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CDFAI
DISPATCH: SUMMER 2005 (VOLUME III, ISSUE II)
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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and
defence policy.
Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (403) 231-7624
Fax: (403) 231-7647
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
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WELCOME
FROM THE PRESIDENT
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Welcome to this Summer’s issue of the Newsletter. In this edition we
introduce two new individuals to our team of experts on security,
defence and international relations. Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) George
Macdonald, CMM, CD, of CFN Consultants has recently joined CDFAI as a
Fellow. Jocelyn Coulon, a visiting professor with the Research Group
in International Security (REGIS), based in Montreal, has also joined
us as a member of CDFAI’s Advisory Council. We welcome them to our
expanding network and look forward to their future contributions.
The four articles in this newsletter, all written since the
publication of Canada’s recently released International Policy
Statement (IPS), are interesting contributions to the understanding of
Canada’s evolving role on the international scene. The first article
written by Derek Burney is titled “International Policy Statement –
One Hand Clapping.?” In his assessment of the IPS Derek discusses the
“…sensible, if somewhat airy, blend of realism and idealism for
Canadian foreign policy” that marks the IPS. He suggests “the proposed
prescriptions” for the most serious external threats to Canada “a
work-man like, piece-meal agenda for officials, but convey neither the
appetite nor the conviction for high-level political engagement.”
In her article “Canadian Security Requirements and the Defence Policy
Statement” Elinor Sloan suggests that the best defence for Canada in
today’s world is a more balanced mix of offence and defence assets
than was the case during the Cold War era. She analyzes the nature of
the threats to Canada and the role of geography in complicating those
threats. She then points to new civilian and military technologies
that may help counter those threats. She warns that the current
procurement process may not support much of some of the best ideas
contained in the DPS.
Rob Huebert’s article “Canadian Seapower in the 21st Century” provides
an historical context for the configuration of today’s Canadian Navy.
He discusses the nature of the Post 9/11 threat to Canada in relation
to adding new ships to the Canadian inventory.
“Forward to the Past: Some thoughts on Vision and Transformation in
the Defence Review” is Jim Ferguson’s article. Jim’s thesis is that as
far as vision is concerned, the government is committed to creating a
Canadian Forces to meet the demands of the last fifteen years and that
the transformation envisaged will likely take another ten plus years
before it is completed.
Enjoy this newsletter; if you have any comments please contact us.
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CDFAI NEW FELLOWS
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 Lieutenant-General (Retired) George Macdonald
joined CFN Consultants in Jan 2005 after serving 38 years in the
Canadian Forces, culminating in the position of Vice Chief of the
Defence Staff from 2001 to 2004, following three years as the Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.
Initially, LGen Macdonald spent several years as an operational
fighter pilot. He has commanded at the squadron, base/wing, and air
division level. Throughout his career, he held many leadership
positions in Ottawa, and has served with NATO forces in Germany and
Norway, and with North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) in
both Winnipeg and Colorado Springs, Colorado. He also held the
position of Director of Operations in the Foreign and Defence Policy
Secretariat in the Privy Council Office.
In addition to his broad operational experience, LGen Macdonald has
extensive executive-level expertise in military requirements and
capability planning, all aspects of defence program management,
corporate change management, international security issues, and
Canada-U.S. relations (including bilateral security issues, joint
planning, NORAD and ballistic missile defence). In his last position
as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, LGen Macdonald was the senior
resource manager for DND and was responsible for strategic planning.
As the second senior officer in the CF and chief of staff of National
Defence Headquarters, he worked closely with both the Deputy Minister
and the Chief of the Defence Staff on both resource and operational
issues.
LGen Macdonald is a graduate of the University of Calgary and
the National Defence College. He has participated in executive
seminars at Harvard University and with the Canadian School of Public
Service and has been published on several topics, including change
leadership, interoperability, knowledge management, and ballistic
missile defence.
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CDFAI New Advisory Council
Member
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CDFAI now has seven Advisory Council Members whose
role is to provide the Board of Directors and CDFAI management with
advice on programs and projects. Council Members also provide advice
on program areas that the Institute should be pursuing.
Jocelyn Coulon is a visiting professor with the Research Group in
International Security (REGIS) at the Université de Montréal's Centre
for International Research and Studies (CÉRIUM) for the year
2004–2005. He also writes a column on international politics for the
Montreal daily La Presse.
He was director
of the Montreal campus of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre from
February 1999 to December 2003. He is a member of the PPC Board of
Directors.
In the past few
years, he has published a number of books, including, in 1998,
Soldiers of Diplomacy. The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and The New
World Order, University of Toronto Press, and in 2004, Guide du
maintien de la paix 2005 and L'agression: Les États-Unis, l'Irak et le
monde, both published by Athéna Éditions.
He is a member of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
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Research Paper: Effective
Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States
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On June 15, Dr. David Carment’s paper entitled: Effective Defence
Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States was released.
Dr. Carment’s paper takes a hard look at the past decade of
failed/failing states operations and sums up lessons he believes are
vital for the success of future operations. Click
here for the full-length PDF of this paper.
Dr. Carment’s paper is the second research paper in 2005 to be
released. Two more papers will be released this year in September and
December. They will be featured on CDFAI’s website as well.
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ARTICLE: International Policy Statement (IPS) – One Hand Clapping?
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by
Derek Burney
After a year and a half of discussion, delay and rewrites, the
recently released International Policy Statement offers a sensible, if
somewhat airy, blend of realism and idealism for Canadian foreign
policy. The strength of the “Statement” is a belated but welcome call
for more focus and commitment, particularly in official development
assistance, in the modernization of the long-neglected Canadian Forces
and on North American security, including the renewal of NORAD. The
weakness lies in the continuing reluctance to acknowledge the need for
a comprehensive, integrated approach to the management of our most
vital relationship - one which demands “repair” before we contemplate
any semblance of “revitalization”. The most serious external threats
to Canada’s well-being are the increasingly protectionist sentiments
of the U.S. Congress and the potentially negative fallout at our
border from a security breach or a new terrorist strike. The proposed
prescriptions offer a workman-like, piece-meal agenda for officials,
echoing recent press releases, but convey neither the appetite nor the
conviction for high-level political engagement. Complacency can be
lethal for Canada.
The most elusive commodity for effective implementation of foreign (or
domestic) policy is genuine political leadership. Of late, that has
been erratic and, given the uncertain life of the current government,
is unlikely to change anytime soon. Nonetheless, we need not only more
coherence in foreign policy and the instruments of implementation, but
also more coherence between foreign and domestic policy and a bolder
plan of action. Our national interest in ensuring a prosperous and
safe Canada within a stable, more humane world cannot be served by
rhetoric and noble intentions alone. Platitudes about “independence”
and “sovereignty” are relatively meaningless in an increasingly
interdependent world, one in which the forces of globalization create
both risks and opportunities for Canada.
Real, effective leadership requires signalling top priority -
confidently and clearly - to the manner in which we manage relations
with the United States. Fundamentally, for Canada, it is a choice
between engagement and irrelevance; between tackling hard issues vital
to our well-being or dancing on the periphery, between leading and
advancing our long-term interests or following the short-term whims of
popular opinion.
Talk of greater integration contradicts the more evident fragmentation
of foreign policy delivery instruments, whether through the pointless
decision to split the integrated department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, or the sub-contracting of vestiges of foreign
policy to the provinces. Nor will adding more resources to Consulates
in the United States achieve much if the substance of our relations is
skewed by inexplicable decisions on basic policy in Ottawa.
Canada has every right and good reason to be concerned about what the
United States will do, unilaterally or otherwise, with its massive
military power. But, if we hope to influence the U.S. on decisions of
that kind, we need to establish a more mature platform of trust that
will facilitate constructive dialogue. We also need to back our
positions with commitments in kind. And when we choose to differ, we
should learn to express our difference in a manner that can be
understood as serving a distinct Canadian interest. That is where the
decision to stand down on Ballistic Missile Defence was most
perplexing to Americans and many Canadians alike. It defied logic in
terms of either Canadian national sovereignty or security. Who doubts
that we are now further than ever from having the degree of trust and
respect in Washington that would be required to make the IPS
commitment to “revitalize” the relationship a reality?
From a more confident platform of high-level engagement, we could move
to strengthen our huge commercial relationship, resolve persistent
disputes and reinvigorate, if not expand, existing agreements. The
energy sector cries out for mutual commitment and mutual benefit but
that will not happen by osmosis. Our border infrastructure is
increasingly out-dated, draining billions of dollars from both
economies. New technologies and new investments are urgently required
to make the border part of the solution and not part of the problem.
We would also both benefit from explicit plans for harmonization and
mutual recognition of standards and for tariff negotiations that would
eliminate, or at least reduce, rule of origin impediments to bilateral
trade.
Canada faces huge challenges in the next decade. We have coasted for
decades on the richness of our resources and the economic oxygen of
ties with our all-powerful southern neighbour. But the easy life at
home and the detached, highly sentimental attitude about our place in
the world is not preparing us for the complexities of globalization or
for competition from those with stronger convictions and capabilities.
We may be entering a “golden era” for our resources, but the climate
for competitive manufacturing operations in Canada is deteriorating in
the face of an appreciating currency, lagging productivity rates and
declining levels of investment. Our exports to China, Japan and the
“emerging Powers” are not matching those of our natural competitors,
notably Australia. Ambitious estimates about the potential for trade
relations with these countries mask the meager results we have had to
date from protracted negotiations with much smaller entities. If we
expect to keep pace, we will need the courage of our convictions - the
essence of leadership - and some concrete prescriptions for action
that would match the dire flavour of much of the analysis in the
”Statement”.
There is, of course, much more to Canadian foreign policy than the
manner in which we choose to manage our most vital bilateral
relationship. It is not a zero/sum game. But, if we are unwilling to
engage systematically and forcefully those with whom we have the most
at stake, it is even less likely that our global aspirations will
stimulate much resonance.
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Article: Canadian Security Requirements and the Defence Policy
Statement
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by
Elinor Sloan
The defence component of Canada’s International
Policy Statement, released in April 2005, includes a marked and
appropriate change in emphasis from the primarily overseas-orientation
of previous defence policy statements, to a greater focus on the
defence of Canada and North America. What is the basis of this new
balance between domestic and international roles? Does it go beyond
rhetoric to encompass future acquisition decisions?
The primary Cold War threat to North America, a
Soviet nuclear missile attack, was such that there was little we could
do to defend against the threat. As a result, we concentrated on
ensuring our security abroad, and the often-stated mantra became “the
best defence is a good offense.” But the contemporary security
environment is such that more can be done to address the threat to
Canada at home. Today the best defence is a more balanced mix of
offense and defence.
An assessment of four factors leads to this
conclusion, the first of which is the nature of the threat. The
contemporary threat to Canada is exceedingly difficult to detect.
Today the equivalent of detecting armies massing is picking up
increased “chatter” pertaining to a planned terrorist attack.
Intelligence is at a premium and human intelligence is very important.
At home we may be looking for a lone person in a visa line-up; abroad
we may be looking for dispersed terrorist cells.
In some ways the ‘difficulty of detection’
issue may be less pronounced abroad than at home. It is possible to
identify those failed states that are likely to harbor terrorists and
pose a security threat to North America, and this was done in
Afghanistan. Yet although it is appealing to focus on failed states,
the fact is that international terrorist organizations operate in
small cells in dozens of countries, only a handful of which are failed
states. The Madridand London bombings well illustrate that terrorists are living
and operating within Western nations. So when it comes to the nature
of the threat we need to continue to look abroad but we also need to
be more vigilant at home—a distinction between the Cold War and
post-9/11 eras.
A second factor is the diminishing role of
geography in assessing security policies. Historically, Canada and the
United States enjoyed a geography that protected them from the threats
of the outside world. New technologies and an increasingly
interconnected, globalized environment has largely eliminated this
geographic advantage. This has meant that what happens in a far off
corner of the world can impact us at home, but it has also meant that
we can no longer put the homeland to one side and concentrate on
missions abroad.
Third, advances in civilian technologies.
Since 9/11 the United States and Canada have implemented a vast range
of technologies designed to detect the terrorist threat at home and
increase the security of the continent. Progress in homeland security
technologies has been significant. Although the magnitude of the task
of monitoring goods and people entering the United States and Canada
is mammoth, technological advances may, in the medium-term, be able to
move the task into the “just possible” realm. In the next few years,
for example, it may be possible to have in place a robust screening
process for cargo containers that enter Canadian ports.
A final factor is advances in military
technologies. Many of these centre on the increased precision,
mobility, and long-range striking power of modern military forces,
attributes which are relevant to the ability
of forces to target the terrorist threat to North America in overseas
settings. But conducting warfighting efforts against terrorists abroad
is still very challenging. Terrorist groups
are increasingly amorphous, more likely to use evolving information
technologies and to rely on less traditional organizational
structures, thus making it much harder to find targets to attack
militarily. At the same time, there have been some significant
advances in homeland defence technologies, such as the High Frequency
Surface Wave Radar Network to detect ships and low-flying aircraft
approaching the continent, and unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor our
coasts and the Arctic. The promises of military technologies can, in
the future, reduce the enormity of defending Canada’s vast landmass.
What does all this add up to? Assessing the nature of the threat, the
role of geography, and advances in civilian and military technologies
reveals that Canada should give roughly equal weight to security and
defence measures at home and abroad.
The defence component of the International Policy Statement appears to
have found this balance in its organizational changes. In place of the
many separate maritime, land, and air headquarters that currently
exist the CF is creating a small number of joint force headquarters
that integrate all three services, the first of which will be in
Halifax. All will report to a single integrated command structure
known as Canada Command, with the idea that such a structure will be
better able to bring all resources to bear on a domestic contingency.
The CF is also creating three new kinds of joint formations—a Special
Operations Group, a Standing Contingency Task Force, and other
Mission-Specific Task Forces—that can be used both for domestic and
international missions.
But likely future capital acquisitions paint
a slightly different picture. The policy supports the acquisition of
joint support ships for sealift, offshore command and control, and
replenishment; an amphibious assault ship for landing troops ashore;
satellite-guided munitions for air-to-ground strike; heavy lift
helicopters for mobility in theater; and the Mobile Gun System and
Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle for ground force operations—all of which
are primarily or exclusively meant for international roles.
By contrast, the list of new capabilities
applicable to the surveillance and control of Canadian territory is
somewhat shorter. It includes acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles (also
applicable to overseas roles); enhancing the Joint Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical Defence Company to support civilian first responders;
expanding the number of surface wave radars on each coast; and
acquiring new fixed wing search and rescue aircraft. Nowhere is there
mention of vessels that can better patrol Canada’s coasts or conduct
missions in an ice-covered Northwest Passage. Nor is there any
discussion of possible shortfalls in the number of long-range patrol
aircraft for maritime surveillance and control, or fighter aircraft
for combat air patrols over North America.
In 1971 the Trudeau government released a
defence policy statement that placed primary emphasis on missions at
home, but subsequently equipped the CF for roles abroad. The challenge
today is to ensure the new defence policy vision is reflected in
future CF capabilities, and that the Canadian government does not
revert to old habits of the past.
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Canadian Seapower in
the 21st Century
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by
Rob Huebert
Until the
Chicoutimi incident that occurred
earlier this year, most Canadians were unaware that Canada had
submarines, let alone a navy. With the exception of those Canadians
who live in Halifax or Esquimalt/Victoria, and are reminded of
Canadian seapower whenever they look out their window, the vast
majority of Canadians are oblivious to the navy’s existence. Since the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers in New York, the Canadian
Navy has become one of the government’s most important foreign and
security policy instruments. It seems improbable that both the end of
the Cold War and the war on international terrorism would place such
a heavy burden on the Canadian Navy; yet it did. In the 1990s and the
early stages of the 2000s, the navy has been committed to a level of
intensity not seen since the Second World War. The equipment of the
current fleet has served the navy well. But it is now time to plan for
the next fleet. With the release of the Canadian Security Policy in
2004 and the International Policy Statement in 2005, the Canadian
Government is developing a new and comprehensive international defence
and security policy that reexamines the manner in which Canada uses
all of its armed forces. This article considers what these changes
mean for Canadian seapower in the coming decades and what instruments
Canada needs to ensure the continued protection of its maritime
security.
The Historical Context
While Prime Minister Trudeau is often
criticized for the defence decisions made by his government, his
government actually left the Canadian Navy in reasonably good shape.
The Trudeau Government’s decisions to allow for the modernization of
the four 280 class destroyers and the construction of the 12 Halifax
class frigates provided the navy with the nucleus for a solid
medium-power navy. These sixteen vessels were the core of a modern,
multi-purpose blue-water fleet. The retention of the three (and
subsequently two) Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) enabled the
Canadian forces to deploy these vessels as a task-force rather than as
individual units almost anywhere in the globe. Furthermore, the
decision to give the destroyers and frigates a wide range of
capabilities, thereby expanding beyond the navy’s Cold War focus on
anti-submarine warfare, meant that when the Cold War did end, the
Canadian Navy could perform a wide range of tasks. This is not to
suggest that there were not problems and mistakes. The inability of
subsequent governments to provide the navy with a modern helicopter
remains a serious omission, as was the delay in acquiring the four
Upholder submarines. Likewise, the reduction in personnel numbers,
which led to the premature retirement of the HMCS Huron, is
also indicative of other bad policy decisions in the 1990s. But, for
the most part, in the 1990s Canada had a very professional and capable
navy that “hit well above its weight class”.
Even before the dust had settled with the
end of the Cold War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to an
international response which included the deployment of three Canadian
warships to support the military effort to liberate Kuwait. While none
of the modern or modernized Canadian vessels were deployed, the
flexibility, utility and durability of the task force demonstrated to
the Canadian Government the political and military usefulness of
Canadian seapower. The 1990s witnessed a continual deployment of
Canadian naval units to a number of international crisis spots,
including East Timor and the Balkans. Furthermore, there was closer,
operational cooperation between the Canadian Navy and American Navy in
the 1990s. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a Canadian frigate was attached
to an American carrier battle group. The frigate assumed all of the
roles of an American vessel, but could be disengaged if the Canadian
Government decided that it did not want it to participate in a
specific action. For example, prior to the Canadian recognition of the
dangers posed by al-Qaida, the attached Canadian frigate was sent away
when the battle group launched missiles against training bases in
Afghanistan, and subsequently rejoined the group after the attack was
complete. (Ironically, therefore Canada could have been with the
Americans at the very forefront on the attack on international
terrorism, but chose not to.)The net effect of both the increase in
overseas international crisis deployments and closer integration with
the USN meant the Canadian navy of the 1990s became a heavily utilized
force that could operate with the best and the biggest in the world.
Maritime Security Post 9/11
Even though Canadians were the overwhelming
victims of the Air India bombing in 1985, one of the worst, single day
attacks by international terrorists, it took the attacks of 9/11 in
the United States to finally compel the Canadian Government to respond
to the threat of international terrorism. The Canadian Government’s
immediate action in the days following the attacks on Washington and
New York was to deploy the Canadian Navy. Almost the entire fleet of
destroyers, frigates and replenishment vessels was deployed in
Operation Apollo. This was the maritime component of the Canadian
commitment to the military intervention in Afghanistan to overthrow
the Taliban and capture al-Qaida members. Canadian vessels were
deployed to demonstrate solidarity with the United States and to
provide naval assistance in tasks such as embargo enforcement, escort
duties and resupply to name but a few. The attacks also provoked the
government to develop a national security policy and an integrated
international policy statement. These developments come at a time when
serious thought must be given to the composition of the next Canadian
fleet. What then are the ramifications for the Navy?
In the short term, the government has made
it clear that protecting Canada is the core function of the Canadian
forces and that any overseas deployment is discretionary. However, the
government has made it clear that it still intends to be an active
player in the security of the international system. In particular, the
international policy statement calls for providing assistance to
failed and failing states. The current Chief of the Defence Staff,
General Rick Hillier, has stated that he sees the need for a joint
effort on the part of the of the Canadian forces to quickly deploy a
unified Canadian force to respond to international crisis. This has
led to considerable discussion regarding the need for a large vessel
that can ship Canadian land forces and their equipment to the crisis
spot. The Canadian Navy has also received consent to procure three
multi-role Joint Support Ships (JSS). These vessels will retain an
ability to replenish Canadian naval vessels, but they will also be
given a sealift capability and the ability to support deployed joint
operations. These new abilities mean that the Navy can expect to
retain a critical role in any future military intervention that Canada
is engaged in. It also means that Canada will retain the ability to go
to any ocean. In fact, the JSS are to be given limited ice capability
so that they will be able to venture into northern waters farther than
any other Canadian warship since the navy gave up its one icebreaker
in 1954. But the question that follows is what will the rest of the
Canadian navy look like?
The truly critical question will be the
nature of the replacement for the destroyers and frigates. The
challenge for naval planners is both numerous and complex. However,
the two core issues that must be considered are as follows:
These vessels need to be able to respond
first and foremost to the security of Canada. However, before assuming
that only smaller, less capable, ocean-going vessels are required,
further consideration of this issue is necessary. Canada now has
direct responsibility for its Exclusive Economic Zone which extends
200 miles from its coastlines. Soon, it will also have responsibility
for up to 350 nautical miles for its continental shelf. In addition,
it has also begun to require all ships that are within 96 hours of
reaching Canadian waters to notify Canadian officials. Presumably this
means a need to investigate ships of interest that do not report to
Canadian officials. If a ship is sailing at approximately 20 miles/per
hour (i.e., under 20 knots) Canada needs an ability to intervene as
far away as almost 2000 miles. In short, even if all Canadian naval
vessels were mandated to deal only with possible threats to Canada,
they must retain an ability to be ocean-going (i.e., blue-water).
Storm conditions in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans are
severe and necessitate large ships. Ships smaller than the current
frigates will have difficulty operating in these conditions and,
therefore, will not provide the security necessary for Canada’s
maritime approaches. If Canada is also serious about protecting all of
its ocean space, some of the next generation vessels will need to have
some capability to travel in ice. With the advances of global warming,
the Canadian north will have decreasing ice cover. However, even as
the ice retreats there will be periods where local ice conditions
worsen. Thus, any Canadian vessel in the area needs to retain some ice
strengthening to operate in Canada’s third ocean.
Perhaps even more challenging is determining
the nature of the threat that these vessels will need to respond to.
Given that these vessels will probably be built by 2025 and then
operate 30 years to 2055, it is a daunting task to anticipate the next
threat. Thus, the next fleet should be able to respond to both low
level threats (the terrorist who puts a box of dynamite in a motor
boat) to the highest level threats (an interstate war of belligerents
who have the most advanced torpedo and missile technology).
Furthermore, it is accepted that Canada will always be involved with
its allies and friends. Thus, any new vessels need to be able to fully
integrate its communication and weapon systems with the navies of the
United States, United Kingdom, Australia and so forth.
In many ways these realities make it clear
that the next fleet is going to strongly resemble a modernized version
of the current fleet. At least 12 units that retain good ocean-going
capabilities with a wide range of weapon capabilities are needed. They
will need to be served by professionally trained personnel who can
respond to the numbing tediousness of maintaining viglence against low
level threats, but can immediately respond within minutes to an
incoming missile or torpedo threat.
Some will criticize this on the basis
that it represents an acceptance of the status quo that does
not think “beyond the box.” Yet the geo-political realities framing
Canadian security needs must remain the means by which Canada decides
the composition of its next fleet. Canada needs forces that will be
able to respond for at least the next thirty years to a wide range of
threats that will take place in a dangerous and challenging maritime
environment. The challenge will be to get the number of vessels
correct with the proper balance between communication, weapons,
personnel training and sea-keeping capability. The real challenge
will be getting the political will to procure this next fleet.
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Article: Forward to the Past: Some Thoughts on Vision and
Transformation in the
Defence Review
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by
James Fergusson
Vision and transformation are the
two core concepts of the Defence Review. Vision, though it has no
particular or specific meaning within defence and military circles per
se, is used with direct reference to the future, and implies a
prescience based upon recent experience and “identifying the key
operational trends that are likely to continue…”[1]
This prescience serves as the basis for transforming the Canadian
Forces (CF). Transformation, however, is not well articulated, except
as being synonymous with change. But transformation does have two
relatively specific conceptual foundations in defence and military
circles – the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the functional
military demands of the post Cold War or what may be labeled the Peace
Intervention era.
Notwithstanding the conceptual, theoretical and empirical debate
surrounding the RMA, transformation in many American military circles
concerns the organizational and doctrinal changes necessary to exploit
fully the technological revolution at the heart of the RMA.
Technologies that are marginalizing, if not eliminating the fog and
friction of war as traditionally understood, and giving its applicants
a decisive advantage on the battlefield demand a transformation in the
organizational structures of military force and the doctrines defining
how these ‘new’ structures apply force.
The second foundation relates to the historical and natural lag
between environmental transformation and capability, organizational
and doctrinal transformation. For the past decade, militaries have
been working on transformation in order to meet the demands of the
Peace Intervention world. Force structures and doctrines designed for
the static nuclear deterrent world of the Cold War are inappropriate
to a dynamic world demanding the intervention of military forces into
a range of conflict environments, most recently encapsulated by the
idea of ‘three block’ war.
For both the RMA and environmental cases, a fifteen to twenty year lag
between them and the full transformation of military force is not
surprising. In terms of the former, it takes time before analysts
begin to understand fully the implications of new military
technologies. In the later case, it takes many years before a
consensus occurs that the old world is truly dead, and many more years
before agreement is reached on the nature and demands of the new
world. In both cases, the military, like all large, complicated,
organizations are slow to change because of the inherent inertia they
possess as a function of, inter alia, a conservative mind-set,
entrenched traditions, existing bureaucratic processes and vested
sub-organizational interests.
In addition, capital equipment, with life-cycles anywhere up to thirty
or more years depending upon up-grade and life extension decisions,
cannot be quickly replaced as no nation can afford to throw its
obsolete equipment away and start over again. Moreover, even if
possible, it takes a great deal of time to procure new equipment and
then train personnel to employ it. Combine these and other related
organizational factors with the time it takes to create a consensus
among all the actors on the new world and new technology and their
demands, it is not surprising that the military is slow to transform.
In the previous historical occurrence, RMA and environmental
transformation occurred almost simultaneously; the former with the
dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the later with the end of
World War II, the collapse of the traditional Great Powers and their
empires, and the emergence of bipolarity. As the technology evolved
after 1945, including delivery systems, so followed organizational and
doctrinal transformation; the latter being the key transformation from
‘warfighting’ to ‘war avoidance’ or deterrence. The new Cold War
environment also demanded some organizational and doctrinal
transformation. Combined, the RMA and environmental transformations
would produce the military Cold War structures and doctrines ten to
twenty years after 1945.
Importantly, however, this raises issues concerning the importance of
the RMA compared to the environment in military transformation. In
this regard, environmental transformation may well have had little
impact on existing military thinking, structures, and processes in the
absence of the nuclear revolution. Beyond the transformation produced
by the permanent alliance structure (NATO) that emerged, it is
doubtful that much organizationally and doctrinally would have changed
from the World War II experience.
Naturally, explaining military transformation is much more complicated
than discussed here; but the key issue for the CF, and thus Canadian
defence and security, is the relative importance of these two
transformation agents. Like 1945, the 1991 Gulf War heralded both the
RMA and a new international political environment. Doubts since 1989
about the end of the Cold War were significantly erased with the
Soviet support for the war, and the collapse of the Soviet Union
itself. These were followed by ‘new’ conflicts, and new demands on
military force in the transformation from ‘war avoidance’ to ‘peace
intervention’.
However, the RMA was a product of Cold War exigencies, and central
among them were inter-state Great Power rivalry with the possibility
of thermo-nuclear war in the immediate background. The Peace
Intervention environment, however, is dominated by intra-state
conflict and limited to clashes between poorly trained forces with low
technology military capabilities or a clash between these local forces
and advanced western intervention forces, such as in Iraq.
It is possible that the capabilities, organizations, and doctrines
necessary to respond to both are synonymous, and certainly there is a
universal quality across time and space of some military capabilities,
organizational structures and military doctrines. However, there is no
shortage of historical examples of military disaster resulting from
the expectation of universality. This is particularly evident in the
failure of Western military powers to transform organization and
doctrine in the lead up to World War I. this failure followed from an
inability to understand the industrial RMA, and the willingness of
elites to accept environmental constancy. In addition, the colonial or
imperial military experience of the Nineteenth Century did little to
prepare for the demands of Great Power war in 1914.
In the Defence Review, the government emphasizes that “the challenge
of failed and failing states will serve as a benchmark for the
Canadian Forces.”[2]
In turn, the focus on land forces centered upon JTF-2 and elite,
special forces with air and naval units almost exclusively in a
logistical support role reflects this emphasis, especially the
Afghanistan experience. However, whether the end result for the CF
will be functional or flexible enough to adapt to a different
environment remains an open question. Like World War I, modern unequal
‘colonial’ wars may do little to prepare nations for a Great Power
confrontation.
There is little doubt that senior military officials are well aware of
the need to transform as a function of the RMA. The Defence Review may
not be very explicit about the RMA dimension, but sensitivity to this
dimension has been present for many years. Strategy 2020, for example,
clearly recognizes this vital requirement not least of all because
incorporating RMA technologies are the key to ensuring
inter-operability with the United States, as well as other allies that
are following the American lead. In this sense, the CF’s future is
being driven by forces beyond its control, if it wants to stay
functionally relevant.
Furthermore, highly, specialized elite ground forces able to call in
precision strikes from sets of capabilities thousands of miles away is
central to much thinking about the future. Of course, these
capabilities will not be possessed by the CF. The costs of RMA
technologies relative to budgetary constraints, even with the proposed
increases in the 2005 budget, prohibit such acquisitions. There are
significant choices to be made, and the Defence Review relative to RMA
is essentially about the choices that will (or should) be made. The
issue then is whether the choices are functional and flexible enough
for the future relative to the RMA and possible future environmental
transformation.
Boots on the ground in the form of elite JTF-2 and special forces may
be essential for Canada in the Peace Intervention world, but they may
not be essential in a world where Great Power rivalry returns. One
central aspect or goal of the RMA is to bring decisive power to bear
(known as Effects Based Operations) from capabilities far removed from
the forward edge of battle. Manpower or land forces are becoming a
greater liability on the RMA battlefield. This battlefield sees the
RMA moving individuals farther away from violence, whereas the Defence
Review suggests that Canada will focus on keeping its forces close to
forward edge. The RMA also creates a technology intensive military,
whereas on the surface at least the CF is headed towards a labour
intensive military.
There are many other factors which account for the transformation
proposed in the Defence Review. But as far as vision goes, the
government is committed to creating a CF to meet the demands of the
last fifteen years. This transformation will likely take another ten
to fifteen years before it is completed, (notwithstanding a range of
barriers, such as the willingness and ability of the government to
spend and maintain its defence course over this time frame). In
effect, ten or fifteen years after transformation should have been
completed if history is the guide, the CF will be transformed. It is
in this sense that the Defence Review is truly forward to the past.
In all fairness, CF has been attempting to change for some time, and
change has occurred. Unfortunately, the ability to do so has been
handcuffed by over a decade of deep budget cuts and high operational
tempo. Neither the money nor time (or respite) has been available.
However, the vision informing the Review is no longer prescient unless
the future remains the same as it has been for the last fifteen years.
Of course, the world may not change and the current system may come to
rival other long-lived stable eras. Alternatively, the details or
implementation of transformation may produce capabilities, structures,
and doctrine functional and flexible to adapt to the current and a
future system. Regardless, the current Review for all its rhetoric
appears driven by the past, rather than the future. Naturally,
governments in Canada are little concerned about the future, and the
military architects are bounded by the art of the politically
possible. Hopefully, in the details to follow over the next many
years, these architects will look forward, rather than back.
[1] Department of National Defence. A Role of
Pride and Influence in the World: Defence. Ottawa: Government of
Canada. April, 2005. p. 7.
[2] Ibid, p.7.
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