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Article: Engaging the Obama Administration

by  Derek Burney

Derek H. Burney is a Senior Strategic Advisor for Ogilvy Renault LLP in Ottawa, the Chair of CanWest Global Communications, Chairman of the GardaWorld International Advisory Board, a Visiting Professor and Senior Distinguished Fellow at Carleton University.

Barack Obama’s visit to Ottawa restored an important tradition of U.S. Presidents making Canada their first international port of call. The timing could not have been more apt. With the global economy sinking deeper into recession, and the unrelenting flow of bad news, there has seldom been a greater need for bold and creative leadership to make the best of a relationship that is the lifeblood of the Canadian economy and the foundation of our security.
 

Judging from the public aspects, notably the joint Press Conference, the two leaders had a constructive discussion and set some clear direction for future collaboration. Canada now has a unique opportunity to build on the positive tone with a more inspired sense of partnership. In briefing U.S. journalists on their return from the Ottawa meeting, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg described the tone of the meeting as “excellent”, adding, significantly, that “there was not a narrow focus on little issues. It was really a very strategic discussion, two countries that had common problems and were looking for common solutions.” That is the most effective manner of engagement. What is also noteworthy is that key Ministers are being tasked to ensure that effective action follows on the key issues of economic recovery, energy and the environment and global security, including primarily Afghanistan. As Jim Travers observed recently in the Toronto Star, it is now up to the Prime Minister to decide “what Canada wants most from the U.S. and (to go) after it with the singular passion and energy politicians usually reserve for the pursuit of power.”

Managing relations with the U.S. is the most vital element of Canadian foreign policy. In fact, it transcends foreign and touches virtually every aspect of our domestic policy as well. Equally, this all-pervasive relationship usually arouses strong, sometimes visceral, emotions among Canadians which in turn pose serious challenges to those in government. These attitudes or neuroses rarely converge with reason. More often than not, they prompt our government to try to “keep some distance” or seek to differentiate from the U.S. in order to accentuate our differences. Not surprisingly, therefore, periods of substantial collaboration at the government level have been spasmodic. Even though history demonstrates tangible success from a positive approach - whether on trade or the environment or security - the political rewards on the homefront tend to be elusive. Canadians may generally expect their government to manage this relationship effectively but they have profoundly different views on how this should be done. Minority governments do not make matters any easier.

The arrival of a new administration and a new Congress in Washington provides a golden opportunity to recalibrate Canada’s relationship with the United States and engage its political leadership in the pursuit of a mutually beneficial agenda. We need to resist the temptation of presenting the Obama administration with a wish list of things we want the U.S. to do for us. Resist, too, the temptation to whine over irritants. Instead, we need a strategy rooted in Canada’s national interest that embraces issues where Canadian and U.S. interests intersect and where firm direction and mature dialogue would deliver results. Given that Obama is even more popular in Canada than he is in the U.S., I believe that our government has greater latitude than ever in initiating a substantive dialogue, at least for now.

Understandably, much of the discussion between the Prime Minister and the President focussed on the immediate task of working sensibly to chart a path out of the deepening economic recession – not with disruptive lunges into protectionism but with actions that enhance the heavily integrated nature of our two economies and give confidence to consumers and investors alike. No two countries have greater potential to cooperate pragmatically on the economic agenda but short-sighted, unilateral manoeuvres by either can be damaging to both. Made in the U.S. policies or “me too”made in Canada mirrors of those policies will not get the job done.

Both countries have adopted stimulus packages of unprecedented size. Only time will tell if they will succeed in lifting us out of the grips of the deepest recession in a generation. If cooperation fails to take hold, the dangers for Canada would be massive. The Buy American provisions in both the House and the Senate stimulus bills were clear examples of the risks. These may not have been aimed at us but, as is so often the case, Canada would have been sideswiped by them. The ideal solution was obviously to eliminate the Buy American conditions altogether. Robust efforts made by the government, vigorous lobbying by a powerful coalition in Washington and, no doubt, the decisive intervention of President Obama produced a compromise, requiring conformity with the U.S. international trade obligations. Not perfect by any means but, if implemented in good faith, this should help prevent the unravelling of our integrated North American market.

The difficult birth of the U.S. stimulus package revealed much about the dynamics of power in Washington. The President should not have been surprised by the antics in Congress. The powerful message of change that carried him to victory in November hit some serious speed bumps along the Washington beltway. It was the “full Monty” of partisan politics on display. (No wonder he chose to visit Canada … in February.) After his appeals for bipartisanship fell on deaf Congressional ears, the President displayed impressive skill using the bully pulpit to rally public support. The resulting legislation is a heavy mish-mash, a product of the Washington sausage factory. But the important point is that Obama’s popularity carried the day. The stimulus bill is not the end of the story. The financial sector rescue, the housing packages and the measures to be proposed for the automotive sector still pose stern challenges for presidential leadership. What is certain, however, is that the future of the Obama presidency now hinges squarely on the success or failure of the package as a whole.

The economic challenges in the U.S. are actually more severe than those in Canada. Problems in finance – public and private – underscore the adage that, particularly in America, “nothing exceeds like excess.” But, as Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney has stated, it is important to remember that we need the U.S. to succeed because our future prospects for growth depend directly on the strength and stability of the U.S. economy.

The gravity of the economic challenges does not mean that the American market model is shattered. But their system of financial regulation may be. Sensible reform and more effective oversight to prevent excesses at all levels is urgently needed and corporations need to recognise that they have obligations that transcend short-term profit objectives. A new “era of responsibility” is definitely in order.

There is cynicism and fear at all levels – and not just about government – and no sign yet that the flurry of rescue packages will restore confidence or stability. Each day brings more grim news. This will pass eventually but the effect may be like that of kidney stones before real relief is apparent. Even pessimists have to believe that the massive amounts of funding being dispersed will ultimately have some salutary effect.

Apart from the need for concerted action to spur recovery, and for vigilance against the perennial peril of protectionism, the most urgent bilateral issue calling for more inspired leadership is the growing congestion along our so-called “undefended” border. Too many new procedures, fees and obstacles have been added, all in the name of security, but equally all serving to frustrate and delay efficient movements of people and goods between our two countries.

The border hassle is a problem that would benefit from more balance between legitimate concerns about security and the underlying mutual benefit to be derived from smooth access across our border. Initiatives to make the border “smart” have, more often than not, led to dumb and increasingly dumber impediments. Ironically, while many Europeans have succeeded in dismantling virtually all internal border control procedures, Canada and the U.S. are marching sternly in the opposite direction. That makes no sense. Border security has become, in a sense, economic protectionism wearing a new dress. The infrastructure at our border is as antiquated as the procedures for entry and exit. We should be making creative use of technology and the infrastructure stimulus to establish new, more efficient, customs facilities, introducing 21st Century pilot projects at the new Detroit-Windsor bridge and at Gateways on the West and East Coast that could serve as models for wholesale reform.

The security dimension is important and not just for the U.S. As our Prime Minister signalled explicitly in the joint Press Conference - and mainly for American listeners - we see any threat against the U.S. as a threat against Canada and will act accordingly. It was reassuring, too, that the President acknowledged the importance of coming to grips with border issues.

But, when the new Director of Homeland Security stated that the Canada-U.S.border is “a greater terrorist threat than the Mexican border”, we need to react in a straightforward fashion. (Presumably, the increasingly violent drug war near Mexico’s northern border arouses concern of a different kind.) In any event, we need to separate myths and perceptions about our border from facts and real flaws. Where there are identifiable gaps in our system, they need to be closed.

We have a long history of intelligence cooperation with the U.S. It should be enhanced with more consistent, more efficient and more coordinated surveillance mechanisms. Security is, at its heart, a matter of mutual trust. We should also explore the scope for more stringent security procedures on our perimeter – our external borders – extending NORAD to land and sea, as well as air, in order to ease monitoring and congestion along our internal border.

If this requires a certain amount of harmonization on things like immigration and refugee policies as well, that too should be explored. The benefits far outweigh the allure of differentiation for the sake of differentiation. Dramatic action is needed but it will only happen if there is firm and persistent political will from the top to break the ‘iron rice bowl’ mentality that feeds current practices.

And, speaking of iron rice bowls, we have literally hundreds of different regulations affecting products from virtually every sector of our economy – including, notably, some of the most integrated ones like autos – that serve no practical or public policy purpose other than to preserve a few jobs and give some officials the distinct claim of being different.

Examples range from differences on frozen orange juice to seat belts, threat immobilization devices, meat grading and health standards for livestock. All beg the basic question “Why must they be different for Canadians and Americans?”

There is regulatory sludge in the energy sector as well. The fact that hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on the MacKenzie pipeline before one inch of pipe has been laid speaks for itself.

When it comes to financial regulations, however, as Newsweek recently reported and President Obama himself acknowledged, there are things we do in Canada that Americans may wish to emulate.

There should be a concerted effort to harmonize regulations and standards where it makes ractical sense to do so.

One of the most significant outcomes of the Obama visit to Ottawa was the commitment to pursue a dialogue on clean energy with emphasis on new R&D, new technologies and a more efficient electricity grid. I am encouraged that the two leaders signalled a desire to explore a more practical route to progress on what are really two sides of the same coin and which also bear fundamentally on our mutual need for economic recovery. In both Canada and the U.S., policies affecting energy and the environment cry out for coherence and prudence. If we continue to tackle the challenges on each with a spaghetti bowl of different approaches at the state, provincial and federal levels – we will undermine both our integrated economy and our shared environment.

What do we know about the energy and climate change priorities of the Obama Administration? To call them ambitious would be an understatement.

From a Canadian perspective, the most significant proposals are to: 

• eliminate the U.S.’s current oil imports from the Middle East and Venezuela

• combined within 10 years;

• increase fuel economy and vehicle emission standards;

• establish a national low carbon fuel standard and bio-fuels mandate;

• ensure that 10 percent of U.S. electricity comes from renewable sources by 2012, and 25 percent by 2025;

• prioritize the construction of the Alaska natural gas pipeline;

• and implement an economy wide cap and trade program to reduce greenhouse gas

• emissions by 80 percent by the year 2050.

No-one should underestimate the challenges the President will face in moving any of these proposals through Congress. He is not the first by any means to advocate “energy independence”. “Coal” and “car” states most affected by carbon caps are already hurting. They are “swing” states to boot and the next Congressional elections are only 21 months away.

What the two leaders seemed to acknowledge in Ottawa was that: 

• Reducing Greenhouse gases is not just about reducing demand, but increasing clean energy supply;

• Reducing emissions is going to take time and technology;

• Climate Change is not just about cleaner transportation and heating fuel, but cleaner electrical power – not just oil, but coal;

• Both countries intend to keep competitiveness concerns in mind – not just between

• Canadian and U.S.-based firms; but between firms doing business in our integrated economy and those located in the rest of the world, including in China, India, and neighbouring Mexico; and

• North American leadership on climate change will be futile, in the absence of meaningful participation from the developing world, particularly the major emitters.

It was interesting to hear President Obama speak about the carbon footprint of not just the oil sands but also coal. With good reason: data for 2005 shows that emissions from the thermal power plants in each of 27 American states individually exceeded the total emissions from the oil sands. Total emissions that year from America’s predominantly coal-fired power plants were more than 50 times greater than from the entire oil sands complex. Emissions from American landfills were 4 times greater. Emissions generated by the U.S. cattle herd alone in 2005 outstripped the oil sands by 3 times.

These statistics in no way diminish the challenge of the oil sands, particularly in light of future development. What they do show, however, is that Canada and the U.S. have a joint responsibility to develop technologies that reduce the carbon footprint from fossil fuels of all kinds.

Prior to the recent meeting, there was much talk about Canada seeking some sort of exemption for the oil sands. Others were making hollow threats about turning off the taps flowing south. The issue of energy security should be about Canada being part of the solution to the twin American objectives of reducing its dependence on less reliable sources of oil and increasing its supply of clean power. It should not be a threat. Nor is it much of a lever for Canada in any event, as Andre Plourde of the University of Alberta, among others, has stated. A bluff may work on occasion in poker but rarely in international commerce.

That being stated, we need to ensure that we are not taken for granted as the primary supplier to the U.S. market to which the major oil companies are and will undoubtedly be fully committed. We need every bit of negotiating leverage that we can muster. It would help, therefore, if we were to establish the necessary infrastructure to diversify our customer base for energy exports and encourage new investment from additional energy customers, notably those in the increasingly important Asian economies. The value chain economics and basic demand forces have to work of course but the best leverage of all is when there are competing demands for what we produce.

A recent study published for the Canada West Foundation urged the broadening of our energy horizon and the launch of discussions for a North Pacific Energy Framework including Canada, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. Discussions within such a framework would provide Canada with the opportunity to defend a more robust international trading system for energy aligned with Canadian interests. In my view, the study’s recommendations warrant serious study. I might question whether a new organization is the best approach; others will quail at the thought of entering into any agreements with the Russians or the Chinese. But, fresh thinking and new direction are needed. Business as usual is the not the answer for energy or any sector.

Where does our government stand? Last month, Environment Minister Jim Prentice laid out the government’s strategy. It is to make environment policies instruments of economic renewal and national development; and to engage the U.S. as much as possible in a coordinated approach.

He made the case that a shared reduction target and common cap and trade system would respond pragmatically to concerns on both sides of the border about climate change and competitiveness; and to the reality that 10% of Canada’s GHG emissions are from energy products we export to the U.S. He pointed out that a cap and trade system is a necessary but not sufficient tool. We need to work as well on shared targets on low carbon power generation, a biofuel mandate, fuel efficiency standards and even a low carbon transportation fuel standard for all of North America based on emissions measured over the complete lifecycle from production to tailpipe. In sum, a Canada-U.S. agreement on energy and climate change should begin with a serious dialogue and a degree of coordination leading to shared targets and timetables, standards and mandates rooted in science and common sense, and ideally a common carbon market.

But, first and foremost, we need a clear consensus in Canada, notably between Alberta and the Federal Government, on measures that would be effective and yet not catastrophic at a time of recession. That would improve the prospect for an intelligent accord with the U.S. We also need to work diligently with the U.S. Administration and the Congress to ensure that their environmental initiatives (Green America) do not translate into new forms of protectionism.

The government is also committed to work towards an effective multilateral climate change agreement. A common Canada and U.S. strategy on climate change would significantly strengthen our joint hands multilaterally. Effective means that all major emitters of green house gases have to be part of the agreement. This means China, India, Mexico among others have to be on board for any agreement to make sense. Credible U.S. leadership will be critical to any global consensus.

We have to get this one right. It will be tricky, extremely tough and very time consuming but the rewards of getting it right should be patently clear to each of you. Just as clear as the damage we can do to one another through neglect or myopic actions by one without regard to the other.

The Arctic is a region where Canada and the United States have shared interests and common responsibilities not only on energy and the environment but also, (as recent Russian antics suggest), on security as well. Without compromising our respective legal claims in any way, we should give clearer commitments and a sharper focus to the stewardship needs of our joint northern perimeter.

The potential for a more inspired partnership across a range of major issues is clear. It is now a matter of will, persistence and leadership. Personalities can make a difference. Remember, though, that the substance of our relationship – economic, security, environment – transcends personalities and is deeper and richer than that of any other bilateral relationship. These very same national interests should rise above narrow partisan posturing in Canada. Moreover, for a new U.S. Administration looking for early momentum to deal with major challenges – domestic and global – what better place to start than with its Northern neighbour. A time of economic crisis may in fact be the best time politically for bold, bilateral action. I agree with Obama’s Chief of Staff who said, “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.”

The lead will have to come from Canada and will require equal parts of patience and perseverance on the part of our Prime Minister. If, however, we choose to be “correct” rather than inspired, we should not be surprised if we elicit little more than a polite acknowledgement of our existence essentially as the source of much of America’s cold weather.

There is, potentially, a broader dividend from a bold, strategic approach. Those who crave a stronger role by Canada in world affairs should never forget that our most important outlet for influence on global affairs is in Washington. And influence in Washington can give us real, not rhetorical, influence globally. Our involvement and sacrifice in Afghanistan gives us more credibility than many in helping the U.S. find a solution that is comprehensive and not exclusively military, and which ultimately transfers responsibility to the Afghans themselves. We should reinforce the diplomatic and more intensive civilian approach the U.S. is now adopting in order to validate our sacrifices to date and bring greater stability to one of, if not, the most dangerous place on the planet. That is very much in the Canadian tradition of diplomacy. We also have common interests in our own hemisphere and on many other international issues where

a combination of trust, credibility and respect can yield real influence.

Obama does have an enormous reservoir of good will from which to draw. He is refreshingly smart, articulate and cool under pressure – all prime qualities of leadership. (And, he even likes beaver tails!) His election sent a powerful message to the world about American democracy. As his reception in Canada showed, many people, including many non-Americans, want him to be successful. He offers a genuine beacon of hope at a time of great pessimism about both politics and economics. The customary optimism and resilience of Americans is being tested now as never before and I believe it is very much in Canada’s interest to do what we can to rekindle those qualities, move bilateral relations to a stronger footing and help restore the best of

America to the world.

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Article: Geopolitics Today

by Barry Cooper

Barry Cooper, FRSC, is a Professor of Political Science, Fellow of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

Geopolitics today is more that a fancy word for international relations and encompasses much more than the impact of geography on politics. A Google search, for example, turns up 2.6 million references. At the other end of the scholarly spectrum, Routledge has published every quarter for the past decade and a half a wide-ranging scholarly journal, Geopolitics. The implications of geopolitical analyses are often counterintuitive but sufficiently thought-provoking to be of interest to readers of “The Dispatch.”

First, a bit of history. The term was invented by a Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellen, early in the twentieth century. He based his argument on that of a German geographer, Freidrich Ratzel, whose Political Geography appeared in 1897. Clearly, something was in the intellectual air because in 1904 Sir Halford Mackinder began publishing a series of papers discussing what he called his geopolitical “heartland theory.” Mackinder developed his argument in part as a response to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s account of “sea power” (a term Mahan invented) in world history.  Mackinder’s basic insight was that the world is divided into the World Island, Eurasia and Africa or “the Core,” and the Periphery, the Americas, the British Isles, and Oceania.      

The difference in size between the two parts meant that, in Mackinder’s famous aphorism: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island commands the world.” Despite changes and modifications made necessary by airpower and other technologies, his doctrine influenced strategic thinking during the interwar period, especially when it was associated with Nazi propaganda regarding Lebensraum, and during the Cold War. Once the Nazi stigma was overcome, beginning in the 1980s, and the impact of new technologies (ICBMs, space-based assets, and cyberspace, for example) was assessed, geopolitical strategic thinking undertook a second sailing.

The assumptions underlying contemporary geopolitics are not wildly improbable. The first is that foreign policy actors face limited choices, but by and large they rationally pursue their national self-interest. In this respect geopolitics is similar to a market, where players also (more or less) act in rational and self-interested ways. Of course, there are exceptions. Businessmen occasionally shoot the goose that lays the golden eggs and political leaders occasionally make spectacular blunders in the execution of foreign policy. But usually they simply follow the expected and constrained conduct of a leader typical of their country.

This means that any given leader is constrained by pretty much the same impersonal forces as his or her predecessor or successor. And the chief constraint is geography, understood in an expansive sense. Accordingly, Canada, so long as it has existed and so long as it will continue to exist, will necessarily be focused first of all on relations with the U.S.  Denmark, no matter how gifted its political leaders may be, will never be a great power.

In other words, the geographical aspect of geopolitics refers not just to the physical attributes of a location – size, whether a country is flat or mountainous, an island, as so on – but also to the effect of these features on individuals and on the political community as a whole. Thus geopolitics conditions, for example, Tsarist Russia, the USSR, and post-communist Russia to act in more or less expected ways.  Likewise, geopolitical realities condition the foreign policies of Japan, the United States or Brazil in intelligibly similar ways in 1920 as in 2020.

Possibly the most interesting thing about adopting a geopolitical strategic perspective is that it alerts you to likely future developments, to challenges and responses, as the great twentieth-century historian and geopolitical thinker, Arnold Toynbee, said. Some of these emerging issues were treated in a new book, The Next 100 Years, written by George Friedman, the founder of the intelligence and forecasting company, STRATFOR.

Now, a century is a very long time in politics and Friedman makes no claim to be able to predict anything in detail. He does, however, consider several permanent geopolitical realities and long-term economic and demographic trends, and reaches some interesting conclusions. Instability and decline in China, Russia, and “old Europe,” for example, or the rise in power and status of Mexico, Poland, and Turkey seem more surprising than the continued primacy of North America, Canada included.

About the only serious reservation I have is Friedman’s lack of concern for what might be termed ethical or spiritual questions. The end of the USSR and the subsequent demographic disaster of Russia were not unconnected to the ideological fantasies of Marxism and the strategy of implementation through totalitarian domination.  Even so, The Next 100 Years is an excellent introduction to geopolitics today, and I warmly recommend it. 

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Article: The Canadian Military in the Service of Northern Environmental Stewardship

by Ron Wallace

Dr. Ron Wallace recently retired as Chief Executive Officer of a Canadian-US defence manufacturer. He has worked extensively internationally, including the Arctic regions of Canada and Russia, where he gained experience in northern engineering and environmental research.
 

Assertions of sovereign interest by nations are empty without the ability to enforce laws and maintain security in the territories so claimed.  Hence, issues of northern environmental protection, security and sovereignty are inextricably bound together.  Although it may seem a trivial observation to some, in order to assert sovereign control in the Arctic, and to ensure environmental protection in this special place, Canada has to be there.  Like a three-sided conceptual triangle, sovereign control, military security and environmental protection each contributes one to the other. 

The use of environmental legislation as a basis for sovereign control is empty without active and capable enforcement.  Here, it is argued that the Canadian military constitutes a fundamental force for more than just sovereignty operations in the Arctic: It constitutes a vital component of the conceptual “triangle” of Canadian sovereignty, defence and the maintenance of the northern environment.  Dr. Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary remarked in 2005 that: “The security of the Canadian north has been a perpetual problem for Canadian policy-makers and for the Canadian military….As such, it frequently seems that Canadian political leaders and defence planners have preferred to ignore these challenges in the hope that nothing will happen.” 

Unfortunately, ‘something’ has indeed happened in the Arctic and for Canadians: Climate change and the implications of a receding polar ice cap for the Arctic Sea and the Northwest Passage; Arctic maritime boundaries and the laws governing Arctic seas; the rise of Russian and other European interests in the polar region with new, potentially material claims for sovereignty; the ownership of rights for, and governance of, Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration; Arctic mining and transportation; military access to, and control of, the Arctic region and many other issues.  These ‘things’ have the ability to affect not only Canadian claims of northern sovereignty and, by extension, the protection of our Arctic environment, bus some actually constitute fundamental underpinnings of the Canadian identity.

The international community may actually be expecting Canada to assume a substantially expanded mantle of true northern leadership.  Or else.  As one of the principle Arctic nations, Canadians will either participate in a new age of Arctic governance and protection or new rules, claims and rights to passage may be thrust upon us.  Moreover, if Canada is unable, or unwilling, to assume such admittedly high costs and responsibilities, we may well have no other recourse but to rely to an ever-greater extent on our historic, natural partner in the north, the Americans.  For many Canadians this may take some getting used to but, one way or another, the day is fast approaching.  As it has in the past, military and financial strength will trump empty gestures of northern nationalism.  It is time to embark upon a ‘policy expedition’ to explore new thinking about Canada’s shared international responsibilities in the North.  It would probably be wise to do so before the national ambitions of other nations are thrust upon us.

The acquisition and maintenance of the integrated military capabilities adequate to properly address Canada’s northern needs will be very expensive.  If Canada wants to be a credible player in the northern sovereignty game, with an ability to seriously exercise a decisive role in polar environmental stewardship, Canadians are going to have to gain the integrated military wherewithal to operate capably there year-round. 

This may be an appropriate time for Canadians to momentarily reflect upon the, at times unforeseen, value of military preparedness, especially in the Arctic.  Early research in the Arctic carried out by land-based explorers and scientists was highly limited by the operational environment of the north; however, with the advent of the nuclear submarine, the Arctic Ocean ceased to be remote.  In the 1960’s, many recognized the value of nuclear submarines for national defence, maintenance of sovereign claims and scientific research.  Such thoughts, briefly entertained in the 1987 Defence White Paper were at first embraced, then discarded and now simply ignored by most Canadians.  Not so for the American, Soviet and now Russian polar fleets.

The past half century has provided overwhelming evidence of the value of submersibles operating beneath the polar ice. Yet, Canada has not joined the capable, long-standing league of the northern nuclear submariner.  It is almost as if we have chosen, whether by deliberation or negligence, simply to cede our northern, high Arctic Ocean to others.  It is not time to re-examine the issues of the 1987 White Paper?

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Article: How did this Happen? More Troubling Questions about the Maritime Helicopter Program

by Sharon Hobson

Sharon Hobson has been the Canadian correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly since April 1985. For the past decade she has also been a regular contributor to Jane’s Navy International and Jane’s International Defense Review.

Despite mounting problems in the Maritime Helicopter Program, no one has yet been held accountable, nor does it seem likely anyone will be – a sad reflection of the cynicism and low expectations that we have regarding military procurement.

Canada is buying 28 MH-92 helicopters from Sikorsky to replace the aged CH-124 Sea King maritime helicopters; however, the crash of a civilian S-92 helicopter off the coast of Newfoundland on March 12 has raised new questions about the military program.

Flight investigators found that two of the three filter bowl assembly mounting studs in the main gear box had broken resulting in a rapid loss of oil and failure of the gearbox.   While Sikorsky is now replacing the titanium studs with steel studs, there is a further problem stemming from discovery of the oil loss.  According to a report by Europe's Joint Aviation Authorities, the S-92 does not meet a specification that calls for the main gear box to run for 30 minutes without oil.  This is despite the aircraft having been certified to the US Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 29 standard that requires it. 

The Canadian military contract with Sikorsky includes the run-dry capability.   But that capability did not exist in the H-92 at the time that Canada selected the Sikorsky helicopter as the winner of the $5 billion program.  In the wake of the S-92 crash, a Sikorsky spokesperson said "we are designing a system to meet the program requirements and will test and enhance it as necessary."  This suggests that a design for the run-dry capability was not approved during the Critical Design Review and has not been included in the first two aircraft.

Air Force sources confirm the main gear boxes in the first two production aircraft, MH01 and MH02, do not have a run-dry capability or an emergency lubrication system. 

How did this happen?  This capability was a requirement during the pre-qualification phase in 2003.  If the H-92 didn't have it, how did the government declare Sikorsky to be compliant with the technical requirements?  Why is Sikorsky only now developing a run-dry capability?  After all, it's not something that is retrofitted, it has to be an inherent part of the gear box design.

When the contract with Sikorsky was signed in 2004, industry insiders voiced considerable doubts that the helicopter Canada wanted, which was still under development, could be delivered within four years.  The government brandished its contract in the naysayers' faces, assuring everyone that the deadlines would be met because there were significant penalties for not meeting them.

Three years later, Sikorsky admitted to the government that it would not be able to meet the November 2008 deadline.  So the government renegotiated the acquisition and support contracts, adding $117 million to them, providing an extra two years for first delivery, and waiving the penalties.  Apparently it pays to be late.

Getting details on what the additional money provided by Canadian taxpayers is buying is a slow and laborious process. Questions to the department are submitted and then a response is given several weeks later - by e-mail.  Reporters are not allowed to speak to anyone in the project office. 

DND spokesperson, Ms. Lianne LeBel, said in an e-mail, "DND is paying for enhancements of the helicopter that were not covered in the original contract, which include growth potential for the engine and main transmission.  It is the Department's assessment that these enhancements will be a valuable asset to the Canadian Forces and are worth the additional cost."  

How does that square with the government's decision to award the contract on the basis of the lowest cost compliant bid, and its protestations this was a sensible approach because it wasn't worth paying more for a capability that exceeded what was needed?   Now that the contract has been awarded, apparently they’ve decided that the extra capability is needed.

There are many other questions about this project, but perhaps the biggest one is why is everyone so quiescent?  When confronted with the government's mishandling of the MHP procurement, industry and military officials just roll their eyes and shake their heads as if dealing with an errant child.  It's shameful.

This is a project that has been underway for almost 25 years.  It has been started, cancelled, restarted, stalled, restructured, stalled, and started again.  When the contract was awarded in 2004 then-Defence Minister Bill Graham expressed surprise that anyone would think the process had been politicized and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) expressed surprise that anyone would doubt that the competition had been anything but fair.  "I'm frustrated because it's really such a great win for us as a military and for the taxpayer," lamented Alan Williams.  "Nobody seems to want to believe me."

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Article: A Renewed Canadian-Iceland NATO Commitment: A Chance to Assist an Old Friend and Ally

by Rob Huebert

Rob Huebert is Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary.

An opportunity has now arisen for Canada to assist a loyal ally and friend while at the same time improve its own Arctic security. Iceland is facing an economic and political crisis of epic proportion.  The country is literally facing bankruptcy and is only now being kept solvent through a series of emergency loans from the IMF and European states. But in a classic example of bad timing, the United States has closed its Air Force base that it had maintained on the island since the end of the Cold War at a time when Icelanders cannot afford to fill the gap this has created. This has left Iceland and the NATO alliance without any land-based air cover in the North Atlantic. Canada is now in the position to show its support of a long-term ally that needs help. This could also serve to strengthen the friendship that already exists in a time when Canada will soon need more Arctic friends. Specifically, it is in Canada’s interests to consider deploying on a long-term basis a small number of its F-18s to the now empty airforce base in Keflavik, Iceland. 
 

Iceland is currently facing an enormous crisis. It is one the hardest hit nations in the current economic crisis. In October of 2008 its banking system collapsed.  This has caused the entire country to face bankruptcy and has resulted in one of the most serious political crises in its history.  Furthermore, it main sources of economic activity have also suffered. Many of its main industries are also being battered by the current world wide economic melt-down. Tourism is in a steep decline as both Europeans and North Americans postpone or cancel their planned vacations. At the same time, the fisheries have been suffering for some time due to a decline is fish stock in and around Icelandic waters. The current circumstances are dire for the small Island state. It is at this time of crisis that Canada should give serious thought to assisting that country by cooperating with it in regards to a common approach to Arctic Security. This would be important in filling a gap and in showing the Icelandic people that Canada has not forgotten them in their time of need.

Why then should Canada consider such a move? First of all there is the issue of coming to the assistance of an ally that is currently feeling abandoned. Iceland has been a member of NATO since the creation of the alliance. Canada-Iceland military relations go back even further. When the UK occupied the Island to preempt German action in May of 1940, both British and Canadian troops were used. When the occupation was transferred to the United States, Canadian naval and air units continued to use the Island as a transit point for convoys carrying supplies to the UK, for ferrying aircraft built in Canada for service in the European theatre, as well as for patrolling for U-boats.

During the Cold War, Iceland was not able to build a military due to its small population (under 200,000 at the end of WWII) and economic base. Instead it allowed the alliance to use its central location to provide for air and sea cover over the GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK). This allowed the alliance the ability to cut off any effort of Soviet Naval surface assets to reach the Atlantic in the event of war. At the same, it also provided a base from which air patrols could be maintained in times of peace. In effect, Iceland is in a very strategically important location for the western states.

When the Cold War ended the United States elected to maintain its base but reduced its airforce to four F-15s along with their support units; however, on March 16, 2006 they withdrew their aircraft. The rationale at the time was that the United States was being economically strained by the war on terrorism in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the Russian Government throughout the 1990s and early 2000s had shown no desire to send either air or naval assets into the Atlantic and seemed to simply be allowing their remaining forces to rust into non-existence. Thus the decision in 2006 seemed strategically reasonable. However the decision to withdraw combined with the dire economic conditions of the melt-down has now created a mounting perception in Iceland that it is being both abandoned and ignored by its allies and friends. An offer by Canada to place two to three CF-18s at the base would undoubtedly show that this is not the case.

There is also a strategic argument that the changing Russian military policy regarding the Arctic also supports such a move. The Russians resumed their long-range Arctic patrols in August 2007 and have been maintaining them on a regular basis – including flights up to Canadian airspace during the recent visit of President Obama to Canada. The Russians have maintained that they did not violate international law and ridiculed Canadian protests. Thus, as long as Canadians also followed international rules and remained within either the airspace of NATO members or international airspace, the Russians should not have any objections to the Canadian presence. At the same time, the Russian Navy also resumed naval deployments to the Atlantic in 2008 for the first time since the end of the Cold War. It thus seems prudent to ensure that NATO retains some ability to resume surveillance of such activities. Both the UK and Norway have quietly expressed some concern and they have been trying to determine a means of replacing the hole left by the American withdrawal. The placement of Canadian aircraft would therefore serve to assist these two NATO allies as well. The Canadian Forces would benefit from the increased opportunities to operate with the European NATO airforces on a more regular basis owing to their closer proximity.      

The main cost facing Canada would be financial. There is no question that there would be additional costs in maintaining even such a small number of aircraft in the existing base infrastructure. Given the current demand that the mission in Afghanistan has placed on the forces, any decision to increase expenditures needs to be carefully considered; however, the Harper Government has already made the decision to substantially reduce its involvement in that conflict. Thus the costs would come when the expense of the Afghan commitment should be reduced.

With the new commitment to Iceland, Canada would then be taking on an important new role for NATO and at the same time reconfirm its friendship and alliance with Iceland. Given Iceland’s membership on the Arctic Council, such an action would bound to be beneficial from a circumpolar basis. Such a move would remind the other northern European states that Canada is also an Arctic state. Too often when the Nordic states talk of a common northern policy they forget about Canada. Thus for what probably would be a minimal cost, Canada would gain significant political capital.

Of course all of this is dependent on Iceland welcoming a Canadian offer, but under the current circumstances, it is hard to expect anything other than an enthusiastic agreement. Canada has recently complained that our NATO allies have been avoiding their commitment to the alliance in regards to Afghanistan. Now is the time to show that Canada does not ignore its allies in their times of need.   

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Article: NATO: A Glass Half Full 

by Alexander Moens

Alexander Moens, the author of Foreign Policy of George W. Bush, is a Professor of Political Science at SFU and a Senior Fellow in Canadian American relations at the Fraser Institute.

The NATO summit in France and Germany this past April was a relatively modest affair, but should give pause to critics who argue that the Alliance is on its last legs. It was clear in advance of the meeting that no new Alliance Strategic Concept would be possible for this 60^th anniversary as allies waited for George Bush to depart and for the new Obama administration to get its strategic house in order. As a stand in, NATO members pledged themselves to a “Declaration on Alliance Security,” which in typical NATO fashion is both grandiose and without hard commitments. Still, the document reaffirms NATO as the essential forum for transatlantic consultation. This comes amidst calls by Germany and others for replacing this forum with a direct USA-European Union dialogue. Such a forum would be a boost for the EU and the death knell to the Alliance and would leave allies such as Canada and Turkey without a forum to influence transatlantic security.

NATO members used the summit to welcome Croatia and Albania (Macedonia is awaiting a settlement with Greece on its name) as new members, but made no concrete promises to Ukraine and Georgia. Despite speculation in the Canadian media in March that the Alliance might appoint Conservative Defence Minister Peter McKay as its new Secretary General, NATO stuck with its tradition of having a European Secretary General (Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen) as long as an American holds the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

Another highlight of the summit was French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s decision to return France to NATO’s integrated military command. On the one hand this is an enormous accolade to NATO’s persistence after France withdrew from its military structures in the 1960s, as well as a strong political signal by Paris that it wants to work with NATO rather than simply replace it with a European defence policy. On the other hand, France is already one of the only two big fighting allies in Europe and has been a key player in NATO’s military operations on an ad hoc basis for decades. It also is a large financial contributor to NATO and has already some 300 officers deployed in various NATO structures. Therefore, in practice France’s return to NATO’s military bodies will not make a big difference. Moreover, we should always remember that France, like Quebec in Canada, sees itself as a founding member of NATO, not just another ally and it will always follow a prickly and independent course. France secured for itself two key commands. It will head one of the commands (Lisbon) of the 20,000 strong NATO Response Forces as well as the NATO Transformation command in Norfolk. In so doing, France will actually be able to streamline NATO and Europe’s duplicative response forces and battlegroups as well as NATO’s and the European Union’s overlapping military transformation and capabilities programs. All in all, it will allow France a strong role in Europeanizing NATO’s capacity. Thus, we should not see France’s return as an abdication of Europe’s independent defence ambition.

Most North American media reported that the summit ended with a let down on the topic of Afghanistan. European nations offered a mere extra 5,000 troops for that operation with most committed only for the Afghan election season in August. Moreover, the pledged new European forces would largely be deployed as trainers for the Afghan army and police.

I would argue that the Summit’s news on Afghanistan is not so bleak. With the United States on schedule to go from 38,000 to 68,000 troops in 2009, and with much stronger unity of command and strategy badly needed, the so-called ‘Americanization’ of the Afghan operation is a necessary step to bolster ISAF in the long run. As in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, concentrated American effort is what paves the way for NATO success. Employing the forces of certain allies predominantly as trainers and securing redevelopment efforts allows a more optimal division of tasks.

The “Declaration on Alliance Security” also lays out key expectations for the new Strategic Concept to be concluded by next year’s summit, including a more equitable sharing of risks and responsibilities, a call for more flexible and deployable forces, and for reformed structures to create a “leaner and more cost-effective organization.”

The salient task of the writers of the new Alliance Strategic Concept will be keeping the decision-making process of the Alliance strong, keeping future tasks specific to direct threats to members’ national security (forget about climate change and energy security), and realizing that commitments will always vary and cannot be mandated on paper.
 

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Article: Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh after Pilkhana 

by Anne Irwin

It remains to be seen whether democratic civil-military relations in Bangladesh will continue to develop in the wake of the Pilkhana revolt. The reports of the various investigations, the restructuring of the BDR, and the handling of the deaths in custody will all be instructive as to who has the upper hand, the civil government or the military establishment.
 

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