. Needless to say, a whole of country approach requires exhaustive joint planning by donors to minimize any likelihood that comprehensive cross-societal engagement will be used as a pretext for yet greater domestic oppression. This level of engagement may result in decades long “ownership” of the fragile state by interveners. There are but a handful of states that require such a commitment, still it may be necessary to establish a triage and pick and choose among the most vulnerable. Going in big and staying the course in such cases, as opposed to spreading resources widely and, often, too thinly, warrant consideration. It bears mentioning that going in big necessitates proper sequencing of inputs: too much aid too fast and the recipient risks drowning. Without the necessary time and space to develop organically, as it were, recipient states will suffer a skewing of indigenous practices that can be highly disruptive and increase dependency on external support. Proper sequencing requires patience and perseverance by donors, and related benchmarking and evaluation metrics, which are critical to overall success, must be geared toward impact analysis rather than outcome analysis. Difficult though it is, a balance must be struck between serving external constituencies, i.e., domestic and international constituencies, and the clients in the recipient state.

23. **Interagency coordination.** Effectiveness and coherence has been closely linked to greater inter-departmental coordination among departments of donor states. OECD DAC’s *Fragile States Group’s* principles for effective international engagement in fragile states call for such coherence among the arms of donor governments responsible for political, security, economic and social policy. As noted in the discussion above, most donor governments have adopted whole of government approaches to forge linkages between departments. Unfortunately, structural change has not always succeeded in getting different departments to communicate more effectively, or reconcile what are still viewed by some as competing objectives. In fact, “jointness” has too often failed to meet expectations among major donor states. Positive rhetoric to the contrary, there continues

to be basic differences between development ministries that focus on poverty alleviation and welfare of targeted groups in recipient countries, and foreign affairs and defence ministries, whose concern is tilted far more in the direction of homeland security and advancing national political interests. Power asymmetries further complicate coordination, with some departments dominating others due to much higher budgets, as with the defence department in the U.S.. Lack of parity tends to render cooperation problematic. There is no getting around the fact that agencies compete for funding, for prestige, and for influence. They have their own language, modes of operation, culture and administrative mechanisms. Some progress has been made in interagency coordination, but stove piping continues to undermine effectiveness and coherence. The only proven remedy to the phenomenon of stove piping has been, and is likely to continue to be, short bursts of strong, capable, and persistent national leadership. Unfortunately, this does not contribute to consistency and continuity, given turnover in the political system and the short attention span of many leaders of G8 donor states.

24. **Alignment and Burden Sharing**. Everyone is for “local ownership”, but there are yawning gaps in expectations between donor states and recipients with respect to ownership. A core misalignment exists between what recipients want to own and what donors are prepared to hand over. We have already touched on fundamental differences in locating the source of insecurity, with recipients stressing the need for immediate, substantial development aid as the best hedge against conflict, terrorism and crime; however, donors continue to be hesitant about channelling funds through local governments and some regional organizations, which, in the most dysfunctional cases, create veritable parallel public security structures staffed and administered by large international NGOs and private contractors. Lack of absorption capacity, extra legal sources of authority, patron-client relationships, and systemic corruption further complicate matters. There is no satisfactory answer to the alignment challenge, but serious consideration might be given to greater investment in the global south to expand the development franchise and attract emerging economies into this domain. The rising prominence of the G20 the greater engagement of BRIC and other regional powers, such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya in Africa, hold the promise of relieving G8 member states of some of their burdens and transferring responsibility to states and regional multilateral organizations better positioned to assume at least some of the obligations of peace and security. Regional players know the local political and cultural terrain extremely well; they have experience and boots on the ground, and a vested interest in long-term engagement. As it pertains to the BRIC countries in particular, substantial financial and human resources can be brought into play. Not inconsequential is the positive impact it can have on optics. Commentators note that whole of government approaches often tend to be motivated by “classical national interest calculations, based on considerations such as strategic location, diplomatic implications, and economic consequences, as well as intangible variables like colonial history and Diaspora linkages.”¹⁸ Multilateral engagement in development and security building can also be problematic. The work of UN departments that have sought to step up the level and scope of even humanitarian intervention have encountered resistance by some states in the General Assembly who view such penetration as a threat to state sovereignty.¹⁹

¹⁸ Patrick and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?* p. 18.

¹⁹ Bruce D Jones, “The changing role of the UN in protracted crises,” *HPG Research Briefing*, Number 17, July 2004.

25. **Learning from Success?** We have noted that in such areas as border control, data sharing, aviation security, financial tracking, and control of weapons of mass destruction, G8 member states and assistance partners have enjoyed noteworthy success. The reasons for this are instructive: these activities generally stop at borders and do not penetrate deep into the social and political fabric of affected states. There is clarity on doctrine, and forging agreement, although by no means painless, has been relatively smooth and de-politicized. As one official put it curtly, “the key is to do what you say you’ll do. Not too much, not too little. We’re all working toward a singular objective. No competition.” Such programs have enjoyed strong support from the upper echelons of government. There are demonstrable, mutual benefits that are recognized by all sides. As another official noted, “in comparison to control of WMDs, in anti-crime you have people who don’t want you to succeed. Urgency, as with nukes, generates political will.” Additionally, in the more successful cases, outputs are concrete, measurable, and time-bound; roles and responsibilities are unambiguous; there is a common language and often a common culture among officials who operate in these domains, with a good number having backgrounds in science and engineering; and guidelines for action are more readily translatable into legal frameworks. Lessons drawn from these cases are by no means easily transferable to other domains, but two that were offered by operational experts are worth noting: “If coordination gets too heavy, you’ll encumber your results,” furthermore, “Coordination too often becomes the goal as opposed to a means to achieving a goal, and this results in valuable time, energy and money being lost.”

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Gregorian's field experience in conflict management and peace-building has taken him to over twenty countries. He regularly provides professional skills training seminars and workshops for UN agency and mission staff, U.S. and Latin American military personnel, senior civilian officials, and academic and corporate leaders in the U.S. and throughout the world.

Gregorian's work has been published in scholarly and popular journals. He has made numerous presentations before professional societies, academic institutions and government agencies. He has appeared on CNN, National Public Radio, USIA Worldnet, Voice of America, the CBC, BBC and local radio and television stations in the United States and abroad. He serves on various boards. Gregorian earned his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Brandeis University.

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