

Terrorism, Proliferation and the Myth of American Independence:

Multilateral vs. Unilateral Approaches to Security after 9/11 and the Implications for Canada

Dr. Frank P. Harvey
Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Professor, Department of Political Science
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

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1. The Conventional Wisdom

The emerging consensus in the literature on 9/11 is clear -- the attacks on New York and Washington destroyed, once and for all, the myth of American independence. According to this view, U.S. officials can no longer remain complacent in the belief that they are somehow isolated from global conflict, or that they have the power to independently protect the U.S. from external (and internal) attacks. The death of independence, in turn, will inevitably have a profound impact on U.S. foreign and security policy. American unilateralism (a key feature of U.S. foreign policy prior to September 11) will be replaced by a strong preference for multilateralism, because only multilateral strategies and institutions can provide the coalitions and international cooperation required to address the security threats created by the forces of globalism.¹ These arguments, predictions and associated policy recommendations represent the conventional wisdom on globalism and the inevitable (and rational) trend towards multilateral solutions to security after 9/11.

Unfortunately for those who embrace this conventional wisdom their predictions about the inevitable (and rational) preferences for multilateralism do not match the U.S. response to 9/11, nor are they consistent with the emerging trend in American security policy. Rather, the evidence confirms that the more insecure the U.S. becomes as a result of the globalization of terrorism and WMD proliferation, the more effort, money, time and energy the U.S. will invest in re-establishing independent, autonomous, self-directed, sovereign and unilateral control over American security.² In other words, despite the reality of interdependence, and increasing levels of U.S. vulnerability and sensitivity to global events, Washington will continue to implement policies that prioritize re-establishing American independence. This is precisely why the American response to 9/11 has been so reliant on unilateral initiatives.

(Table 1 Here)

Table 1**American Unilateralism after 9/11**

- *. Short-term (unilateral) shifts in U.S. alliances and coalitions to combat immediate security threats, often at the expense of long-term, multilateral strategies;
- *. Accelerated deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence;
 - + requested increase of \$3 billion (to \$8.3 billion) for Missile Defence (FY 2002/2003);
- *. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (and multilateral arms control more generally);
 - + refused to ratify CTBT;
- *. Re-interpretation of Geneva Convention regarding status of Al'Qa-ida and Taliban prisoners;
- *. Rejection of Land Mines, International Criminal Court, and Kyoto Treaties;
- *. Imminent invasion of Iraq to replace Saddam Hussein, despite growing international condemnation;
- *. Unilateral declaration demanding that PLA replace Arafat;
- *. Substantial increase in U.S. defence budget by \$48b to \$396.1 billion (FY 2002/2003) -- the largest single increase in defence budget since Korean War;
- *. Revising regional command structure to include new Northern Command (NORCOM) to facilitate homeland defence and continental security;
- *. New cabinet level Department of Homeland Security;
- *. \$30 million/day, \$1 billion/month for the war on terrorism;
- *. \$90 billion economic stimulus bill to deal with economic impact of 9/11;
- *. \$39 billion for homeland defence;
- *. \$20 billion increase for Intelligence (to approx. \$40 billion);
- *. \$23.8 billion on Border and Transportation Security (156,169 employees);
- *. \$15 billion emergency assistance package for airline industry (cash and loans);
- *. \$8.4 billion on Emergency Preparedness and Response (5,300 employees);
- *. \$7.8 billion for Defense Department anti-terrorism efforts;
- *. \$5.9 billion to enhance defenses against bioterrorism, including:
 - + \$1.2 billion to increase capacity for health delivery systems;
 - + \$2.4 billion for research and development on bio-terrorism responses;
 - + \$420 million for the Pentagon to study bioterrorists;
- *. \$3.6 billion on WMD Countermeasures (598 employees);
- *. \$3.5 billion to enhance response capabilities of America's first responders -- firefighters, police officers and emergency medical workers;
- *. \$1.4 billion to secure diplomatic facilities:
 - + \$755 million for security-driven construction;
 - + \$553 million for upgrades for worldwide security;
 - + \$52 million for a new Center for Anti-terrorism Security Training;
 - + \$60 million for public diplomacy through international broadcasting;
- *. \$1.2 billion for the Secret Service (6,111 employees);
- *. \$364 million on Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (976 employees);
- *. Over one hundred new bills, acts and other pieces of legislation passed by U.S. government since September 11, most of which assign new powers to FBI/CIA/NSA for surveillance and law enforcement
(Please see <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm>)
- *. Established more state control over traditional non-security areas – e.g., air transport, trans-national finance, and refugee and immigration laws;
- *. Mounted extensive diplomatic pressure on Canada to pay additional \$5 billion to improve Canada-U.S. border security, and to rationalizing refugee and immigration policies;
- *. Etc...

All of these efforts have one overriding objective in mind -- to acquire more independent control over U.S. security. Officials in Washington are committed to becoming less dependent on other states and international organizations for the safety of American citizens, compelled to be less dependent on the United Nations, less dependent on European allies, and less dependent on Russia and the multilateral arms control regime. Compare for example the combined investments listed in Table 1 to the \$870 million Washington still owes the U.N. in outstanding dues – a relatively straightforward illustration of American strategic priorities and commitments to multilateralism.³

Washington is unlikely (and apparently unwilling) to heed the concerns expressed by multilateralists regarding the futility of American unilateralism. Nor are they likely to accept the obsolescence of geographic boundaries or suddenly acknowledge the death of their own independence. When it comes to protecting Americans after 9/11 there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that American officials are in favor of becoming more dependent on the U.N. or, for that matter, any other state, alliance, multilateral coalition, organization, institution or regime. Charles Krauthammer (2001) offers perhaps the most insightful interpretation of U.S. priorities after 9/11:

It took only a few hours for elite thinking about U.S. foreign policy to totally reorient itself, waking with a jolt from a decade-long slumber. After the apocalypse, there are no believers. The Democrats who yesterday were touting international law as the tool to fight bioterrorism are today dodging anthrax spores in their own offices. The very idea of safety-in-parchment is risible. When war breaks out, even treaty advocates take to the foxholes.... This decade-long folly -- a foreign policy of norms rather than of national interest -- is over.... On September 11, American foreign policy acquired seriousness. It also acquired a new organizing principle: We have an enemy, radical Islam; it is a global opponent of worldwide reach, armed with an idea, and with the tactics, weapons, and ruthlessness necessary to take on the world's hegemon; and its defeat is our supreme national objective, as overriding a necessity as were the defeats of fascism and Soviet communism.⁴

Critics are correct to warn that unilateral, state-centric approaches are destined to fail, because of the uncontrollable forces of globalisation (see endnote # 1). But the futility of unilateral strategies is almost irrelevant today. What **is** relevant is that major powers will forever struggle to re-establish independent control over their security **even in the face of failure**. This fact should be the starting point for our theories, explanations and predictions of international behaviour after 9/11, and our policy recommendations as well.⁵

2. The Inevitability of American Unilateralism

How does one explain this ever present and powerful fixation with maintaining independent control over ones security, notwithstanding the evidence that successful unilateralism is difficult in a globalizing world?⁶ Doesn't this imply that leaders prefer strategies that are not particularly rational, unlikely to enhance security and may actually make things worse?

On the contrary -- what appears on the surface to be an irrational response to the contemporary realities of globalization is in fact a perfectly rational strategy derived from an objective assessment of the costs, benefits and risks of available alternatives. Unilateral approaches to security are never evaluated (or selected) in isolation – they are always compared to the successes, failures and overall potential of multilateral alternatives. With respect to that comparison, it is becoming increasingly apparent that multilateral approaches to security have

not succeeded, and that unilateral strategies offer a better return for ones security investment, with fewer risks.⁷

The debate between supporters of ballistic missile defence (BMD-unilateralism) and their critics who favour reliance on the nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime (NACD-multilateralism) serves well to highlight reasons why Washington prefers unilateral solutions.

The main challenge for proponents of the NACD regime is the lack of demonstrable proof that multilateral arms control actually works. As a regime with a very specific and straightforward set of objectives it has never achieved the kind of success that would warrant giving its proponents the moral or intellectual authority to dismiss unilateral alternatives, such as BMD.⁸ Without this evidence there is no logical, empirical, legal, moral, or policy relevant foundation for embracing multilateral arms control. Several additional points related to measuring the success and failure of the NACD regime should be noted.

First, ongoing disagreements over appropriate criteria for measuring success and failure preclude definitive statements about the real (and relevant) contributions of the NACD regime to global security. For instance, should we rejoice in the success of indefinite renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or remain highly sceptical of the treaty's capacity to prevent signatories (including, but not limited to, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria and Libya) from acquiring and/or selling prohibited WMD technology? Should we focus on the portion of any draft arms control treaty that achieves consensus, or the portion that remains contested because of a combination of insurmountable political, financial or military hurdles? Consider, for example, how much of the 450 pages of text in the most recent draft of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remain highlighted and bracketed – i.e., contested. Should we focus on the minutia of pre-negotiation concessions on the location and timing of the next conference, chairmanship, conference schedules, etc., or should we acknowledge the fact that the combined efforts of those involved in virtually thousands of similar conferences have failed to stop WMD and ballistic missile technologies from proliferating to states who want them? Examples of NACD successes typically highlight less significant accomplishments in the area of 'process' rather than 'outcome', or minor revisions to the text of draft treaties, because these 'successes' are far easier to identify. But this approach simply lowers the bar for measuring progress – indeed, the evaluative criteria for the NACD regime is increasingly removed from straightforward questions about whether WMD technology continues to proliferate and how we can prevent it.⁹

Second, proponents of multilateralism are quick to offer as clear 'evidence' of success a long list of multilateral treaties, protocols, agreements and conventions; nuclear weapon-free zones; hundreds of multilateral declarations, verification programs, monitoring agreements, protocols, export control guidelines and clarifications/modifications/amendments and other MOUs. In addition, multilateralists are likely to list as illustrations of progress hundreds of governmental and non-governmental institutions, organizations, conferences, annual meetings, boards and agencies with arms control, verification and monitoring mandates; hundreds of U.N. resolutions and legal opinions designed to address proliferation; hundreds of independent departments, intelligence agencies and legislative committees established by western governments (with

billions of dollars invested world-wide) to solve one or another part of the proliferation puzzle; and virtually thousands of non-governmental organizations and think-tanks with the same mandate receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in public and private funds. All of this activity is held up as concrete evidence of what four decades of multilateral arms control and disarmament activity has accomplished -- incontrovertible evidence that multilateralism is alive and well.

But evidence that multilateralism is rampant and spreading does not, in any way, constitute proof of successful multilateralism.¹⁰ Notwithstanding all of this activity there is no demonstrable proof that we have dealt effectively with the proliferation problem, or that the planet is any safer today than it was before we engaged in all of this activity. Indeed, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (and their delivery vehicles) continue to proliferate and pose a more significant global threat today than ever before. Please refer to the following link for evidence of WMD proliferation -- compiled by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University.

<<http://www.is.dal.ca/~centre/NMDchart.pdf>>

Two final points regarding the ‘choice’ between multilateralism and unilateralism should be noted. First, policy choices are not always a matter of ‘preferences’ but rather are products of systemic pressures that push leaders in one or another direction – imperatives, not choices, explain behaviour. “People and countries might shape systems, but systems shape countries and people. It is impossible to divorce the exercise of power from the context in which it is set....A singularly unipolar political structure will produce, absolutely inevitably, a unilateralist outcome....The sole viable alternative to unilateralism is not multilateralism, but isolationism.”¹¹ In order to protect their own security and economic imperatives after 9/11, European, Canadian and Russian leaders simply cannot afford American isolationism and will reluctantly come to support almost any U.S. foreign policy initiative (unilateral or multilateral), even while criticizing the approach in public.

Second, the unilateralism-multilateralism debate often creates a false dichotomy – there are no pure unilateralists or multi-lateralists, and ones preferences are likely to vary from issue to issue, region to region, threat to threat. Historically, American foreign policy has exhibited elements of both strategies – in fact, some recent descriptions of contemporary U.S. strategy include *multiple bilateralism* and *à la carte multilateralism*. But Washington tends to receive far more criticism for its unilateral initiatives than praise for its contributions to multilateralism. This often creates an exaggerated impression that Washington prefers unilateralism even when the record is more balanced.

However, when it comes to American ‘security’ after 9/11 unilateral priorities are likely to prevail for the many reasons outlined in this report. In essence, multilateralism has become a liability and a security threat. It is perceived by Washington today as “a strategy by smaller states to tie the U.S. down like Gulliver among the Lilliputians. It is no wonder that France prefers a multi-polar and multilateral world, and less developed countries see multilateralism as in their interests, because it gives them some leverage on the United States.” These states are not driven by some higher moral imperative to create a truly global order based justice and international

law; they are motivated by the same fundamental imperatives that drive American foreign policy: power, security, self interest and survival.

3. Implications for Canada

There are at least two obvious predictions that follow from the preceding analysis. First, terrorism has become a fact of life for the United States. The U.S. will continue to be threatened by terrorism and will inevitably experience additional (and devastating) terrorist attacks. This emerging security reality will create enormous pressures on American officials to respond, and these responses will continue to mould and shape the U.S. foreign and security policy paradigm.

Second, current and future U.S. administrations will respond to terrorism with unilateral initiatives. These unilateral responses, in turn, will have a direct impact on Canadian foreign, economic, security and defence interests, especially if the security threat in question is alleged to have originated inside Canada. Several recommendations follow from these two inevitabilities.

1. Canadian officials should develop planning scenarios to help prepare for a variety of U.S. responses to terrorist attacks. The objective is to go beyond emergency preparedness (an obviously important component of immediate responses to terrorist attacks in Canada or the U.S.) and to begin thinking about how Canada could respond to a range of potential U.S. reactions. These responses should be coordinated in ways that avoid the negative consequences of being caught off guard, and that ensure Canadian interests are not jeopardized in the wake of U.S. unilateralism. The recent case of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian citizen suspected of working with Al' Qa-ida terrorists, illustrates the potential costs to Canada's security. Although Mr. Jabarah was in Canadian custody (after being captured in Oman) he was recently shipped off to the U.S. without a clear explanation from either DFAIT or the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). "CSIS, no doubt, was interested in knowing everything that Mr. Jabarah could tell them about his recruitment to al-Qaeda and anything about al-Qaeda's presence and operations in Canada."¹² But, as Wesley Wark rightly asks, if Jabarah had information about potential terrorist operatives and activities inside Canada then why did Canadian officials let this Canadian citizen go?
2. A coordinated legal and diplomatic action plan would also help to avoid the strong tendency in Ottawa to be reflexive when dealing with the U.S., or when facing any major international crisis. Canada's reaction to 9/11, as Jeffrey Simpson accurately points out, was coloured "by a fear of being seen to have agreed with Washington, and being accused of having 'caved,' 'sold out' or not adequately protecting Canadian sovereignty....A confident country, whose identity is rooted in its sense of self rather than a determination to highlight differences, would not have worried, as the Chrétien government did, about criticism of being too close to the United States."¹³ Simpson's observations go well beyond Prime Minister Chretien's tentative response to 9/11 – the same pattern was repeated over the last ten years in Bosnia circa 1990-1995, in Kosovo 1998, throughout the NMD debate, in Canada's initial response to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, in Ottawa's subsequent PPCLI deployment to Afghanistan, in our reactions to the U.S. NORCOM announcement, and, most recently, in our tentative response to Washington's plans to deal with Saddam Hussein and WMD proliferation by Iraq. Waiting for the U.S. to act/respond may be appropriate when the policy in question

affects some other region or state, but reflexive responses are entirely inappropriate when U.S. actions have a direct (and sometimes instantaneous) impact on Canadian economic and security interests. In a post-9/11 environment, the imperative to be confident and proactive when crafting Canadian foreign and security policy has never been greater.

3. With limited resources, however, Canadian officials should avoid the tendency to implement (and pay for) quick fixes. This will become increasingly difficult as Canada gets swept along by U.S. unilateralist pressures, but officials in Ottawa should be prepared to handle these pressures in ways that steer U.S. unilateralism in more productive, cost effective, security maximizing directions. The objective here is to avoid unintended consequences and to prevent what Gladwell (2001) refers to as the 'paradox of law enforcement.'

The way in which those four planes were commandeered...did not simply reflect a failure of our security measures; *it reflected their success* (emphasis added). When you get very good at cracking down on ordinary hijacking...what you are left with is extraordinary hijacking.....The history of attacks on aviation is the chronicle of a cat-and-mouse game, where the cat is busy blocking old holes and the mouse always succeeds in finding new ones.... During the nineties, in fact, the number of civil aviation "incidents" worldwide—hijackings, bombings, shootings, attacks, and so forth—dropped by more than seventy per cent. But this is where the law enforcement paradox comes in: Even as the number of terrorist acts has diminished, the number of people killed in hijackings and bombings has steadily increased....Airport-security measures have simply chased out the amateurs and left the clever and the audacious.¹⁴

Similarly, Rubin (2001) has shown that almost all American security measures put in place since September 11 are designed to prevent a repeat of September 11, and they will very likely succeed. But preventing the same attacks from occurring again is a very small part of what needs to be done – “Counterterrorist planners need to have some imagination in figuring out the more likely threat and not just a rote repetition of the previous assault.”¹⁵ Solutions should avoid exclusive reliance on inventing new technologies and should focus on making existing technologies work properly. Rubin cites Israel's airport security systems as an example – it is among the most efficient and effective airport security systems in the world yet has remained virtually unchanged since the 1960s.

4. Although the gap between Canadian and American objectives and priorities in the war on terror is arguably quite narrow, there are specific priorities on which Canadian officials should focus. For example, port security is a high risk area for future terrorist activity that demands proactive Canadian planning.¹⁶ If Canadian security and sovereignty is a priority, then Ottawa should accelerate Canada-U.S. joint planning under NORCOM and establish additional integrated enforcement mechanisms with the U.S. for homeland security. Canadian officials should also seriously consider support, in principle, for American ballistic missile defence, especially now that Canada's concerns about automatic proliferation by Russia and China are no longer valid.
5. Officials in Ottawa must be better prepared to defend the security policies they put forward as alternatives to U.S. unilateralism, and should bring to the table more than the hope that multilateralism, if given enough time, will solve everything. Canadians must engage Americans on the right debates, with the right arguments derived from the right evidence. Take for example Prime Minister Jean Chretien's reaction to current American plans to invade Iraq -- “The question of the production of unacceptable armaments in Iraq,” the Prime

Minister argued, “is a problem that is under the authority of the United Nations, and it is completely different than the problem of terrorism. If we try to do it unilaterally it will go absolutely nowhere.”¹⁷ The Prime Minister continues to urge the U.S. to work with allies and through the U.N. In other words, avoid unilateralism at all costs. As Fulford observed,

We Canadians love to lecture Americans on their shortcomings in world affairs, not because the Americans listen but because it makes us feel we are part of great events and bring to them a superior wisdom. While we habitually denounce all generalities made about culture, we are able to identify with ease what we consider the sins of the United States....The idea of dealing even-handedly with both sides holds a particular appeal for Canadians. It, too, provides a feeling of cool superiority. Unfortunately, it may also leave us incapable of the one act that has always been essential to survival, distinguishing friends from enemies.¹⁸

But, from the point of view of our American allies, rejecting unilateralism without explaining precisely how Prime Minister Chretien’s multilateral solutions will address these very real security threats is not particularly helpful. In fact, the Iraqi case is perhaps the best illustration to-date of the failure of multilateral organizations to control WMD proliferation. The U.N.’s inspection regime (UNSCOM) was the most intrusive multilateral arms control regime in history, yet it failed to prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. The suggestion that we work through the U.N. may appeal to some members of the Canadian public, but it will be ignored and dismissed by American officials who are responsible for protecting the American public and American, European and Canadian troops.

6. U.S. dependence on (and preference for) unilateral approaches to security (such as BMD) will have a direct impact on Canada’s ongoing commitments to multilateral arms control (NACD). If globalism diminishes the capacity of multilateral institutions and regimes to provide core security guarantees, and if these multilateral regimes become less credible and reliable as a result, Canadian officials will be forced to reassess Canadian priorities. Ironically, one way for Canada to increase respect from multilateral alternatives is to accept the fact that, occasionally, unilateralism may be the only option available for meaningful security. If we fail to establish that balance in our policies (and official statements) then Canada will face increasing marginalization on arms control and disarmament issues. To reject any and all unilateral options simply because they are ‘unilateral,’ or because of some hope that, with enough time, multilateralism can be made to work, is not a credible solution.

Of course, given our middle power status and the relatively minor influence this carries on the international stage, multilateralism may be the only game in town for Canada. There is nothing wrong with this -- Canada has done an outstanding (although not error free) job as the world’s favorite multilateralist. But Canadian officials should not assume that the priorities we are forced to accept by virtue of our position in the world should be imposed on others, simply because they represent the best (or only) option we have. Regardless of how commendable ones goals are of establishing a truly multilateral global order, the refusal to acknowledge the deficiencies of multilateralism is morally suspect. This is particularly true if there is no clear evidence that multilateral alternatives worked in the past, or can be made to work more effectively in the future. Indeed, the unintended consequence of maintaining an almost religious commitment to multilateralism is that weapons of mass destruction will

continue to proliferate, especially in places such as Iraq. Something more must be done today. If U.S. unilateralism is not the answer, then what is?

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- ¹ Globalism typically refers to one (or more) of the following five trends:
- (a) **death of geography** -- geographic boundaries and territorial borders/barriers are becoming increasingly insignificant, porous and permeable (soft) – state control over domestic economic, social and cultural affairs is diminishing as state sovereignty (i.e., the capacity to protect and promote national interests and values) evaporates;
 - (b) **death of distance** (space and time) -- distances between countries (and cultures) are decreasing as information, communication and transportation (ICT) technology continues to improve. Advancements in ICT also increase the efficiency of financial, trade and military activities – i.e., the time required to perform these activities is declining, in some cases at exponential rates.;
 - (c) **sensitivity** -- as the planet shrinks, both small and large states are becoming more sensitive to economic, political and military crises that occur in any part of the world; relatively minor political, economic and military events are having a larger impact on states and regions in the system;
 - (d) **vulnerability (ripple effects)** – states are becoming more susceptible to the negative consequences of these crises, and these consequences are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing;
 - (e) **death of independence** -- all of these pressures (a-d) combine to eliminate the capacity of both small and large states to maintain independent control over their own defence and security. The policy implications of this last feature will be addressed in more detail in section three below.
- On the related issues of interdependence, sensitivity and vulnerability, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2000) Power and Interdependence (3rd Edition). New York: Longman. See also "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age." Foreign Affairs (vol. 77 no. 5, September/October 1998).
- ² Lael Brainard (2001: op. cit.) -- “The aftermath of September 11 confronts America with countervailing pressures. When a sense of safety previously taken for granted is profoundly undermined, there is a natural tendency to pull up the drawbridges and pull back from the world. And when jobs and economic security are put at risk, there is a tendency to look towards protectionist solutions.”
- ³ <http://www.cunr.org/priorities/Arrears.htm>
- ⁴ Charles Krauthammer (2001) “The Real New World Order: The American and the Islamic challenge.” The Weekly Standard (November 12, 2001 - Volume 7, Number 9). For an equally compelling contribution to the debate over an emerging U.S. empire, see Robert Kaplan (2001) Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York: Random House. Similarly, Emily Eakin (2002) argues that the prevailing opinion in the U.S. today is that 9/11 was a product of “insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation.” See Emily Eakin (2002) “It takes an empire.” The New York Times, Tuesday, April 2, 2002 – www.thenewyorktimes.com
- ⁵ Citing Washington’s return to the U.N. Security Council after the attacks, Keohane (2001) argues that multilateralism offers a better explanation for the U.S. response to 9/11. The Bush administration needed desperately to legitimize its war in Afghanistan and required institutions and international law to accomplish this -- “only the U.N. can provide the breadth of support for an action that can elevate it from the policy of one country or a limited set of countries to a policy endorsed on a global basis.” But Keohane’s interpretation of U.S. actions and motivations is misleading, for several reasons. First, the U.S. response required very little ‘elevation’ to be endorsed as legitimate by other leaders. The deaths of over 3,000 innocent Americans provided more than sufficient justification for American retaliation. Second, expressions of support from almost every other country and international organization on the planet fully endorsed the U.S. right of self defence, as entrenched in the U.N. charter. That support was immediate, unanimous and virtually guaranteed, for the same reason – the destruction and associated devastation in New York and Washington. European leaders were competing with each to provide whatever assistance the U.S. requested, and all reaffirmed their NATO charter commitments to support the U.S. In contrast to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who received praise for his reaction to 9/11, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien lost credibility and enraged the Canadian public when his expression of support was slow, equivocal and ambivalent. European and Canadian leaders, international organizations and multilateral

institutions needed U.S. to legitimize *their* reaction to 9/11 more than the U.S. needed them – Keohane got it backwards. While the Bush administration welcomed any and all support it received after 9/11, that support was never perceived as a precondition for responding, for the same reason NATO's response to ethnic cleansing by Milosevic in Kosovo did not require a U.N. Security Council resolution for legitimacy.

6 With respect to failures of unilateralism, see Serge Sur (ed.) (1993) "Disarmament and Limitation of Armaments: Unilateral Measures and Policies." New York: United Nations Publications (January 1993); William Rose (1988) "U.S. Unilateral Arms Control Initiatives: When Do They Work?" Contributions in Military Studies. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group (December 1988); Ernest H. Preeg (1999) "Feeling Good or Doing Good With Sanctions: Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest" (Significant Issues Series, Vol 21 No 3). Washington: Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies (March 1999). This is one in a series of CSIS sponsored studies on economic sanctions; Joseph J. Collins and Gabrielle D. Bowdoin (1999) "Beyond Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Better Alternatives for U.S. Foreign Policy." Washington: Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies (April 1999). According to these CSIS reports, without exception unilateral sanctions have failed to achieve their primary political objectives. As a strategy they are likely to become even less successful as a result of globalization; Douglas Johnston and Sidney Weintraub (1999) "Altering U.S. Sanctions Policy: Final Report of the CSIS Project on Unilateral Economic Sanctions. Washington: Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies (April 1999) -- the final report of the series; Elisabeth Zoeller (1984) "Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures" Transnational Publishers (April 1984); Christian M. Scholz and Frank Stahler (2000) "Unilateral Environmental Policy and International Competitiveness. Kiel Inst of World Economics (January 2000).

7 Consider, for example, the competition between multilateral and unilateral approaches to border security and immigration surveillance. Given finite resources, American officials are currently weighing the benefits of, on the one hand, increasing the number of customs inspectors and x-ray machines at the U.S. border and, on the other, working with other states to examine containers at their origins and to coordinate visa strategies. As Brainard (2001) points out, terrorists often calibrate their visa strategies "to take advantage of different levels of scrutiny across countries." Obviously working with other states to develop effective multilateral approaches will help. But when it comes to comparing levels of overall confidence, there is a natural tendency to be much less confident in strategies that depend on the expertise, motivation, good will and priorities of other states, especially if these states are not being targeted by terrorists. Lael Brainard (2001) "Globalization in the Aftermath: Target, Casualty, Callous Bystander?" Analysis Paper #12 (November). Washington: The Brookings Institute -- www.brookings.com

8 In fact, the only example of real progress on nuclear disarmament in the last half century was a product of unilateral moves by the Bush administration to exchange the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for deep cuts in nuclear forces to between 1700-2200.

9 For a discussion of what Charles Krauthammer (2001) refers to as the "utter bankruptcy" of multilateral arms control, see "The Real New World Order: The American and the Islamic challenge." The Weekly Standard (November 12, Volume 7, Number 9). As Krauthammer points out, "[t]he 1972 Biological Weapons Convention sits, with the ABM treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in the pantheon of arms control. We now know that its signing marks the acceleration of the Soviet bioweapons program, of which the 1979 anthrax accident at a secret laboratory at Sverdlovsk was massive evidence, largely ignored. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union that the vast extent of that bio-weapons program was acknowledged. But that -- and the post-Gulf War evidence that Iraq, another treaty signatory in good standing, had been building huge stores of bio-weapons -- made little impression on the liberal-internationalist faithful...The very idea of safety-in-parchment is risible. When war breaks out, even treaty advocates take to the foxholes."

10 For details on the 'products' of four decades of multilateralism, please refer to any number of Internet resources -- examples include:

http://www.mint.gov.my/policy/p_treaty_nuclear.htm
<http://www.ucusa.org/security/arms.resources.html>
<http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/CHEMICAL.txt>
<http://www.library.yale.edu/un/un3b1.htm>
<http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/warfare.htm>

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- 11 Tim Hames (2002) "Arrogance, ignorance and the real new world order." The Times of London. (February 15) -- www.thetimes.co.uk – As Hames correctly points out, "Genuine multilateralism requires a multipolar order. That can only be achieved when authority is distributed evenly across a number of players (a transient event in human history so far) or if the largest power chooses, for some reason, to shrink itself to meet the occasion. That was the essence of American foreign policy in the decade between the Gulf War and September 11."
- 12 Wesley Wark (2002) "What's going on here?" Globe and Mail (Monday, August 5, 2002 – Page A11).
- 13 Jeffrey Simpson (2001) "Timing is Everything for PM's New York Trip." Globe and Mail (Friday, September 28) – www.globeandmail.com As Simpson (2001) correctly points out, "rarely does our government take an initiative vis -à-vis the United States.... Governments have historically preferred to react to pressures, proposals and developments coming from Washington. That way they can pick and choose among responses, trying all the while to protect themselves from a public opinion wary of a government being seen as "too American."...The continuing Canadian hang-up in bilateral relations, much on display (in the Post September 11 crisis), is a persistent reluctance to take the lead in dealing with the United States, with the result that the Americans tend to take initiatives."
- 14 Malcolm Gladwell (2001) "Safety in the Skies". New Yorker Magazine (posted 2001-09-24). www.newyorker.com "The better we are at preventing and solving the crimes before us, the more audacious criminals become. Put alarms and improved locks on cars, and criminals turn to the more dangerous sport of carjacking. Put guards and bulletproof screens in banks, and bank robbery gets taken over by high-tech hackers. In the face of resistance, crime falls in frequency but rises in severity, and few events better illustrate this tradeoff than the hijackings of September 11th...The contemporary hijacker, in other words, must either be capable of devising a weapon that can get past security or be willing to go down with the plane (or both). Most terrorists have neither the cleverness to meet the first criterion nor the audacity to meet the second, which is why the total number of hijackings has been falling for the past thirty years."
- 15 For a discussion of the unintended consequences of fighting the last war, see Barry Rubin (2001) "Don't fight the last war." The Jerusalem Post (Friday, September 28) – www.jerusalempost.com
- 16 According to Lloyd Skaalen and Migs Turner (2002), "more than six million foreign maritime cargo containers pass through North American ports annually. According to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the contents of less than 3% of these containers are physically inspected. And when they are 'inspected', with potentially fraudulent certification, only one end of the container is seen." See Lloyd Skaalen and Migs Turner (2002) "Put-up or Shut-up Canada!" Journal of Homeland Security (22 March). For an excellent account of the maritime dimensions of homeland security, see <http://ifpafletcher.cambridge.info/USCGFR.pdf>
- 17 Quoted in Keith Jones (2002) "US war plans panic Canada's elite." Weekly Standard (19 February) -- www.wsws.org
- 18 Robert Fulford (2001) "From delusions to destruction: How Sept. 11 has called into question the attitudes by which our society lives." National Post (October 6) – www.nationalpost.com