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CDFAI
DISPATCH: SUMMER 2006 (VOLUME IV, ISSUE II)
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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and
defence policy.
Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (403) 231-7624
Fax: (403) 231-7647
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
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MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT
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Welcome to the Summer 2006 issue of “The Dispatch” newsletter. In this
edition we introduce Natasha Hassan as a new Advisory Council member.
Brian Fleming, previously announced as a member of the Board is
joining the ranks of CDFAI Fellows. We look forward to their
contributions on Canadian security, defence and foreign affairs
issues.
In this newsletter there are nine amazing articles for your
consideration on various topical issues facing Canada. They are as
follows:
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Deprogramming the Cult of Peace – Mark Entwistle. “There can
never be peace in the absolute sense, only phases of relative
success in managing conflict.
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Wanted
(?) – A Canadian Defence Policy – James Fergusson. Under whose
defence policy are and should the Canadian Forces be operating?
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Canada
in Kandahar – John Ferris. Why are we there?
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Eight
Simple Rules for Dating the US – Jack Granatstein. Canada must
follow a National Interests-based approach in dealing with the
United States.
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The Debate Between the Canadian Commitment to Afghanistan and the
Sudan: The Need to Consider All Costs! – Rob Huebert. An
analysis of four highlysuspect assumptions.
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Consequence
Management – A Growing Challenge to Canadian Security – Mike
Jeffery. There are many dimensions to national security….a key
capability is the ability to manage the consequences of disasters –
a reflection on Katrina and lessons for Canada.
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Canadian Participation in EU-led Military Operations Does Not
Serve Canadian Interest – Alexander Moens. Does placing Canadian
Forces under the European Union in military operations produce an
effective political or force multiplier for Canada?
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Dealing
with the Real Weapons of Mass Destruction – Small Arms and Light
Weapons – David Pratt. The problem with small arms is generally
threefold: availability, durability and ease of use.
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It’s Time for Canada to Get Serious on Iran – Andrew Richter.
The key issue is whether the international community is committed to
preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, and what states are
prepared to risk in the attempt to do so – the PM is about to face
an enormous test.
The mission in Kandahar and Transformation are two highly charged
activities that the Canadian Forces are involved with at present.
Seventeen suspected terrorists have been captured in Toronto in the
past week. How is Canada’s security and international role evolving?
Enjoy this issue of “The Dispatch” and contact us if you have any
comments.
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CDFAI NEW ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBER
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Natasha Hassan is Deputy Comment Editor of The Globe and Mail.
She joined the Globe in early 2005 as Bureau Editor for the Report on
Business, where she was responsible for the business section's
national and international news coverage.
Ms. Hassan came to the Globe from the National Post where she held
numerous positions, most notably Comment Editor from the paper's
inception in 1998 till 2004. She was also a senior editor and
editorial writer with the former Financial Post before the launch of
the National Post.
Prior to her career in journalism, Ms. Hassan worked as research
co-ordinator for the Centre for International Studies.
Ms Hassan is a fellow of LEAD International, established in 1991 by
the Rockefeller Foundation to promote leadership in sustainable
development. She has a degree in international relations from Trinity
College, University of Toronto. She is also a co-founder of the Robert
H. Catherwood Scholarship at the U of T and a member of its oversight
committee.
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CDFAI New FelloW
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As well as serving as a CDFAI Board Member, Mr. Flemming
recently became a CDFAI Fellow.
Brian Flemming, CM, QC, DCL, is a Canadian policy advisor, writer and
international lawyer. From 2002 to 2005, he was Chairman of the
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), a Crown corporation
that was created by Canada’s federal Parliament on April 1, 2002, to
improve security at Canadian airports and on Canadian aircraft. He
acted as CATSA’s first CEO and set up the Crown corporation.
Following his departure from CATSA, Mr. Flemming became a Special
Advisor to Sypher-Mueller International, an Ottawa-based consulting
firm working primarily in the aviation sector. In August, 2005, he was
appointed for a two-year term by the Government of Canada to the new
Advisory Council on National Security.
Previously, in 2000-01, Mr. Flemming was Chairman of the Canadian
Transportation Act Review (CTAR) Panel, a major statutory decennial
review of Canada’s transport policies. His report to the Government of
Canada was widely hailed for its vision and balance. In 2003, he was
awarded the National Transportation Week “Award of Achievement”.
Mr. Flemming is a former senior partner of the law firm of Stewart,
McKelvey, Stirling & Scales and a former lecturer in public
international law at Dalhousie Law`School. He has been chairman as
well as a director of scores of public, private and not-for-profit
corporations. His public company directorships have included Noranda,
Brunswick Mining & Smelting, Enheat, VGM Capital, First Choice
Canadian Communications, Azure Resources and Homburg Invest. He is
currently Chairman of the Board of Trustees of PDM Royalties Income
Fund.
Between 1976 and 1979, he was Assistant Principal Secretary to Prime
Minister Pierre E. Trudeau. In recent years, he has spoken at
international meetings or universities in North America, Europe, Asia
and Africa on transport policy, general security issues, air transport
security in Canada and internationally, the war on terrorism and the
public international law of the sea.
He has been the vice chairman of the Canada Council for the Arts, a
board member of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, chairman of the
International Centre for Ocean Development, founding chairman of
Symphony Nova Scotia and a board member of: the Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research,
the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Van Horne Institute,
Pearson College of the Pacific and the International Oceans Institute
of Canada.
Mr. Flemming has degrees in science from Saint Mary’s University,
Halifax, and in law from Dalhousie University, Halifax. He did
post-graduate work in public international law at University College
London, England, and at the Hague Academy of International Law,
Netherlands.
He has an honorary doctorate from the University of King’s College
where he was chairman of the Board of Governors for nearly 10 years.
He became a Member of the Order of Canada in 1989. He lives in
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, is married and has two adult children.
Please click
here for Fellows’ full
biographies.
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Congratulations
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CDFAI Fellow, Dr. Frank Harvey has received a 2006-2007 Fulbright
Award and has been asked to take up the Fulbright-SUNY (Plattsburg)
Distinguished Research Chair in Canadian Studies in the winter term of
2007.
Awards in the Fulbright Distinguished Chairs Program are viewed as
among the most prestigious appointments in the Fulbright Scholar
Program.
The honour comes with a $25,000 (US) research grant to cover expenses
while completing a major research project on “The Homeland Security
Dilemma” during his residency at the Center for the Study of Canada at
SUNY Plattsburgh.
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ARTICLE:
Deprogramming the Cult of Peace
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by Mark Entwistle
Leo Tolstoy did posterity a disservice when he chose the title
“War and Peace” for his epic novel of Russia. He helped to cement in
the public mind the sense of a dichotomy between two absolute states
of being, where mankind lives either in one or the other. The idea of
“peace” as commonly deployed is also rooted deeply in religious and
theological traditions of God’s Kingdom and Peace with a capital “p.”
However, despite being noble and reassuring, the concept of peace is
both delusional and dangerous. Delusional because it ignores wilfully
the reality of the human condition held in evidence by the entirety of
human existence and deludes us into a false ideal. Conflict in all its
forms will always be constant and omnipresent in human interaction;
the real issue is its healthy management.
There can never be peace in the absolutist sense, only phases of
relative success in managing conflict.
Peace is
never made, established or reached; there is no such thing as a peace
treaty. There is no “soft” peace or “hard” peace. This is because,
immediately on signature of any agreement, deal or treaty, negotiated
or not, even after the cessation of hostilities, the dynamic of
conflict begins again immediately, perhaps transmogrified into
different forms on different issues and with varying intensity. But,
left unchecked by lack of will or knowledge, or by being blinded by
the laissez-faire ideal of peace, it is likely that “post-peace
conflict” will devour the participants again. It is no coincidence
that merely two decades separated two colossal conflagrations – the
20th century world wars.
There is
no such thing as a peace process, but rather the altogether less sexy
process of perpetual conflict management. It is no coincidence that
there is still no reconciliation between the Palestinians and Israelis
after repeated attempts. The protagonists have been hoodwinked for
years by the idea of a peace process, leading to a universal
settlement of all conflict in one dramatic flourish. A more realistic
approach may be to take the conflict apart one smaller piece at a time
and build new structures to absorb the inevitable future conflict.
Some
will recoil from this kind of talk in fear of feeling hopelessness.
But perhaps hope is more likely nurtured by tackling conflict in a
realistic way with greater prospect of longer-term stability than by
constant disillusionment before an ideal than will never be reached.
The idea
of “peace” is dangerous because it is an enabler. It allows us to
underestimate the hard work required to earn success in confronting
conflict, and a safe haven to hide from reality. It is a distraction
because it leads us to false conclusions on the basis of something
that does not exist. While we wait for peace, conflict steeps. The
greatest threat to any chance of managing our way out of conflict is
the idea that peace just happens by willing it.
It also
hides from us, perhaps ironically, the insinuation of progress in
conflict itself, where the tension can effect positive change and
innovation. The United Nations, with all the humanitarian coordination
work it does, might never have been created in 1945 had it not been
for catastrophic war.
Conservative hawks in Washington and chanting protesters have one
thing in common. They are both addicted equally to the idea of peace,
albeit in polar opposite ways. The former assume at the core that the
military option alone can settle immediate conflict; this explains
partly the mess in post-Saddam Iraq. The latter believe that conflict
will settle itself as long as there is no military tool at all; they
genuflect before the idol of peace. Both are passive in equal parts in
the face of the challenge of conflict that requires relentless and
never-ending application of human effort. Both want the quick fix that
the dream of peace offers and a return on investment without making
the investment in the first place.
The fact
is that we have not made enough progress in understanding conflict and
the tools to manage it. It is time to banish the easy jargon of peace
and get down to the dirty business of confronting conflict.
We face
a steep inter-disciplinary learning curve where ideas and concepts
from fields as distinct as, for example, trauma psychiatry, hold
promise. The medicine of trauma is the subject of lively debate in
psychiatry. We accept a priori that individual human beings are
affected psychologically by war, violence, community conflict,
torture, deprivation, arbitrary abuse of human rights, but the idea
that entire societies are no longer resilient opens new opportunities
to manage future conflict. Here is arguably the greatest source of
repetitive conflict; untreated, communities can become downright
pathological. Witness the Israelis and Palestinians, who both live in
a twisted vortex of violence, retribution and blame so severe that
they have become virtually dysfunctional in the pursuit of a solution.
The
conflict prevention function has been left by default and lack of
resources to a relative handful of academics and NGOs, when, in fact,
it is also needs to grow into a professional service. This is fertile
ground for a public-private partnership approach, where the burden of
professional research and development costs can be shared in the
exercise of both good public policy and corporate performance.
Conflict
is costly to the overwhelming majority of the private sector because
it destabilizes potential markets. The more engaged and integrated
companies are in international business, the more they are affected
negatively by instability and the more likely they are to serve as
counterweights in the political arena to the relatively few (but
large) corporations that benefit from defence spending and preparation
for war. History provides evidence. For example, “big business” in the
United States was opposed generally to the Spanish-American war in
1898 so sought by Theodore Roosevelt and the militarist “jingoes” and
newspaper editors of the day.
That conflict is expensive, above all in human loss, seems a
self-evident truth. But the business case for damage to private sector
interests from conflict and lost opportunity, and even by extension to
national interest as a whole through reduced tax revenue from
non-defence industry companies, has yet to be made in dollars and
cents. This is an important piece of economic and political research
waiting to be done.
The fact that traditional peace activists engage in protest alongside
opponents of liberalised global trade is ironic because, in fact,
freer international trade is a measure itself in conflict prevention.
It is a serious policy and political error that our societies cannot
devote to preparedness to confront conflict even a tiny fraction of
the financial resources available for military preparedness, as
necessary as the latter will always remain. In terms of resources
available for professional conflict prevention, our civilization is
like a big city hospital with one doctor on call who can’t get past
the triage. Only visionary political leadership will begin the process
of aligning the balance.
In Canadian terms, Canada must devote the resources to its military
required to get the job done. At the same time, and in no
contradiction, it has the historic opportunity to lead the global
debate on conflict and be a model to the world in dedicating attention
and resources to conflict resolution and prevention. Such a decision
would have positive reinforcing domestic political implications as
well.
As historians have told us, war never in reality “breaks out” but is
the culmination of a traceable sequence of events, often jumbled and
confusing at the time. In the same way, conflict needs to be battled
every step of the way.
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ARTICLE: wanted (?) –
A Canadian Defence Policy
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by James Fergusson
Roughly over a year ago, the Liberal minority government under
Paul Martin released the long awaited Defence Policy Statement (a
White Paper by another name). Since then, the government has been
replaced by a Conservative minority under Stephen Harper, and in its
first speech from the throne, and first budget, little was said about
defence. Both provided at best a minimalist window into the new
government’s thinking, and this window not surprisingly reiterated the
party’s positions laid out in the previous election campaign. In terms
of the budget, the government noted some of its capital priorities,
again reflecting its campaign rhetoric, but provided a modest
immediate increase to the spending proposed by the former government
for this fiscal year, which, if previous figures are to be believed,
may not be enough to meet current spending shortfalls. Like its
predecessor, more money is to come in future years.
To any
attentive observer of Canadian defence none of this is surprising,
even though some, such as the Canadian Defence Association (CDA), had
come to believe that Canadian (and thus government’s) attitudes
towards defence had changed significantly after 9/11. But, at least
the last Liberal and the current Conservative budget speaks volumes to
‘business as usual’. At a time of record surpluses when a significant
commitment is possible, very little is truly done. Instead, the
increases are pushed into the future under the assumption that the
good times will continue at least for the next five years. In effect,
Canadian governments of either political stripe have long made
promises to restore, modernize and expand the Canadian Forces (CF)
only to find that the reality of Canadian political life gets in the
way. Defence is quickly pushed down on the government priority list
with little, if any fear, of electoral retribution.
Perhaps,
this is a somewhat unfair assessment to make of the current
government. Notwithstanding the previous, somewhat disingenuous
notion, that National Defence and the CF could not spend a sizeable
influx of new money, there remains difficult choices for the
government to make, especially concerning new capital acquisitions.
There will never be enough money under current and foreseeable
circumstances short of full-scale war to re-create a balanced
integrated force of land, sea and air as Canada last possessed at the
end of World War II. This reality is further compounded by the
continued, inexorable rise in costs of defence goods driven by
technology and the U.S. defence budget. Even if the government decided
to abandon inter-operability with the U.S. military as a defence
objective, the CF could not escape these rising costs.
In
effect, the new government, like the old, must make difficult choices
about defence, and one of the most difficult choices is simply
deciding how to proceed. It can accept the DPS as is and move to
implement the choices of the last government; choose to move forward
quickly to implement those elements of defence policy outlined in the
Conservative election campaign alongside those parts of the DPS not at
odds with these elements; reject the DPS and proceed only with the
Conservative platform; or put defence on hold until the government
completes a full review of defence. Either of the last two appears to
be the path chosen by the Harper government. Of course, this will not
make the advocates of defence very happy, as already evident in
several opinion pieces. Nonetheless, before the new government
proceeds, political and pragmatic considerations dictate a look at
whose and what defence policy should be implemented.
At least
on the surface, the DPS is the Liberal Party’s defence agenda having
been accepted by Cabinet and the Prime Minister prior to its release
in April 2005. No government willingly executes the policy preferences
of its predecessor, especially when another election is probably just
around the corner. Conservatives have always campaigned as the party
of defence, and have been strong critics of Liberal weakness on
defence, as evident in the last election. On these two grounds alone,
the new government should be expected to abandon the DPS. Certainly,
it could move forward with the Liberal agenda without any likely
significant impact on voters not least of all because the DPS promised
the re-capitalization of CF as part of transformation. Pro-defence
voters are thus unlikely to object to its implementation. Furthermore,
fears that the Conservative Party would not be able to use defence as
a means to differentiate itself from the Liberals are likely
unfounded. The Liberal Party may well abandon its own defence agenda
with the process and final result of its leadership campaign. Indeed,
Paul Martin quickly abandoned improving relations with the U.S. and
ballistic missile defence within months of entering office in
December, 2003.
However,
the DPS is not just the Liberal defence agenda. If reports are to be
believed, it is more the Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS) personal
agenda. Immediately upon assuming office, General Hillier made it
abundantly clear that the existing draft of the new defence policy
statement was unacceptable. Apparently, it had reflected the
longstanding consensus driven-process that sought to balance the needs
and interests of each of the three services, and distributed benefits
and costs relatively equally amongst them. In rejecting the balanced
approach in favour of a single service dominant (Army-centric)
approach, the CDS placed his own personal stamp on the subsequent DPS,
and for good or ill personally took credit for its drafting.
From
this perspective, one might expect the new government to be somewhat
more comfortable with the DPS, which could be reasonably attributed to
Canada’s senior military officer, rather than the previous government.
However, there are different issues here concerning the politicization
of the CDS and civil-military relations that the government confronts.
First of all, Hillier’s ability to re-write the DPS and put his stamp
on defence policy can be partially attributed to an image of a close
personal relationship with the former Prime Minister, Paul Martin,
which may be troubling for the new government. It speaks to a
‘liberal’ CDS. Second, accepting the CDS’ defence policy implies that
the military makes policy, rather than advises and implements. Of
course, in many circumstances especially when civilian leadership has
little interest in, or is paying little attention to defence, defence
policy making may by default fall to National Defence. But even here,
it is not the CDS that makes policy, and the CDS’ input is to be
weighed along with the civilian Deputy Minister (DM). Moreover, the
CDS represents the ‘uniformed’ side, and the DM the ‘civilian’ side of
Defence. The DPS represents in this context the dominance of the
‘uniformed’, whereas putting it aside would signal the re-assertion
not only of political control, but also civilian input into the
process.
Finally,
the dominance of the CDS also raises questions about the internal
politics within the military side of the house; politics which the
current Defence Minister as a former senior officer no doubt clearly
understands. In this regard, the Army leadership model adopted by the
CDS over the long term raises questions of the sustainability of
current plans. Despite the outward ‘three musketeers’ image, there are
forces present which have been alienated by the process and outcome.
From a process perspective alone, the current model is different from
a Navy and Air Force culture, and also a bureaucratic one. One might
bemoan organizational and cultural influences, but they are a reality
that cannot be ignored. The next CDS may well look to return to more
of a consensus driven process, such that the DPS will not survive the
current CDS anyways. If this is likely, then another reason exists to
put the DPS on the shelf.
In the
end, idealists will suggest that defence is too important to be left
to petty image politics. But, politics is about image and perception
and to ignore this reality is to assume that military decision-makers
are somehow immune to politics. In the end, the government has every
incentive to make defence policy its own. With Paul Martin gone and
Hillier likely past the halfway mark of his tenure, putting the DPS on
hold or on the shelf makes political sense. It also makes some
pragmatic sense when considering the ‘what’ of defence policy.
Three
main arguments sustain the call for moving forward quickly and thus
the emerging disappointment with the new government. The first is the
generally positive reviews of the DPS. While criticisms have been
leveled at some its elements, the DPS has generally been well received
as a reasonable and accurate assessment of Canadian defence objectives
and requirements for today and the future. Thus, it would be pointless
to delay for even if the current government were to conduct its own
defence review, the results would be the same. Second, the new
government’s own priorities are not significantly different from those
in the DPS, notwithstanding the armed ice-breakers. The government may
disagree about the details of airlift per se, but everyone agrees that
airlift is a priority. Finally, investment decisions must be made now
otherwise it may be too late, especially given the length of time it
takes to procure new equipment; an issue which is receiving much more
attention today than the DPS itself. There is no time for a review.
However,
these three arguments do not necessarily justify moving forward
quickly. Certainly, few would disagree with the general tenor of the
DPS. But then, few would disagree with the general tenor of most
formal government policy documents, at least in terms of the defence
portfolio since the lessons of the 1987 White Paper. Lack of details
is the hallmark of a good policy document. The more detailed, the less
room there is for manouever, especially relative to the unexpected,
and no government wants to become trapped by its own policy rigidity,
if it can help it. Furthermore, assessments of the threat environment
and the fundamental objectives of defence policy, at least on the
surface, always reflect the obvious. No one would object to the
priority of Canada in defence and security first, then North America
and finally the rest of the world.
One
might readily conclude that the DPS can be implemented because it is
general and short on specifics. But, this is the heart of the problem
for the new government. In being asked to implement a document of the
obvious and the general, there are no clear or necessarily logical
investment priorities that fall out. Instead, any and all possible
modern military capabilities can be made to fit. The DPS needs to be
shelved because it lacks the very detail and rationale for making
specific investment choices, or such choices must await detailed
analysis. In this regard, there is a lesson from the death of the
former investment priority list – the Strategic Capabilities
Investment Plan (SCIP) – which was constructed after years of careful
deliberations under the same government but different Prime Minister
and CDS.
Of
course, there are pressing capital needs facing the CF and these needs
are reflected in the Conservative campaign platform. But even here
this is more easily said than done. No one would disagree that airlift
is a priority, especially with the ageing Hercules fleet. Even if the
government implements its promise to procure strategic lift (roughly
four C-17s), the Hercules fleet will have to be replaced very soon,
and its obvious replacement is the J Model (notwithstanding a future
Airbus competitor). However, needing airlift and deciding on the
details of actual number and capability are two different things. This
cannot be separated out from other investment and thus overall choices
about the nature and type of armed force of the future. Any investment
decision carries opportunity costs. Such decisions not only have
implications for other choices, but also can in many circumstances
dictate future choices and a future end state that may well be
inconsistent with the direction the government actually would like to
go.
This
direction, whatever it may be, leads one back to the DPS and the type
of armed force implicitly envisioned therein, or through other
statements and actions emanating from the former government, the
Department and the CDS. At best, the type of armed force and thus
investment priorities follow from the Afghan experience and conflict
model. If the new government has doubts or concerns about the
Afghanistan commitment, then building an armed force to reflect it is
problematic. Some might believe that the model is inappropriate for
future defence requirements. Others might think that the experience
over time will lead the government to eschew such missions. In either
case, quick choices can build an armed force disconnected from
political reality or result in capabilities of little actual value.
Finally,
as it is somewhat imprudent for a new government to accept
uncritically the priorities of the former government, it is also
imprudent for a new government simply to implement its campaign
promises when it comes to defence. Once in power, decision-makers gain
access to detailed information not available when in opposition.
Recall the price paid for the rash decision of the Chretien government
in 1993 to cancel the EH-101 immediately upon taking office while
reportedly rejecting any formal brief from the Defence Officials.
It is
only logical and pragmatic that the new government takes some time
before moving forward on defence. In the end, its decisions may not
differ significantly from those of the past government. Regardless, it
is politically reasonable, prudent and pragmatic for the Harper
government to examine defence in detail before meeting its commitment
to rebuild the armed forces. It has already inherited the most
significant re-structuring of National Defence since Trudeau in 1972,
if not since integration and unification of the CF in 1964, and will
have to live with the consequences. Perhaps then it is reasonable to
give the new government some time to make its own decisions regarding
the future of the rest of the defence portfolio.
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Article: Canada in Kandahar
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by John
Ferris
Afghanistan is easy to enter and hard to leave. The country, split
into many minorities by social, ethnic, religious, and clan divisions
and with a weak central government, is governed not by one level of
power, but by many. Kabul is cheap to conquer. Afghanistan is not,
because Afghanis want to be there more than anyone else does. Britain
was beaten in Afghanistan from 1838 to 1942, and the USSR between 1979
and 1989, not because their armies were crushed, but because they
realized victory would cost more in men and time than they wanted to
pay. On the other hand, limited aims are easy to achieve in
Afghanistan, especially if one only wants to stop it from being a
problem. In 1881, after an invasion producing mixed results, Britain
formed an alliance with the strongest of Afghan princes, Abdur Rahman,
helping put into power a man who kept his people from bothering the
Raj. Britain maintained that situation until 1948 through a
combination of bribery and threats: on the one occasion in 1919 when
Afghanistan created a problem, Britain hurt Afghan forces and bombed
Kabul, just to show it could. They then renewed the subsidy and kept
the peace. From 1923 until 1975, similar means kept Afghanistan from
bothering the USSR. Afghanistan is only a problem when it is invaded
or ignored.
Western countries ignored Afghanistan from 1989 to 2001. They paid the
price on 9/11. That event forced the United States to attack
Afghanistan, the base for Al Qaeda. Other western countries followed
suit, putting NATO multilateralism and old school ties into action in
order to show the wounded and lonely hyperpower it still had friends.
The Taliban regime was smashed rather more easily than Al Qaeda
expected. The question then was, what next? Historically informed
realpolitik suggested a simple answer: find the strongest warlord one
could stomach and put him in power – admittedly hard to do, as some of
the strongest warlords could not be stomached at all. Western states
did not like this idea and pursued different initiatives. The
Americans promoted a government of national unity but kept their
forces out of it, focusing on the Afghani-Pakistani borderlands and on
Iraq. Other western countries followed greater ends with greater
means, namely to create a decent and legitimate government and have
thousands of NATO soldiers help establish its rule across the country.
This was an honourable aim but not an easy one, nor are the liberal
democracies of NATO the first states to think they can make of
Afghanistan a better place. Britons believed they would do so in 1838,
as did the Soviets in 1979, and Afghanistan did become a better place
from 1881 to 1975. In 2002 western states gave a decent but militarily
weak Afghan politician, Ahmed Karzai, power in Kabul and encouraged
his efforts to create legitimacy and a national following. This was a
difficult task, but it has enjoyed some success, first because western
forces were the strongest in the land; secondly, because most Afghanis
were tired of war; and finally, because Karzai and his backers were
pragmatic enough to bribe many warlords into the process, leaving out
only some of the most powerful and unpleasant among them. This first
success has led NATO to up the ante and try to establish that regime
in areas where it is powerless. It is that policy that has taken
Canada to Kandahar.
Afghanistan has a way of arousing ambition in outsiders. The Martin
government used the commitment to Kandahar as a means to show that
Canada mattered in the world and to showcase its doctrine of focusing
all parts of hard and soft power through the prism of “3-D” (defence,
diplomacy, and development). General Hillier, borrowing the parallel,
if militarized, American concept of counter-insurgency as a “three
block war,” pinned the future of the Canadian forces to Kandahar.
Stephen Harper is using that mission to symbolize his kind of Canada,
a country acting resolutely on tough priorities. Contrary to some
critics, this aim stems not from a neo-conservative aping of George W.
Bush, but rather from Harper’s love of hockey and his roots in
Anglo-Canadian culture. The public love-fest with its soldiers of
recent years, marked by sentimentalism and a fetishization of war
dead, reveals a popular hunger to see Canada do something in the world
and develop a sense of national pride, lacking since 1990 – or 1968.
Harper also hopes to embarrass the Liberals. A party led by Bill
Graham or Michael Ignatiev cannot easily repudiate a Canadian mission
in Kandahar. That issue, however, can split the Liberals during a
leadership campaign and an election, as Harper and Jack Layton hack at
them as lumberjacks attack a tree, each using defence as a wedge to
splinter opposite sides of the Liberal vote. In the confusion, the
Conservatives may capture the role of the party of security and
Pearsonianism without losing votes in Quebec. All shades of Canadian
opinion brought us to Kandahar. All are caught in the outcome.
Afghanistan has made the military more important to Canadian politics
than it has been since 1984, or even as far back as 1967.
So, what is happening there? The unusual media focus on the mission,
especially by embedded journalists, makes us think we know more than
we do. In fact, the revolution is not being televised. The slogans of
the “three block war” and “3-D” collapsed when they hit reality (or
vice versa), crippling our ability to practice what we knew we should
theoretically do. With the first death of a civilian Canadian
official, Glyn Barry of the Department of Foreign Affairs, development
officers and diplomats left Kandahar, leaving soldiers to handle these
tasks. The latter’s ability to do so was diminished by the chance
death and incapacitation of two of the few CIMIC officers charged with
the military side of politics. The “three block war” and “3-D” have
been translated, tactically speaking, into armoured convoys on dirt
roads throughout Kandahar province, aiming to conduct “presence
patrols” and attract enemy attacks – similar to the practices of
Americans in Vietnam.
This image is familiar from press reports, but that is just part of
the picture. However much Canadians may dislike the term, their forces
are fighting a counter-insurgency campaign. That kind of war has a
history from which lessons can and should be derived. Most
insurgencies fail; poor counter-insurgents can crush bad guerrillas,
but good ones are hard to beat. To extend the reach of an unpopular or
corrupt government can strengthen rather than weaken resistance to it.
In counter-insurgency, politics matters more than tactics, and the two
must be coordinated. How far this is being done in Kandahar is
unclear; no doubt the civil side is being left to Afghan civil
authorities, as should be the case, but Canadian colonels and
sergeants seem to be forced into making their own politics for
Afghanistan. One’s impression is that coordination is fragile, but the
fractures have not been exposed because the enemy is weak.
That enemy includes the armed forces of warlords, drug smugglers, and
the Taliban which, incidentally, is far from a local body; many,
perhaps most, of its soldiers are recruits from religious schools in
Pakistan. Now, as ever, the Taliban relies on foreign jihadists and
mercenaries to make up for its lack of support from Afghanis. Thus,
many battles are being fought because the enemy wants them, which is
not always a wise strategy for irregulars, and so far they seem to be
getting the worst of combat. This suggests NATO’s strategy is having
some effect. There are other promising signs: Afghan soldiers are
motivated and brave, and the opposition seems to have little support
in rural areas (nor do we, despite all the press about medics and
CIMIC spreading the Canadian way in dusty villages), though we may yet
acquire support through luck and hard work.
On the other hand, we are sitting beside a bomb and a fuse. The main
cash crop in the Kandahar and Helmand provinces is opium. If we move
to extend the government’s power and to suppress that trade, we may
well fix the fuse and the bomb, creating an alliance between villagers
and our armed opponents. If so, they will beat us, because they want
to be in Kandahar more than we do. If that does not happen, we may win
almost without noticing it when we suddenly find that the Afghan army
and police force can stand without us. Meanwhile, by coincidence,
public support for the mission probably is strong enough to carry us
through to victory, but too weak to keep us there long in the event of
failure. Win or lose, so what? Why are we in Afghanistan at all? At
present, that question is posed only on the left, but judging from
polls and impressions, it is on the mind of most Canadians. This
should not be surprising. Indeed, it is a condition of our way of war.
Lucien Bouchard once said Canada was not a real country. When it comes
to foreign policy, he was almost right. Canada is not a normal
country. We do not need to defend our vital interests through power,
nor could we. We do not use our forces to pursue our state interests.
Instead, we loan them to some international organization, be it the
British Empire, the UN, or NATO, which we think can maintain a liberal
political and economic order across the world. We have never used our
forces in direct service of our interests, not even in the emblematic
case of 1939. We define our interests as being those of the world
community. We want to be a referee even when we are a player.
Canada is not in Afghanistan to serve a neo-con policy, or at least
not that alone, especially if one remembers that in foreign policy,
neo-cons and liberal internationalists are sisters under the skin. We
are there for the same reasons we have been anywhere since 1945: to
maintain our influence among our friends, to stand on guard for
liberal internationalism, and to do our bit to sustain a world order
which we think is both good and good for us. What is on trial in
Kandahar is any form of Pearsonian policy. If we do not stand there,
where will we, particularly since the most obvious alternative,
Darfur, is not exactly a picnic? If we sent our forces there, within a
year we would probably face the same pressures and some of the same
enemies as we do now in Afghanistan. Everything complained of by those
who oppose our commitment in Afghanistan will occur in Darfur as we
fight a neo-colonial counter-insurgency beside George W. Bush and
against an Islamic government supported by Al Qaeda. Perhaps it would
be right to intervene in Darfur, but it would be wrong to do so simply
because we think it will be easy, or nice, or something Americans
don’t do.
These dilemmas reflect the emerging conditions of our foreign and
defence policy. Like most states, our military capabilities declined
over the past generation, and we have moved to rebuild them since
2001. Because our forces are on an expeditionary force basis, however,
their rebuilding will make us more powerful than most realize. If
Canada acts on the defence policy announced by the Martin
administration in 2005 – or on the beefed-up variant proposed by
Harper – it will matter more in the world in terms of hard power than
it has at any time since 1960. It will be a kind of world power so far
as capabilities go, multiplying the value of our soft power (and vice
versa). Most states in the world have little ability to project force.
European countries, for example, unwilling to change their conscript
systems and disinclined to intervene abroad, have large armies at home
but little power to move beyond their borders. In functional terms,
their conscript systems are ceasing to be military services and
becoming social ones instead. World conventional power rests on a
combination of a blue water fleet and an expeditionary capability in
which the United States stands alone, Britain and France punch above
their weight, and Australia, Canada, and India are the only bantams.
We may become a middle power again, however, at least until China and
India become world powers.
An irony is arising in Canadian policy. We are developing relatively
great capabilities and more power than we need to pursue our own
interests. This leads us into temptation as public pressure drives our
government to do something to deal with any crisis overseas, while our
way of war, lending force to international agencies rather than using
it to further our own interests by ourselves, means that we can
rationalize their use for every end on earth. But which of them are
worth the pursuit and at what price? The commitment to Kandahar ended
the danger that Canada would become invisible in the world. Now that
we are becoming strong, we might ask what we want to use that power
for.
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Article: Eight
Simple Rules for Dating the US
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by J.L.
Granatstein
One of the great problems Canada faces in dealing with the United
States is the Canadian public’s detestation of President George W.
Bush’s America and all its works. If Animal Farm’s catchphrase
was “four legs good, two legs bad”, Canada’s is “U.S. sucks”. For a
nation that depends so totally on the United States for its economic
survival and ultimately for its defence, this is utter foolishness.
To his credit, Prime Minister Stephen Harper recognizes this folly. As
he told Policy Options in February, “the previous
government…had fights with the United States” and “their fights…did
nothing to advance Canadian interests.” Where his government disagrees
with Washington, Harper said, “let’s stand up for our interests…in a
meaningful way that really helps Canadians without poisoning
everything else.” That is the key: Canada must follow a National
Interests-based approach in dealing with the United States.
But what might this mean? Here are
eight key rules that Canada needs to follow:
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We
must work to maximize our trade with the U.S. The American market is
and will remain the engine of global prosperity, and Canada’s great
advantage is that we know this market better than any other. Our
prosperity—and almost half of all Canadian jobs--depends on the
United States market, and those who look to India or China as
possible replacements for the U.S. are letting anti-Americanism
cloud their judgement. If we can’t sell to the Americans, Canadians
will be eating grass and boiling nettles.
-
It
follows from this that a vital Canadian interest must be to maintain
the freest possible access to the U.S. The border simply must be
open. Our trade—and our tourism revenues—depend on this, and it must
be Canadian policy to act to differentiate the Americans’ northern
border from their southern one. We don’t need fences or Minutemen
patrolling the Canada-U.S. border, and we must mobilize those in
Congress who oppose the U.S.’s coming passport requirements.
-
To
keep the border open, Canada must tighten its immigration and
refugee systems even more. The Americans are right to be suspicious
of our laxity, and their concerns must be met. We also need the
real, armed border protection force that the Harper government says
it will provide. Anything else sends the wrong message to our
friends and enemies, especially when Customs officers walk off the
job every two weeks.
-
The
government and Canadian opinion-makers need to fight the mindless
anti-Americanism that is so powerful now in every part of Canada.
That “U.S. sucks” chant dominated the arena in Vancouver during the
world junior hockey championships in January, and that chant sent
precisely the wrong message to a United States where Fox Cable News,
the first anti-Canadian network, reaches a huge and influential
segment of the audience. The Americaphobes need to be exposed and
isolated and painted as the ignorant haters they are. We need not
like everything the U.S. does, and Canadians never will. But
outright hate must not be spewed over our media and in public
places. A good speech or two from the Prime Minister (and a finger
or two pointed at NDP leader Jack Layton) could be very helpful
here.
-
We need to maintain
sufficient military capability in Canada to be able credibly to tell
the Pentagon and the White House that they need have no fears about
the area to their north. The message must be that Canada’s here,
Canada’s friendly, and we’ve got your back. For thirty years, the
Canadian Forces have not been able to give such a guarantee, and the
coming budget increases, the projected increases in personnel, and
the creation of Canada Command must be sufficient to allow us to
make this pledge to the Americans.
-
An increase in the
CF will also help us play a bigger, more effective role in the world
and allow us to defend our sovereignty against the only power that
seriously threatens it: the U.S. The Americans are good neighbours,
but they do not recognize our claims to the Arctic and its waters.
Only by visibly exercising control and by demonstrating to all and
sundry that we do so can we advance our sovereignty. The U.S. won’t
go to war for the Northwest Passage, but it will test our control,
politely. With similar tact, we need to demonstrate that the
government and the Canadian Forces have the will to prevail.
-
Canada needs to
speak truth to power in Washington. President Bush paid no attention
to Prime Minister Martin; he must pay attention to Stephen Harper,
and he will, if Harper talks sense. The key is to speak quietly when
we disagree with U.S. policy and not to posture for the cameras
while playing to the Yankee-haters at the Toronto Star.
-
And, finally, while
Canada’s national interests and those of the United States are not
always the same, they frequently are. We are both North American
free market democracies, after all, and our histories and values are
similar. As the smaller power, Canada should support the US when our
interests coincide. This may require that Ottawa’s Axworthy-like
penchant for moral posturing be restrained, but that will be a good
thing. The Americans know that it will take several years to rebuild
the Canadian Forces and what Washington most often wants from us is
political support, not soldiers. When it is in our interest, we
should offer it. When it is not, then (as in #7) we should tell
Washington so quietly.
Those eight simple rules can put Canada’s relations with the United
States back on track. Their application, for example, might not bring
the U.S. to accept our Arctic sovereignty, but they will make the
President, Congress, and the State Department more amenable to
treating with a reliable ally. Good sense on our part can have a
beneficial effect on all our relations with the United States. And
that is very much in Canada’s national interest.
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ARTICLE:
The Debate Between the Canadian Commitment to Afghanistan and
the Sudan: The Need to Consider All Costs!
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by
Rob Huebert
With increasing attention being paid to international efforts to
resolve the violence in the Sudan, Canada has been under mounting
pressure to join these efforts. Combined with the recent Canadian
military casualties in Afghanistan and the accompanying opinion polls
showing decreased Canadian support for that mission, a debate
regarding Canadian military action there has ensued. The emerging
position is that Canada should mount a significant deployment to the
Sudan. While few have come out and specifically stated it, the
underlying assumption is that such a mission would be preferable to
the current Kandahar mission. This debate is both illustrative and
disturbing with respect to what it suggests about the public’s current
understanding of Canadian defence and foreign policy.
The fact that Canadians are discussing and debating overseas
deployments to these failed and failing states is an important
indication of Canadians’ caring nature. There are few other states
that have either the will or the capacity to offer such assistance.
These deployments are expensive in terms of both personnel and
resources. Given their expense, it is imperative that the debates be
based on a full and complete understanding of the facts, rather than
on wishful thinking.
The argument that Canada should commit resources to the Sudan contains
four highly suspect assumptions. The first is that Canada is morally
obligated to stop the genocide and the other horrific actions that
have taken place there. It is often implied that this is in keeping
with the Canadian tradition of support for “human security,” which
some suggest has always been the raison d’etre of Canadian defence. A
second assumption is that the mission to the Sudan will be conducted
as a “peacekeeping” operation as opposed to the “peace enforcement”
nature of the Afghanistan operation. A third is that the Sudan mission
is preferable to the current Afghanistan operation because America’s
participation has not yet been proposed. The belief that Canada can
deploy troops to both Afghanistan and the Sudan in a meaningful
fashion comprises the last supposition.
Let us begin with the first of these four assumptions. As important as
peacekeeping has been in the minds of the Canadian public, the reality
is that Canadian forces have been built and designed to fight wars
against enemies. To a large degree, the most successful Canadian
peacekeeping deployments have been to ensure that inter-allied
relations are protected in the face of an adversary. Canadian
involvement in the Suez crisis in 1956 focused on helping the
Americans, the British, and the French to resolve their differences.
The commitment to Cyprus was also about ensuring that the Greek and
Turkish allies did not go to war with each other over the island.
While Canadian forces were deployed to other peacekeeping operations
and made important contributions, none of these other operations come
close to equalling Canada’s contribution to the Cyprus and Suez
deployments. Also forgotten in the understanding of Canadian forces is
that Canadian forces perform so well in traditional peacekeeping
operations because they have been highly trained for war-fighting
against the USSR and its allies. Canada’s peacekeeping success was
built on Canada’s requirement to ensure that its commitment to NATO
remained strong and that NATO itself remained strong. The assumption
that the current Canadian deployment fighting alongside its allies is
at odds with Canadian history is simply wrong. If anything, the
Canadian contribution of war-fighting troops deployment is actually
much more in keeping with the traditional uses of the Canadian
military since the end of the Second World War.
A second assumption that is building in the push for making the
commitment to the Sudan is that it will be a traditional peacekeeping
operation. This is based on the belief that current negotiations will
lead to a peaceful settlement between the rebels and the government;
it is to believe that there are two sides that need to be separated so
peace can be enforced in the region. Unfortunately, this belief flies
directly in the face of all precedents of the current Khartoum regime.
There is no evidence that they have any intention of giving up their
genocidal, destructive polices any time soon. Indeed, why would they?
If they were reasonable men concerned about the violence, there would
not be a crisis in the Sudan. The sad reality is that they will not
end their horrific policies unless and until they are forced to. Any
solution to Sudan’s “problem” will require the use of military force.
And even if the government was somehow convinced to change its
policies, the militias would still need to be brought under control,
once again requiring military force. Thus, any action directed to
truly resolving the policy of genocide, rape, and destruction in the
Sudan will require the extensive use of military power; any meaningful
Canadian deployment would probably be even more violent and dangerous
than our current deployment in Afghanistan.
Wending its way into the arguments of those strongly supporting an
intervention in the Sudan is the third assumption, that is, that it
can/will be done without the Americans. It is the probable absence of
the Americans that causes some commentators to openly state that the
Sudanese mission is preferable to the current Afghanistan deployment.
Regardless of one’s view of current American foreign policy and
leadership, the reality is that if the United States does not commit
troops to the Sudan, any mission is likely to fail. Canada has already
discovered that it cannot deploy by itself as it attempted to do in
Central Africa. Previous African efforts in the Sudan have likewise
been unsuccessful, and the Europeans have shown no willingness to
deploy on their own. The power needed to successfully force the
government to stop its horrific actions and to stop the militias’
actions could only come from the United States, assuming it is willing
to deploy. If the crisis is to be resolved, America must be involved.
A fourth assumption many adhere to is that Canada can support both the
Afghanistan mission and a deployment to the Sudan. However, a
meaningful Canadian commitment to both, as opposed to mere tokenism,
is just not possible. Starting with the cuts to the military made by
the Trudeau government, continued by the Mulroney administration, and
accelerated by the Chrétien government, successive Canadian
governments decided to increase the number of overseas deployments
while simultaneously and substantially reducing the size of the
Canadian forces. This has created a situation wherein the forces’
members are asked to shoulder an increasingly heavy work load with
increasingly smaller numbers. Thus, with a few notable exceptions such
as Bosnia, the Canadian commitment to international conflicts became
smaller and ultimately less effective. Only in very recent years has
it been recognized politically that Canadian contingents cannot be
everywhere at the force levels that they have been reduced to. Had the
forces been maintained at 80,000 rather than reduced to 50,000, it
might be possible to talk of both a meaningful Afghanistan and a
meaningful Sudanese mission. But with today’s numbers, Canada has just
two options. Either we pull out of Afghanistan completely when our
official commitment ends in February 2009 and redeploy to the Sudan,
or we maintain both by prioritizing one mission and sending only a
token force to the other.
The costs of not renewing our commitment to Afghanistan should be
clarified. First, there is a very real possibility that other
contributing states might then also re-examine their decision to stay.
A Canadian withdrawal might well be interpreted by the fundamentalist
forces in that country as a victory. Whether valid or not, the
decision to redeploy will be interpreted as a reaction to the recent
Canadian casualties. Any Canadian withdrawal will be attributed to
those events and perceived as a victory; the Taliban and Al Qaeda will
view our withdrawal as validation of their recent attacks on Canadian
forces. If Al Qaeda comes to believe that Canada is a “soft target,”
they may be encouraged to mount an attack on Canada itself in the
future.
By the same token, a Canadian decision not to participate in an
international peacemaking/enforcement effort in the Sudan will hurt
efforts to bring peace to that country. Canadian forces, when properly
supported and concentrated, have shown that they are capable of
playing a significant role in robust missions that border on
war-fighting, rather than peacekeeping mandates. Canada is seen as a
leader and its absence would be felt. But Canada cannot do it alone.
Overall, the discussion regarding committing forces to the Sudan is
understandable. Canadians do not want to see the Sudanese people’s
agony prolonged. But the price of providing real assistance comes at a
cost that is not yet fully comprehended. Had the decision to reduce
the number of Canadian forces not been made by successive governments,
it might have been possible to commit to both actions. But the cuts
were made, and Canadian forces cannot support both tasks in a
meaningful manner. Likewise, those who call for a deployment to the
Sudan also must recognize that this mission will be every bit as
dangerous as the current mission in Afghanistan (and possibly even
more hazardous). In all likelihood, a traditional peacekeeping
deployment will accomplish little apart from making the contributing
countries feel good. To stop those willing to commit themselves to
genocide and rape, force is needed. And historically, the
participation of the United States is necessary to generate enough
force to complete that mission. This is not the scenario portrayed by
those advocating Canada’s commitment to the Sudan, but it is a
necessary precondition for a successful outcome. Until Canada succeeds
in rebuilding its forces (assuming that it is allowed to continue to
do so), it must make some hard decisions. The commitment to remedy the
crisis in the Sudan is noble, but most Canadians are unaware of the
inherent expense. If this decision is made, it must be based on the
facts, not on wishful thinking.
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ARTICLE: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT – A GROWING CHALLENGE TO CANADIAN
SECURITY
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by
Mike Jeffery
“First the levees
were breached––and then law and order. As Katrina left people
scrambling for food, for water, for supplies – for survival —
lawlessness and violence, both real and imagined, spread, creating yet
another problem for authorities who were burdened enough already.”[1]
There are many dimensions to national
security, but as numerous incidents over the past decade, both in
Canada and elsewhere have shown, a key capability is the ability to
manage the consequences of disasters. No where was this more evident
than in events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. The recent release of
the US House of Representatives
final report on the crisis is likely
to result in considerable discussion south of the border on what
should have been done to prevent the disaster from occurring and the
means of managing the consequences once the Hurricane hit. It would be
easy for Canadians to dismiss this as a unique American experience
with no lessons for Canada. It would also be a mistake.
While the conditions which created the disaster in New Orleans are
unique and there is very little likelihood such specific events would
unfold in Canada, there are real lesson’s here for all developed
countries. Katrina illustrates the increasing vulnerability, even
fragility, of modern societies and the limits of emergency services in
dealing with the consequences of disaster. It should serve as a wake
up call to governments and policy planners alike.
Irrespective of debates over growing threats, natural events which
result in death, destruction and the disruption of society have been
around forever. Historically, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and
other conflagrations have regularly caused upheaval, while pandemics
have decimated populations. As society has advanced, man made
destruction, as a result of war or accident, have added to the list of
threats. What has changed, as illustrated by Katrina and similar
events, is the structure of our modern post industrial society. In
pursuit of efficiency, in our increasingly urbanized environment, we
have integrated baseline infrastructure services resulting in an
increased fragility or vulnerability, which amplifies the disruptive
effect of any threat, while the ability of our emergency services to
respond has not kept pace.
Just consider the foundation elements of our modern society.
Electricity is the lifeblood of any modern society and, as anyone who
experienced the ice storm or major power outages knows, we are wholly
dependent upon it. Without it, our computers, the key information tool
of society won’t work, traffic lights and control systems are out of
order snarling our transportation networks, water pumps remain silent,
allowing our homes to flood and industries and security systems are
ineffective making people and businesses vulnerable. In addition,
modern communications have made us a virtual community. No longer do
we bond with our next door neighbours, rather we have friends and
close contacts around the city, the country and even the globe.
Communications technology sees us connected in ways our parents could
not have imagined. Even more significant, business and government,
upon which we depend, have become equally distributed. The help desk
or customer service office you call for assistance is just as likely
to be in India as around the corner. If these communications systems
fail, society is paralyzed. Finally, advanced transportation systems
have resulted in a global “just in time” society. This goes much
further than manufacturing and pervades every aspect of our world.
Without the constant movement of goods, everything from gasoline to
foodstuffs ceases to be available. Equally important we have become
routine world travelers, as we interact in these 21st
century social, business and governmental networks.
It of course can be argued that society has always been susceptible to
these weaknesses but able to weather such disruptions. That while the
power may go out or the transportation system may fail, we can and do
survive until the services are put back in order. The problem with
this argument is that it ignores two significant trends. First is the
reality that we have grown dependent on these systems and no longer
possess the level of resilience that has saved us in the past. Perhaps
the best example is the food supply system. I can remember when the
home basement or storage room was a virtual grocery store. Fruits and
vegetables, canned or frozen every fall, and a freezer full of meat
were sufficient to see us through the winter months. There were items
that we could only get at the grocery store, but the family would only
shop once or twice a month, stocking up with “bulk” commodities. Other
than fresh milk, which was often delivered, we didn’t spend a great
deal of time going to the store. We could survive for months without
re-supply. Today however, we have grown to depend on a grocery store
which always has an ample supply of fresh food, negating the
requirement to stock up “just in case”. But the grocery store is not a
large warehouse but the distribution point for a constantly moving
supply system. Disrupt the system and the grocery store stocks very
quickly dry up. By some estimates there is approximately a three day
supply in the North American food chain.
The second trend, in our complex society, is that these systems are
increasingly interdependent and disruption of one can quickly lead to
failure of another. A loss of power impacts on virtually every aspect
of our infrastructure and even emergency power systems are time
limited. Power outages disrupt communications, leading to a loss of
situational awareness, resulting in less personal and organizational
agility and decreased effectiveness. And both of these reduce the
effectiveness of our transportation system. Collectively, such
failures quickly lead to a decline in control of society’s activities
and an unforecast surge demand on parts of the system, which further
create erratic fluctuations. Here the spectre of tens of thousands of
vehicles clogging the highways as people evacuated New Orleans,
exacerbated by a lack of fuel, illustrates the problem. So it is my
contention that the underlying threat is really no different than it
has ever been. What is | | |
