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CDFAI
DISPATCH: SPRING 2006 (VOLUME IV, ISSUE I)
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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and
defence policy.
Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (403) 231-7624
Fax: (403) 231-7647
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
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WELCOME
FROM THE PRESIDENT
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Welcome to the Spring 2006 issue of “The Dispatch” newsletter. In this
edition we introduce two new Fellows, Barry Cooper from the University
of Calgary and Stéphane Roussel, Université du Québec à Montréal to our network
of Canadians interested in providing informed opinion on Canadian
security, defence and foreign affairs issues.
Since our
last newsletter CDFAI has been planning its programs for 2006 and
working on broadening its outreach assets.
Along with
this newsletter Dr Elinor Sloan’s paper, The Strategic Capability
Investment Plan: Origins, Evolution and Future Prospects is being
released.
In this
newsletter there are four compelling articles for your consideration
on topics such as the OAS, Hamas, Opportunities for the new
Conservative Government and Putting Public Servants in Harm’s Way.
The first
article by George Haynal is titled - Canada in the Americas: Whence
did it Come, How did it Do, Where is it bound? George provides an
analysis of Canada’s involvement in the OAS and Hemispheric
multilateralism plus some suggestions on where this country should
consider going in the future.
Tami
Jacoby’s article The Writing was on the Wall! Implications of the
Hamas Victory briefly discusses the issues facing Hamas and the
key question on whether it can resolve the seeming contradiction
between its internal and external agenda.
The
North American Cocoon by Gordon Smith touches on many of the
current challenges facing the new federal government and some of the
issues that need to be considered.
Putting Public Servants in Harm’s Way: Dilemmas of the Democratic
State in a Violent and Uncertain World by Dennis Stairs examines
the “substantial and significant” Canadian interests that need to be
analyzed by governments in Ottawa before authorizing the deployment of
personnel to dangerously violent environments abroad.
2006 is
now upon us, there is a new government in Ottawa and already the
international scene is changing. How will Canada respond? CDFAI
believes that there are many positive ways that this nation can and
should be involved. Enjoy this issue of “The Dispatch” and contact us
if you have any comments.
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CDFAI NEW FELLOWS
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Since the
last newsletter, two new Fellows have joined CDFAI.
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Barry Cooper:
a fourth
generation Albertan, was educated at Shawnigan Lake School, the
University of British Columbia and Duke University (PhD, 1969).
He taught at Bishop's University, McGill, and York University
before coming to the University of Calgary in 1981. He has been
a visiting professor in Germany and the United States. His
teaching and research has tried to bring the insights of Western
political philosophers to bear on contemporary issues, from the
place of technology and the media in Canada, to the debate over
the constitutional status of Quebec and Alberta, to current
military and security policy. |
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Stéphane Roussel:
is Assistant Professor -
Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal
(UQAM) and the Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and
Defence Policy. From 2000-2002, he was Professor at Glendon
College (York University) in Toronto where he taught
international relations and security studies. He has also
lectured as a visiting Professor at Université de Montréal. He
graduated from Université du Québec à Montréal (B.A. and M.A.,
1983-1990) and Université de Montréal (Ph. D., 1999). Professor
Roussel has received several grants and scholarships from
institutions such as Department of National Defence, Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and NATO. |
Notation:
CDFAI Fellow, Alexander Moens, Professor at Simon Fraser University,
BC was a panelist at the February 23-24 CDA Conference: “NATO in
Transition: The Impact on Canada” held in Ottawa. The panel was
titled: The Political and Military Transformation of NATO.
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Congratulations
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February 28, 2006 – CDFAI Fellow, Jean-Sébastien Rioux,
was appointed Chief of Staff for The Honourable Jim Prentice,
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
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EDUCATION -
CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNALISM COURSE
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| WHO: |
Eleven Canadian students enrolled
in the 3rd and 4th year (minimum) of a university journalism
degree program |
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| WHAT: |
This program introduces students to
military journalism and the Canadian Forces. The course
includes a combination of media-military theory in a classroom
setting, coupled with field visits to Canadian Forces regular
and reserve units. |
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| WHEN: |
May 7 – 17, 2006 |
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| WHERE: |
Classroom work – Centre for
Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary
Fieldwork – Calgary reserve units and regular force units in
Edmonton, Alberta |
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| HOW: |
Included in the scholarship are:
- Transportation to and from Calgary
- Accommodation
- Meals and,
- Ground transportation in Alberta
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| DEADLINE: |
Submissions must be post-marked no later
than March 24, 2006. |
See
www.cdfai.org (homepage) for Military Journalism Application
information.
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CANADA IN THE AMERICAS: WHENCE DID IT COME, HOW DID IT DO, WHERE IS IT
BOUND?
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by George Haynal
(The article is
strictly a personal contribution and does not attempt to reflect the
views of Bombardier)
Canada’s 1990 decision to enter the
OAS was touted as the beginning of our “decade of the Americas”.
Rightly so, as it turned out. We did play a successful
multilateralist role in the hemispheric system that has served both
our partners and ourselves well. Now the Americas’ receptivity to
hemispheric cooperation is in decline. We need to refine the way in
which we continue to build a place for ourselves in this important
part of the world.
How We Came To Be A Hemispheric Player
The decision to join the
OAS came a full century after the foundation of the International
Union of Pan-American States in 1889 (the predecessor to the OAS,
which itself was founded in 1948). Put another way, Canada had
refused to join the interamerican system for a hundred years until the
Mulroney government in one of its underappreciated acts of
statesmanship (like its campaign against Apartheid) did so. Its
successors maintained the Mulroney vision, and to his credit, Lloyd
Axworthy, actually built on it.
Why? What explains our apparently
sudden engagement with the Americas in the 90’s and the bipartisan
determination thereafter to maintain it?
A review of our motives
is useful because the interests that drove policy then continue to
drive it now. Only the environment for pursuing them has changed.
Our Americas policy is built on six
pillars:
First, by the late 1980’s there was
no reason not to engage. The Hemisphere had become club-able (In the
peculiar Canadian sense of the word, i.e. that we were prepared to be
part of it). Our historic discomfort with the politics of the
region, and our fear of being caught between conflicting U.S. and
Latin American expectations, were no longer justified as the era of
military dictatorships had ended. There were few governments that were
active in the OAS by 1990 that had not been democratically elected.
Even if Cuba was a major exception, and if a number of other regimes
had questionable democratic credentials, Canadian politicians were
comfortable in arguing that by joining the Hemispheric club we would
now be able to help embed democracy and respect for human rights,
rather than legitimize despotism.
The region had also become
economically more accessible.
With political change had come more
open economies and Canadian companies, particularly telecom and
resource companies were investing intensively in the region. They
needed rules based systems and transparent governance to ensure the
viability of their presence. The best way Canada could help them, and
also help the region to attract stable constructive investment, was to
help raise the bar for governance throughout the Hemisphere.
Second, Canadian decision makers saw Hemispheric multilateralism as
useful in managing relations with the US. The United States wanted us
to be engaged as independent but broadly sympathetic actors in the
Hemisphere (as we had been in the North Atlantic in the course of the
Cold War). It was easy by the 90’s to accommodate them since
Canadian policy in the Americas was broadly congruent with those of
the Bush I and Clinton Administrations. Both they and we placed an
emphasis on embedding free markets and democratic governance in the
region.[1]
Canada, with no history in the Americas and respected as a democratic
market economy, could be among the countries with credibility needed
to stimulate and channel efforts at political and economic reform.
There was also another, narrower dimension to US arguments for Canadian
engagement. The way the Americans saw it, the privilege of FTA
partnership brought with it some obligation to help spread the values
on which it was built, and that obligation could best be discharged in
the Americas, the one region where Canada actually had both interests
and influence.
The FTA also played a role in persuading the Canadian government to
become a Hemispheric player. Our success in negotiating the agreement
convinced political leaders that we could take an active( and
sometimes divergent) role in America’s backyard without the United
States being able to steamroll us.
The subsequent inclusion
of Mexico in NAFTA further convinced Canadian decision makers that we
were, whether we liked it or not, now tied to Latin America. If we
wanted the region to live by our values and respect our interests, we
could no longer go mano a mano with our partners wearing rubber
gloves. If we wanted a more inclusive community (and one less
dominated by the US), we had to join it.
Third, Canada needed a
region that it could call its own. The end of the Cold War and the
development of the European Union meant that we were no longer able to
rely on the transatlantic relationship to offset the gravitational
pull of the United States.[2]
If our diplomacy was effective, the Hemisphere could provide a bloc
that we could leverage in the management of power relations around the
world.
Fourth, an activist
engagement through the OAS could, and did, burnish the Government’s
multilateralist credentials, demonstrating Canadian determination to
bring our values to a region that many Canadians thought were badly in
need of them. Our engagement with the Central American peace processes
showed what effective Canadian diplomacy could achieve in tough
circumstances.[3]
Fifth, Canada’s cultural
duality and our changing demographics both made it politically
important to be seen to be part of the hemispheric system. Joining it
recognized and leveraged Quebec’s identity as a non-English speaking
civil law-based North American society. The Americas would be a stage
to complement and diffuse the focus on the “Francophonie” and to
assert internationally the Latin nature of one of our founding
cultures in a body that was free of French competition.
Growing domestic political constituencies with ties to the
Caribbean demanded that Canada engage as a big stick ally to the
small, English speaking island states who felt their ambitions and
interests were too often frustrated by the Hemisphere’s much larger
Spanish speaking membership.
Sixth, we needed to distribute more
widely the increasingly heavy political, moral and security load we
were carrying in Haiti, while assuring us a visible leadership role in
the effort.
Last, and most important, while few Latin American countries saw us as
authentically part of the Americas (and there was little reason they
should, given our record) virtually all genuinely welcomed our
engagement. Fledgling democracies attempting the difficult transition
from closed to open economies, they saw Canada as a helpful model.
[4]
They also saw us as singularly effective in “managing” the United
States and wanted us to help them do the same. They looked to us to
modulate American policy and to bring a non US-North American
dimension to the way that the OAS system worked.
How we did:
By and large our decade of engagement
with the Americas seems to have served these diverse sets of interests
reasonably well.
We made a modest but real contribution to the advancement of human
rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and socially sensitive
economic reform in the Hemisphere. We have helped strengthen ties
between our economy and those of the region. We have helped the
region, especially the smaller countries, to participate more
effectively in the great multilateral institutions that shape so much
of their environment. Our decade of the Americas, in
short, may have been among the most successful engagements we have
recently had in any part of the world.
But while we can take comfort from what we managed to achieve, we
certainly cannot afford to be complacent. We face a major challenge in
ensuring that the progress continues in the less receptive environment
ushered in by the new century.
The rise and decline of
Hemispheric multilateralism
The Quebec City Summit of April 2001
was the culmination of our Decade of the Americas. It was also to be
the apogee of the current efforts at hemispheric construction. A
gathering of democratically elected leaders, the Summit affirmed a
shared commitment to both democracy and free trade (in an economic
zone that was to have free access to the US market). But as with all
apogees, that Summit was the top of a down slope, in this case for
hemispheric cooperation.
There were many reasons for this decline of common purpose.
Enthusiasm for Hemispheric free trade
had already started to wane when it became clear that the new US
Administration could not deliver it.[5]
By the early years of the new decade, botched economic reforms brought
( and continue to bring) into power a number of anti free trade
governments to align with President Chavez in opposing free trade and
the market economy. Brazil‘s determined diplomatic efforts to scupper
what they saw as a US centered economic system is also bearing fruit.
Efforts to negotiate the FTAA are now condemned to irrelevance as
countries in the region, including the US, make their own more
restricted (and restrictive) trade arrangements.
Though constitutional form continues to be observed and the structures
of democratic governance remain the norm, the tide of enthusiasm for
parliamentary democracy began to ebb even before the Leaders met in
Quebec City. Hugo Chavez announced the return of populist “Caudillo
democracy” to a region that had spent the last decade desperately
trying to distance itself from the legacy of authoritarian rule and
move towards the more rules-based parliamentary model that Canada has
tried to promote. His political success (and generosity with oil) has
led other leaders to emulate (or at least to accommodate) the
“Bolivarian” model. Chavez drew his ideological inspiration from Fidel
Castro, a deeply divisive figure who is now again to be reckoned with,
at least in rhetorical terms.
The Hemisphere has also fallen far among America’s priorities except
as an active front in “the war on drugs”. It concentrates its foreign
policy on fighting Islamic terrorism. Its international economic
diplomacy is now dedicated to advancing the Doha Round and concluding
a series of politically saleable bilateral arrangements that preempt
competing regional arrangements. Rather than a region where the USA is
advancing a broad progressive agenda, it has become, once again a
place of troubles to manage, in Cuba, in Venezuela, in Bolivia, and it
now has a a regional power, Brazil, that is challenging US primacy.
Alongside these divisive
changes, all of which challenge hemispheric solidarity, is the
corrosive persistence of problems that have not found a solution
despite decades of effort by the regional community:
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The Caribbean
states are still struggling with deep economic and social problems,
and the OAS seems to be of little more help than it was before
Canada joined.
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The global
community is still struggling with the seemingly insoluble
challenges of helping Haiti to help itself, though there are now
others, like Brazil who are now sharing in that effort who were not
before.
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Deep economic
inequalities still persist throughout the region.
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Human rights are
still only tentatively enshrined in many countries.
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Narco trafficking
(and the fight against it) persists as a profound social, economic
problem, now transmuted into a political one with the election of
Evo Morales in Bolivia.
The picture is far from universally
negative however. On the positive side:
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Constitutional
forms have been observed even where change of government has been
out of cycle.
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Elections, though
often troubled, have been conducted under impartial supervision in
most countries of the region, conferring legitimacy on the
governments that were elected.
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The economies of
the region, though many are unstable in a number of cases,
continue to perform above the historic norm.
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Foreign investment
is flowing into stable and open economies, including from Canada.
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Brazil has taken
its rightful place among the emerging giants of the world economy
and is increasingly active and engaged with the global economic
system.
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Though some border
tensions continue to seethe, sometimes stoked by narco terrorism,
there are no military conflicts on any frontier in the Americas.
Where do we go from here?
Even if we did not meet all our
objectives, our modest hemispheric investment has provided real
returns. At the very minimum it has brought a major shift in
perceptions. Canada is no longer a stranger in the Hemisphere. We are
parties and partners who have earned respect if not yet affection. The
question is how to build on this legacy in the current circumstances.
The government has not yet decided. We are on rhetorical cruise
control when it comes to the region. It is now as much the private
sector as the government that is shaping our presence. Only with
Mexico are we starting to make the kinds of efforts that indicate a
wish for real engagement.
Given that the region
represents real potential for Canada, even though it continues to be
troubled, what should we do now that the impulse to common action has
lost momentum?
Our interests are unchanged. The government, however, has to
decide how much of a priority to attach to them. The International
Policy Statement was only modestly helpful on this front. It may
be time for a broader consultation among those interested in the
subject. There are now far greater numbers of Canadians who have
legitimate claims to seats at the table in such a consultation than
there were before1990. That alone may be an important and positive
result of the Decade of the Americas.
These consultations might usefully focus on the following questions,
among others.
First, if the US has lost focus in the Americas, could Canada now play
an even more important role as champion of democratic development and
transparent economic governance than it had before. Should we
reassess the emphasis we place on our hemispheric multilateralism, and
put a higher priority on strengthening the OAS system now that it is
not only down, but less dominated by what has too often been
seen as a US agenda? We have had some success in making this body a
credible instrument for shared effort. Should we not do more now that
it needs our engagement more than ever, and when we could therefore
have more influence than ever?
Second, should we not make more of an effort to shape some of our own
domestic policy priorities with a more hemispheric perspective?
Immigration is one area in which where we effectively ignore the
wealth of resources available to us in the Americas. Should we not
place more emphasis on enriching the mix of new citizens with
systematic programs in Latin America similar to those that we now have
in China and the Indian subcontinent? This is important to consider
even as a matter of simple self interest. As economic opportunities
continue to grow in the region (and as the United States continues to
become increasingly Latino in makeup) we would be well advised to
ensure we have bridges to the Americas.
Third, as we consider power relations in the increasingly global world
order, should we not place more of our diplomatic emphasis on building
up a global relationship with Brazil. It is one of the new economic
giants, along with China and India, who are coming to be important
players in shaping the world economy and the rules that govern it. Our
relationship with Brazil is almost bizzarely thin for two countries
that increasingly share so much in terms of values and geo-strategic
interest. Educational and cultural exchanges, research collaboration,
a shared effort on the global stage in defence of human rights and
peace maintenance, cooperation in multilateral economic and social
forums are all natural areas for development. Yet, we seem stuck with
a relationship too thin to withstand frictions of the kind that other
major country relationships withstand without the parties ceding their
core interests.
Fourth, can we have a more productive relationship with Latin American
countries whose economies, like ours, rely on the development and
exploitation of rich natural resources? Our resource sector is, as
noted, already deeply involved in the region. That engagement has
largely been mutually beneficial. Should Canadian governments
not also engage, making, for instance a more concerted effort to
ensure that resource management policies in the region reflect our
own? Such a convergence would serve all of us well.
Should we, lastly, not use our privileged engagement with the Americas
as leverage in our relationships elsewhere?
The EU have in the last years been working to establish close
relationships in the region. China is entering the Americas to assure
itself access to resources and markets and as part of its broader
strategy to establish its global influence. We are already in the
Americas, as members of the community, not as outside partners. Using
the advantages of incumbency should be an important part of our future
foreign policy?
Could we, for instance, use our influence in the region to press our
issues more effectively (or push back) with major powers such as EU,
China and the U.S., which have considerable leverage to bring to bear
on us?
Could we not also work better with the countries of the region to
ensure that their interests and ours are pursued effectively in the
global system, for instance in the UN and the international economic
organizations?
Could we not, conversely use our global networks of relations to
continue to build positive change in the Americas?
Could we not work more with the EU in ensuring that the Hemisphere
continues to evolve in directions that we both support, for instance
in Cuba.
Could we not work with China to help ensure that trade and investment
in the region are done on an open and sustainable basis.
Lastly, could we not cooperate more fruitfully in the Americas with
Mexico, the North American partner with whom we need to build common
purpose on many fronts? Everyone would benefit from Canada-Mexico
cooperation in the hemisphere.
It would bring a non-US, but North American dynamism to the region.
Canada would be able to enrich its own capacity for action by working
closely with a country fully of the Hispanic and aboriginal
traditions.
Mexico would be helped to move beyond the reticent engagement it has
in the hemisphere which is based in part on concern about being caught
alone between the U.S. and Latin America.
A win-win all around, if we took the opportunity.
The foregoing provides
some ideas for a new approach to the Americas but others will have
their own perspectives on where we should be heading. It is time to
hear from them.
Footnotes:
Nor were we able to make a significant region for ourselves out of
the “Asia Pacific”.
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Article: The writing was on the wall! Implications of the Hamas
victory
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by
Tami Amanda Jacoby
The recent landslide victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement
(HAMAS) in Palestinian legislative elections on January 25, 2006
should be no surprise to anybody following the key fissures in the
Palestinian areas erupting over the last few years. The writing was on
the wall as student and Chamber of Commerce elections, as well as
public opinion polls, consistently demonstrated, year after year,
overwhelming support for Hamas over the ruling Fatah party in Gaza and
areas of the West Bank. The electoral results punctuated a reality
that was long concealed. What accounts for widespread support for the
Hamas?
During the peace process era, the chasm between the haves and
have-nots widened as Fatah party officials pocketed donor funds,
evaded public accountability, and a myriad of self-preservationist
security services cracked down on opponents with utter contempt for
the rule of law. Palestinian officials negotiated with Israel at a
time when the continuation of Jewish settlement activity and
unilateral measures such as Israel’s security barrier and targeted
assassinations rendered joint work increasingly unpopular. These
actions resulted in the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the
Palestinian people.
Owing to the bankruptcy, both political and economic, of the
Palestinian National Authority, Hamas gradually built a power base at
the grassroots level through a loosely knit group of operatives
functioning clandestinely and openly recruiting through mosques and a
comprehensive network of social welfare services. These institutions
obtained loyalties in exchange for badly needed relief at a time when
basic services were unavailable from the main governing bodies. As a
result, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the entire peace process
were undermined by a more radical agenda that spread like a cancer
throughout the Palestinian areas and funneled in to the transnational
development of radical Islam.
The ramifications of the Hamas victory are as yet unknown although a
number of scenarios are possible. On one hand and for the first time
ever, Palestinians elected a government that represents the popular
will. In this respect, it was the first authentic exercise of
democracy in the history of the Arab world. However, democracy does
not necessarily bring with it a more progressive or enlightened
agenda. The Hamas is not, in itself, a democratic entity and is no
model of harmonious relations. Palestinian support for Hamas was
motivated for the most part, by frustrations over the failed Oslo
Peace Process, continued Israeli control, oppression on the part of
their own police state, and abandonment by neighbouring Arab
countries. For many Palestinians, Hamas is a protest vote that,
although highly controversial, represents the hope of a better future,
one in which corruption, nepotism, lawlessness, poverty and oppression
are things of the past. If the Hamas comes through on its promise of
Palestinian institutional reform and transparency, the very changes
long demanded by the United States and its allies, it may well provide
the needed internal stability that will fulfill the long-sought after
Palestinian objective of national self-determination.
On the other hand, Hamas has the potential to destabilize the entire
region by escalating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and transforming
the Palestinian areas into breeding grounds for international
terrorism. Democratic government is only possible in a peaceful
society. While the religion of Islam calls for tolerance and peace,
Hamas promotes extremism and war. Hamas is ultimately, a ruthless and
radical Islamic fundamentalist movement whose founding charter calls
for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamist
state over every inch of Palestine. The Hamas deals ruthlessly with
anyone suspected of collaborating with Israel and views with contempt
visions of a secular ideological alternative.
Supported by fundamentalist Iran, the Hamas is designated within the
overall global war against terrorism as a terrorist entity by the
United States, Canada, the EU, and Australia. Hamas activists, through
the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted countless
large-scale suicide attacks and other forms of indiscriminate
slaughter of innocent civilians in Israel. Hamas was responsible for
67% of suicide bomb attacks between 2000 and 2005 (sometimes in
collaboration with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad) resulting in
thousands of Israeli casualties. Hamas shows no sign of changing its
mandate to recognize Israel and engage in peaceful negotiations in the
near future.
The key question is whether Hamas will resolve the contradiction
between its internal and external agenda. On one hand, Hamas remains
committed to the uncompromising platform of national struggle for all
of Palestine. On the other hand, Hamas must now fulfill its
obligations to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian
people. Governance requires compromise. So does international
legitimacy. If Hamas does not redefine its politics, it will be
refused entry into the international community and denied access to
funding, which can only undermine plans to redistribute wealth and
build a platform for statehood. The international community can only
hope that Hamas will moderate its stance in office, thereby opening
the doors to collaboration with alternative leadership candidates,
structures, and ideas that are more moderate and untainted by the ills
of any previous governing body.
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Article: The North
American Cocoon
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by
Gordon Smith
It is quite remarkable. The last
election campaign barely touched on anything beyond our borders. One
might think we lived in a North American cocoon. Actually, even that
would be too broad a conception, as even Mexico was never mentioned,
to the best of my knowledge.
Of course, relations with the United
States were mentioned, with the winning Conservatives saying they
should be improved. Even before the new government took office,
however, the Prime Minister-designate as he was then known, had to
tell the American Ambassador we didn’t need to be lectured on whether
we needed icebreaking capability in OUR North. And then the US
military in Baghdad shot at a convoy transporting the Canadian Charge
d’Affaires and other Canadians. The US said the convoy ignored orders
to stop; this was flatly rejected by the Canadians who were fortunate
not to have been wounded or even killed.
The US is our “best friend”, it is
often said. But countries have interests, not friends. The key in
managing our relationship with the US is never to lose sight of our
national interests. The US certainly won’t now or in the future, and
nor should we be captured - either by our emotions (rhetorically
bashing the latest excess from Washington) or wishful thinking (if
only the US elections were sooner and the Democrats in power).
In short, Canada lives in an
increasingly small world and needs to interact with it. As James
Rosenau points out, it is a world of “fragmegration” (fragmentation
and integration occurring at the same time), the “intermestic” nature
of policy (the international and the domestic are increasingly meshed)
and “distant proximities” (events seemingly far away can have an
immediate bearing on our lives).
Let us hope that the new government
does not commission a large number of basic policy reviews. Policy is
made and not written about in abstraction by committee. White papers
are usually laborious to produce, bland as to their practical
implications and soon forgotten.
The reality is that Canada has
limited assets in the international arena. They must be harnessed to
work together. I would hope the hugely unpopular decision to split
Foreign Affairs and International Trade would be reversed without
delay. I would also like to see Canada’s development assistance as a
critical arm of foreign policy.
There are many issues in the world
over which Canada has no influence, but about which Canada is often
asked for opinion. It reduces our political credibility, however, if
we make hortatory statements which will inevitably be ignored outside
our borders.
As an example of a major
international problem, let me take the Middle East. The victory of
Hamas in the Palestinian elections has obviously complicated the
situation in the Middle East, and raises many questions. Should
donors, including Canada, turn off the aid spigot ($1B US a year)
until Hamas changes its declaratory policy on the use of violence and
the elimination of Israel? Or should donors continue providing
assistance to a duly elected Palestinian administration, counting on
positive incentives and realities of holding power to change Hamas?
This is a tough choice, and one on
which the new government will hear from Canadians. I would urge those
interested to read Graham Fuller’s book entitled Political Islam.
Fuller is a former CIA official specializing in the Middle East who
now lives in Canada. He argues the political Islam is a reality with
which we will have to come to terms. It does not imply accepting
violence as part of politics but dealing with people who may have been
terrorists in the past, and tolerating other than traditional western
forms of democracy.
In the Middle East, the key decisions
will be taken by the Quartet (the UN, US, EU and Russia). Canada
should try to influence these decisions by having its own position and
by being ready to take a specific role in the process. We could, for
example, concentrate on the issue of water, or refugees. The point is
to choose a few global issues which we have knowledge of and
experience in, and devote significant intellectual and financial
capital on them, accepting we are not centre stage or unlimited in
capacities.
CDFAI has long argued for a foreign
policy based on national interests – which is not to say that values
should be ignored. Canada is largely made up of immigrants from
various parts of the world, however, and Canadians hardly share a
common perception of their national interests. Many Canadians press
the point of view of their specific group, and it is a real challenge
to balance various groups’ pressures. We need hard-nosed thinking as
to where Canadian interests really lie, especially in
Israeli-Palestinian issues.
The Conservatives have stated
unequivocally that Canada’s climate change policy should not be
determined by the Kyoto regime but should be “made in Canada” instead.
A national policy should be formulated for greenhouse gas emissions
reductions, as well as an energy policy which would ensure a maximum
benefit from the use of technology.
There are opportunities here. Kyoto
extension is going nowhere as the US will never participate without
China and India being included, and that won’t happen. The US wants a
“made in the US” approach to greenhouse gas reductions. The US is not
arguing that climate change is a figment of the imagination and that
human behaviour does not contribute to the problem; the point is that
we should not stick only to a Kyoto type approach. Canada could
take a lead in developing a better approach, which would be more
acceptable to the countries now outside the Kyoto protocol. Canada is
eminently suited for a role as broker of an international agreement on
a controversial issue like cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
We can expect the new Government to
be sensitive to the fact that the US is obviously preoccupied by its
security and the “war on terrorism”. This effects Canada in many ways.
The threat that weapons of mass destruction might one day be used by
terrorists adds seriously to the problem. Regimes to constrain
non-proliferation need to be strengthened (Iran will be a good test
case), and we in the West (not just the US) have a major problem with
extreme violent Islamists.
In trying to forge international
agreements on security, it is important, however, to remember that
security can be defined in different ways in different parts of the
world. For example, many more people are killed in internal conflicts
than by terrorists. Canada could help the international community
achieve a broader global understanding of the various security needs
and challenges.
There are far too many poor people in
the world; this creates problems of global consequence. A researcher
at the Centre for Global Studies has established, for example, that
there was in Pakistan a clear link between poverty and terrorist
behaviour – something I know will be a controversial finding.
Reducing poverty and inequity in the world is of great importance to
improving world security, however, and needs more collaboration and
imagination on a global level than has thus far been achieved. This is
something to which Canadians could make a crucial contribution,
considering their skills and vast experience in building capacity in
developing countries.
It is to be hoped that the new
Government will continue its predecessor’s efforts to strengthen the
world’s capacity to meet global challenges. This includes the reform
of international institutions and the creation of both formal and
informal networks (see the writings of Anne-Marie Slaughter and
Jean-Francois Rischard). There is increasing interest in the idea of a
L20 on which Prime Minister Harper can build.
Finally, another subject dear to
CDFAI, we must take on board the reality that our armed forces – and
diplomats (Glyn Berry has recently been buried as this is written) –
are now on the front line. They should be given the appropriate
equipment and resources to cope with this reality, once the government
specifies its priorities and the roles it foresees for Canada on a
global stage.
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ARTICLE: PUTTING PUBLIC SERVANTS IN HARM’S WAY: DILEMMAS OF THE
DEMOCRATIC STATE IN A VIOLENT AND UNCERTAIN WORLD
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by Denis Stairs
On 15 January a suicide
bomber, apparently Taliban-inspired, detonated a car stuffed with
explosives alongside a Mercedes “G Wagon” patrol jeep occupied by
members of Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar,
Afghanistan. Glyn R. Berry, a senior Canadian foreign service officer
and the PRT’s political director, was killed instantly,[i]
and the three soldiers who were his companions in the vehicle were
grievously wounded. Several Afghan civilians also died, and early
press reports indicated that at least nine others were injured.
The Minister of National
Defence, Bill Graham, had warned Canadians weeks before that the
Kandahar operation would be dangerous, and casualties were likely. So
had senior military officers, and they have continued to do so
repeatedly throughout the build-up of Canadian forces in the theatre
to their current level of some 2,200 personnel.[ii]
Notwithstanding the
warnings, however, Mr. Berry’s death came as a profound shock – and
not least of all to Foreign Affairs Canada. This can be explained in
part as a natural response to the sudden loss in dramatic
circumstances of a close friend and greatly admired colleague. But it
also seems possible that the foreign service itself was caught be
surprise. It had known, of course, what the dangers were. But its
knowing was of the abstract sort – the sort that leads the wise and
the thoughtful to insist in a policy meeting that the hazards be
carefully weighed when recommendations to government are being
thrashed out. Such knowing is important, even essential, to the making
of responsible decisions. It is not, however, the knowing that comes
from real experience. Canadian diplomats had often been in tight spots
and dangerous environments before. But none had perished as the
direct result of a hostile act of political violence. With Mr. Berry’s
death, the realities in Kandahar lost their abstract cover. They were
really real.
It is reasonable in the
light of all this to speculate that the Department, since the middle
of January, has been reviewing its position and second-guessing
itself, if not formally, then certainly in quiet corridor
conversations and in solitary rounds of soul-searching. In assessing
the options, in consulting with cognate departments, ultimately in
advising the government, had it given the risks their proper weight?
Were the objectives at issue clear enough, significant enough, to
warrant taking the hazards on? That the Canadians in the theatre were
doing magnificent work – professionally, selflessly and with courage –
could not be denied. That at least some Afghans would suffer much
less misery in their lives because of it could not be denied either.
Moreover, those who were actually doing the job – Mr. Berry included –
were clearly willing as individuals to accept the sacrifices involved,
including in extremis the greatest sacrifice of all. But in the
end they were there not as private individuals but in their capacity
as public servants[iii],
and their presence was a consequence of government policy. That being
so, the question had to be asked: Were the prospects of long-term gain
sufficiently promising to justify the effort – and the cost? Should
Foreign Affairs, in short, have recommended differently.
Given the tendency of
Canadians to think their foreign policies should manifest their
‘values’, they might be wise to reflect on the tragedy that has
befallen Mr. Berry and his family, and reconsider the criteria they
need to apply in assessing their country’s operations abroad.
Especially in cases where government policy places public servants
(uniformed or otherwise) in physical jeopardy, they must surely ask
whether the desire to ‘do good’ in the world is a sufficient ground in
itself for authorizing hazardous deployments. This is because the
perils involved are borne not by the Canadians (and public opinion
polls would indicate that there are many of them) who hold such
preferences, but by others – by professionals whose job it is to
implement the policies of government authorities.
It should be remembered
that in any liberal democratic society (and some, like Lloyd Axworthy,
would universalize the proposition to argue that the same should be
true of all societies), the first responsibility of those who
govern is always to serve the interests of the citizens over whom they
preside. In the case of liberal states, this obligation is reflected
most obviously and tangibly in the structure of government
institutions. Intellectually, these are founded in the western
tradition of liberal political philosophy. Practically, they are
imbedded in constitutional arrangements, practices and conventions
that are designed to ensure that those who govern do so to advance not
simply what they perceive to be their own interests, but more
importantly the interests of the citizenry at large. Since persons of
power cannot be counted on to behave in this fashion on the basis of
goodwill alone, we have contrived through the electoral process and
myriad other protections to ensure that our political leaders will
understand that serving the public interest is in their own interest
as well. If they fail in that understanding, or if they lose track of
it, they know they will be fired.
It follows from all this
that governments in Ottawa have a duty to ascertain that a substantial
and significant Canadian interest is at stake before they can
reasonably authorize the deployment of their personnel to dangerously
violent environments abroad. The interest at issue has to be
“substantial and significant” because the burdens that may have to be
borne by those in the field – loss of life, limb, or long-term health
among them – are extremely severe. Making Canadians feel good about
their country’s well-intended internationalism is not an objective
that can meet by itself this “substantial significance” test. Neither
(I would argue) would an objective aimed primarily at reinforcing the
influence of Canadian diplomacy at the headquarters of the United
Nations, or in the councils of NATO, or in the capitals of important
allies.
It should be noted here
that the justificatory requirements are much less demanding in cases
where the expenditure of government assets bears only on public
treasure, and not on the lives of public servants. In the case of
development assistance, for example, making at least some Canadians
‘feel good’ can be an acceptable rationale, provided only that the
expenditures are not so extensive as to involve an ‘opportunity cost’
that deprives other Canadians at home of services, like health care,
that they understandably regard as vital. In such cases, governments
are free, within reasonable limits, to be generous to others with
Canada’s public funds because at least part of the citizenry is asking
them to be so. Other rationales, more utilitarian in character, can
also be persuasive, provided they are empirically convincing. If
development assistance promotes trade, enhances Canada’s image in the
world at large, supports its diplomacy in the U.N. General Assembly,
avoids embarrassment in the OECD, wins Ottawa a seat at the table in
organizations that it wishes to encourage abroad, and so on, then the
expenditures involved (if they are not out wildly out of proportion)
are easily defended. They can be defended, too, if persuasive
evidence can be mounted to show that improving the conditions in which
populations have to live overseas also serves in the end to increase
the security of Canadians at home.
But where the lives of
public employees may be placed in serious jeopardy, much stronger
tests are necessary. In the final analysis, these tests boil down to
the requirement that the risk be assumed because it is necessary to
the enhancement of national security – to the defence (direct or
indirect) of the realm and of those who reside within it. As
individuals, those who volunteer for service in the Canadian Forces
may be responding to any of a multiplicity of incentives – the
prospect of learning a trade, seeing the world, operating complex
equipment, working miracles with esoteric electronics, enjoying the
rewards of membership on the team, ‘making a difference’ where the
challenges are great and ‘making a difference’ really counts, and all
the rest. But when their lives are seriously and predictably on the
line, a government can justify their deployment only by reference to
the increased level of security – Canadian security – that it
expects will ultimately result. Other purposes, more mundane purposes,
may also be served. But as justifications they are not enough.
It is precisely this
circumstance that makes deployment decisions so very difficult in the
current environment, especially for countries that have limited
capacities and know they cannot by themselves have a decisive impact
on outcomes. The world, as usual, is disordered, but the game itself
is prosecuted by a far more variegated collection of players than the
ones we associate with the traditional state system. Many of the
adversaries are non-state actors. Some of them – not all – are loosely
co-ordinated, but their networks are both shadowy and transnational.
Their motives, moreover, are mixed, and the mixtures are different
respectively for leaders and followers. Some of their purposes may be
clear, but others are difficult to pin down. Since their conventional
military capabilities are meagre, the political techniques they employ
as a substitute are those of transnational guerilla warfare
(techniques that are often unhelpfully subsumed under the heading of
“terror”). Some of these, in some locations, fit the traditional ‘hit,
run, and-hide-in-the-mountains’ pattern. Others are targeted to the
vulnerabilities of urban modernity.
The problem for
decision-makers is that the consequences of any physical intervention
in response to challenges of this sort are uncertain, and the
cause-and-effect linkages between the intervention itself and security
conditions at home are both indirect and highly unreliable. The
results cannot be predicted. They may even turn out to be
counterproductive. Under such circumstances, the interventionist
enterprise is enveloped by the curse of ambiguity, and in a democratic
society this is certain to generate debates that cannot be resolved in
the abstract. The uncertainties, moreover, are not confined to the
untutored and the uninformed. They afflict the professionals in the
policy community as well.
Governments in the
liberal world have experienced such problems often enough before, in
recent times most tragically (if somewhat differently) in the context
of the American intervention in Vietnam. But in Afghanistan, and in
other cases like it, the difficulty may be worse. Perhaps the
intervention will both weaken the Taliban and win the locals over. But
it may just as easily weaken the Taliban only at first, and then
strengthen it again by intensifying resentment, both locally and far
away, of the muscular aliens who have come to do the stabilizing job.
Again, the involvement specifically of Canada in the intervening
coalition may well win Ottawa credit in Brussels, Washington and
elsewhere, but it may also render Canadians at home much less secure
than before by making them targets for guerilla attack. Will the
Kandahar operation serve, in the end, to moderate the politics, or
have the opposite effect and radicalize it? On these questions, and
others like them, there are many who have strong convictions. But
their convictions are not the same, and the reality is that no one
really knows.
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