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CDFAI
DISPATCH: SUMMER 2010 (VOLUME VIII, ISSUE II)
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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and
defence policy.
Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (613) 288-2529
Fax: (613) 288-2530
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
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Article
Summaries from the Assistant Editor
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Afghanistan: Out of Sight...?: Derek Burney examines Canada’s
role in Afghanistan, noting that without further debate and direction
on what our future role should be the Canadian public will continue to
lose trust in the value and importance of our presence in Afghanistan.
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The Failing Greek Economy: Barry Cooper investigates the
reasons for the economic decline of Greece, and its place in the
European Union, by discussing the relative value of currency and how
countries can extend their influence through this.
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Access to Information and the Harper Government: Sharon Hobson
probes the public’s access to information from the government with
regards to military matters. She concludes that all her inquiries were
answered in a ‘consistent manner’ — vaguely and without specifics.
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Democracy Promotion - Conservative Style: David Pratt
investigates the Conservative Government’s pledge for democratic
reform in the 2008 Throne Speech and concludes that the Harper
Government has dawdled, thus passing up an opportunity to be a leader
in democracy promotion at home and abroad.
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Addressing the Detainee Issue: Modernizing the Geneva Convention on
the Treatment of Prisoners of War: The Afghan detainee debate has
become a topic of great debate in Canada. Rob Huebert
investigates the options that Canada has with regards to detaining
Prisoners of War and what options we should consider in the future.
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China, America and World Leadership: Alexander Moens
investigates the rise of China and its potential to surpass the United
States as the worlds primary superpower.
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A Different Take on National and Global Security: Hugh Segal
explores the need for Canada to pursue a more ‘linked-up’ framework
for strategic doctrine that not only includes a well funded, equipped
and trained military, but investment in foreign aid to increase
stability in at risk nations.
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“Back to Basics?” Canada and the “New NATO Strategic Concept”, from
Afghanistan to the Arctic: Stéphane Roussel and Samir Battiss
discuss the changing nature of the NATO alliance and what Canada
can do to make sure its national interests are heard.
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Message
from the Editor-in-Chief - david bercuson
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David is the Director of Programs at CDFAI, the Director of the Centre
for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and
the Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of the 41st Combat Engineer Regiment.
In the second week of May, the navy suddenly announced that half its
fleet of Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) would be retired,
three on the east coast and three on the west coast, due to shortages
of funds and sailors, mainly reservists, to man the ships. From the
way the news suddenly appeared in mid-week, in broad daylight and not
late on a Friday afternoon, it was very apparent that the announcement
had come from the navy itself and not from the Minister of National
Defence.
There was an immediate public protest from the premier of Nova Scotia
who claimed he had not been consulted by Peter MacKay who is, after
all, not only MND but also the minister who is politically responsible
for Nova Scotia. Not 36 hours went by before the Chief of the Defence
Staff withdrew the announcement and ensured all and sundry that all
the MCDVs would continue to patrol Canadian coastal waters for the
time being. Obviously he too was bypassed when the navy broke its
news.
This is not the first time the navy has made a sudden announcement
that its presence in Canadian coastal waters would be slashed due to
funding cuts. Two years ago a similar notice was given that offshore
fisheries patrols by Canada’s larger ocean going ships would be
drastically curtailed for the same reason. Then too the announcement
was quickly protested by east coast politicians and just as quickly
withdrawn.
From time to time all three services play this game with the public
and the government. The habitual offender used to be the air force
that would periodically announce it could no longer carry on the
“Snowbirds” summer air show appearances. The army’s old ploy was to
release information that it was looking at unit consolidations that
would inevitably produce base closures in politically sensitive
regions of the country.
Canadians ought to be used to this strange method of communication
from the Canadian Forces. It is, after all, one of the few ways that
the Chiefs of the Air Staff, Maritime Staff and Land Staff can speak
directly to the public – but at the same time not speaking directly –
to level with them about how underfunded they are. There is simply no
real chance in Canada that any military leader is going to speak up
when his (or her) service is in trouble without losing his/her career.
That is the way Canada’s Parliamentary system works and it does not
matter which party is in power. A year and a half ago the Chief of the
Land Staff actually laid out the desperate straits the army was in
during early 2009 to the Senate Committee on National Security and
Defence, but effectively withdrew his remarks several months later
after the government announced a billion+ purchase of new and better
LAV-type vehicles – a purchase that was subsequently shelved.
No government wants Canada’s military leaders to come clean with
Canadians but this government’s tight control of virtually any defence
information, even how far a program to purchase fixed-wing search and
rescue aircraft, has made the matter far worse than at anytime in the
last decade or so. Watch for the imminent cancellation of the
Snowbirds – again.
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Article: Afghanistan:
Out of Sight…?
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by Derek Burney
Derek Burney was a member of the Independent Panel on Canada’s
Future Role in Afghanistan. He is Senior Strategic Advisor to Ogilvy
Renault LLP in Ottawa, Chairman of the Board of CanWest Global
Communications Corp., and a Visiting Professor and Senior
Distinguished Fellow at Carleton University. He also served as
Canada’s Ambassador to the United States from 1989-1993.
The tragic earthquake in Haiti, and Canada’s swift and substantial
response, has moved the focus sharply away from fundamental questions
about our ongoing role in Afghanistan. Parliament approved an end to
Canada’s “combat role” in 2011 and this is being translated, in some
instances, to mean a complete withdrawal of all of Canada’s military
activity in this beleaguered country, leaving unanswered many critical
strategic questions. Parliamentary and media debate has centered
around the dated and peripheral issue of detainees, but discussion on
Canada’s future role has been sterile, reflecting little analysis of
the consequences for our non-military role as well as for the volatile
region in which we have made such a significant commitment of treasure
and blood for over more than eight years.
A complete withdrawal would presumably include the sharp end being
conducted with significant, albeit unreported, success by our Special
Forces units. It would also mean that the essential security support
for Canada’s massive economic development assistance programs would
also come to an end raising questions from the Auditor General, among
others, about whom we should expect to substitute for us in providing
this security. In a place as volatile as Afghanistan, there is simply
no way that bilateral, economic assistance can be provided without
basic security. The two go hand in hand. Will all of Canada’s future
aid be funnelled exclusively through multilateral channels? Have we
thought through what the implications more broadly would be from a
total military withdrawal, including the consequences for relations
with key allies who, along with Canada, are doing the heavy lifting in
Afghanistan?
Stability in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to stability in
Pakistan, a nuclear weapons state wobbling precariously under pressure
from terrorists who see no border distinction between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but who use the open geography of the frontier as safe
havens for attacks in both countries.
The prolonged dithering by President Obama before his decision to
increase the U.S. military commitment undermined support among the key
allies, but it is now evident that the U.S. is adapting its counter
insurgency strategy, as well as its capability, to reflect more of
what seems to be working (belatedly) in Iraq. It will take time to
recoup confidence in U.S. leadership, just as it will take time for
their troop increases to have practical effect on the ground. What we
are likely to see, at least from the U.S. Administration, is a
lowering of benchmarks for progress and increasing accommodation of
local factors in Afghanistan, i.e. tribal and political factors. The
more pervasive U.S. concern, however, is Pakistan. But to suggest
that, because the U.S. intends to start withdrawing forces in 2011,
Canada should pull out completely is a non-sequitur.
The international forces are pledged to stay until the Afghan Defence
Force is trained and capable of preserving basic security for larger
proportions of the Afghan population. The non-combat training
component is an essential element of the commitment by NATO and other
international units operating under a U.N. mandate with that objective
in mind.
Canada has pressed persistently for more troops from other allies in
Afghanistan and for a more comprehensive or coherent NATO strategy.
How would a decision to withdraw completely tally with that position?
It is not to deny that Canada has done more than most, and certainly
more than its share, but there are gradations between what we are
doing and what we still could do that should be analyzed. Are we
influencing the new U.S. strategy on the basis of our experience? Are
we assessing our own military effort in Kandahar against the new
strategy?
What precisely have we learned that has worked, or not worked, through
the sacrifices to date?
The Americans changed their strategy in Iraq after a vigorous debate
in Congress and within the U.S. military itself. Much of the latter is
now a matter of public record. The upshot has been less emphasis on
spasmodic patrolling in volatile neighbourhoods and more on stationing
troops prominently in those communities. The theory is that if you are
present for only one or two hours of patrol the insurgents have
virtually free entry for the remainder of the day. Is the surge that
made this change possible in Iraq applicable in Kandahar with a
similarly increased deployment? We read, too often, news reports about
regular patrols by Canadians in Armoured Personnel Carriers that are
not sufficiently armoured to withstand increasingly lethal IEDs. Is
our own military rethinking the utility/futility of this routine? If
not, why not?
There are many reasons to be discouraged about events in Afghanistan.
Desertion rates within the Afghan forces are reportedly as high as 25%
and the recent attacks in Kabul suggested some serious deficiencies in
intelligence gathering as well. More fundamentally, the Karzai
Administration is tottering following a flawed electoral process and
failed attempts to form a cabinet demonstrating seemingly less
capacity for basic governance. The pressures for democratization are
not necessarily conducive to greater stability. In an environment
where the capacity to govern and to provide rudimentary levels of
security are nascent, ideals associated with democratization have
little resonance. Yet another international forum assembled in London
last week in yet another effort to establish a more effective plan
forward. The prospect of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban
surfaces yet again for consideration. But the ingredients for
progress, let alone success, seem more elusive than ever.
The Canadian public may be immune or fatigued by a steady stream of
negative reports about Afghanistan. Questions persist about what our
future role should be and why. The lack of serious debate and
direction on these questions, along with the exaggerated attention
devoted to the marginal issue of detainees, saps the most basic
commodity of all: public trust in the value or efficacy of what we are
doing and why.
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Article: The Failing Greek
Economy
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by Barry Cooper
Barry Cooper, FRSC, is a Professor of Political Science and Fellow,
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.
I n 1935, Elizabeth Marian Butler published The Tyranny of Greece
over Germany, a study of the influence of classical Greek art on
the modern German poets, starting with Goethe. The title came to mind,
rather ironically, last spring when I considered the contortions the
Germans and Greeks performed before agreeing to measures to rescue the
Greek economy.
This exciting drama needs to be understood in its prosaic historical
and geopolitical context. For two centuries prior to 2001, the drachma
had been endlessly devalued in order (more or less) to balance the
Greek books. After they joined the eurozone that year, the Greeks
could borrow on the international bond market at rates that were
exceedingly low in terms of Greek financial history.
The new money was spent on infrastructure, the 2004 Olympics (at twice
the budgeted cost), and an additional quarter million bureaucrats.
Today this country of 11 million boasts nearly a million of such
creatures, a good chunk of its “work” force. The wages of
non-bureaucrats also increased, along with pensions, and the
government grew increasingly lax in the unpleasant business of
collecting taxes. Today the Greek government debt is truly impressive.
At the same time as the Greeks were spending lavishly, they were
cooking the books. Today Greek statistics are as reliable as Chinese
ones. To a lesser extent the Greek response, to grow fat, lazy and
mendacious, was copied by the other “Club Med” eurozone members,
Portugal, Spain, and Italy. They all took a free ride on what in
effect were German bond prices backed by German productivity.
The conventional economic interpretation is that a single currency for
economies that are different in size, growth rates, and structure –
poor, slow-growth, labor-intensive agricultural economies versus rich,
high-growth, capital intensive, industrial ones – is not such a hot
idea. Economists who support a Canada-US currency union and the
“Amero,” may dispute the argument, but it seems to make political
sense.
Germany, for example, favours a strong currency and relatively high
interest rates because they produce value-added BMWs and need to
attract investment to do so. Greece, in contrast, needs a weak
currency because the value-added component to olive oil is low; they
need to be price-competitive, which is facilitated by low interest
rates.
A single currency for both Germany and Greece gives the Greeks access
to money at rates for which they would not qualify on their own. The
effect has been to increase inflation across the eurozone and
eventually to precipitate the debt crisis. Following the 2008-09
financial downturn and the evident reluctance of the EU countries to
bail out their eastern neighbours, some economists predicted the end
of the euro and of the EU as well.
A more interesting way to look at the current problem is to focus on
politics rather than economics. Consider the question from Germany’s
perspective.
What historians call “German particularism” refers to their political
fragmentation prior to the unification of 1871. With a unified France
to the west and Russia to the east, the historic German problem has
been its geopolitical vulnerability. After the first unification the
Germans responded with military and economic efficiency along with
demographic, economic, and military expansion.
After two general wars, in 1945 Germany’s neighbours ensured either
through occupation by the Red Army, or subordination to NATO, that
Germany was deprived of the option of military effectiveness. That
left economic dynamism as a substitute for military dynamism. Here we
may see the EU and the euro as a means of harnessing German
productivity for the benefit of all Europeans. In other words, from
the German perspective, these measures were a way of limiting German
economic power.
The problem with the eurozone from the Club Med perspective is not
that they obtained access to cheap money but that their inefficient
workers had to compete with the Germans who, for historical and
ultimately for geopolitical reasons, are hyperefficient. moreover,
giving Club Med countries cheap credit made them less, not more,
efficient. In this respect it increased their dependence on the
Germans much as transfer payments increase the dependence of
“have-not” provinces on Ottawa.
In short, Club Med countries borrowed German money to buy German goods
because their own labour force could not compete with German workers.
This is embarrassing for the Greeks, who went so far as to blame the
German occupation of WW II for their current plight. Not surprisingly,
their economic ingratitude has irritated the Germans. The interesting
thing is not whether the Greeks could have been bailed out by the EU,
meaning mostly by the Germans, or whether IMF help, which indirectly
meant American help, was inevitable. Rather, it is the internal debate
in Germany.
Chancellor Merkel favoured the IMF option because it was popular with
an electorate tired of helping a bunch of ingrates – a sentiment not
unknown in Alberta regarding transfer payments. On the other side,
finance Minister Schäuble saw an opportunity to extend German
influence by imposing strict conditions on the Greeks and eventually
on the entire Club Med.
The internal German debate over control of the eurozone has an urgency
that only in part reflects the traditional geopolitical problems. It
also reflects German demographic issues: a low birth rate and aging
workforce. If Germany does not act quickly, within a decade or two, it
will be incapable of acting at all, but that does not mean the Club
Med countries will like, or even understand, German imperatives.
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Article: Access to Information and the Harper Government
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 by
Sharon Hobson
Sharon Hobson has been the Canadian correspondent for Jane’s
Defence Weekly since April 1985. For the past decade she has also been
a regular contributor to Jane’s Navy International and Jane’s
International Defense Review. She is also the 2004 recipient of the
Ross Munro Media Award.
It was my favourite headline of 2009 – "Harper lauds press freedom in
speech, doesn't take questions from reporters" said the Globe and Mail
on November 21. It was perfect. This government talks a good game when
it comes to democracy, especially when it comes to democracy in other
countries, but when it comes to transparency in the policy-making
process, the Harper Conservatives are secretive and scary.
Recent criticisms over attempts by Environment Canada to muzzle its
scientists caused the Hon. Jim Prentice, Minister of the Environment,
to write a letter to the Ottawa Citizen defending his government's
actions. He wrote, "Environment Canada's media relations policies are
standard practice across the government and are consistent with the
government's overall communications policy."
This is hardly a defence. Rather it is an admission that the whole of
government is following a noncommunications policy aimed at keeping
tight control over every scrap of information and preventing the
Canadian public from knowing what its political representatives are
doing, thinking and planning.
Prentice then went on to say, "the policy assures that communications
with media are co-ordinated to ensure that requests for information
are responded to quickly, accurately and in a consistent manner across
Canada."
The only part of that sentence that is really true is the part about
all media inquiries being dealt with in a consistent manner. Look, for
example, at what happened recently when I tried to get information on
the impact of the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) on Canadian defence companies and Canadian defence procurement.
The Department of National Defence (DND) refused to answer any
questions about ITAR, despite having done interviews on the subject in
the past. Mr. Michael Slack, the Director Continental Materiel
Cooperation, has been very keen over the years to talk about the
industrial benefits of the Joint Striker Fighter program, and
Canada-U.S. co-operation. But now he will not return phone calls.
Instead, his public affairs officer directed me to Public Works and
Government Services Canada (PWGSC).
PWGSC's spokesperson, France Langlois, in response to questions about
whether the ITAR has affected the procurement process and was causing
the DND to change its equipment requirements, responded in the usual
way–via e-mail. Her bullet point response provided general government
spin on a subject that I had specific questions about.
She said,
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The Government of Canada is committed to an open, fair and
transparent procurement process while obtaining, at the best possible
value for Canadians, the equipment required by the Canadian Forces.
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In its procurement process, PWGSC adheres to all relevant trade
agreements and works with other departments to determine the best
procurement strategy to meet their requirements.
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PWGSC and the Department of National Defence do not exclude
suppliers subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
from bidding on Canadian military procurement.
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The Government of Canada continues to work with the U.S.
administration to ensure an open dialogue on ITAR matters. Our goal is
to find a mutually agreeable and viable solution that will place the
emphasis on security and will resolve ITAR issues and concerns for
Canadian industry.
Langlois said PWGSC was declining a request for an interview, and
passed me to the Department of Industry in search of a report that
someone, somewhere had told her may exist. She could supply no
details as to who told her about the report and what it was on
specifically.
The Department of Industry responded in an e-mail that it had no such
report and told me to phone the Canadian Association of Defence and
Security Industries (CADSI).
CADSI's web site claims it is "the primary advocate for the defence
and security industries", but President Tim Page declined to be
interviewed, saying in an e-mail, "I am under a non-disclosure
agreement with the federal government and am not at liberty to discuss
this issue in the public domain. I can tell you that the issue is
still an active file."
Meanwhile over at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, despite e-mail and voice mail promises to the contrary, they
finally opted not to respond to two simple questions: 1) Has Canada
gained back all the exemptions it lost in 1999 when the ITAR was
amended?, and 2) what was the value of Canada's defence exports to the
U.S. in 1998 and in 2008 (or the latest year that you have figures
on)?
So there you have it. All my inquiries answered in a "consistent
manner".
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Article: Democracy Promotion -
Conservative Style
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by David Pratt
The Honourable David Pratt, P.C. is currently a consultant. He is
the former Advisor to the Secretary General and Special Ambassador for
the Canadian Red Cross and former Minister of National Defence.
“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we
shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of
liberty.” - John F. Kennedy
“A new, non-partisan democracy promotion agency will also be
established to support the peaceful transition to democracy in
repressive countries and help emerging democracies build strong
institutions.” - Harper Government: 2008 Throne Speech
Inevitably there are different levels of political will that go
into grand declarations on fostering freedom and democracy. In the
case of the “Canadian Democracy Promotion Agency,” it would seem the
Harper government simply lacked the ideas and motivation to see its
democracy goals realized. This was largely confirmed by the results of
a recent consultation sponsored by Stephen Fletcher, the Minister
responsible for Democratic Reform, with organizations involved in
democracy promotion. The meeting did not go well leading many to
conclude that the Conservatives have now effectively abandoned the
2008 Throne Speech pledge.
On the face of it, part of the government’s lack of enthusiasm for
democracy promotion can be traced to their December 30th prorogation:
a decision widely regarded as manipulative and anti-democratic. It was
hardly surprising when democracy promotion was absent from the March
3rd Throne Speech; however, a closer examination of the manner in
which the Conservatives managed this issue reveals how they took a
golden opportunity to advance an important file and, through inaction
and ineptitude, turned it into a largely unnoticed, but still
significant, political mess. Retracing the history of this commitment
reveals how a seemingly good proposal could end up going so badly off
the rails. The idea of establishing a democracy promotion agency
stemmed from the recommendations of a July 2007 Report by the Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development entitled:
“Advancing Canada’s Role in International Support for Democratic
Development”.
The Standing Committee’s report, and its 28 recommendations was a
comprehensive and creative contribution to an important issue.
Canadian support for democratic development has been an element of our
foreign and official development assistance policies since the mid
1980s. Over the years, a number of Canadian organizations have emerged
as important contributors in various aspects of democracy support
including: the Parliamentary Centre, IDRC, Rights and Democracy, the
Forum of Federations, the National Judicial Institute, CANADEM and
Elections Canada. The government has also given the issue a higher
profile since it identified democracy as one of four core values
guiding our foreign policy, along with freedom, human rights and the
rule of law. Total budgetary expenditures on democracy support amount
to about half a billion dollars.
With so many organizations involved in democracy support, and
significant budgetary allocations, it was very important for the
Standing Committee to address the issue. Given the strategic
priorities of Canadian foreign policy, the Committee sought to explore
the extent to which these resources were being spent in a focussed and
coordinated manner. They also considered new instruments that might be
necessary to help implement Canada’s policies. So the Committee’s
report, the first comprehensive examination of democracy support in
over 20 years, was very timely.
The central message of the report was clear: “We believe that Canada
should become among the world leaders in a growing field of
international policy that is as necessary to the future of global
order as it is challenging in implementation.” However, the report
also added: “To achieve this goal for Canada will take more than just
incremental steps – a few addons; a little more funding here and
there. It will require some new directions and new instruments.”
The centrepiece of the Committee’s report, contained in
recommendations 12–14, called for a new independent Canadian
Foundation for International Democratic Development. In addition, the
Committee recommended more regular and realistic evaluations of all
public funding provided and the democratic development assistance
strategies being pursued.
The Harper Government’s initial response to the report seemed
favourable. In a document released in November 2007 entitled “A New
Focus on Democracy Support”, the government said it viewed the
Committee’s report positively and would take steps to add greater
emphasis on democracy support as a key international priority. It
committed to take action in five areas. First, it promised to develop
a “Whole-of-Government Policy Statement” on democracy support within
six months. Second, it proposed a research program on democracy
support and comprehensive country-level governance assessments. Third,
it undertook to conduct an annual “Democracy Dialogue” and bolster the
Democracy Council – an informal forum established in 2005 to promote
best practices among the various players in democracy development.
Fourth, it planned to publish a new Annual Report on Democracy
Support. Finally, it pledged to create a panel of experts “to assess
the capacities of existing organizations that are active in democratic
development and democracy support and identify how to improve Canada’s
performance.”
The government made some progress on this agenda. Minor steps were
taken, but many actions that could have been pursued were not. IDRC,
with funding from Foreign Affairs, commissioned a “Literature Review
on Applied Research on Democracy Support” and some additional studies
were done through the Democratic Transitions fund of the Glyn Berry
Program for Peace and Security. “Democracy Dialogues” were also held
from 2007- 2009. However, the “Whole-of-Government Policy Statement”
on democracy support is two years overdue and no country level
governance assessments have been carried out. No efforts have been
made to enhance the Democracy Council that could have fostered more
coordination, coherence and integration of our current democracy
support efforts. There has been no progress on an Annual Report on
Democracy Support or on the panel of experts who were to assess the
capacities of existing organizations.
Moreover, instead of following through on the commitments made in the
November 2007 official response, the government abruptly changed
course. In the spring of 2009, Minister Fletcher appointed a panel
chaired by well known academic Tom Axworthy to provide advice on how
and what to establish in terms of a new democracy promotion agency. If
Minister Fletcher had given the panel broad terms of reference such as
an implementation strategy for the 2007 Standing Committee report, the
panel would have had considerably more scope in the conduct of its
work. Regrettably, the Minister’s terms of reference directed the
panel toward a particular conclusion by focussing on two things: the
2008 Throne Speech commitment and Recommendation 15 from the Standing
Committee’s report.
Recommendation 15 called upon Parliament to “consider setting up a
centre for multi-party and parliamentary democracy” to be funded
through the Canada Foundation for International Democratic Development
– the institution that was at the core of the Committee’s
recommendations. By constricting the panel’s terms of reference, the
government seemed to be rejecting the major conclusions of the
Standing Committee’s report. Indeed, it was moving in precisely the
direction the Committee had warned against when it cautioned that “a
few add-ons; a little more funding here and there” was not what was
required.
Given the direction it received, it did not come as a shock that the
Axworthy panel’s key recommendation was the creation of the Canadian
Centre for Advancing Democracy (CCAD) and that its purpose was to
focus on political parties. Parenthetically, it is ironic that the
Harper government sought to assist political parties abroad while at
the same time seeking to withdraw public funding for parties in
Canada. It is also worth noting that there are many international
organizations already involved in political party capacity building;
any Canadian agency would be entering an already crowded field.
Nevertheless, the Axworthy panel report also sought to reinforce the
Standing Committee’s recommendations. In effect, it proposed the
Canada Foundation under the guise of the CCAD with field offices, a
grants program for other Canadian NGOs engaged in similar work as well
as research, education and evaluation programs and a substantial
budget.
It is doubtful the government expected what it got from Mr. Axworthy.
It was probably anticipating something considerably more modest in
scope and budget. If it sought to spend a few million dollars and put
a quick “tick in the box” on democracy promotion, Mr. Axworthy’s
document clearly did not provide the government with what they were
looking for. His report was quite emphatic in noting that “committing
to democracy as a foreign policy priority requires patience, clarity,
resources, and above all, time. Few priorities are so important, few
priorities so resistant to a quick fix.”
As with most minority governments, patience, clarity, resources and
time are in short supply with the current administration. Since the
Standing Committee issued its report in 2007, the government could
have made real progress and perhaps taken steps to realize the
Committee’s goal of making Canada a leader in democracy promotion.
Instead, it dawdled, played around the fringes and then sought the
proverbial quick fix.
Thus, after two years of work, there really is very little to show for
the government’s half hearted democracy promotion efforts. Had the
Standing Committee report been acted upon, the Harper Government could
have established a “democracy promotion agency” capable of making a
substantial contribution to the “governance deficit” that exists in
fragile states and those emerging from conflict. Countries like Haiti,
Afghanistan and Iraq come immediately to mind, but there are many
others that could benefit.
Notwithstanding the current debacle at Rights and Democracy, there
exist many Canadian organizations that can do democracy promotion, and
do it well. What these agencies needed from the Canadian Government
was a more strategic approach, more coordination, more coherence, and
of course, some additional funding. What they got was a tactical
political response that fell well short of a real strategy to the
detriment of one of the Conservatives’ “core values” of Canadian
foreign policy.
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Article: Addressing the Detainee Issue: Modernizing the Geneva
Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War
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by Rob Huebert
Rob Huebert is Associate Director of the Centre for Military and
Strategic Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Calgary.
Based on the ongoing media coverage, and actions of Canadian
politicians, it would appear that the sole issue of Canada’s
commitment in Afghanistan concerns Afghan detainees. Parliament is now
holding hearings on this issue; at the same time, there is almost a
complete dearth of consideration given to any other element of the
mission. Given the fact that the Americans have finally become serious
about the war, at the same time that Canada is preparing to withdraw,
the lack of Canadian debate about what should be done after the
planned 2011 withdrawal is disheartening. No debate has arisen as to
whether or not Canada achieved its strategic objectives or even what
those objectives were. Given the costs that have been paid in terms of
both blood and money it is disturbing that the only point of
discussion with respect to the mission in Afghanistan is the detainee
issue. Is there a means to ensure that the problems Canada now faces
with this issue can be avoided in the future so that other similarly
important issues can remain on the political and public agenda?
What should Canada do with individuals who are captured while in
battle with Canadian forces, whether they be insurgents, pirates and
so forth? Canada needs to revise its treatment and definition of those
individuals who engage Canadians in battle and are taken prisoner.
Historically the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War provided
Canada with guidance on this issue. Canadian forces had clear rules
and an understanding of what was expected when they captured enemy
forces. Furthermore, the Canadian Government’s responsibility was also
clear. A POW had certain rights, but Canada also had a right to keep
them from re-entering the fight. The holding of the enemies’ personnel
as POWs sometimes proved to be an incentive for the proper treatment
of Canadian troops, of course this did not work with the Japanese, but
it did work with the Germans.
The holding of POWs in World War II occurred in an era where state
versus state conflict was the norm. Then you knew who the enemy was.
In the modern era conflict now takes place in the context of
asymmetrical warfare. Since the end of the Cold War, Canadian ground
forces have not been deployed against a state. Instead, Canada has
been deployed to increasingly violent conflicts around the world
involving non-state enemies. Now the combatants do not wear uniforms,
do not swear allegiance to a state and tend to be indistinguishable
from the civilian population. Old distinctions no longer hold. Then,
they used to be called POWs. Now, with both the Afghan conflict and
the Iraq conflict, enemy forces captured in battle do not acquire the
designation of POW because they do not fit the definition of “Prisoner
of War” as set out in the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War. As
such, the Geneva Convention does not apply to these captured forces
and, as such, their treatment is not governed by the Geneva
Convention. Currently, there are no international guidelines governing
the treatment of these enemy forces. It is this lack of clarity as to
who the enemy is, and that they are not deemed POWs, that has caused
most western states to tie themselves into knots as they try to deal
with those captured in battle. The reason is that any of the current
options available for dealing with enemies captured in battle are
problematic.
It is unacceptable for the Canadian Government to simply direct its
forces not to take prisoners. The thought of simply fighting the enemy
to the death is morally unacceptable. To be ordered to not accept the
capitulation of an enemy would run counter to the entire ethos of the
Canadian Forces. Nor does it make sense to simply release all that are
captured. Such a policy would encourage any force engaging Canadian
troops to simply engage in hit and surrender tactics. To release them
simply allows any enemy to ultimately “win” most encounters. In this
case the moment Canadian Forces gained the advantage the enemy would
only need to surrender knowing they would eventually be released. The
third option open to Canadian Forces is to hand all captured personnel
to national authorities, which is what Canadian troops have been doing
in Afghanistan. This option has two inherent problems.
First, national authorities may not be in a position to receive
captured personnel. This is the dilemma facing Canadian Forces who
captured Somali pirates. Who do you deliver them to when there is no
state? A second problem is that once the captured personnel are
transferred there is no way of controlling how they are treated. In
Afghanistan it is becoming clear that some have faced mistreatment
once they are in the hands of the Afghan authorities.
Clearly there are currently no good solutions. So what should be done?
It seems that as challenging as it will be, the international
community needs to rethink the Geneva Convention’s governing the
treatment of prisoners taken in battle who do not meet the criteria of
Prisoners of War. New rules are needed to govern the treatment of
individuals now captured in battle. This will not be easy. If these
rules and norms are brought into the modern era, it may be possible to
avoid the current situation where the detainee issue threatens to
overshadow all other issues concerning Canadian involvement in
international conflicts.
What needs to be done? First, how captured individuals are defined
needs to be reconsidered. Whether they are detainees, pirates or
unlawful combatants, a new term that encapsulates who is being
captured is required. Nations seldom fight one another; armed groups
do. Canada, and the other western states, need to acknowledge this.
Now, and presumably into the future, Canadian Forces can expect to
engage in future operations against personnel who do not wear a
uniform, owe no allegiance to a state government, or are trained as
western military personnel are trained. So what are they to be called
and what rights will they receive?
The second challenge will be what is done with them. It is clear that
something other than current practice must be considered. Perhaps the
time has come to reconsider the use of POW camps. The creation of such
camps on Canadian soil would mean that Canadian officials would retain
control over what happens to these individuals. There are two very
significant challenges that Canada and other western states would face
in developing such camps. First, Canada’s Charter of Rights now
affords rights that did not exist when German and Italian POWs were
held on Canadian soil. Can accommodation be reached where modern
Canadian rights are protected but legal status to remain in Canada is
not automatically granted to any individuals caught in battle? Canada
will need to be able to repatriate these individuals once the conflict
is over, or when Canada wishes to disengage. Further problems will
arise if the country does not want them back. The state where the
conflict occurred could refuse to take them back and if so, what would
Canada do then? So POW camps in Canada may not be the solution.
Perhaps a POW camp in the country of conflict itself would be more
tenable, but then how would they be controlled? Who would control
them? All of these are difficult issues to reconcile.
None of these problems will be easy to resolve, but Canadian leaders
need to acknowledge that the entire nature of warfare has changed. As
long as the decision is made that Canadian forces are to be committed
to modern wars much more serious long-term thought must be given to
the question of handling those captured in modern war. Modernization
of the Geneva Convention would not be easy, but the current status quo
is not working. The treatment of those captured by Canadian troops is
an important issue, but it should not be allowed to overwhelm all
other issues. By modernizing the Geneva Convention on POWs, Canada and
its allies and friends can ensure that they can move beyond the issue
of detainees.
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Article: China, America and World Leadership - Alexander Moens
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by Alexander Moens
Alexander Moens, the author of Foreign Policy of George W. Bush, is
a Professor of Political Science at SFU and a Senior Fellow at the
Fraser Insitute in the Centre for Canadian American Relations.
The United States has had a remarkable century of world leadership. It
still produces nearly one quarter of global wealth and has been the
world’s military hegemon since the late 1980s. Its foreign policy has
facilitated the globalization of trade and liberal democracy. But
American power and global leadership is in decline. Who or what will
take its place?
Naturally all eyes are on the potential challenger: Beijing shows all
the features of a great power. It is building a military to match its
economic strength. It is stretching the rules of free trade by not
letting its currency appreciate.
China has not been modest about its border disputes with Vietnam,
India and Japan. It acts as a neo-imperial power in Africa just as the
United States and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. China uses
commerce, aid, and weapon sales to gain access to raw materials and to
obtain support for its position vis-à-vis Taiwan. China plays the
multilateral game as a great power: It will not bind itself to
outcomes. Its position in Copenhagen in late 2009 on global warming
was an example.
The United States is the offspring of an earlier successful great
power. As Walter Russell Mead wrote, the United States was dependent
on British financiers in its rise as a superpower. Though they were
both democracies, and shared the same language and culture, the
handover from Britain to America was long and fraught with the threat
of war from 1812 till the mid 1890s. Eventually, Britain maximized its
own national interest by not challenging or holding back the United
States, but by becoming its closest ally.
Can history repeat itself? China’s economic boom is a prodigy of
American capitalism. China’s manufacturing miracle is built on the
American consumer market, leading Niall Ferguson to coin the term
“Chimerica.” Financial interdependence between Beijing and Washington
is deep to say the least.
But passing the baton of benevolent empire is not going to be easy for
three reasons. First, China’s rise is hampered by its lack of
political legitimacy and international purpose. Second, India and
other neargreats are rising fast as well and are thus reducing the
space for monopoly or duopoly. Third, the United States will remain
comparatively much stronger than Britain did.
It is difficult to imagine that the entrenched leadership of the
Communist Party will hand over the reigns to any other entity;
therefore, we have to imagine that just as the Party allowed private
economic activity to rise alongside the state economic sector, so it
may allow more independent political forms of expression to rise
alongside, not in opposition to, the Communist Party structure.
Beijing will likewise need to invent more say for its many regions.
China’s economic success has emboldened some of its elite to view
Western democracy as too weak. Chinese democracy and market economics
will have a unique form, just as European democracy differs from
American democracy. Nevertheless, the essence of capitalism and
liberal democracy is not relative but absolute. Global political
progress is bent towards the values of liberal democracy. Without
them, China cannot lead.
Complex multipolarity, rather than an empty throne, will be the
environment China faces in its rise. India is not far behind, followed
by Brazil and Indonesia. Any attempt by China and the United States to
dictate new terms of international politics will be rejected by a
plethora of others. In that sense, the “rise of the Rest,” as Zakaria
defined it, puts a cap not only on the United States but also on all
(Chinese) ambition.
Finally, the United States may not decline much. It has maintained a
strong birth rate and with Mexico feeding the labour pool, it is on
course to grow to 500 million people by 2050 and 1 billion by 2100. It
also has very large energy resources. Close connection with Canada
gives it access to the single largest reserve of non-conventional oil.
Moreover, shale gas discoveries in the last two years have put
America’s natural gas supply at over 100 years. From time to time, it
is able to remake its image in the world. Barack Obama is trying to do
so again.
America’s leadership part in providing equality of opportunity to
other nations is still in demand. American ideals soften its economic
power and military might. China cannot assume world leadership unless
it can emulate, or better, the sense of progress and opportunity that
the United States has embodied.
There is nevertheless a lesson in the British-American relationship.
It will be crucial for the United States to share world power as long
as China keeps moving towards liberal economic and political values.
It will be just as difficult to involve the Rest. The United States
has the most to gain from insisting on this from the start.
Endnotes
[1] The Economist, “Facing up to China,” February 6, 2010, p.11
[2] Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy
and How it Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002) pp. 14- 17
[3] Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, “The End of Chimerica,”
Harvard Business School Working Paper, 10-037, 2009 http://
www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-037.pdf
[4] Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2009 [5] Michael Lind, “America,” Foreign Policy, Issue 172,
May/June 2009, p. 90
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Article: A Different Take on National and Global Security - Hugh Segal
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by Hugh Segal
Senator Hugh Segal is a Senior Fellow of the CDFAI, former Chair of
the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies and a former Chair of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
Complexity has always been the enemy of sound military and strategic
decision making, strategic planning and rational and effective
execution in the field. Officers who manage complexity and use it to
their best interests are more successful than those who do not. The
mix of military planning, contextual awareness, war studies,
supportive intelligence and planning kit and instruments all connect
with this central challenge for successful military deployment. The
fact that those who are the genuine enemies of our way of life, who
would use violence and terror to destroy our democracy, economic and
social well-being, are no longer defined as an opposing nation-state
or alliance of nation-states adds very much to the complexity of the
challenge. In simple terms, however one feels about nuclear deterrent
capacity, there are few places, if any, where we might aim our side’s
missiles and reduce the nature of the granular threat terrorists,
non-governmental networks and violent organizations now pose.
Instead, we appear to need a heightened intelligence capacity that
uses both human and electronic data sources more intensely; we need to
use infiltration into hostile networks more adeptly and continue the
remarkable multi-billion dollar investment in preventive security
systems and trip wires to protect the safe movement of people and
freight within and beyond their own borders.
And, it goes without saying, that rapid deployability of well-equipped
and trained forces, so as to stabilize in countries that have been
de-stabilized, is still a singular and unavoidable priority. This
means that for Canada, deployability investments cannot slacken off
whether we are talking about naval, air, air transport, reserve or
armed strike force capacities. The fact that the nature of hostile
threats aimed at us seem to know no time or geographic boundaries is
not a licence for standing down. Standing down on any of the measures
of deployability is to make more certain, and deadly, further,
frequent attacks on our own soil, or that of our allies, friends and
trade partners. None of the above is new to the defence and strategic
community or any departure from doctrine, intent or concept. Fighting
those who would do harm to us or neutralizing their planning and
execution capacities as far away from Canadian soil and communities as
possible is always the best approach to coherent national defence. For
Canada this has always meant working closely with allies and
multi-national alliances or institutions that shared our stability and
political goals. This is no less true today than it was in 1939. The
lessons of Afghanistan, Cyprus, Ethiopia, the Golan, Gaza, Bosnia and
other engagements in Sub-Saharan Africa profoundly change the mix of
what constitutes a viable national or global security risk management
strategy. While the planners or concept originators for terrorist
organizations or their sponsoring bureaucrats or security officials in
terrorist-sponsoring governments may well be educated and relatively
well-heeled (think governments of Iran, Venezuela, Syria and others),
a public level of disaffection or economic oppression is usually
essential to a viable terrorist insurgency sinking roots. This was
even true in the Anglosphere when, in the early days of the northern
Irish ‘troubles’, the Catholic community was living in an economically
depressed context, as were many who formed the core of the irregulars
on the Protestant side. A visit to the council housing areas of both
groups in Belfast made that perfectly clear. The ‘Good Friday’
agreement of 1998 followed a period of massive European investment in
the Irish Republic and better economic times that generated jobs and
opportunities on both sides of the Irish border and across communities
that were both Protestant and Catholic. As we speak, the most hopeful
signs for mid-east peace between Israel and Palestine (and there are
not many) is not the attitude or ‘finesse’ of the Netanyahu
government, nor the lack of coherence on the Palestinian side among
warring government factions in the West Bank and Gaza. It is the 7%
GDP increase recently recorded for the communities of the West Bank –
a growth spurt that is to be devotedly encouraged by all. As long as
the average Gazan family cannot aspire to earn more than one
fourteenth of what a neighbouring Israeli family might earn, the
likelihood of any meaningfully rooted peace initiative seems remote
indeed. This is true in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where
the massive deposits of valuable minerals lack any enjoining
infrastructure to produce cash flow that helps the locals break out of
grinding poverty. This is true in large parts of Northern Africa for
the UMMA or broad population. This is true in Afghanistan in spades
and in other regions where instability is either already there or just
around the corner. Terrorist agents, provocateurs, sleeper networks or
operational units need places to hide, plan, acquire, bank, bribe,
intimidate, train, armup and from which to deploy or facilitate others
in so doing. Well-to-do middle class communities made up of people
with hopes, prospects, some measure of material well-being and with
discernible and positive futures for their children are not the best
potting soil for nihilistic, destructive terror organizational or
recruiting roots.
In the same way as field commanders look to cut off enemy supply lines
to keep fuel and reinforcements from reaching opposing forces, so too
must a new national security framework and its global security partner
strategy, broaden to address the role of grinding poverty in the
generation of real threats to our national security at home and those
of our allies abroad. This is not new. The famous Marshall plan that
reflected the North American commitment to rebuild Germany and our
war-torn allies in Europe was a response to stability issues, simple
humanitarian and economic good sense, and the larger battle against
the Communist idea and promise, however hollow and narrow. The
relative middle-class comforts of Cyprus, while not evenly
distributed, did allow a more rational work out between our Turkish
and Greek allies, even if final terms have never been formalized.
Growing prosperity in places like Brazil and Chile, have helped reduce
insurgent and criminal threats. In Mexico, divisions between the very
wealthy and the very poor have produced an environment for armed drug
gangs and the violence they create. The grinding poverty in
Afghanistan fuels an insurgency still; the relative oil wealth of Iraq
makes a more manageable sort-out there more likely.
It was a few years ago that the British engaged a “joined up
Government” approach to putting military, intelligence, Foreign and
International Aid (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Treasury around the same planning table so as to achieve more coherent
and linked-up execution and effect on the ground. Still, it was very
hard to get out ahead of crisis; responding coherently seemed an
ambitious enough undertaking which the British did quite well. While
our recent Canadian response in Haiti was more than impressive, our
relative engagement on poverty abatement, along with that of other
donor countries, while greater than some, had not been deeply
effective. Fortunately, the cruelty of the natural disaster has yet to
be compounded by any organized criminal or political insurgency
fuelled by the drugs and arms already in the country.
So a realistic Global and National Security strategy is not only about
robust military, intelligence, technological and well-trained human
resource and material assets and the continued investment to keep them
at the leading edge. Canadian soldiers, sailors, flyers, CIDA workers,
former ambassadors who have been on deployment in Afghanistan often
reflect on how support for local schools, wells and medical
requirements go a long way to building the framework for the
cooperation and trust most likely to enhance security. Imagine for a
moment how many hundreds of billions of dollars, Euros or pounds might
have been saved, not to mention how many hundreds of thousands of
lives, if Afghanistan had faced a western and wealthy Middle
East-sourced Marshall Plan after the defeat of the old Soviet Union by
the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. Imagine a middleclass Afghanistan with
prospects, a viable economic mix and reduced unemployment. Instead the
chaos of factionalism, extreme and terrorist instability, abject
poverty and corruption, which always do better in those kinds of
places, gave the Taliban a country and Al Qaida a home base.
Better minds than mine can make circles on a map around the coming
Afghanistans where economic investment and poverty abatement would be
at least as strategic an investment as any other that might be
planned, or worse, made necessary in the future by events spiralling
out of control. Yemen, Sri Lanka and Ivory Coast are those that come
to mind.
Global and National Security are not what they used to be. And a
joinedup strategy for NATO, the Commonwealth, the OAS, US Central
Command in Tampa, the British Ministry of Defence or our own
Expeditionary Command, which linked to or encouraged Anti-Poverty
Initiatives in target regions of potential instability, should be the
framework of any coherent strategic doctrine in the future.
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Article: “Back to Basics?” Canada and the “New NATO Strategic
Concept”, from Afghanistan to the Arctic
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by Stéphane Roussel
(pictured) and Samir Battiss
Stéphane Roussel is Assistant Professor at the Department of
Political Science, Université du Quebec a Montréal (UQAM) and the
Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy.
In April 2009, NATO launched a quest for a “New Strategic Concept”,
its third since 1991. The hope was to find a guideline to face the
issues raised by the military and political evolution of the Afghan
campaign. This war is reactivating debates about issues that were
supposed to be settled: the relevance and the legitimacy of conducting
operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area, especially since its
European member states are obviously reluctant to commit their troops
to this kind of operation, or of widening the organization’s list of
functions. The shadow of a defeat in Afghanistan would reinforce the
opinion of several allies who wish that the North Atlantic Alliance
would get “back to geographical basics”, both in terms of membership
and operation area. Historically, Canadian decision - makers
enthusiastically supported all forms of NATO’s expansion: new members,
new operational zones, and new tasks and functions. This paper is
contending that it may be time to reconsider this traditional
attitude.
Regarding the question of the operational area, Ottawa should consider
the possibility of limiting NATO’s activities to the European
continent, and its immediate neighborhood, in order to avoid such
future plights like Afghanistan that poison Canadian defence policy.
There are certainly excellent arguments to support and encourage
NATO’s role as “global stability provider” since alternative
arrangements, such as UN missions or ad hoc coalitions, lack the
cohesion or legitimacy that NATO enjoys. Nevertheless, NATO remains
plagued with weaknesses, most notably, some allies reluctance to
increase their military contribution to combat missions; the
multiplicity of national caveats; and the “operational deficit” of
some new members who are unable to work efficiently with the “core”
members. As long as an agreement on these questions cannot be found,
it would be unwise for Canada to support any position that could
institutionalize the imbalance that exists in Afghanistan. In the
meantime, focusing on the Euro-Atlantic zone is probably the safest
attitude.
One of the scenarios that sustains Canada’s opposition to any setback
in the Euro-Atlantic area would be the reinforcement of the European
pillar within NATO. This scenario is fuelled by the full support
offered by NATO to the European Union and the complete participation
of France in the military structure of the alliance that was announced
in 2009. This is the most recent version of a classical Canadian
concern: the emergence of a “two pillared”, or “dumbbell”, alliance in
which Canada is simply marginalized as the junior North American
member, disappearing in the shadow of the U.S.
A recent report published by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs
Institute (CDFAI) and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute
(CDAI), Security in an Uncertain World. A Canadian Perspective on
NATO’s New Strategic Concept, reflects the fear of a “too
Eurocentric” alliance (14). To avoid such a situation it proposes to
“enhance its special relationships with key democratic states outside
the Euro-Atlantic region” (33), hence reducing the relative weight of
European members within NATO. It is even possible to go further and to
imagine the creation of a “concentric NATO” within which a distinction
would be established among the most important contributors to the
combat missions and the other members. Obviously, it will draw a line
between "inner circle”, further learners’ pool, and "out -circle",
developing learners’ pool, and then create a kind of “directorate”
within the alliance. To counter potential negative perceptions, NATO
must emphasize that the door remain open to other members if they meet
military-based criteria. Of course, such a project is double-edged,
since nothing can guarantee that Canada will be invited into this
“NATO directorate,” even if Canadian leaders are convinced that the
first-line role of Canadian forces in Afghanistan is a ticket to get a
seat at this table.
Contrary to what the dumbbell metaphor implies, a concentration on
Europe should not be primarily considered from a negative perspective.
This possible evolution of NATO is not as dangerous as it seems, nor
lacking in opportunities. On the one hand, one can doubt NATO’s role
as a “counterweight” to the American influence. Practically, NATO
structures are a tool box for U.S. military/civilian decision-makers.
Historically, and contrary to the generally accepted idea, Canada
deals extremely well in its bilateral relations with the United
States. On the other hand, moving towards a renovation of NATO would
offer the occasion to revamp and reinforce the North American side of
the dumbbell, that is, the network of Canadian-American bilateral
institutions. A good opportunity to reinforce this network would be to
create a new institution to manage common issues in the North American
Arctic.
The Arctic question offers another reason why Canada should be careful
to not encourage geographical expansion. According to the authors of
the CDFAI/CDAI report, it is not in Canadian interests for NATO to
limit “its mission and objectives to the collective defence of the
Euro-Atlantic region, forgetting that NATO's borders extend to the
Arctic and the Pacific and disregarding security interests shared with
democratic states in other regions” (emphasis added). At first glance,
it seems to be in Canada’s best interests to attract NATO’s attention
to the Arctic region. The political, strategic, and economic
consequences of global warming in the Arctic can, potentially, affect
Canada’s interests directly. No matter what happens with the
materialization of anticipated threats, economic exploitation,
emergence of criminal activities, increase in the sea traffic, etc.,
they largely hold the attention of the government and the population.
NATO can play a coordination role among the allies – five of the eight
Arctic States are members of NATO – to secure this area and provide a
forum to address common challenges and problems; however, it is not
completely in Canada’s interest to direct too much attention on the
sovereignty issues in the region, especially regarding the legal
status of the Northwest Passage. Canada is isolated vis-a-vis the
United States and the European Union on this issue who are opposing
Canada’s views. Moreover, as we said elsewhere (The Dispatch, Fall
2009), a Canada-U.S. bilateral agreement is far more interesting for
Canada than a multilateral agreement.
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About Our Organization
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Profile
CDFAI is a think tank pursuing authoritative research and factual
comprehensive analysis to ensure Canada has a respected voice in the
international arena.
Background A charitable organization, founded in 2001, CDFAI
develops and disseminates materials and carries out activities to
promote understanding by the Canadian public of national defence and
foreign affairs issues. We are developing a body of knowledge to be
used for Canadian policy development, media analysis and educational
support. Our network of distinguished Canadian Fellows supports CDFAI
by authoring research and policy papers.
Mission Statement
To be a catalyst for innovative Canadian global engagement.
CDFAI is a research institute focused on Canada’s international
engagement in all its forms: diplomacy, the military, aid and trade
security. Established in 2001, CDFAI’s vision is for Canada to have a
respected, influential voice in the international arena based on a
comprehensive foreign policy, which expresses our national interests,
political and social values, military capabilities, economic strength
and willingness to be engaged with action that is timely and credible.
CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what
Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and
what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign
policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and
markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging
diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing
struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of
goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the spread of
human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a
prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal
internationalism.
In all its activities CDFAI is a charitable, nonpartisan organization,
supported financially by the contributions of foundations,
corporations and individuals. Conclusions or opinions expressed in
CDFAI publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute staff,
fellows, directors, advisors, or any individuals or organizations that
provide financial support to CDFAI.
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