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CDFAI
DISPATCH: FALL 2006 (VOLUME IV, ISSUE III)
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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and
defence policy.
Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (403) 231-7624
Fax: (403) 231-7647
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
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MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT
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Welcome to the Fall 2006 issue of “The Dispatch” newsletter. In this
edition we welcome Perrin Beatty and David Pratt, former Ministers of
National Defence as new Advisory Council Members. We look forward to
their contributions on Canadian security, defence and foreign affairs
issues.
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Foreign Policy: Initial Impressions – Derek Burney. “….Even
more troubling is the apparent unwillingness of our society to
support actions intended to sustain the liberty and security we
often take for granted.”
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Measuring and Monitoring Governance – David Carment. An
overview and some initial findings of the Canada Corps supported
research on governance by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
project (CIFP) at Carleton University.
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Supporting Our War Effort – Ray Crabbe. As the only country
on Osama Bin Laden’s hit list to not be directly attacked by
Al-Qaeda, is the indirect approach of attacking Canada’s military
designed to send a strong message to Canadians?
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How Can the Canadian Forces Move Ahead When They’re Busy Playing
Catch Up? – Sharon Hobson. What is missing? “A promise to
provide the CF with the money it needs to buy the equipment it
should have been buying all along, as well as the money to
transform, and the money to win a war.”
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Is the 3-D Construct at Work in Kandahar or Are We Kidding
Ourselves? – Eric Lerhe. Although purporting to not provide an
assessment, Eric’s analysis is well documented, providing not only
observations but also some questions a fuller assessment might
consider. Improving the lives of the Afghani, he suggests,
requires immediate action.
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Developing Capabilities for the Canadian Forces – George
Macdonald. “Everyone’s fixation on the purchase of equipment is not
inappropriate, but we must keep in mind that this commitment is only
the first step in acquiring a capability…. Having said this, one
major and persistent disconnect is the provision of personnel for a
capability.”
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Covering the Afghan Mission: A Lament on the Fourth Estate –
Scot Robertson. “Canadians deserve better and more substantial
coverage and discussion of a mission as important as Afghanistan.”
Scot offers several questions that the media might consider tackling
in exploring some of the deeper issues.
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Lebanon – Why Canada Should Not Participate in the UN Force –
Cam Ross. Not only does Cam point out the reasons why Canada should
not participate in UNIFIL-2, he goes on to point out a role that
Canada can play.
The
rotation from the PPCLI to the Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group is
nearing completion and the worst week of casualties in the Canadian
Afghan mission has occurred. A friendly fire incident and enemy
engagements were the headlines over the Labour Day weekend.
Individuals across the country are talking more about the Canadian
Forces and our Foreign Policy than at any time in recent memory.
Average Canadians are seeking to better understand the situation. It
is time for leadership both at the political level and in the various
federal government departments to provide a vision and plan that
Canadians can understand and buy into.
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CDFAI NEW ADVISORY
COUNCIL MEMBERS
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The Honourable David Pratt, P.C. is currently serving as Advisor to
the Secretary General and Special Ambassador for the Canadian Red
Cross. Mr. Pratt’s focus is on issues related to conflict prevention,
the control of small arms and light weapons, international
humanitarian law, war affected children and security sector reform.
For 16 years, Mr. Pratt served as an elected representative at the
municipal, regional and federal levels. He was first elected to the
House of Commons for Nepean-Carleton in 1997. From December 2003 to
July 2004, Mr. Pratt served as Canada’s Minister of National Defence.
Prior to his appointment to Cabinet, Mr. Pratt was Chair of the House
of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
– a position he held from 2001 to 2003.
He also served as a member of the House of Commons Justice
Committee’s Sub-Committee on National Security. As Canada’s Special
Envoy to Sierra Leone under two ministers of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Pratt was involved extensively in legislation to address the “conflict
diamonds” issue.
Perrin Beatty was first elected to
the House of Commons as a Progressive Conservative in 1972.
During his 21 years in Parliament, he served as Minister in seven
different portfolios, including Treasury Board, National Revenue,
Solicitor General, Defence, National Health and Welfare,
Communications and External Affairs. Following the 1993
election, he joined a number of corporate boards and worked as a
consultant and columnist. In 1995, Prime Minister Chrétien appointed
him President and CEO of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).
Since leaving the CBC in August, 2005, he has been President and CEO
of the Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada.
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CONGRATULATIONS
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 Dr.
Denis Stairs, CDFAI Advisory Council Member and Fellow was
recently awarded Officer of the Order of Canada.
 
The
Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) is pleased to
announce that Brigadier-General David A. Fraser has been selected as
the recipient of the Vimy Award for 2006.
Currently the Commander of the Multi-National Brigade in Kandahar,
Afghanistan, BGen. Fraser is a distinguished Canadian who has
exhibited the highest standards of leadership
throughout his career of service to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.
The CDAI, which sponsors the Vimy Award, is an Ottawa-based think-tank
dedicated to increasing public awareness of Canada’s security
situation and the vital role played by the Canadian Armed Forces in
our society.
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CALL FOR PAPERS
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The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) and the
Canadian Defence & Foreign Affiars Institute (CDFAI) in
collaboration with the Institute for Research on Public Policy
(IRPP), Queen's University and the War Studies Programme at the
Royal Military College of Canada will host the
9th
Annual Graduate Student Symposium:
Security and Defence: National and International Issues
Deadline for submissions is September 23, 2006.
Click the following links for more information:
English |
en Français.
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CDFAI 2006 ANNUAL OTTAWA
CONFERENCE
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Conference Topic: Foreign Policy Under a Conservative Government:
An Interim Report Card
Keynote Speakers: Hon. John Manley and Minister Peter MacKay
Date: Monday, October 30
Location: Crowne Plaza Hotel Ballroom A/B 101 Lyon Street Ottawa,
ON
The cost of this year’s conference is $150.00. The fee will include
the conference session (five panels), two breaks and lunch. To
register, visit the conference website
www.peopleware.net/1540 or for more information visit
www.cdfai.org.
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Article: Foreign
Policy: Initial Impressions
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by Derek Burney
Canada’s new government is still finding its feet and a sense of
priorities on foreign policy, trying to manage issues where major
Canadian interests are at stake (e.g. lumber), enhancing a fundamental
instrument of foreign policy with a series of defence expenditures and
reacting spontaneously to global developments, some of which can prove
to be neuralgic when assertions of principle intrude on more familiar
positions of ‘balance’. One consolation is that there has been no
suggestion of the need for yet another vacuous foreign policy review.
In dealing with lumber,
and relations with the United States more generally, the emphasis has
been to improve the tone and reassert a sensible priority for this
pervasive relationship. A negotiated settlement on lumber was favoured
in order to bring closure, however temporary, to this long-festering
trade dispute and a degree of stability, as well as some redress, to
the beleaguered Canadian industry. The deal is not perfect by any
means but pragmatic. However, rectifying the fundamental damage that
lumber has caused to the Dispute Settlement provisions of NAFTA has
been left for another day. With the collapse of the Doha Round,
Canada’s broader trade policy agenda needs a new sense of direction.
Despite declining public
support for Canada’s role in Afghanistan it is seen, nonetheless, by
the Prime Minister, as the “right thing” for Canada to be doing, and
consistent with our traditions and values. Inevitably, as casualties
continue to mount, our involvement will need a more compelling
defence. The Prime Minister’s initial reaction to the
Hezbollah/Israeli conflict also reflected a position more of principle
or moral judgement than expediency but was criticized for lacking the
customary Canadian ‘balance’. The U.N. Security Council resolution
offers a temporary reprieve, (and a safe haven of sorts for many
politicians), but the task of replacing militant reflexes with genuine
negotiation persists as the major hurdle to peace in that region.
Canada’s role is likely to be marginal at best.
Decisions on major
defence expenditures for trucks, ships and heavy-lift aircraft will
eventually provide Canada with a better means to help preserve
national security and to participate as well in resolving global
conflicts - objectives that had been served for too long with little
more than rhetoric (and misplaced nostalgia).
China remains a
potential wild card on which the direction and purpose of government
policy is somewhat undefined. There are significant economic interests
warranting emphasis on a pragmatic approach as well as the
understandable need to draw China more responsibly into world affairs,
but there are ideological undercurrents calling for stronger
assertions of principle, notably on human rights, democratic values
and Taiwan, that require tact, a degree of realism and genuine
‘balance’.
The issue of global
climate change is another on which the government is, thus far,
essentially marking time. Reservations about the Kyoto Accord are one
thing but what the “Made in Canada” alternative will mean or cost is
not yet known. Tangible measures to reduce emissions in North America,
combined with a serious effort to invoke non-participants in Kyoto,
like the U.S., China, and India, would be a good blend of what is
desirable and what may be achievable.
Along with other
democracies, Canada is having difficulty handling what may be the most
serious challenge of all – the global threat of irrational Islamic
terrorism. That is where principles and interests converge. However,
the comfort (and softness) of affluence and an aversion to
war-fighting seems to be engendering a false sense of immunity among
Canadians even though some of the terrorist activities occur within
our own borders. The enduring image of Canada as a peace-keeper is
somewhat at odds with tasks that go well beyond the blue-beret norm.
Even more troubling is the apparent unwillingness of our society to
support actions intended to sustain the liberty and security we often
take for granted. The most effective antidote to this complacent trend
is leadership based on conviction and a realistic assessment of the
role that Canada can and should play.
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Article:
Measuring and Monitoring Governance
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by
David Carment
The Canadian government’s Canada Corps is dedicated to
improving governance in fragile and failed states. To this end, Canada
Corps is supporting research on governance by the Country Indicators
for Foreign Policy project (CIFP) at Carleton. The project’s dual aim
is to aid in the better understanding of democratic processes and to
support informed, evidence-based decision-making for Canadian foreign
policy and development assistance related to democratization. The
expected outcomes for this project are: 1) A qualitative and
quantitative assessment tool of democratization processes in
developing countries that will be made available to Canadian
government officials; 2) Robust research into processes of
democratization and governance within selected countries and; 3) A
thorough assessment of Canada’s potential contribution to
democratization processes, to be communicated to the broader community
of practice. These objectives will be achieved through a number of
products, including baseline studies for each of the selected
countries, reports, and country monitoring and risk analysis.
Within the scope of this project, governance refers to the traditions
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the
common good. CIFP’s working definition of governance identifies seven
discrete dimensions of the phenomenon: political stability and
violence, rule of law and human rights, government efficiency,
accountability, economic and market efficiency, democratic
participation, and gender and equality. Each dimension captures one
particular facet of the broader phenomenon of governance, to be
measured and assessed using a number of different structural
indicators.
Level of Democracy
Preliminary findings identify a number of fundamental
relationships between governance and state stability. Using CIFP’s,
fragile states index developed through the support of the Canadian
International Development Agency, initial results suggest compelling
and in some cases provocative insights regarding the intricate
relationship between governance, democracy, and country stability.
For example, in the figure above, the relationship between a given
state’s level of democracy and its relative stability proves complex.
Instead, the relationship resembles the inverted ‘U’ relationship
that various writers have observed between conflict – both civil and
international – and regime type. Clearly, the full democracies are
the most stable of all. At the other end of the scale, full
autocracies are also stable but slightly less so. However, states
between these two extremes tended to be more fragile. The implication
is that, while established democracies and entrenched autocracies tend
to be relatively stable, states caught between those two extremes,
termed anocracies by some writers, tend to be much more fragile.
Human Rights
Intriguingly, a similar relationship exists between human
rights indicators and fragility. The graph above, suggests that though
states with the best human rights records tend to be the most stable,
states with extremely poor rights records tend to be somewhat more
stable than those that score nearer the mean. Such insights are in
some ways surprising and even troubling, with potential implications
for the way in which donor states engage both chronic human rights
offenders and states undertaking human rights reform. As developing
states work to encourage better respect for human rights within their
borders, donors and partners alike must work carefully to minimize the
risk of a potentially catastrophic destabilization of the state.
Gender Empowerment
Other findings prove intriguing as well. In particular, the fact that
strong performance on gender measurements correlates closely with
stability may come as a surprise to some, even as it serves as
vindication to others. The scatter plot above, plotting UNDP’s Gender
Empowerment scores against the CIFP fragility index, suggests a strong
correlation between gender and country stability. The possibility that
gender parity may indeed play a strong and measurable role in the
stability of the state beyond that of general development is a
potentially powerful result, one that at a minimum warrants further
quantitative investigation.
GDP/Capita
Finally, a number of authors have found that GDP per capita correlates
strongly with both stability and peace. Interestingly, the graph above
shows a non-linear relationship between poverty and fragility. The
greatest returns to increasing mean income levels occur among
relatively poor states; as per capita GDP increases further, the
returns to stability appear to diminish.
For more
information about the project please and research on failed and
fragile states visit CIFP’s website at
www.carleton.ca/cifp or contact
cifp.liaison@gmail.com.
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Article:
SUPPORTING OUR WAR EFFORT
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by
LGen (ret’d) Ray Crabbe
The recent deaths and injuries to Canadian troops in Afghanistan have
triggered the inevitable call by several groups to bring the troops
home and withdraw from the mission. As the Royal Canadian Regiment
completes its handover from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry battle group, there is little question that attacks by the
Taliban and al-Qaida will be fast and furious against the newly
arrived and untested troops. They will do so to test the mettle and
willingness of the soldiers to operate and carry out their mandate and
to test the resilience and courage of the soldiers to bounce back from
tragedy and diversity. This tactic has been employed by various
factions throughout the history of Canadian peacekeeping and in recent
operations.
The suicide bombers, Improvised Explosive Devices and ambushes will
continue unabated and more casualties will occur. Canadian support
will waiver and many will continue to question the loss of life and
limb and whether or not it is really in Canada’s interest to be in
Afghanistan. The media will continue to focus on the sensationalism of
the nasty and vicious war against terrorism and not on the successes
in many parts of Afghanistan, adding to the growing concern by many of
the value of Canada’s commitment to NATO, to the Afghan people and to
the international community to play our role in the serious threat
posed by terrorism.
Canada remains the only country on Osama bin Laden’s hit list to not
be directly attacked by al-Qaida. This indirect approach of attacking
Canada’s military is designed to send a strong message to the nation,
and in the process cause Canada to re-think its strategy, and withdraw
its troops. To waver now or in the future to such attacks would be
playing right into the terrorists’ hands.
Regrettably, there are many Canadians who are still oblivious to the
realities of what Canada’s military is doing in Afghanistan, and the
vital importance of the work being done there, on behalf of all
Canadians. It is not peacekeeping – peacekeeping is dead. It no longer
exists in its traditional form. Our troops are engaged in a war with
the intent of bringing some semblance of normalcy to a ravaged and
failed nation, and in doing so, fighting terrorism at its source and
off Canadian shores. It is a war that pits ethical professional troops
who operate within the laws of war against non-ethical and
non-disciplined fighters who have no ethics or morals.
Surprisingly and sadly, recent polls indicate that a large number of
Canadians do not support Canada’s commitment to fight terrorism in
Afghanistan – no doubt brought on by the recent tragedies, suicide
attacks and other vile actions by insurgents. Unfortunately, Canadians
are now seeing the realities of the threat to our nation and the price
of freedom.
There is nothing more devastating for a military commander to lose a
soldier under his command. Equally devastating for the troops is the
death of a fellow soldier. The bond, trust and teamwork amongst
soldiers are the essence of why they fight. Every soldier knows and
understands when he joins the brotherhood of arms that he is signing
up for an “unlimited liability” to serve anywhere, anytime, under any
conditions, and to put himself in harm’s way if required, knowing that
in doing so he may be killed. As our troops know all too well, the
relegation of their personal safety to the performance of their duty
is uppermost in being a soldier. These young Canadian men and women
accept obligations to obey lawful commands, subordination to
authority, limitations on their freedoms, and the intrusive and
pervasive discipline required to be among the best soldiers in the
world. It is that sense of duty and discipline that separate Canadian
soldiers from others: soldiers like Corporal Ainsworth Dyer, Corporal
Paul Davis, Master Corporal Tim Wilson, Captain Nichola Goddard, and
Private Kevin Dallaire and the 21 others who have died in Afghanistan,
and the thousands of other young Canadians who have and will continue
to fight for what is right – our values and freedoms.
For our military to carry out this unlimited liability on our behalf,
Canadians have an obligation to support them when they are placed in
harm’s way, especially in the face of tragedy. That first
responsibility rests with the government of the day and our senior
military leaders to mitigate that harm in every practical way
possible, through the provision of good leadership, weapons, vehicles,
equipment and training. It implies an obligation to look after the
families of the troops when deployed and if tragedy strikes, to ensure
their service is not forgotten. In both these instances, the Canadian
Forces have done an excellent job.
Prime Minister Harper and the current government continue to support
Canada’s role and commitment in Afghanistan and have stated so
publicly and very clearly. Canadian troops are commanded by the best
leadership there is, from the commander of the multi-national brigade,
Brigadier-General Dave Fraser, to the outstanding Warrant Officers and
Non-Commissioned Officers who are the immediate commanders on the
ground.
The second part of this responsibility is support from the Canadian
people. It is extremely difficult for soldiers who are committed to
operations if their efforts and sacrifices are not supported and
appreciated by the very society that they serve. Putting their lives
on the line day in and day out for a just and necessary cause requires
public and genuine support of all Canadians.
Of particular importance is the unflagging and unanimous support of
the families of the fallen soldiers. Having had the opportunity to
speak to several soldiers who have returned permanently incapacitated
and to the families of those who gave their lives, I have been deeply
impressed by their support for Canada’s role and their positive
attitude, despite the unimaginable sorrow of their losses.
We can all learn a very valuable lesson in this regard from the brave
and courageous remarks of the father of Corporal Paul Davis who,
despite the deep sadness of the loss of his son, steadfastly supports
the efforts of our troops in Afghanistan. And of Master Corporal Tim
Wilson’s wife, Daphne, who expressed hope that her husband’s death
would contribute to a better life for Canadians. And Captain Goddard’s
parents who so very bravely spoke to the nation of the sacrifices of
their daughter for the good of all Canadians.
There can be no greater tribute to the soldiers and their
unlimited liability that they accept on behalf of a nation than for
that nation to fully and outwardly support their efforts.
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Article:
How can the Canadian Forces (CF) move ahead when they're busy playing
catch up?
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by
Sharon Hobson
With 2300 Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan, the CF is desperately
trying to find the right combination of equipment and tactics to
reduce the risk to life and limb to an absolute minimum. Urgent
operational requirements have been issued for such items as
uninhabited aerial vehicles, lightweight towed howitzers, armoured
patrol vehicles, armoured logistics trucks, satellite phones, and
colour cameras for the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle.
As to why the army didn't have at least some of these pieces of kit –
and the means to transport them -- already in their inventory, one
needs only look to the defence cuts of the 1990s for the answer.
Still, given the previous Liberal governments' proclivity for sending
Canadian troops around the globe to various hot spots, it's surprising
that they didn't put more resources into acquiring equipment relevant
to the role. But they didn't. So now, at the same time as the
military is working to undertake a "transformation", it is also having
to devote resources to equipment acquisition projects that should have
been taken care of years ago.
Balancing the needs of the Afghanistan commitment with the military's
transformation plans is causing the planners at the Department of
National Defence (DND) a lot of grief.
To complicate things more, at the same time as the planners are
modifying their transformation plans, they are also having to
integrate the Conservative defence preferences with the Defence Policy
Statement (DPS) announced by the Liberals in April 2005.
The minority Conservative government has inherited a defence policy
statement which it doesn't necessarily want to discard, but it wants
to put its own spin on it.
The Liberal DPS said "a greater emphasis must be placed on the defence
of Canada and North America than in the past. This must be the
Canadian Forces' first priority." Certainly the Conservatives have
nothing to argue with there, given their "Canada First" election
promises. The Liberal document also noted "security in Canada
ultimately begins with stability abroad" and "the Canadian Forces must
retain a spectrum of capability to operate with our allies on
international missions." Again, nothing there for the Conservatives
to quibble with, particularly as the DPS goes on to say, "This is
especially the case in failed and failing states ….. The Canadian
Forces will focus their expeditionary capabilities on operations in
these states, including in a leadership role". Afghanistan would be
a prime example.
For the eight months after publication, the DND strategists
concentrated on putting into place the elements to implement the DPS,
including standing up four new operational commands. The details of
the priorities and force structure were to be published in the Defence
Capabilities Plan (DCP). In July 2005, General Rick Hillier, Chief of
the Defence Staff, described the capabilities plan as “an adjunct” to the DPS, and said “how
we develop the capabilities is what we’re going to spend the next four
to six months walking through.”
Of course, that schedule put completion of the DCP right in the middle
of an election, so everything was put on hold. Now that there's been
a change of government, everything has had to be reviewed, and the
latest is that there will be a new policy statement and defence
capabilities plan issued this fall, all in one package.
But what will that package contain? The last policy statement is only
a little over a year old, and it's unlikely that the military
leadership, with Hillier at the helm, is going to change its mind
drastically about its vision of the future and what needs to be done
to rebuild the Canadian military and restore military credibility.
Therefore, the military advice to their political masters will likely
be much the same.
But looking at what the Conservatives promised in the election
and talked about in their May budget suggests that the DND will have
to reprioritize. In addition to the Liberal plans, the Conservatives
want a much larger expansion of the CF, plus the establishment of
territorial battalions, an army base in B.C., and a dramatically
increased Arctic presence. Consequently, some projects now on the
books will have to be dropped, others added, and capabilities
changed. But what capabilities will be affected and who will make the
choices?
If the Minister of National Defence is set on acquiring Arctic capable
ships, the navy may have to give up its frigate modernization. If the
Minister wants UAVs, the air force may have to stop the upgrade of its
CP-140 aircraft. The army, which is already rethinking its commitment
to Strykers and the Multi-mission Effects Vehicles, will have to find
a way to acquire the necessary vehicles to accompany a huge expansion
in manpower. It's possible that all three services, as part of their
joint effort, will have to drop or delay long-awaited programs in
order to keep the Conservative promises for new territorial battalions
and Arctic capabilities. And the amphibious ship may be toast.
Because there just isn't enough money to do everything. The Liberal
and Conservative budgets show a huge increase in defence budgets from
2005 through 2011, but given that major defence procurements stretch
over 15-20 years, the DND needs some assurances beyond 2011. The
current batch of major defence acquisitions which will provide the CF
with much needed transportation capabilities eat up most of the funds
allocated, and there's not much flexibility left. The government's
decision to change to accrual-based accounting just defers the bills,
it doesn't eliminate them.
And, again, let's not forget the war in Afghanistan which has cost
over $2 billion so far. Overlaying all of the government's
priorities, and the planning for future military capabilities, are the
demands of an operation that has all the hallmarks of continuing
beyond the current commitment of 2009.
It's true that the DND has always had to balance ongoing commitments
with future planning, but it's been a very long time since those
ongoing commitments included a war.
What's really missing from all the planning is the promise of long
term stable and predictable funding. A promise to provide the CF with
the money it needs to buy the equipment it should have been buying all
along, as well as the money to transform, and the money to win a war.
If a government can't assure the money, it shouldn't make the
commitments.
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Article: Is the 3-D Construct at work in Kandahar or are we kidding
ourselves?
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 by
Eric Lerhe
Offsetting those arguments are several that suggest
some elements of the theory are not that sound at all.
First, it is not at all clear that terror issues primarily from failed
states. Saudi Arabia provided most of the 9/11 bombers, and it
is by no means a “failed state.” It is equally hard to argue
that the Afghanistan state that sponsored Al Qaeda qualified either.
By most measures it was significantly more united, law abiding, and
peaceful under the effective but allegedly unpopular Taliban than was
the case before or after. This suggests that any
counter-terrorist plan that relies exclusively on assisting failed
states will be seriously incomplete. On the other hand,
raising the ability of failed states to effectively govern themselves
appears likely to reduce the threat posed by non-state terrorists, but
this has not been proven in actual events.
A more immediate theoretical problem arises within
the “Development” component of the 3-D concept Many
key members of this community in Canada simply do not accept
significant elements of that vision. CARE Canada President
John Watson describes “3-D” as part of a pernicious “groupthink that
is leading us towards disaster.”
[8] He also argues
“it is a canard that military deployments are necessary to provide
security for humanitarian workers to operate.” OXFAM Canada rejects
coordinating activities with the military and claims that the military
and development components in Afghanistan “must remain separate to
avoid any perception on the part of the local population that
humanitarian workers are part of the war effort.”[9]
In support of this view, John Watson argues “government officials” and
“military officials” delivering aid are “not aid workers” but
“officials of a foreign occupying power.”[10]
The broad Non-governmental Humanitarian Agency (NGHA) and
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) thrust is that there is little
cause to alter their longstanding commitment to the “impartial,
neutral and independent” delivery of aid.
[11] In the view of the
NGHA those principles offer better protection than that provided by
closely coordinating their work with the military.[12]
Further, they argue that their assistance has a longer-range focus,
more community “buy-in”, and greater overall effectiveness than direct
government assistance efforts.[13]
No evidence supports these claims. However, one must acknowledge
the NGHA community frequently offers a deep experience in the local
environment that few government agencies can match. This is
certainly the case in Afghanistan.
There is only slightly more evidence for those
arguing the opposing view that development should be coordinated with
defence and development. While the just-cited CIGI report
on “3-D” in Haiti argued for close coordination, the report itself
acknowledges that the overall tone amongst its participants was
“deeply pessimistic” and that the six recent UN missions there have
failed to have “any lasting effect in terms of stabilizing Haiti’s
turbulent political situation.”[14]
After three years in Iraq and four in Afghanistan, it is also clear
that most Western security and development efforts there, whether
performed in a coordinated fashion or not, have not brought greater
stability.[15]
A 2005 Canadian conference assessing the 3-D concept in Afghanistan
assessed that the only successful 3-D application occurred within the
United Kingdom’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Northern
Afghanistan - the Canadian PRT had not yet been established.[16]
The evidence, and it is anecdotal, suggests that the UK model, which
involved a fully coordinated “command group” composed of military,
political, police, and development officials, extended the rule of law
and eroded opposition force legitimacy.
There are other successful operations although they
do not completely follow the 3-D model. In Zabul province,
adjacent to Kandahar in the southwest of Afghanistan, a U.S. PRT
dominated by the U.S. military has achieved “remarkable” progress in
stabilizing an area once dominated by the Taliban according to Graeme
Smith of The Globe and Mail.[17]
In Zabul, the U.S. formula is based on the logic that “if you promise,
you should do it” with the emphasis being placed on project delivery
following as rapidly as possible after the initial discussion of the
project with the Afghan villagers.[18]
Rapid action resulted primarily from their military commanders having
the personal authority to spend some $30 million on development
projects and some $22 million has already been disbursed.[19]
Local project agreement and final approval of work and funding rarely
took longer than two weeks for the largest of their projects.
Today, eleven months since its start-up, an
assessment of how the Canadian PRT is performing is due. While
acknowledging the mixed results enjoyed by the 3-D approach elsewhere,
the short time the Canadian PRT has been operating, and the more
dangerous security environment found in Kandahar, the hard data
suggests the implementation of the 3-D concept there is largely
fiction. There is no doubting the presence of the 2,300
members of Canadian defence component, 140 of which are in the PRT.[20]
However, the diplomatic component appears to be represented by three
people, while CIDA temporary withdrew its single representative in
April 2006 as a result of the Taliban attacks.[21]
Since his return, he has frequently been unable to venture beyond the
PRT offices.[22]
In addition, OXFAM Canada will not station its
workers anywhere near friendly military forces in Afghanistan. CARE
Canada does not cooperate on aid projects with the Canadian Forces in
Kandahar and argued before Parliament that its activities elsewhere in
Afghanistan were better able to deliver aid than the competing
Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team.[23]
Inquiries to DND and CIDA were unable to identify any other Canadian
NGHA coordinating its development services with the Kandahar PRT.
Beyond the military, the most active Canadian PRT component regularly
working with the Afghani is an RCMP six-man team engaged in training
the Afghani police.
Despite the lack of support from the rest of the
development community, CIDA endorses the “whole of government”
approach and states that it “fully supports” the deployment of the
Canadian Kandahar PRT.[24]
As a way of underlining their commitment, their website site announces
that Afghanistan is the “single largest recipient of bilateral aid”
with some $1 billion being pledged from 2001-2009. However, most
of this funding flows to national programmes largely directed by the
Afghan national government and disbursed over the entire country.
Only some $ 5 million per year is ultimately spent in Kandahar and
such spending is not linked with the Canadian PRT.[25]
In fact, during the Canadian PRT’s first eleven
months, CIDA only allocated some $4 million directly to PRT activities
in Kandahar. Regrettably, little to nothing of this has actually
been spent.[26]
Given that DND has spent in excess of $616 million on the first nine
months of its Kandahar commitment, the overall CIDA contribution seems
small indeed.[27]
The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has noticed this
discrepancy, but the Committee’s Chairperson reported that CIDA had
“refused” to provide their Afghanistan budget details.[28]
This month, John Geddes suggested CIDA was now “feeling the heat” of
such public questioning and that this may have spurred the agency to
take steps to more obviously support the PRT.[29]
There are other problems beyond this small level of
CIDA funding and its late arrival. Graeme Smith contrasts the
rapid allocation of funds to locally approved projects in the U.S. PRT
with the more ponderous bureaucratic process followed by CIDA and the
U.K.’s Department of International Development. It seems even if
the PRT and the local villages agree on a project, the approval must
follow a delay-inducing trail up the CIDA decision chain. A
USAID assessment of PRT activities in Afghanistan also remarked on the
delays involved in CIDA establishing its “project funding and
management process” in Kandahar.
[30] That assessment
included concerns by some Canadian PRT members that the Afghans would
interpret these delays as a lack of “equal commitment” to Afghanistan
compared with the prior generosity of the U.S. effort and that would
increase instability.
On occasion, the situation was even worse than
that. Garth Pritchard, an embedded journalist who spent four months in
Kandahar, reported that CIDA promised $100,000 for water wells and
schools contracted by the Canadian military in 2005 and then reneged
once they were completed.[31]
The delays prompted the U.S. Military and the Canadian Department of
National Defence to ultimately pay the local contractors.
Certainly there are immense security problems in
Kandahar. The January 2006 killing of the PRT’s political
director, Glyn Berry, highlighted the risk to civilian workers and
likely provoked the initial withdrawal of the CIDA representative and
the temporary suspension of their activities.[32]
Yet when the representative was in place, the evidence suggests the
small amounts of CIDA money he brought were offset by the bureaucratic
delays CIDA introduced.[33]
Very recently CIDA started taking action in
response to these criticisms. Projects are being increased,
older ones are being accelerated, the single CIDA advisor at the PRT
will be joined by two more, and they have partially addressed some of
the cumbersome bureaucratic processes at the PRT.[34]
While acknowledging the dire security situation, one still has to ask
how it took eleven months to achieve these very small improvements.
Further, one also has to suspect that at the end of the day these
improvements will not provide the Canadian PRT in Kandahar either the
funding or the rapid approval process enjoyed by the US PRT in Zabul.[35]
It must also be acknowledged that however positive
that US PRT may appear to the Globe and Mail, other observers
have pointed out significant problems with the US model.
Mismanagement, “marginal success” in development tasks, and
duplication are cited.
[36] Yet the relative
stability enjoyed by the Zabul province and the credit that is being
given to its PRT for this suggests some aspects of that model bear
closer examination. Indeed every PRT model must be examined for
its ability to provide stability as well as development.
This leads to some tentative observations a fuller
assessment should review:
-
Security is tied to development. If local
conditions deteriorate, local support for coalition security efforts
will diminish.
-
The application of the 3-D concept in Kandahar
was a failure. Too few diplomatic and especially developmental
assets were offered to make this a 3-D partnership.
-
It is too early to judge the 3-D concept a
failure based on our experience in Kandahar - the concept was not
followed.
-
The 3-D concept as applied in Kandahar may be
worse than the defence, diplomacy, and development components
proceeding unilaterally if all that the partnership brings is
bureaucratic delay.
-
While the 3-D concept has proven problematic in
Kandahar-like situations, the traditional developmental approach
that relies on neutrality, impartiality, and independence appears
equally inappropriate. A new approach may be needed for
areas of high conflict.
This could well involve the military taking the
lead for development under such conditions. Further, some key
members of the development community share this view. Meinrad
Studer of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
international organizations division begins by arguing that the ICRC
should “declare its willingness to cooperate with the military and
other humanitarian agencies.”[37]
He then concludes with:
When it is a matter of saving lives, a pragmatic
approach must be taken. It is not inconceivable that in certain
situations the military may be in a better position than the ICRC to
carry out certain humanitarian tasks.
As has been shown, that viewpoint is not shared by
much of the Canadian NHGA community. This leads to some
questions that a fuller assessment might consider:
-
Is 3-D possible when the significant elements of
the Canadian NGHA community reject cooperation and coordination with
the military?
-
In that sense, are Canadian NGHA being more
obdurate in this regard than their U.S., U.K., and international
counterparts?[38]
-
Can CIDA advance development projects in Kandahar
with those NGHA that do cooperate or with cooperating Afghani?
-
Is 3-D possible when the level of fighting
stretches security forces to a point where they are unable to
protect traditional NGHA development teams?
-
If the ideal 3-D model is not possible due to
NGHA resistance or local instability, does the U.S. PRT model offer
an alternative path? Does the U.K. PRT model? Does the
just-mentioned ICRC view?
-
At what point in a deteriorating security
environment should the military take over responsibility for aid?
When should it return responsibility to the development teams?
-
Must new resources accompany the direction to
DND, CIDA, and the Department of Foreign Affairs to implement 3-D
given their traditional responsibilities have not been reduced?
Regrettably, there is no guarantee that a more
complete assessment of the Canadian 3-D approach will follow this
effort. Even if it does, a detailed review will take time.
Meanwhile, Canadian lives are being lost in Afghanistan.
Further, the evidence is increasingly demonstrating that any
development measure that improves the lives of the Afghani will result
in greater support to coalition forces. This suggests that
immediate action is required in advance of any such fuller study.
Until that review is complete and until CIDA can generate the
personnel and financial resources to re-qualify for membership in the
3-D partnership, the concept should be put into abeyance. In the
interim, the military commander should be immediately given the $30
million his U.S counterparts enjoy for local development projects and,
most critically, the local authority to spend it rapidly. He
should be provided whatever federal officials or military officers are
needed to ensure funding and project delivery follows within two weeks
of a local agreement. As quickly as the security situation
allows and as quickly as CIDA can generate a meaningful contribution,
the military commander should return the coordination of development
over to the development experts.
Endnotes
[1] The precise question was “Do you support or
oppose sending Canadian troops to Afghanistan?” with some 55% choosing
to oppose sending troops. See Jeff Sallot, “Opposition to Afghan
mission rises in latest poll.” Globe and Mail, 6 Aug.
2006, p 4. In Jun 2006, a CDFAI poll asked the same question and
had 59% supporting the sending of Canadian troops. See CDFAI
Media Poll for the Ottawa Citizen, Jun 2006, (Toronto: Innovative
Research Group, Inc., 2006).
[2] UNSCR 1659 (2006) and 1623 (2005) specifically
endorse the NATO mission to Afghanistan.
[3] This was outlined by Bill Graham, the Minister
of National Defence, in his letter to the Globe and Mail dated
22 Aug. 2005. See
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/
ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/22050822/COGRA accessed 21 Aug. 2005.
[4]
See Government of Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement –
A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, - Overview, Defence,
Diplomacy, Development & Commerce Sections. At
www.international.gc.ca as of 13 Jul 2005 accessed 1 Aug. 2005. The
Overview, p. 13 provides a full description of the 3-D theory.
[5] See Krulak, Charles C., Gen. "The Strategic
Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War"
Marines Magazine, January 1999 and David Carment’s
Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing
States, (Calgary: CDFAI, 2005),p. 11 for a description of the UK
pools.
[6]
This view is strongly endorsed by Andy Tamas, an experienced
development officer with extensive experience in Afghanistan:
“What keeps a society peaceful is a happy population that is being
well served. If they’re not being well served, they won’t believe in
the legitimacy of the elected government, and there will be an
atmosphere where anti-government insurgents and trouble makers will
thrive.” See Blatchford, Christie, “Small strategic team making
a big difference,” Globe and Mail, 8 May 2006. A1, A11.
[7] Thompson, Andrew, S.,
“Canada in Haiti: Considering the 3-D Approach” CIGI Report on the
Conference held at the Center for International Governance Innovation,
Waterloo, Ontario 3-4 Nov. 2005.” (Waterloo: CIGI, 2005) p 9.
[8] In addition to “3-D,” the other elements of the
“groupthink” he decried were the “three-block war,” “net-centric
warfare,” and ‘interoperability.” See: Watson, John, “Can Canada
succeed in Afghanistan?” Globe and Mail, (Web
exclusive), 27 Jul. 2006, at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com.servelet/story/
RTGAM.20060726, accessed 10 Aug. 2006.
[9] See Gleiser, Natasha, “Line between aid and
security blurs in Afghanistan,” Capital News Online, 17 Mar.
2006, at http://temagami.calreton.ca/jmc/
cnews accessed 17 Aug. 2006.
[10]
Watson, “Can Canada succeed.”
[11]
Henceforth, the paper only use the more precise “NGHA” term to
describe non-government development agencies and organizations.
[12]
Sedra, Mark, “Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: The Provincial
Reconstruction Team Debate,” Unpublished paper available at
www.asiapacificresearch.ca/coprn/
afghan_project/m_sedra.pdf accessed 21 Aug. 2006. p 2.
[13] McCort, Kevin, (Senior Vice President
Operations CARE Canada) “Address to House of Commons Standing
Committee on Defence – 8 Jun. 2006” available at CARE Canada
website http://www.care.ca/work/hot_issues/Afghanistan/
Afghanistan_e.shtm accessed 21 Aug. 2006. This claim is also
repeated, again without evidence, at Sedra “Civil Military Relations,”
p. 3.
[14] Thompson, “Canada in Haiti,” p. 7.
[15] Raviv Chandrasekaran makes a convincing case
much of the current instability in Iraq is due to the failure of the
US civil officials to coordinate the activities of the U.S. Coalition
Provisional Authority with those of the U.S. military. See
his “Who Killed Iraq?” Foreign Policy, (Sep./Oct. 2006). p
36-45.
[16] The location of the PRT is not given (the UK
had PRT at both Mazar e Sharif and Maimana) and no evidence at all is
provided to support the claim of effectiveness. See Wright,
Julian, “Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach - A CIGI
Report on the Conference held at the Center for International
Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario 12-14 May 2005.”
(Waterloo: CIGI, 2005) p 7-8.
[17] The assessment is Graeme Smith’s made
after interviewing a wide range of Afghani in the province. See his:
“An oasis of relative calm in a sea of violence,” Globe and Mail,
23 Jun. 2006, p. A11.
[18] See: Graeme Smith, “An oasis,” p. A11.
[19] ______, (Canadian Press), “RCMP and aid staff,”
p. 1.
[20] Others have suggested as many as 200 military
personnel may be in the Kandahar PRT.
[21] Rubec, Stephanie, “Canada halts Kandahar aid
work,” The Toronto Sun, 16 Apr. 2006, _______, “Canadian aid
projects suspended in southern Afghanistan,” CBC News, 16 Apr.
2006, 09:56.:03 EDT; both accessed via
http://.listnowar-paix.ca/pipermail/nowar/
2006-April/011729.html
accessed 13 Jul. 2006.
[22]
See York, Geoffrey, “Canadian program presents alternative to
Taliban,” Globe and Mail, 22 May 2006.
[23] McCort, “Address to House of Commons,” p.2.
John Watson, President CARE Canada, has, however, offered to exchange
location data with the PRT. See his “3-D and the Kandahar RPT
(sic): Blurred Vision” an address to Canada in Afghanistan:
Assessing the 3-D Approach - A CIGI Conference held at the Center
for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario 12-14 May
2005. This author’s personal copy, page 11.
[24]
Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, “Afghanistan:
Canada’s Commitment – Results” at
http://www.acdit-dica.gc.ca/cidaweb/
acdicda.nsf accessed 22 Aug 2006. and Canada,
Canadian International Development Agency, “Media Room: Canada’s
Development Commitment for Afghanistan – Jul. 2005.at
http://www.acdit-dica.gc.ca/cidaweb/
acdicda.nsf accessed 22 Aug. 2006. It is interesting
that the CIDA site also never uses the term “3-D.”
[25] No critique of those activities in intended.
Indeed, CIDA’s support to Afghan national programmes is much
appreciated by the Afghan government. Regrettably, that
advantage is partially offset by the fact that Canada has concentrated
most of its other activities in Kandahar and is only able to encourage
the Afghan government to direct a small portion of the overall funding
to that province. Happily, the Kabul government is becoming
increasingly ready to do just that.
[26] ________, (Canadian Press), “RCMP and aid staff
to join mission in Kandahar,” (22 Aug. 2005) p. 1; at
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/print/
CTVNews/20050822/Kandahar_nextphase accessed 22 Aug.
2006. Graeme Smith, “An oasis,” A11; indicates the figure
was $5 million and that “little money” has been spent. Only a
single project at Shah Wali Kot was funded reportedly worth $900,000.
Other reports suggest the “planned” budget may have reached $6 million
but no one suggests more than $900,000 was spent. More credible
reports suggest that even the $900,000 for Shah Wali Kot was never
disbursed.
[27]
Pugiliese, David, “Cost of Afghan mission $2 B and rising,” Ottawa
Citizen, at
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/
news/story.html?
id=e866f81e-549d-4012-9814-27621db2b032 accessed 21 Aug. 2006.
The $616 million represents the Kandahar forces operating cost from
Aug 2005 - Mar 2006 plus 330 million for specific equipment purchases
for that force.
[28] Geddes, John, “Bullets fly. Ottawa ducks: How
Canada slipped into a war our leaders can’t or won’t explain,”
MACLEANS.CA, 25 Aug, 2006; page 7 of 8 of web version at
http://www.macleans.ca/shared/print.jsp?
content=20060828_132392_132392 accessed 28 Aug. 2006.
[29]
Geddes, “Bullets fly,” page 7 of 8 of web version.
[30] U.S. Government, USAID, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment,
(June, 2006)(PN-ADG-252 available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdfdocs/
PDFADG252.pdf accessed 21 Aug 2006.
[31] Pritchard, Garth, “So Canadian International
Development Agency – Where is the money?” Canadian Free Press,
5 May 2005. at:
http://www.canadafreepress.com/2005/
cover050505.htm accessed 13 Jul. 2006.
[32] Rubec, “Canada halts.”
[33] This is not to suggest that CIDA was the sole
source of bureaucratic delay. Interviews with those involved
with the PRT reveal DND had its own bureaucratic stumbling blocks.
On the other hand, DND was still able to deliver on a significant
number of Kandahar PRT projects while CIDA was not. Moreover, the
evidence is starting to suggest significant delays occured as a result
of the need to re-scope initiatives to keep them within the artificial
boundaries established by ad-hoc interagency agreements with CIDA.
DND reportedly ordered the PRT to halt, then rename and redefine the
rebuilding of a police station because it had used the prohibited work
“project” to describe it. Such a term was apparently ‘owned’ by
CIDA.
[34]
Interview with CIDA Ottawa official. For example a new agreement
between DND and CIDA will allow Canadian military personnel to access
CIDA funding for development projects.
[35]
Intriguingly and perhaps sensing our internal Canadian problems, USAID
is reported ready to fund “Canadian conceived” projects in Kandahar.
______, (Canadian Press), “RCMP and aid staff,” p. 1.
[36] Geddes, “Bullets fly,” page 7 of 8 of web
version.
[37]
Studer, Meinrad, “The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations in Armed
Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 83, No.
842. (Jun. 2001), p. 386.
[38]
Indeed Mark Sedra argues that “most NGHA have accepted, in extreme
circumstances, armed protection form military personnel and military
involvement in aid delivery.” See his “Civil-Military Relations in
Afghanistan,” p. 4.
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Article: Developing Capabilities for the Canadian Forces
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by
LGen (ret’d) George Macdonald
The government’s announcements
regarding the purchase of major equipment in late June are great news
for the Canadian Forces. They represent the largest package of defence
procurements in a generation and will certainly help to address a
shortage of funding in military mobility that has persisted for years.
The commitment to rectify this situation is commendable, but the
government’s persistence in providing timely approval of project
documentation and contracts is now needed as the procurement proces | | |
