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Mexico City
April 11-12, 2005
Speaking Notes for Panel: Political Cooperation and Coordination
Reid Morden©
Will spend a few minutes talking about the possibilities and limits to
further institutional coordination and integration and then take a
brief look at the security agenda as an area of these possibilities
and constraints.
The broadest question, of course, is whether it is desirable, or
possible, to take two sets of multilayered arrangements with
substantial histories and find enough points of commonality to let us
build a true trilateral North American community? It is important to
continue to challenge the presumption that trilateral integration is
both good and possible.
Even if the answer is yes (not a foregone conclusion), the inclination
will be to find an anchor or a foundation on which to build. That
leads us directly to the further development/expansion of NAFTA.
NAFTA was and is about trade policy. Perhaps some of the framers had a
glint in their eye that the treaty could become much more. However, my
recollection was that the negotiations pretty well exhausted the
participants just getting agreement on the main trade issues. Also, at
least initially, Canada’s motives seeking a seat at the Mexico-US
table were defensive in seeking to protect the gains from a brutal set
of bilateral negotiations which had led to the Canada-US FTA.
Note that when Messrs. Manley, Aspé, and Weld issued their ambitious
statement for constructing the North American community, they avoided
this particular trap, ascribing only additional trade measures to the
NAFTA arena. That said, they should be congratulated for the vision
contained in their recommendations for cooperation and
institution-building in a number of other areas.
[1]
There are, not surprisingly, other views. In a paper from the
Patterson School at Carleton University, Jean Daudelin argues that
“for Canada, the trilateral option should not be pursued beyond
existing arrangements, essentially around NAFTA, except in an ad-hoc
manner and avoiding any significant institution-building. Canada's
bilateral relationship with the United States is vital and its
management should not be cluttered by the massive complexity of
Mexico-US affairs.
Canada's relations with Mexico, for their part, are developing quickly
and should be deepened, but they are and will remain marginal to the
country's core interests. As such, they should be kept as separate as
possible from the critically important Canada-US relationship.
Arguably, and in spite of the Fox administration current infatuation
with the concept, the same reasoning applies to Mexico: There is
simply no sound rationale for trilateralism in North-America.”[2]
I also note that, while there is a welter of ministerial-led activity
coming from the recent meeting of our three leaders in Waco,
institution-building was not at the top of the tree. Mr. Martin, asked
for his views on how integrated NA might become over the long haul,
said that future cooperation is a not a “big bang”. He apparently did
note that the leaders were talking about “big progress”. However,
North America would not end up looking like the EU.[3]
I think substance should certainly precede institutions but
institutions become important at certain points when progress toward a
goal makes it desirable.
However, just to take two instances in the reporting from Waco
demonstrates how far we must go if anything close to a North American
community is to be built. The New York Times report notes that Mr.
Martin was present and never mentions him again. The Toronto Globe &
Mail account reports that the meeting was about trilateral issues, but
gives almost as little notice of President Fox.
Whatever the differing views on the broader issue, North American
security issues are almost ubiquitous whenever there is talk about
closer coordination and cooperation. Why? We need look no further than
the leader’s statement in Waco. Having determined that changing times
demand more to be done in North America with respect to prosperity and
security, the three leaders declared that “Our (Security and
Prosperity) Partnership will accomplish these objectives through a
trilateral effort to increase the security,
prosperity, and quality of life of our citizens. This work will be
based on the principle that our security and prosperity are mutually
dependent and complementary…..”,[4]
Complementary? I don’t think so. In this post 9/11 era, security is
top dog. To borrow a statement from Frank Harvey at Dalhousie
University, “The economics of security (the negative economic
impact of security failures) will invariably trump the security of
economics (the positive impact of sound economic policies) for at
least two reasons: “First, any terrorist attack on U.S. soil will
inevitably have a major, immediate and uniformly negative impact on
the American (and international) economy anyway. Second, in a
security-conscious society faced with the challenge of perfection in
the war on terror, the loss of 3,000 lives will invariably be
perceived by the American public as a far more significant tragedy
than the loss of 300,000 jobs. Conversely, the potential to save 3,000
lives will be perceived as far more important than the potential to
create 300,000 new jobs.”[5]
The 2004 Auditor General’s report on Canada’s contributions to
security after 9/11 summarized Canadian priorities in terms of a
profound sense of “economic insecurity” resulting from “heightened
border security” and the “shutdown of civil air transport”.[6]
While Americans are very worried about another attack, the strategic
calculations in Canada remain focused on preventing or mitigating the
economic consequences of America’s response. This is perhaps
understandable given our economic dependence on the U.S. -- 43% of our
wealth; 87% of our trade; 35,000 trucks and 500,000 individuals cross
the border every day; etc. Billions of dollars tied to Canada-U.S.
trade were lost as a direct consequence of 9/11, and despite the
obvious economic benefits to both countries of keeping the border open
there is no reason to expect a different outcome after the next
attacks.[7]
In short, regardless of the mutual benefits of two-way trade, economic
interests will be sacrificed at the altar of homeland security every
time. John Manley has always been at pains to remind Canadians of the
uncomfortable need to understand this North American reality.
Where is the post-Waco security work to focus. On securing the
continent from external and internal threats by beefing up measures to
screen people and goods crossing North America’s borders by sea and
air. Drugs and crime get a mention as does enhanced intelligence
sharing.
Let us take a quick look at these elements of the Waco work plan.
Start with the last- enhanced intelligence sharing.
Obviously, multilateral approaches to gathering and coordinating
intelligence on terrorist activities and recruitment efforts, or
tracking terrorist fund raising and other financial activities, are
likely to be more efficient and cost effective than trying to do these
things alone. As far as these relatively straightforward (and risk
free) strategies go, of course, the U.S. is perhaps the most
committed, active and successful multilateralist around.[8]
Except. Fundamental point. Intelligence organisms, wherever they may
be housed (e.g. intelligence agencies, police forces, immigration
services) are not prone to share. In fact they are highly allergic to
sharing even with the occupant of the next office, never
mind----foreigners. When they do share, it is the result of broadly
perceived and accepted national interest and years in the build up of
mutual trust and confidence. This exists between Canada and the US and
has done for years. It may also exist between Mexico and the US.
However, a Canadian intelligence sharing relationship with Mexico will
only be built up over time.
Leaving this cavil aside, our leaders missed an opportunity in Waco,
as Manley et al did not, to look at the continent as a single entity,
a single perimeter, in all aspects of which each of the three
countries has an individual and collective interest. The idea of a
perimeter causes a neuralgic reaction among politicians---especially
in Canada. Unwonted fear that giving content to the concept will
trigger that other bogeyman, the “harmonization” of laws with others
on the continent, thereby inevitably leading to a loss of
sovereignty. Utter nonsense, and I was pleased to see that Manley,
Aspé and Weld, in their report have addressed this head on.[9]
This is not to argue for the disappearance of the border and is not to
equate the “harmonization” of policies and procedures with the
disappearance of Canadian laws, policies and procedures to a set of
those same laws, policies and procedures “made in the U.S.A.”. What
the Perimeter does mean is finding the common elements of those
different sets of laws, policies and procedures, and incorporating
them in a common set of rules that will rebuild the mutual trust and
confidence vital to let life return as closely as possible to
pre-September 11 levels.
If progress is made on the perimeter, it will among other things
facilitate dealing with the threats which largely originate outside of
North America. There is a fairly rich security menu where cooperation
can be actively enhanced. Much has certainly gone on since 9/11 in
these areas between Canada and the US. The same between Mexico and the
US.
Along the border, among other things, this will certainly mean
augmenting the relatively small number of border control officials on
both sides of the Canadian/US border. Also needed are methods and
processes for filtering the bad from the good within the transport
networks which move goods and people. Specifically this may mean the
positioning of more control points, singly or jointly, at key termini
abroad as well as the co-location of Canada and United States’ agents
at continental arrival points.
As to the agenda itself, there is demonstrable progress. For example,
bilateral joint teams have been agreed in a number of sectors, eg
immigration, refugees, OC. There are also programs to ease passage of
innocent goods and people. In terms of specific sectors:
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Customs
– means going abroad. Progress on agreement on selecting high risk
individuals for inspection.
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Crime –
opportunity to interweave with Mexico – joint enforcement,
integrated intelligence, technology, joint training.
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Immigration. Also issue with Mexico – focus of much criticism –
some tightening. Same re Refugee Destination – is there sufficient
political will? – Jury still out. Suspect because of changing
demographics in Canada.
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Transportation:
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Need
to focus on ground which carries overwhelming percentage of trade
by road and rail.
-
All
have been very slow to respond to seaborne risks. Major gap.
Joint teams abroad just beginning. Need to use technology.
Miniscule amount of sea cargo currently inspected.
-
Air –
U.S. ahead of Cda but not airtight – Primitive I.D. inspections –
lack of equipment to X-ray checked baggage.
-
Financing. Fintrac. In Canada have gone from nothing to very
draconian money-laundering legislation. Opportunities exist to
intensify cooperation.
How to
integrate 2 bilateral dialogues into a 3-way discussion.
-
Post
9/11 – a test to design a North American security perimeter.
Reactions, at least in Canada, not encouraging. The business
community, loudly but behind closed doors – argued for bilateral
solution to the borders – on the grounds of vastly different issues.
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Granted
– differences would make a trilateral negotiation awkward – but not
impossible.
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Exist
models of assymetrical multilateral negotiations – notably in the
area of trade policy. Should use these models if possible and
devise new ones if necessary – otherwise fly in face of partnership
we are seeking for forge in North America.
To
conclude:
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We seek
a partnership of shared interests
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Political will should be energized, at the very least, by the
recognition that the world in changing
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There
is a need to be adventurous and contemplate institutions which will
consolidate and give permanent form to integration progress.
Endnotes
[1] Chairmen’s
Statement, Independent Task Force on the Future of North America,
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Consejo Mexicano de
Asuntos Internacionales, Council of Canadian Chief Executives, 2005
[2] Jean
Daudelin, The Tri-Lateral Mirage: The Tale of Two
North Americas,
Carleton University,
May, 2003
[3]
Globe and Mail,. Martin, Bush Stand Together, Brian Laghi,
March 24, 2005
[4] Joint
Statement of Presidents Bush and Vincente Fox and Prime minister
Martin,
Waco,
Texas,
March 23, 2005
[5] Frank
Harvey, Canada and the New American Empire, Implications for Security
Policy, Conference held jointly by University of Victoria and CBC
Newsworld, November, 2004
[6] Report
of the Auditor General (2004). National Security in
Canada:
the 2001 Anti-terrorism initiative…(pg 3)
[7] Frank
Harvey,
ibid
[8] Frank
Harvey,
ibid.
[9] Chairmen’s
Statement, Independent Task Force on the Future of North America,
ibid., Recommendation 2
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