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CDFAI
DISPATCH: WINTER 2004 (VOLUME II, ISSUE IV)
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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and
defence policy.
Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (403) 231-7624
Fax: (403) 231-7647
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
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MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT
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Welcome to the Winter issue of “The Dispatch”
newsletter. In this edition we introduce one new Fellow, Nelson
Michaud from Laval University to our network of Canadians interested
in providing informed opinion on Canadian security, defence and
foreign affairs issues.
Since our last newsletter CDFAI co-sponsored, with the Centre for
Military and Strategic Studies at University of Calgary, a Conference
on The Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves, 1995:
Ten Years Later from December 2-4. The Conference was well attended
with each of the Chief of Maritime Staff, Chief of Land Staff and
Chief of Air Staff, as well as Commander Canada Command, making
prsentations.
Confusing The Innocent With Numbers And
Categories: The International Policy Statement And The Concentration
Of Development Assistance written by
Denis Stairs and released mid-December is the last in this year’s
research paper series.
The three articles in this newsletter continue the
discussion on Canada’s evolving role on the international scene. The
first article written by Anne Irwin is titled “Some thoughts about
soldiers’ complaints and the Ombudsman.” Dr Irwin uses her PhD thesis
research to situate the challenges that Yves Côté recently announced
as the new Canadian Forces Ombudsman, will face.
Reid Morden has written an interesting article on
“Security and North American Relationships” in which he discusses the
ubiquitous nature of security in any discussions about cooperation and
coordination with our North American neighbours, no matter what the
subject. He discusses border security, intelligence agencies and
activist foreign policies as necessary but carry a risk for Canada.
“Just the Facts, Ma’am: Measuring Canadian
Multilateralism and Listening to Our Global Conscience” authored by
Frank Harvey discusses the Global Partnership Program Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPP) and one
of the most serious security threats facing our world today. Dr Harvey
moves behind the rhetoric of the recently released DFAIT report on
this subject and analyzes Canada’s performance.
As 2005 draws to a close and the Federal election
is underway, all of us at CDFAI, wish all of you our readers, a Merry
Christmas and a Happy and prosperous New Year. These are challenging
times for Canada and there is so much that this country can and should
do.
Enjoy this newsletter; if you have any comments please contact
us.
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CDFAI New Fellow
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Nelson Michaud (Ph.D. Laval) is Associate professor of Political
Science and International Relations, Chair of Laboratoire d’étude sur
les politiques publiques et la mondialisation (LEPPM) et and Chair of
the Groupe d’études, de recherche et de formation internationales
(Gerfi) at the École nationale d’administration publique; he is
Researcher-Member of the Institut québécois des Hautes Études
Internationales, Associate Researcher at the Centre d’études
interaméricaines and Research fellow at the Centre for foreign policy
studies (Dalhousie University). He has taught at Dalhousie and Laval
Universities and has been invited as a guest professor at the Canadian
Royal Military College.
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Congratulations
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2005 - Ross Munro Media Award Recipient: Bruce Campion-Smith
The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) and the
Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) are pleased
to announce that Bruce Campion-Smith has been selected as the
recipient of the 2005 Ross Munro Award.
Click here for more
information. Top of page...
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RESEARCH PAPER
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RESEARCH PAPER: Confusing
The Innocent With Numbers And Categories: The International
Policy Statement And The Concentration Of Development Assistance.
On
December 15, 2005,
Dr. Denis
Stairs’ paper entitled: Confusing The Innocent With Numbers
And Categories: The International Policy Statement And The
Concentration Of Development Assistance was released. In
April the federal government presented Canadians with an International
Policy Statement (IPS) that the government said would bring greater
strategic focus to Canada’s development assistance. In his paper
released today for CDFAI, Dr. Stairs concludes the IPS has changed
almost nothing with respect to development assistance. The
complete paper is available online at
www.cdfai.org.
Click
here
to dowload the full-length paper in PDF format.
This is
the final research paper for 2005. A similar series of papers
will be released in 2006.
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ARTICLE: Some thoughts about soldiers’ complaints and the Ombudsman
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by
Anne Irwin
Now that the new Ombudsman for the Department of National Defence
and the Canadian Forces has reported for duty, we shall see whether he
interprets his mandate in the same fashion as did his predecessor,
André Marin. The current Ombudsman, Yves Côté, appointed in July 2005,
certainly has big shoes to fill. Throughout the eight years of his
tenure, Marin interpreted his terms of reference very liberally, and
on March 30th, 2005, he issued an unsolicited White Paper in which he
called for the enshrinement of the position in the National Defence
Act and an extension of the Ombudsman’s mandate to include complaints
which are now covered under the Military Police Complaints Commission
as well as those that have been made under the Forces’ internal
Redress of Grievance procedure, which are at this time exempt from his
jurisdiction.
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Canadian Forces/Department of
National Defence was established in 1998 as part of a number of
policies intended to increase civilian oversight of and transparency
in the military in the wake of the Somalia inquiry and reports of
widespread sexual harassment and poor morale in the CF. The Ombudsman
acts independently of the chain of command and reports directly to the
Minister. The establishment of this new forum for the complaints of
serving and retired personnel was not greeted with enthusiasm by the
higher leadership of the CF; in fact, in his final annual report André
Marin accused the chain of command of “ … defensiveness and an
unwillingness to evaluate [his] criticism with objectivity and
introspection”
(www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/reports/annual/2003-2004_e.asp). Relations
between the Ombudsman and the senior leadership of the CF deteriorated
to such an extent that there were reports of probes and investigations
of the Ombudsman’s office by senior military officers, with Marin
suggesting that these were attempts to “undercut his office” (Pugliese
2005).
It might seem that this resistance on the part of the CF leadership
was simply due to a conservative mindset bent on protecting the status
quo and, perhaps, even on professional jealousy. The argument can be
made, however, that something more fundamental yet complex was going
on: this perceived defensiveness can be traced in part to a cultural
gap between the Ombudsman’s staff and the senior leadership of the
Canadian Forces. More specifically, this cultural gap entailed a very
different understanding of the nature of discourses of complaints
within the military.
Soldiers have always been complainers. Despite the fact that they
belong to a hypermasculine culture which values stoicism and physical
toughness, soldiers are chronic, creative and voluble complainers.
Complaint is so much a part of the soldier’s everyday life that when
officers and NCOs are assessing soldiers’ capabilities, the quality of
being a non-complainer is worthy of comment, as the following,
recorded during a meeting at which soldiers were being evaluated,
demonstrates: “in our platoon I can't see Vanik moving ahead of Martin
… Martin never complains”. During the same meeting, when asked how a
particular soldier performed in the field, a Warrant Officer replied,
“he doesn't complain, he never complains”. Both of the soldiers in
question were indeed hard workers, but they certainly participated
quite regularly and enthusiastically in the litany of complaints that
was a feature of soldiers’ routine discourse. What constitutes a
complaint, then, is not a simple thing.
There are a number of different types of complaints which soldiers
regularly make, and not all of them, in fact, most of them, are not
directed at redressing a wrong. The majority of complaints routinely
made by soldiers are in the form of derogations, which are negative
statements without the intent of changing a situation (Weeks 2004).
Although they are not attempts at changing an unpleasant situation,
derogations are not pointless, but, in fact, serve a number of
different functions in the context of the culture of an infantry
battalion. One of the most important functions they serve is to define
the complainer as an insider, because one of the markers of cultural
competence in a given social setting is knowing how to complain
effectively. Members demonstrate their cultural competence by
recognizing the settings in which particular types of complaint are
acceptable and by framing their complaints such that they are
responded to in the way intended or hoped for by the complainer.
Derogations include a number of sub-types of complaints, among them:
complaints which serve as a running commentary on the moral
shortcomings of superiors; complaints on behalf of subordinates,
intended to demonstrate an intermediate commander’s concern for the
welfare of his or her troops; and complaints about the physical
hardships which soldiers are expected to tolerate. This last sub-type
is used creatively by soldiers to validate claims to particular
experiences and thereby to bolster their identities as warriors. These
derogations are so common and, indeed, expected, that officers treat
the absence of complaint as a noticeable matter, interpreting lack of
complaint as evidence of poor morale.
The problem facing soldiers is that, in a setting like the army, in
which complaining is endemic, in order for a complaint to be heard
above the noise of chronic grumbling as a genuine request for redress
or change a soldier must complain very loudly. But to complain loudly
enough to be heard is to risk being labeled a complainer or a whiner.
The alternative to go silent, to become mute, which contributes to the
folk wisdom that when soldiers stop complaining it is the time to
start worrying about morale.
The fundamental misunderstanding that lies behind the defensiveness of
the senior leadership of the CF to the activities of the Ombudsman
relates to the tendency of military leaders to hear all complaints as
derogations, and not worthy of attention, or as coming from “whiners
and complainers” and discount them, while only paying attention to the
silences. In contrast, the Ombudsman hears all complaints as requests
for redress and worthy of attention, even if some of the complaints he
hears may be meant as derogations. The new Ombudsman is a lawyer with
extensive experience in human rights. He is also a former military
legal officer. It remains to be seen whether he will be able to bridge
the cultural gap with the senior leadership of the CF.
References
Pugliese, D. (2005). Military launched probe into Forces ombudsman.
Times Colonist. Victoria.
Weeks, J. (2004). Unpopular Culture: The ritual of complaint in a
British bank. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.
i The analysis which follows is based on anthropological fieldwork
which I conducted with an infantry regiment; the complaint discourses
I collected and analyzed may well, and probably do, differ in the
other elements and arms of the Forces. The fieldwork was supported by
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Doctoral
Fellowship Award #52-94-0219 and the Department of Social Anthropology
at the University of Manchester for which I am very grateful.
ii It can be argued that this hypermasculinity prevails even, perhaps
even more, in infantry units which include women soldiers but that is
the topic of a different paper.
iii All names are pseudonyms.
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Article:
Security and North-American Relationships
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by
Reid Morden
The three countries of North America are struggling with the question
of whether it is desirable, or possible, to take two sets of
multilayered arrangements with substantial histories and find enough
points of commonality to build a true trilateral North American
community.
There are differing views. Should NAFTA be the vehicle for launching
labour, social, and other initiatives as part of a trilateral building
process? Should we “clutter” Canada’s vital bilateral relationship
with the United States with the massive complexity of Mexico-US
affairs?”[1]
Whatever the differing views on the broader issue, North American
security issues are almost ubiquitous whenever there is talk about
closer coordination and cooperation. Why? One need look no further
than the statement by the leaders of the three countries in Waco,
Texas, in the spring of this year. There, the three leaders declared
that “Our (Security and Prosperity) Partnership will ……….. increase
the security, prosperity, and quality of
life of our citizens. This work will be based on the principle that
our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and
complementary…..”[2]
Complementary? Not likely. To borrow a phrase from Paul Cellucci, the
former US ambassador to Canada, security, post 9/11, trumps trade.
Dr. Frank Harvey at Dalhousie University puts it a little differently:
“The economics of security
(the negative economic impact of security failures) will invariably
trump the security of economics (the positive impact of sound economic
policies) for at least two reasons: “First, any terrorist attack on
U.S. soil will inevitably have a major, immediate and uniformly
negative impact on the American (and international) economy anyway.
Second, in a security-conscious society faced with the challenge of
perfection in the war on terror, the loss of 3,000 lives will
invariably be perceived by the American public as a far more
significant tragedy than the loss of 300,000 jobs. Conversely, the
potential to save 3,000 lives will be perceived as far more important
than the potential to create 300,000 new jobs.”[3]
What is Dr. Harvey
getting at? The 2004 Auditor General’s report on Canada’s
contributions to security after 9/11 summarized Canadian priorities in
terms of a profound sense of “economic insecurity” resulting from
“heightened border security” and the “shutdown of civil air
transport”.[4]
In short, while the Americans are very worried about another attack,
the strategic calculations in Canada remain focused on preventing or
mitigating the economic consequences of America’s response. This
is understandable given our economic dependence on the U.S. -- 43% of
our wealth; 87% of our trade; the 35,000 trucks and 500,000
individuals cross the border every day. Billions of dollars tied to
Canada-U.S. trade were lost as a direct consequence of 9/11, and
despite the obvious economic benefits to both countries of keeping the
border open, there is no reason to expect a different outcome after
the next attacks.[5]
Obviously, multilateral approaches to gathering and coordinating
intelligence on terrorist activities and recruitment efforts, or
tracking terrorist fund raising and other financial activities, are
likely to be more efficient and cost effective than trying to do these
things alone.
Except that intelligence organisms, wherever they may be housed
(intelligence agencies, police forces, immigration services) are not
prone to share. In fact they are highly allergic to sharing even with
the occupant of the next office, never mind----foreigners. When they
do share, it is the result of broadly perceived and accepted national
interest and years in the build up of mutual trust and confidence.
This is a reality between Canada and the US. It is not a reality
between Canada and Mexico. It is a partial reality between the US and
Mexico, driven by drugs, crime, and immigration factors.
Leaving this cavil aside, the leaders missed an opportunity in Waco to
look at the continent as a single entity, a single perimeter, in all
aspects of which each of the three countries has an individual and
collective interest. The idea of a perimeter causes a neuralgic
reaction among many politicians in Canada. They fear that giving
content to the concept will lead to the “harmonization” of laws with
others (read USA) on the continent, thereby inevitably leading to a
loss of sovereignty. That is utter nonsense and John Manley, Pedro
Aspé and Governor Weld, in their report of the Independent Task Force
on the future of North America, have addressed this head on.[6]
Dr. Janice Stein of the University of Toronto describes where
terrorist networks work most effectively:
“Often with life-cycles of decades, networks of terror thrive on the
openness, flexibility and diversity of post-industrial society,
crossing borders almost as easily as do goods and services, knowledge
and cultures. They have global reach, particularly when they can
operate within the fabric of the most open and multicultural
societies, and through post-industrial organizational forms.”[7]
How well that could describe Canadian society today!
Simply as the next door neighbour and traditional close ally of the
United States, the principal target of the terrorist’s wrath, Canada
and Canadians have become targets.
In the past, Canada has always been able to say that if there was a
terrorist presence or activity here, it was because some small
elements of an immigrant community had imported their homeland strife.
Now, however, Canada’s very foreign policy leads us into areas of
ideological and religious conflict where violence, more often than
not, is seen as a means of resolution. In short, our own policies and
actions may well motivate those who disagree with us to retaliate on
Canadian soil.
Closer to home, nothing is more important than our overall
relationship with the United States. Thus, in the intelligence and
security community, nothing could be more important than its ability
to manage the border. The chance arrest of would-be bomber, Ahmed
Ressam, at the BC/Washington border just before the millennium still
resonates among many American politicians and media as evidence of a
porous, and therefore dangerous, border. While their criticisms may
not be well founded, they continue to have an important impact on
Americans. Canada is not “a Club Med for terrorists” but there remains
a very serious job of re-building trust and confidence with the
American administration, the American Congress and American public
opinion.
In Canada this essentially starts with the RCMP and the CSIS. They
must, at all costs, deepen and strengthen their internal cooperation,
and their exterior links. Adequate funding to play a truly
cooperative and effective role is a sine qua non. Equally
neither Canadian governments nor Canadian citizens should be tolerant
of any continuation of earlier turf wars and the obvious lack of trust
and cooperation.
In his autobiography, Louis Freeh, former Director of the FBI,
reflects on the fragility of public trust in government institutions[8].
This is relevant in today’s Canada. Leaders of both the RCMP and CSIS
have a role to play in explaining their role and functions to
Canadians at large. Even more important, it is vital for Canada’s
political leadership to be at the forefront of public education and
public debate. They must not wait for a tragedy, as with the bombings
in London this past summer, to concede that there may be a problem.
In sum, the terrorist issue is going to be with us for a long time.
Like it or not Canada is involved. Involved as a matter of self
interest in keeping our southern border open. Involved because an
activist foreign policy, which few Canadians would wish to change,
carries with it real risk in this volatile and dangerous century. Most
important, open debate is crucial so that Canadians can better draw
the line between essential security needs and their rights and
freedoms.
Endnotes
[1] Jean
Daudelin, The Tri-Lateral Mirage: The Tale of Two North Americas,
Carleton University, May, 2003
[2] Joint Statement of Presidents Bush and Vincente Fox and
Prime Minister Martin, Waco, Texas, March 23, 2005
[3] Frank Harvey, Canada and the New American Empire, Implications for
Security Policy, Conference held jointly by University of Victoria and
CBC Newsworld, November, 2004 [4] Report of the Auditor General
(2004). National Security in Canada: the 2001 Anti-terrorism
initiative…(pg 3)
[5] Frank Harvey, ibid
[6] Chairmen’s Statement, Independent Task Force on the Future of
North America, ibid., Recommendation 2
[7] J. Gross Stein, “Network Wars” in R. J. Daniels, P. Macklem & K.
Roach (eds.), The Security of Freedom, Essays on Canada’s
Anti-Terrorism Bill, University of Toronto Press, 2001, p. 75;
[8] Louis J. Freeh, My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating
Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War
on Terror, St. Martin’s Press, 2005
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Article:
Just the Facts, Ma’am:
Measuring Canadian Multilateralism And Listening to Our Global
Conscience
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by
Frank Harvey
The International Policy Statement (IPS) was not the only major
document to be released by the Canadian Government in 2005. Shortly
after the IPS hit the streets Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre
Pettigrew released the inaugural Annual Report of Canada’s
contribution to the Global Partnership Program Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPP).i
Since proposing the program in 2002 at the G8 meeting in Kananaskis,
Alberta, the Canadian government has consistently highlighted the
Global Partnership as a key foreign policy priority, for a very good
reason – the program deals with “one of the most serious security
threats facing our world today.”ii The report goes on to point out
that the GPP constitutes “a new generation of funded mechanisms that
deliver policy through direct project implementation….Together, they
respond to the priorities set out in Canada’s International Policy
Statement issued in April 2005 and offer a vibrant reminder that
Canada has an important role to play in international affairs.” In
others words, the GPP encompasses a prime example of the specific
programs, projects and actual funding priorities that put the words of
the IPS into practice. As Pettigrew (2005: 1) correctly points in his
introductory remarks, “making such a commitment is one thing; making
good on it is another,” and he invites all Canadians “to read this
report and take pride in how we are meeting our international
responsibilities.”iii
I accept the invitation and offer the following report card on
Canada’s performance. I will leave it to others to decide how proud
Canadians should be.
Comparing Multilateral Commitments
The DFAIT report provides an excellent overview of the many WMD
challenges in the Former Soviet Union, a list of GPP programmes
designed to address the threat, a summary of the specific projects in
which Canada is involved, and a budget that explains where the funds
have gone. But the document is decidedly (and ironically)
state-centric in its reporting -- there are almost no comparative
statistics to help place Canada’s contribution in a ‘multilateral’
context. If Canadian officials are seriously committed to making (and
highlighting) important multilateral contributions, then a comparative
framework is really the only one that should be used.
Figure 1 compares country pledges, commitments and spending since 2002
(all funds are in Canadian currency). iv From the point of view of
measuring real investments (as distinct from promises), pledges are
not as relevant as commitments, and commitments, in turn, are less
relevant than actual spending. Arguably the most relevant measure of a
state’s priorities emerges from Figure 2 -- the proportion of a
country’s ‘commitment’ that remains ‘unspent’. France and Italy
deserve special mention here for spending nothing on GPP programs
during the three year reporting period – 100% of committed funds
remain unspent. However, among G8 members who have expressed at least
some serious interest in dealing with the global threat of
proliferation, Canada ranks third, behind France and Italy, in its
failure to spend a large portion of the money
committed to GPP projects -- 76% of committed funds remain unspent. A
third place finish in this category is particularly noteworthy in view
of the repeated references to the GPP in the International Policy
Statement, in Canada’s National Security Policy, and in almost every
major speech by a Canadian official on the issue of non-proliferation,
arms control and disarmament since 2002.
Why has it been so difficult for Canada to find and fund projects
worthy of any portion of the remaining $276,049,600 the government
committed to help deal with “one of the most serious security threats
facing our world today”? Ottawa’s reluctance to live up to its
multilateral commitments is even more puzzling considering the fact
that other GPP participants managed in the same period to find and
fund projects totalling $3,724,771,737 -- roughly 13.5 times the
amount Canada is having a hard time spending (Figure 3).
Excuses?
Comparing multilateral commitments this way also helps to strip away
the excuses Canadian officials might offer to explain the numbers.
Clearly, funding GPP projects in the Former Soviet Union is not an
easy task. As Flournoy (2005) explains, liability disputes over legal
responsibilities in the event of accidents are complex and
time-consuming, and access procedures allowing foreign personnel to
bypass security measures when entering FSU weapons facilities are not
always straightforward.v But every country engaged in GPP activities
faces identical challenges – there is no reason why Canadian officials
would be any less capable than others of working through these legal
and security impediments. Piggyback on existing projects
and related agreements is the most common approach states are using
today to overcome the hurdles.vi Canada, for example, has already
signed two significant MOUs with the United Kingdom to piggyback on
their GPP projects, so there is no obvious reason why Canada couldn’t
spend more this way. Blaming the slow pace of Canadian spending on
higher standards for financial accounting or other Treasury Board
requirements is equally suspect as an excuse – the appropriations
process in the United States is perhaps the most onerous among G8
members, yet the United States accounts for 72% of all GPP spending to
date.vii
With these facts in mind, the following excerpts from the
International Policy Statement can now be placed in their proper
context:
“There is no contradiction between Canada doing well and Canada
doing good. Canada benefits directly when the world is more secure….
If we are to take our responsibilities seriously to ourselves and
the Canadian generations to follow, then we must take our
responsibilities to the global community seriously as well, not only
with noble sentiment and rhetoric-we must also earn and
perhaps re-earn our way. This will take effort and it will take
dedication.” (Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2005).viii
“[A]s Canadians we must be active beyond our borders to protect and
promote our values and our interests -- security in the face of
terrorism and the increasing threat of nuclear proliferation….We
must ultimately be committed to playing a lead role in specific
initiatives and, on occasion, to resolving to go it alone.
We have the means to help, and so we will. We must.”
(Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2005).ix
“Canada can make a difference, if it continues to invest in its
international role and pulls its weight….Future generations will use
these tests to determine whether Canada’s global potential has been
fulfilled. The responsibility to act now is ours.”
(Overview, International Policy Statement, page 5).
The Prime Minister and other senior government officials have an even
more important “responsibility to be honest,” as Kim Nossal concludes
in his excellent contribution to the 2005 CDFAI report on Canada’s
International Policy Statement.x If Canada has such a hard time
meeting commitments to a policy initiative it considers a priority,
one has to wonder how well the government is doing with other
‘important’ policy initiatives (Kyoto benchmarks, foreign aid, AIDS in
Africa, our Responsibility to Protect the people of Darfur, etc.).
Perhaps the most relevant numbers to emerge from a comparative
assessment of GPP contributions is the fact that American investments
account for 72% of all spending to date, compared with 25.7% from
everyone else, and 2.3% from Canada (Figure 4). Despite having a GDP
that is only 11 times larger than Canada’s, the U.S. has spent almost
31 times more on GPP initiatives. Germany’s GDP is about 2.3 times
Canada’s yet it has spent almost 4 times as much. Conversely, Canada’s
GDP is about 5.6 times that of Norway’s but Ottawa has spent only
about 1.8 times more on GPP projects.
Canadian officials repeatedly claim to be among the world’s staunchest
defenders of multilateralism, but they obviously have something very
important to learn from the world’s most criticised unilateralist
about how to make meaningful and honest contributions to multilateral
security.
Figure 1
GPP Pledge-Commitment-Spending Trends
($ millions CDA)
Figure 2
Multilateral Credibility Gap:
Percentage of GPP Country Commitment Unspent
Figure 3:
Multilateral Credibility Gap:
Canadian Unspent vs. GPP Spending Opportunities
($ CDA)
Figure 4:
Multilateral Burden Sharing
Portion of Total GPP Spending to Date (%)
Endnotes
[i]
The Global
Partnership Program: Securing the Future.
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade --
www.globalpartnership.gc.ca.
[ii]
Ibid, p. 1.
[iii]
Ibid.
[iv]
Pledge, commitment and spending figures have been compiled from three
sources: (1) the Post-2005 G8 Gleneagles GPWP Annual Report
(Consolidated Report Data Annex A) -http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile
/PostG8_Gleneagles_
GPWGAnnualReportAnnex2005.pdf;
(2) Strengthening the Global Partnership Factsheet --
http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/
Index.html;
and for Canadian figures (3) DFAIT’s 2005 GPP Annual Report
--
www.globalpartnership.gc.ca.
[v]
Michèle A. Flournoy (2005) Testimony before the Subcommittee on
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation -- United States House of
Representatives “The G-8 Global Partnership: Successes and
Shortcomings,” June 30, 2005. Flournoy is a Senior Adviser for
International Security --
www.csis.org
[vi]
Ibid. See also
Austin Carson (2005) “Piggybacking Global Partnership Pledges: Lessons
Learned.” SGP Issue Brief # 2, Center for Strategic and
International Studies --
http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/
SGPIssueBrief/ Carson_Jan2005.pdf
[vii] For an
excellent overview of the complexities of the U.S. appropriations
process for GPP funding, see Jane Vaynman (2003) “U.S. Funding for the
Global Partnership: The Legislative Decision-Making Process.” Center
for Strategic and International Studies --http://www.sgpproject.org/resources/
guides/ us_guide.html
[viii]
Foreword by
Prime Minister Paul Martin, International Policy Statement.
[ix]
Ibid.
[x]
Kim Nossal (2005) In The National Interest. CDFAI Report
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/InTheCanadianInterestE.pdf
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ABOUT OUR ORGANIZATION
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An investment in CDFAI is an
investment in Canada.
CDFAI or the Canadian Defence &
Foreign Affairs Institute is a unique charitable organization,
headquartered in Calgary, Alberta. It is the largest Canadian
non-governmental organization dedicated solely to studying and
providing policy recommendations on Canadian defence, security and
foreign affairs issues.
Canadians depend on and
support a world that is politically free and open. Both Canadian
values and Canadian interests are served by the free flow of people,
goods, and ideas across international boundaries. Such a world
requires a strong Canadian diplomatic presence, effective security and
adequate military capacity. CDFAI is dedicated to educating the
Canadian public about the importance of these issues.
An investment in CDFAI is an
investment in Canadians.
CDFAI’s goal is to elevate Canada’s
international stature.
By developing and sponsoring
authoritative research and education programs, CDFAI provides
Canadians with factual and comprehensive policy analysis regarding
Canada's foreign policy and the state of our military preparedness and
national security.
An investment in CDFAI is
good for business and the Canadian economy.
An investment in CDFAI will
help maintain a properly funded research institute that can influence the
making of defence and foreign policy decisions in Canada. CDFAI will
help to strengthen Canada’s capacity to participate on the
international stage.
"There is a connection
between a democratic and prosperous Canada and an active and engaged
Canadian foreign policy. Let us refer to this as “Canada’s necessary
international connection.” From the earliest colonial days to the
present, Canada’s small population base has made it imperative for
Canada to trade abroad in order to achieve a high standard of living.
Canada has also required substantial inflows of immigrants to build
its population base and it has always needed access not only to
international markets, but also ideas."
David Bercuson, eminent
historian, noted Canadian author and Director of Programs with CDFAI.
Research and Publications
Research Papers
Updates on the Department of National
Defence
Internships
Education
National Conferences
Speaker Series
Canadian Military Journalism Course
Graduate Student Symposium
Community Outreach
Ross Munro Media Award
Journal of Military and Strategic
Studies
Ross Ellis Lecture in Military and
Strategic Studies
Quarterly Newsletters
Website
During its brief history CDFAI
has witnessed reforms to military policy, increases in defence
spending and increased interest in Canadian foreign policy.
CDFAI’s financial goal
for 2005 is to raise $1 million. The cost of fund development is 10
percent of its goal.
CDFAI provides Canadians
with factual and comprehensive policy analysis to promote their
understanding of Canada’s foreign policy and the state of our military
preparedness and national security by developing and sponsoring
authoritative research and education programs.
Founded in 2001
and headquartered in Calgary, CDFAI is a non-profit, charitable
research and education institute.
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