

**Unwilling to be Willing:**  
**The Primacy and Capability Principles in Canadian-American Relations**  
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## **Introduction**

Americans are benevolently ignorant about Canada, while Canadians are malevolently well informed about the United States<sup>1</sup>

*J. Bartlett Brebner*

America's happy ignorance about Canada, famously attributed to historian J. Bartlett Brebner, has lately become much less benign. Americans were shocked when Canada and Mexico, their immediate neighbours and partners in NAFTA, refused to join the "coalition of the willing" in the recent invasion of Iraq. Paul Cellucci, the American Ambassador to Canada, criticized the Chrétien government publicly, and President Bush cancelled his May 5<sup>th</sup> planned trip to Canada. Instead he invited Prime Minister Howard of Australia, a coalition partner, to visit the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas. But beyond the visible irritations, disappointments, and tensions connected with the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, was this event a fundamental departure in Canada's relations with the United States?

John Holmes, the wisest of diplomats, wrote about Canadian-American relations, "the first principle to accept is that crisis is normal and more often than not, therefore, no crisis."<sup>2</sup> Holmes had lived through the origins of the Cold War, Dean Acheson's irritation with Lester Pearson over Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Canada's refusal, unlike Australia again, to support the war in Vietnam, and the Nixon economic shocks, so his caution about overreacting to events by blowing them out of proportion is a wise one. But Holmes lived in the age of the bipolar superpower, not in the age of the active hyperpower. "Living with Uncle," to use Holmes' phrase, has always been complex, but life with an enraged uncle bulked up on steroids

is something else again. How best to share the North American neighbourhood with such a superman is the theme of this paper.

### **Complex Interdependence**

Allan Gotlieb, Canada's Ambassador to the United States, writes, "for Canada, the principal challenge has been – and remains – how best to manage our relations with the United States," and goes on to describe how the new diplomacy is public diplomacy because of the active and ever-present role of Congress in American foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> Similarly James Blanchard, American Ambassador to Canada, emphasizes the myriad of points of contact between our two countries and makes a point similar to Gotlieb's, that Canadian-American relations are tremendously complex because our provinces have such a large role in treaty implementation.<sup>4</sup> Both ambassadors describe a relationship of complex interdependence rather than the classic realist worldview of power dependent on military force. As defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, dependence is a state of being determined significantly by external forces, and interdependence "means mutual dependence. Independence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors as in different societies."<sup>5</sup> As described by Gotlieb and Blanchard, Canadian-American relations characterized by an absence of force, a myriad of issues, and multiple channels of contact, are a classic illustration of interdependence.

Power, the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do at an acceptable cost, is at the centre of complex interdependence, but it is power applied through a variety of forms, including "soft" power or the ability to communicate values. In complex interdependence, sensitivity is the liability to effects promoted from outside one's borders while vulnerability is an actor's ability to suffer costs imposed by external events. Canada's sensitivity

to American decisions is high (because of the high volume of interactions between the two countries), and therefore our potential vulnerability is a critical component of Canada's foreign policy. Do we have the ability to sustain costs or keep them at acceptable levels if decisions are taken that put us at risk? To use a business metaphor, do we have a diversified portfolio or have we put most of our eggs in one basket? With 45% of our output exported and 82% of those exports going to U.S. markets, the answer is obvious. The United States buys 38% of our GNP while we buy 3% of theirs. Canada's wealth has increased because of our proximity to the most dynamic economy on earth, but so has our vulnerability. We are now enormously dependent upon the decisions of foreigners. Our span of domestic control has lessened drastically. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the centrality of Canadian-American relations, always the number one priority of Canada's post-war foreign policy, has assumed gigantic importance. In today's world, there is the United States and then all the rest.

There are two basic strategies for diversifying risk and reducing vulnerabilities, and Canada has traditionally employed both of them. The first is to ensure that the portfolio is managed well: if your wealth is dependent on one stream of activity, then that area requires your constant supervision with your best people. The embassy in Washington has always been Canada's most important post with ambassadors of the calibre of Lester Pearson, Hume Wrong, Arnold Heeney, and Allan Gotlieb. These men have been skilled in taking one of the main characteristics of American decision-making and making it work for Canada. The government of the United States is a many-splintered thing. Whenever one reads in the media, "the United States wants," one must ask what part of the United States wants what? The United States government itself is so complicated and its worldwide responsibilities so vast that it is truly rare when a president can enforce solidarity around a given policy. The Pentagon may have a policy,

but that will likely differ from the view of the State Department, and both may be contested by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Indeed, the Pentagon itself is so vast that the policy of the Secretary of Defence may differ from the views of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in turn will differ from the priorities of the Service heads. The key requirement for Canadian ambassadors in Washington has been to develop multiple points of contact that have access and clout. Thus, Lester Pearson in the 1940s organized baseball games between his embassy's staff and the State Department and through play, as well as hard work, become very close with J.P. Hickerson, the professional diplomat who headed up the Canada desk. Hume Wrong, meanwhile, was a life-long friend of Dean Acheson. When the State Department began to lose its primacy over foreign policy to the National Security Advisor of the White House, Ivan Head, foreign policy advisor to Mr. Trudeau, made it a priority to develop a working relationship first with Henry Kissinger and then Brent Scowcroft. Allan Gotlieb similarly made Michael Deaver of the Reagan White House, an important ally of Canada. On any given issue, given the complexity of the American government, there will be a host of views and somewhere out of this melange will be a position acceptable to Canada (State versus Treasury, the Homeland Security Department versus the Attorney General, etc). We diversify risk by diversifying our contacts throughout the apparatus of the United States government. Today our requirement is to take Allan Gotlieb's challenge of the new diplomacy one step farther by developing systematically an informed American public supportive of Canada's perspective. With nearly 700,000 Canadian expatriates working in the United States, Canada has tremendous assets in influencing American public opinion but this asset has not been monetarized or made into a coin of the realm that can be used in foreign policy.

While attempting to diversify risk within the bilateral Canada-U.S. relationship, we have also made it an article of faith to supplement our middle power size by working through multilateral international organizations to achieve our goals. This is not because of some dewy-eyed idealism about our world (though there is some of that in the Canadian character. Lester Pearson, Escott Reid, and Lloyd Axworthy were all products of good Methodist upbringings), but because it is in Canada's interest to do so. The same diversifying risk strategy of multiple contacts and shifting coalitions as applied within Washington, is equally relevant to the broader international stage. Through multilateral organizations like the United Nations or NATO, Canada has the opportunity to work with a broad membership to develop a common point of view. The means of multilateral organizations are most often the best way to achieve Canadian ends. Therefore Canada puts much value in maintaining and strengthening international organizations. As a country with limited power, a rules-based international system to adjudicate disputes is far preferable to a power-based world of all against all. John Holmes puts it well when he writes, "Canadian governments, if not always the Canadian people, have recognized that international institutions whether they be the UN General Assembly, the NATO Council, GATT, or the Summitry of the Seven are essential for a country our size to act effectively vis-à-vis a great power."<sup>6</sup>

### **Primacy and Capability**

Complex interdependence, then, best describes the Canadian-American relationship, and Canada has been skilful in reducing its vulnerabilities and diversifying its risks both by working for a rules-based international system and by paying close attention to the management of the American file. But what about the domain of military might and traditional power politics? Complex interdependence may well apply to acid rain, wheat exports, or cultural policy, but

what about “hard power” and military security? Here, too, the record shows that Canada has been very successful in maintaining its manoeuvrability and reducing its vulnerability. In the security area, Canada has acceded to most American requests, but not all, and we have done so in a way that preserves Canadian interests. We have, for example, persuaded the Americans to protect us when Canada was most at risk in 1940, and it was Canada and Great Britain that worked hard to persuade the United States to join NATO, not the other way around. Even in the area of security, where American military assets are so overwhelming, Canada has more than held its own. We have agreed when it was in our interest, and disagreed when it was not, and yet we have been able to maintain a robust relationship throughout. Even in security policy, the relationship has been reciprocal, not overwhelmingly one-sided.

In 2003, we are so used to the overwhelming presence of the United States in world affairs that we rarely consider what the world would be like if the United States was not engaged. Not so for the generation of politicians and diplomats who made our first post-war policy. They faced the awful possibility that in May 1940 Britain might be defeated and the United States might not fight. It was an experience the Pearson generation never forgot, and the essence of their policy from 1940 to 1950 was to do all they could to ensure that the United States would never again choose the isolationist path. The formation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949 was a crowning achievement of British and Canadian diplomacy for in that treaty the United States committed itself in advance to the defence of its allies. With NATO, the ghost of May 1940 was finally laid to rest.

From 1940 on, Washington became the prime centre of operations for Canadian diplomacy, and a young Lester Pearson, Minister-Counsellor during the wartime years at the Canadian Legation in Washington (it was not yet upgraded to an embassy), developed two

principles on primacy and capability to govern the Canadian-American relationship. These principles continue to be relevant. Pearson's primacy principle is that Ottawa should choose its disputes with the United States carefully. He wrote in 1943 that it was prudent to "take a strong line only when the issue is important and we have a good case," and then bargain hard for Canada's advantage.<sup>9</sup> The capability principle arises from the desirability of being an effective player. Escott Reid, a colleague of Pearson's and one of the most innovative and prolific thinkers in the External Affairs Department of his era, wrote a memo decrying the timidity of his political masters. Reid wrote, "No useful purpose is served by being indignant about what the United States is doing. We are being treated as children because we have refused to behave as adults. An adult makes his own decisions; he accepts responsibility for his own decisions. On matters of high policy in the realm of foreign affairs Canada does not make decisions; it has decisions forced on it."<sup>10</sup> Pearson agreed: "this kind of diplomacy, the strong glove over the velvet hand, has nothing to commend it."<sup>11</sup>

A summary of the critical security issues from 1945 to the present shows how discriminating Pearson was in applying the primacy principle during his tenure and how this tradition has by and large been maintained to the present day. Canada has usually agreed with the ends of American security policy, disagreed with the means, and has been able to forge acceptable compromises on both sides. But on the capability or effectiveness principle, Canada has been going downhill since Mr. Pearson retired in 1968. Not in everything and not all at once but systemically beginning with the military in the Trudeau years, moving on to development assistance in the Mulroney era, ending up at the downgrading of our human diplomacy resources in the Chrétien period, Canada has devalued our power assets and diminished our reputation for effectiveness. Declaratory policy endures but Canadian pronouncements are now often ignored

because there is nothing behind the words. Canada's vulnerability has increased, not because of an independent stance on critical issues, but because we no longer have the capacity to be effective or make a difference. Americans respect power and we have not been prepared to pay for our power assets. Therefore, while Americans continue to like us, they no longer respect us and that is a terrible position for a proud, wealthy, but vulnerable middle power.

### **The Security Imperative**

In applying Pearson's primacy principle to security issues, Canada has usually agreed to American requests affecting the security of North America (Diefenbaker's reluctance over the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 being the glaring exception), and we have agreed to participate in a number of wars and peacekeeping operations outside of North America if such actions have a multilateral seal of approval. But we have refused to become involved in two U.S. led wars in Vietnam, 1964-74, and Iraq, 2003, when the United Nations was not involved. On North America security issues, to summarize:

- In 1945 Cabinet approved a revision of the wartime ABC-22 Defence of North America Plan: in 1946 the Pentagon submitted an "Appreciation of the requirements for Canada-U.S. security," which forecast attacks on North America within three years and was generally alarmist, even for that alarmist age. General Bernard Montgomery was invited to Ottawa to give a different view on the importance of Europe, the *New York Times* was appraised, Mackenzie King met Henry Truman, and Canada put forward a more modest plan that gained the support of George Kennan of the State Department, then at the height of his influence. The State Department, the *New York Times*, and Canadian diplomacy eventually prevailed over the Pentagon's initial view. Canada, in turn, made a major investment in the 1950s in air defence capacity, and in 1957 the North American Defence

Command, a joint command, was formed which has continued to this day to give Canada a seat in North America defence forums.

- In 1962 the Kennedy administration discovered that the Russians were installing missiles in Cuba capable of hitting North America. The United States moved to a war footing and the ominous Thirteen Days of October ensued. Of all the American allies, only the Diefenbaker Government of Canada contested the evidence of the Kennedy administration and there was initial confusion about whether Canada had placed its armed forces on full alert. Robert Kennedy opined, “Canada has given us all support short of help.” The retribution was political, not economic. In 1963 the White House issued a press release which flatly contradicted statements of Mr. Diefenbaker on nuclear policy and this event precipitated a Cabinet crisis which eventually brought down the Diefenbaker government in a parliamentary vote. Had Diefenbaker been re-elected, a crisis in Canada-America relations might have erupted but Lester Pearson’s Liberals won on a platform to accept nuclear weapons for Canada’s forces in NORAD and NATO. McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor for Kennedy, often joked that he had brought down a government with a press release and the Kennedy-Diefenbaker imbroglio continues to be the nadir in Canada-U.S. relations.
- In the early 1980s, the Russians provoked a crisis in NATO by deploying the SS-20 intermediate missile. NATO responded both diplomatically (the zero option eventually adopted by Gorbachev) and militarily by the testing of new cruise missile technology (which was the forerunner of the “smart weapons” now so critical to the American arsenal). After an intense Cabinet debate, Prime Minister Trudeau agreed to allow the Americas to test the missiles over Canada. Trudeau was influenced by allies like Helmut

Schmidt who argued that Canadian territory in this instance could make a useful contribution to NATO, and by Cabinet colleagues like Allan MacEachen who strongly argued for testing. Since this was not a primacy issue for Trudeau at a time when the Canadian-American agenda was full on domestic issues like the National Energy Policy, following Pearson's philosophy, Trudeau did not want to pick a fight on every issue. The tests were allowed and Trudeau kept his Cabinet together.

- In 2001 and 2002, following the September 11 terrorist attack on the United States, border security suddenly became a defence as well as an economic issue. Deputy Prime Minister John Manley agreed with Homeland Security czar Tom Ridge on a series of "smart border" reforms, most of which originated from Canada. Like the defence crisis of 1946, the border crisis of 2001 has been defused by a concrete, sensible plan.

If Canada has generally gone along on defence of North American issues, it has been less obliging with interventions outside North America, unless sanctioned by a multilateral authority.

- Canada was the first country to publicly raise the concept of a North American Alliance in 1947 and the establishment of NATO in 1949 was always regarded by Mr. Pearson as one of his greatest achievements. In 1950-51 Canada sent the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Division and a brigade to Germany as part of the post Korea scare but this was less on American urging than on Canada's own assessment that Europe was in danger.
- There was more debate in Canada about sending a volunteer brigade to join the U.S. led UN operation in Korea but like the troop deployment in Europe for NATO, the fact that Pearson saw Korea as a test of the collective security mission of the United Nations itself was more important than direct American pressure. Korea was a war but Canada's major

commitment there highlighted the Canadian tradition of contributing to most UN operations. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Pearson invented modern UN peacekeeping.

- Canada was never asked by the Johnson administration to join the Vietnam War but unlike Australia we never volunteered either. The Vietnam War was not sanctioned by the United Nations and there was virtually no lobby in Canada in favour of intervention. Since the rest of NATO also held aloof there was no American backlash against Canada, except when Mr. Pearson made a 1965 speech advocating a halt in American bombing. The Minister of External Affairs, Paul Martin, contemplated resigning over Pearson's initiative. President Johnson told the Prime Minister that he was "pissing in my backyard." But Canada also contributed a large force to Cyprus to prevent war between Turkey and Greece in 1964, a United Nations intervention that was favoured by the Johnson administration. Canada was able to negotiate and pass through Congress the 1965 Auto Pact despite not being an ally of the U.S. in Vietnam.
- In the Persian Gulf in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999, Canada supported the actions of the United Nations in the first instance and NATO in the second. In neither case did we make a major military contribution but Canada was part of a large multinational coalition. In Afghanistan too, in 2001-2002, Canada sent forces and in this operation our military impact might have been greater because of the relative scarcity of professional troops on the ground. The Afghan operation, too, was sanctioned by the Security Council.
- With the Iraq war in 2003, Canada made history by refusing for the first time to support a war in which both our closest allies, the United States and Great Britain were involved. In the Suez Crisis in 1956, like Canada the U.S. had opposed British military action and over Vietnam, Britain too stood aloof. Because of intense anti-war sentiment among the

Canadian public, fuelled in large part by unease that the UN Security Council had refused to authorize the war, Canada opted out of the coalition of the willing. For the Chrétien government the necessity to support the institution of the UN Security Council took primacy over our traditional alliances with the United States and Great Britain.

**Table I**

*Coalition of the Willing/Unwilling 1945-2003*

<u>North America</u>	<u>Outside North America</u>
Revision of ABC-22 – Yes	Korea – Yes
NATO – Yes	Troops to NATO – Yes
NORAD – Yes	Peacekeeping – Yes
Cuba – No	Vietnam – No
Nuclear weapons – Yes	Persian Gulf – Yes
Cruise Missile Testing – Yes	Kosovo – Yes
Smart Borders – Yes	Afghanistan – Yes
	Iraq – No

The only direct retribution by the government of the United States over Canadian actions on security matters was the public rebuking of the Diefenbaker government by the Kennedy administration over Cuba and the arming of Canada’s armed forces with nuclear weapons (which the Diefenbaker government had agreed to, but then dithered). Where Canada has agreed with the ends but disagreed about aspects of the means such as over military planning for North America we have been successful in achieving a compromise. Once Vietnam, the government of Canada disagreed with American policy but so did most American allies, and most importantly

so did a significant strand of American political and public opinion. Over Iraq in 2003, however, there was a large consensus in the United States that Saddam Hussein had to go and the NATO alliance was split, not united against intervention as was the case in Vietnam. Managing the fallout of the Iraq decision will be much more difficult than managing the Vietnam issue, 1964-73.

### **The Capability Principle**

Prestige is the currency of international relations. One gains prestige by being known as an effective player in diplomacy, development, or defence. Walter Lippman, advisor to Woodrow Wilson and the dean of American pundits for four decades wrote that a successful foreign policy “consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitment and the nations power.”<sup>12</sup>

The three Ds of diplomacy, development, and defence are broad avenues of power in foreign policy and, in recent years, Canada has diminished its capacity in every one of them. A starting point is the energy and ability of the men and women who represent our interests or defend our security abroad. The Canadian Foreign Service was once one of the best in the world. Henry Kissinger, for example, writes in his memoirs, “Canadian leaders have a narrow margin of manoeuvre, that they utilized with extraordinary skill.”<sup>13</sup> But years of pay-freezes have meant that well-trained Foreign Affairs and military officers face a huge wage disparity compared with the private sector, while spouses find it difficult having a career in a foreign posting. The Department of National Defence is finding it exceedingly difficult to recruit professionals like engineers or doctors. The most worrisome brain drain in Canada is the brain drain away from the military and the Foreign Service.

In our most important foreign posting - Washington – for example, Canada’s human resources pale in comparison with Mexico. Mexico has consulates in 40 American cities and the Mexican Ambassador in Washington is almost of Cabinet rank in importance. In contrast, Canada has only 10 consulates in U.S. cities and a very over-worked staff in Washington. There is plenty of American goodwill towards Canada, but it takes a tremendous amount of work to penetrate the U.S. bureaucracy, secure a place on the congressional radar screen or get calls placed through the White House switchboard. Indeed, it is not only Senators, Members of the House, or White House staffers who need to be lobbied: the staffs of the myriad of House and Senate Committees and the personal staffs of the politicians are also critical gate keepers. Washington is a constant beehive of activity. In Ottawa, the U.S. ambassador needs to know five or six senior Ministers, a dozen key officials, and some influentials from the Prime Minister’s office. In Washington, the Canadian Ambassador needs to influence not a handful of people but literally hundreds of individuals, because the U.S. government is a many-splintered thing.

Economic resources are a second component of international power. Canadians certainly have an image of themselves as generous donors committed to the development of the underprivileged. Prime Minister Chrétien rightly placed African development at the centre of the recent G-8 meeting in Alberta. But the reality is that we have been punching well below our weight. The Trudeau government made the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) a pillar of our foreign policy and increased spending tenfold from \$277 million in the late 1960s, to a little over \$2 billion in 1984-85. Today, CIDA’s budget is still only \$2.4 billion which explains why in real terms Canada’s percentage of aid to GNP has fallen from .75% in 1975 to .25% today, compared to the Netherlands who spend three times as much at .84% of GNP.

It is military capability, however, that has fallen the furthest. When I first went to work in Ottawa in the mid-1960s, there were over 100,000 men and women in the military, with half in the army. Today, the manpower of all three services is only 60,000 and the army was so stretched by the 2001 deployment of 750 troops to Afghanistan that the mission could not be renewed after its initial term. Today, Canada is 34<sup>th</sup> in the world contributing to UN peacekeeping, a far cry from the halcyon days of Mr. Pearson, although this percentage will increase with the new mission to Afghanistan announced in the spring of 2003. Our NATO allies on average spend 2% of GNP on defence; we spend less than 1%. This is not failing the Lippman test; these results are so dismal it means that we should not even be writing the exam!

Only once in the entire peacetime history described above did Ottawa respond to a crisis with sufficient innovation and resolve. After the Second World War, similar to what occurred after the First World War, the government of Mackenzie King demobilized Canada's large military forces -- in 1945 we were likely the fourth-largest military power in the world -- and radically reduced the size of the regular forces and the militia. By 1947, from the 730,000 Canadians who had enlisted or were conscripted during the war, the military was under 33,000. Neither the Cold War nor the creation of NATO in 1949 produced any groundswell of opinion that military preparedness should be a major priority. But in June, 1950, North Korea attacked the Republic of Korea, the United States ordered American forces in Japan to intervene, and the Cold War suddenly became hot. The Korea War in June, 1950, was the September 11<sup>th</sup> of its era: It was a shock, it was a massive intelligence failure, and it seemed to be the augury of worse things to come. Having agreed to war in Korea by his allies, might Stalin next plan war in Europe? After Korea, things were never the same again: Canada joined the United States in a UN-sanctioned war to defend South Korea; both Canada and the United States agreed for the

first time to send large armies to defend Europe in peacetime; and both countries hugely expanded their military forces from very low levels, a policy from which the United States at least has never wavered.

Returning to Ottawa by train from the Toronto funeral of Mackenzie King, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in 1950 began to make defence peacetime decisions that would have astonished their old isolationist leader. A special brigade was raised for the Korean theatre, soon after another brigade and the First Air Division were sent to Europe and the size of the military more than doubled to 105,000. The defence budget more than tripled from \$403 million in 1950-51 to \$1.45 billion in 1951-52. In comparison, the February, 2003, budget raised the budget of the Department of National Defence by under 8%. In the view of military historian Jack Granatstein, starting in 1950 and lasting until about 1965, “for the first and only time in its peacetime history, Canada mattered militarily.”<sup>14</sup>

Mattering militarily meant that with the F-86 Sabres, the first Canadian air division provided the best aircraft to defend Europe, when the threat was highest; mattering militarily, meant the Commander of the British Army of the Rhine said in 1957 that Canada’s brigade was, “the best fighting formation in the world.” Mattering militarily meant that General E.L.M. Burns, a Canadian, was chosen to head up the United Nations Emergency Force that ended the Suez Crisis of 1956, and mattering militarily had members of the Eisenhower administration in the US praising Louis St. Laurent, CD Howe, Lester Pearson and the Canadian way of doing things rather than gripes about a porous border. It is no coincidence that Pearsonian diplomacy, the high water mark of Canada’s influence in the world was backed up by significant Canadian military assets. Although it did not use the term, the government of Louis St. Laurent practiced “muscular multilateralism,” a cooperative approach to world problems bent on using

international organizations to the full, but with Canada punching above its weight in providing armed muscle as the sinews of the international organizations we were attempting to build.

What was done in 1950 in defence can be done today. We have done it in other areas. The February budget, in a little noticed section, committed Canada to doubling our spending on international development by 2010. It is right that we do so because economic assistance is also part of foreign policy capacity. But we need a similar commitment to national defence. We need a regular force of 85,000 well equipped, trained, and able to move by sea and air to the world of disorder outside of our borders.

In 1956 when Mr. Pearson invented modern peacekeeping, he knew that the Canadian forces could back up his initiative. The world needs multilateralism as much today as it did in 1956, but influence does not come cheaply. We need to double the amount we spend on national security to over \$20 billion a year, and we need to keep up this level of spending for at least a decade - \$200 billion more than is currently projected. Applying the capability principle is critical but expensive.

### **Conclusion**

Primacy and capability are two principles that set a useful framework for Canada-America relations. Issues are primary because publics feel deeply about them – there are some fights that can't be avoided – and the future agenda of primacy issues is likely to be crowded. American and Canadian value steams are diverging. Like Europeans, Canadians hold to a multicultural, social democratic, pluralistic ethic, while Americans increasingly are retrenching into an exclusionary, competitive worldview.<sup>15</sup> The gap is large and getting larger. Value divergence between neighbours inevitably leads to foreign policy disagreement. But disputes over some issues can be counterbalanced by effective action on others. This is where the

capability principle applies. If Canada cannot be effective nor acquire a reputation in areas where Canadians and Americans agree, such as the mission to Afghanistan, then the impact of declaratory disagreement over issues like Iraq will be all the larger. We are at a watershed in Canada-America relations. Either we restore our capabilities or we increase our vulnerability. The choice is ours.

## Notes

1. Attributed to historian J. Bartlett Brebner
2. John W. Holmes, Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 3.
3. Allan Gotlieb, "I'll be with you in a minute Mr. Ambassador," The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. VIII.
4. James J. Blanchard, Behind the Embassy Door (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1998), pp. 30-73).
5. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Third Edition (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 87.
6. Holmes, op. cit. 7
7. Quoted in Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War 1941-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 25.
8. For an excellent overview of the first year of Canada's policy vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union, see Smith, The Diplomacy of Fear, op. cit. For the revised defence plan ABC-22 of 1946-47 see C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 374-426. On the creation of NATO, see Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 221-240. On Korea, see John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson 1949-1972 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), pp. 65-107. On the Cuban Missile Crisis, the best perspective on the Diefenbaker government is H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 283-311. On Vietnam see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Indochina: Roots of Complicity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), and Charles Taylor, Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam 1954-1973 (Toronto: Anaysi, 1974). On cruise missile testing and Trudeau's approach to the United States, see Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, The Canadian Way (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), pp. 165-216 and 264-309 and Mark macGuigan, An Inside Look at External Affairs During the Trudeau Years, ed. by P. Whitney Lackenbauer (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002), pp. 13-20, 41-75, and 105-124.
9. Quoted in Smith, op. cit., p. 25.
10. Ibid, p. 17.
11. Ibid, p. 20.
12. Walter Lippman, quoted in Ronald Steel, Lippman and the American Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), p. 406.
13. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1979), p. 383.
14. Jack Granatstein, Canada's Army (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), p. 311.
15. See Michael Adams, Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003) for a socio-political profile of Canada and the United States based on cross national surveys from 1992, 1996, and 2000.