Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

In researching the potential for NORAD to take up the maritime warning function, I was frequently led to writers who suggested that “connecting the dots” was a key element in countering terrorism. The testimony before the ongoing commission of inquiry into the Air India bombing also made it clear Canada has had particular problems in this area. Indeed, one witness argued that a failure to “connect the dots” between readily available intelligence data was likely why we were unable to prevent this attack.[1]

The “connecting the dots” phrase gained widespread use with the release of the report of the 9–11 Commission investigating the 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon.[2] While not precisely defined, the report described “connecting the dots” as the ability of analysts to “draw relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government” about terrorist activity, see the relationships between key elements, and identify opportunities to defeat it.[3] Significantly, the commission’s report identified ten separate “missed opportunities” where, had the CIA and FBI shared data about the 9/11 plotters, analysts would have been able to connect the dots and thwart the attacks.[4]

The 9–11 Commission proved conclusively that these large, lavishly funded, American agencies had collected all the intelligence details needed to do exactly that. However, the information was contained within narrow departmental stovepipes, shared grudgingly – if at all – with other agencies, and controlled by a strict “need to know” protocol. This approach completely stymied any analytical effort to sift through all the data that was held on al-Qa’ida suspects worldwide and then connect it to the activities of the nineteen terrorists preparing the 9/11 attack. The commission concluded by noting that ”the importance of integrated, all source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to ‘connect the dots.’ No component holds all the relevant information.”[5]

Since then, the United States has made significant progress in integrating its analysis effort and encouraging a shift from a “need to know” to a “need to share” information regime. Federal law – the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act – mandates an improved approach to the way information regarding terrorist activity is shared. Further, the act directs the creation of an “Information Sharing Environment” (ISE) with mechanisms and policies to share data across government agencies while also protecting privacy and civil liberties. The system is not perfect, and the United States government admits to gaps with state and local authorities.[6] However, today Americans can go to the <www.ise.gov> website to read the entire information-sharing policy, including the procedure to seek redress should citizens wish to challenge the data the government holds on them.

Such is not the case in Canada – far from it. While some isolated mechanisms have been set up to improve information sharing by grouping representatives from government agencies in an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, Maritime Security Operations Centres, and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, we do not seem to have a government policy on sharing terrorist intelligence. The 2004 National Security Policy contains nothing on data sharing beyond the usual bromides regarding the need to eliminate “organizational silos” and create an “integrated national security system.”[7] There is no description of such a system, its data sharing rules, the incentives and sanctions which reinforce it, or even a basic schedule for implementation.

While the assembly of various intelligence, military, and law enforcement agents into new operations centres and integrated teams will improve coordination, there are limits regarding what can be achieved without detailed policy. As an example, the 2004 National Security Policy directed the creation of multi-department Marine Security Operations Centers (MSOC) in the Atlantic, Pacific, and St. Lawrence regions. It mandated they be “headed by Canadian Forces Maritime Command” and that they “include staff from the CBSA [Canadian Border Services Agency], Transport Canada, the RCMP, and the Canadian Coast Guard.”[8] In 2006, Transport Canada reaffirmed that vision, stating that “MSOC personnel [should] use the collaborative work environment to enhance their information sharing and analysis capability.”[9] This directive supports the connecting the dots strategy.

However, after a promising start in the Atlantic MSOC, progress elsewhere has been hit or miss. A visiting Senate committee to the Pacific MSOC in 2006 discovered “that most of the people occupying seats in the facility had never been in the building before – they had been gathered in haste to try to demonstrate that the centre was operational.”[10] This was corrected in 2007, but it is not yet clear when the MSOC in the Great Lakes will be fully operational, and only two of the five required departments are currently operating there.[11] It would seem some elements of the security bureaucracy are choosing to remain in their “organizational silos” for as long as possible, given that no detailed government direction holds them to a schedule.

Even when all the departments assemble in one spot, not all of them can share data. An officer at one MSOC reported that “[a]nything collected under the auspices of the Customs Act cannot be shared with any other department. It can be as benign as the name of a ship.”[12] In response to these types of problems, that same Senate committee concluded: “Canada’s perimeter cannot be defended with a series of dots, some of them all but invisible. The dots have to be real, and they have to be connected.”[13]

This failure to share data is not limited to the marine security area, as testimony before the Air India inquiry is now demonstrating. Even if James Bartleman’s testimony is doubted, it is now clear that accurate information on the Sikh terrorist threat from the Indian government and our own External Affairs officials was ignored by the RCMP and the CSIS. Five days before Air India Flight 182, when CSIS did elevate the threat warning of Sikh terrorism to “high,” this warning was not passed on to the RCMP teams at Pearson and Mirabel.[14] Testifying at the Air India inquiry, retired Deputy Commissioner Jensen of the RCMP concluded that “there were some dots that could have been linked and should have been linked.” Had that been done, the Air India attack “might have been prevented.”[15] Significantly, he recommended that politicians today do more to improve timely information sharing between the CSIS and the RCMP.

In spite of this, recent witnesses from the Privy Council Office and Public Safety Canada appearing before the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-Terrorism Act have suggested government has made “great progress” since the Air India bombing. However when asked who was responsible for drawing together all the relevant data on a developing threat (connecting the dots), the replies were not reassuring. A series of elliptical responses suggested that “PCO,” “representatives from the different agencies,” then “the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre,” and finally, “a number of agencies and government departments that have sources of information” were all to be considered “responsible.”[16] Perhaps frustrated, the questioning Senator then directly asked the PCO official, “Are you the person who brings all the silos together? Is it PCO that does that?” Ever nimble, the PCO official admitted they did, but added that Public Safety “shares” that responsibility, although “it is mostly the RCMP and CSIS.” Neither clear responsibility for coordinating the diffuse departmental data nor a process to do so was ever clarified during this testimony, despite the most pointed questioning possible.

If information sharing is problematic within Canada, it is now certainly no better with our allies, according to some. In one of the rare, official acknowledgements of the problem, the combined Canadian/American military team studying maritime information sharing found the following: “Although national laws and policies permit the sharing of information, this direction is not routinely being followed at the mid-level management and analyst level …”[17]

Regrettably, the task for improving Canadian/American information sharing has likely been made considerably more difficult after the deportation and torture of Maher Arar. Indeed, those commenting on any new information regime, including the proposed Canadian ”no-fly” list, now regularly cite this case as an example of the danger of sharing data with the United States.[18]

According to Jack Hooper, a senior official who recently left CSIS, a ponderous oversight system and the results of unnamed “judicial inquiries” have made it “difficult to connect the dots when the whole page is black.”[19] One must suspect that part of that official’s concerns stems from the now very public advertising of CSIS and RCMP information sharing shortcomings during the Air India and Arar inquiries. On the other hand, one must also accept that a certain chill has undoubtedly arrived within the wider security bureaucracy as a result of these inquiries. It is possible, therefore, that risk aversion now significantly trumps openness and the willingness to share sensitive data.

As a result of these numerous information sharing problems, Ken MacQueen and John Geddes argue that a full commission similar to Justice Major’s Air India inquiry is long overdue. It is their sense that Canada is more exposed to terrorist threats today because we have, until now, not done the kind of exhaustive review achieved by the 9–11 Commission. Rather, Canada largely ignored the problem after Air India: “Canadian authorities, for reasons both valid and dubious, had no stomach for such reflection, what mistakes were made, what lessons were learned – if lessons were learned – have been stamped “Secret” and buried deep.”[20]

While one hopes for the very best in Justice Major’s investigation, some of the factors outlined in this brief article suggest he may have great difficulty achieving anything comparable to what the 9–11 Commission accomplished with respect to improving the United States government’s ability to connect the dots. First, many will suggest that there are immense legal challenges to sharing some kinds of data. Moreover, any proposal that existing data control legislation might be loosened will be opposed by a legal community that will argue for the strictest possible interpretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Second, efforts to improve international data sharing will be enormously complicated as a result of the Arar affair. Further, those arguing against a better data exchange regime with the United States will also find ready support amongst that element of the Canadian public that is easily swayed by anti-American rhetoric. Third, elements in the security and intelligence bureaucracy are proving themselves hesitant to share information, slow to leave their “silos,” and not terribly supportive of the inquiry process. As was noted earlier, one of its members suggested the inquiries themselves are hampering efforts to share data.[21] Elsewhere, attempts to deny or delay evidence in the name of national security almost derailed the Air India Commission of Inquiry.[22]

In addition to the impediments outlined above, Canadian politics must still be addressed. In this regard, it was encouraging to see the current government had the strength to overrule its bureaucracy’s unwillingness to provide evidence to the Air India Commission. Yet it is also clear the terrorist threat to Canada has not proven sufficiently perilous to force a bipartisan approach to countering terror. Significantly, the American report’s success relied on bipartisan support. In Canada the major political parities remain deeply divided over such key elements as the Anti-Terrorism Act. According to one respected analyst, “senseless politicking” guides many of their responses.[23] Therefore, no matter how compelling Justice Major’s final report, there is little hope that any minority government will be able to form the bipartisan consensus needed to implement its policy recommendations. We should thus expect continuing problems with respect to connecting the dots.

Endnotes

[1]. The witness was retired Deputy Commissioner Jensen of the RCMP. See Jeff Sallot, “Air India Bombing: Intelligence Breakdown Left Dots Unconnected, Ex-Mountie Says,” Globe and Mail (19 June 2007), A8.

[2]. The 9–11 Commission Report – The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm> accessed 28 July 2007.

[3]. See <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch13.htm> accessed 3 June 2007.

[4]. See <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch11.htm> accessed 3 June 2007.

[5]. Ibid.

[6]. Jane Hovarth (Chief, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office, Department of Justice), Information Sharing in the War on Terror (Powerpoint Brief) at <http://www.rebootconference.com/ publicsafety2007/ppt/Robbin_Mark_PublicSafety2007.ppt> accessed 9 July 2007.

[7]. Government of Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, (Privy Council Office, 2004), 18, 9; see also pp. VII, 10.

[8]. Ibid. 37–38.

[9]. Government of Canada, Transport Canada Response to Standing Senate Committee on Defence and Security, cited in Canadian Security Guide Book 2007 Edition, Coasts – A Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Defence and Security (First Session, 39th Parliament, March 2007), 13.

[10]. Ibid. 13–14.

[11]. See the RCMP’s description of its very limited “interim MSOC” at <http:/www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/fio/marine_faq-e.htm> accessed 22 July 2007.

[12]. Chris Thatcher, “A Pan-government Approach to Marine Security,” Vanguard (Knowledge Center, Defence, 2006) at <http:/www.vanguardcanada.com/MSOCThatcher> accessed 30 May 2007.

[13]. Canadian Security Guide Book, 17.

[14]. Ken MacQueen and John Geddes, “Air India: After 22 Years, Now’s the Time for Truth – Like 9/11, It Might Never Have Come Off if Canada’s Experts had Heeded the Signs.” Macleans (28 May 2007) at <http://www.macleans.ca> accessed 7 July 2007.

[15]. Kim Bolan, “Police Failures Resulted in Air India Disaster: Inquiry,” CanWest News Service (18 June 2007) at <http://www.canada.com/> accessed 17 July 2007.

[16]. Government of Canada, Issue 6 – Evidence (Special Senate Committee on the Ant-terrorism Act, 4 June 2007) at <http://www.parl.gc.ca39/1/parlbus/comm./bus/senate/com-e/anti-e06ev-e/htm> accessed 9 July 2007.

[17]. Ibid.; Bi-National Planning Group Final Report on Canada – United States (CAN/U.S.) Enhanced Military Cooperation (Peterson A.F.B, Colorado: Bi-National Planning Group, 13 Mar. 2006), C-7.

[18]. Jim Brown, “No-fly List Could End Up in Foreign Hands, Air India Probe is Told.” CBC News (5 June 2007) at <http:/www.cbc.ca/cp/national/070605/n0605112A.html> accessed 17 July 2007.

[19]. Colin Freeze, “State Agents Say Inquests Causing ‘Judicial Terrorism‘,” Globe and Mail (9 June 2007), A4.

[20]. MacQueen and Geddes, Macleans (28 May 2007).

[21]. As noted previously in Freeze, “State Agents.”

[22]. Ibid.; “Air India Inquiry No Longer a Sedate Roundup of Facts,” Canadian Press (22 May 2007) at <http://www.hfxnews.ca> accessed 12 July 2007. Here, one must contrast the Canadian bureaucratic response with the obvious ability of the 9–11 Commission’s ability to dig into the most secret of intelligence files as it catalogued such things as the ten failed intelligence sharing incidents.

[23]. Wesley Wark, “Parliament Pokes Itself in the Eye – Senseless Politicking is About to Deprive Canada of Two Potentially Very Valuable Weapons in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Ottawa Citizen (16 Feb. 2007) at <http://www.canada.com> accessed 16 Feb. 2007.

by Ray Crabbe