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 CDFAI DISPATCH: WINTER 2006 (VOLUME IV, ISSUE IV)

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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and defence policy.

Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (403) 231-7624
Fax: (403) 231-7647
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
 

IN THIS ISSUE

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

Welcome to the Winter 2006 issue of “The Dispatch” newsletter. As the year comes to an end, and given the challenges facing much of the rest of the world, Canadians have so much for which to be thankful. But is Canada doing its fair share of trying to bring peace and security to others who are less advantaged? Although Canada is performing abroad at a higher level of commitment than in previous years, much is still to be done. The Canadian Forces are heavily involved in trying to bring security to Afghanistan and elsewhere while our diplomats are working hard at making coalitions work better for peaceful conclusions.  But how effective is Canada’s international aid at achieving our national goals while helping others?  In Afghanistan this is still an open question.  CDFAI will monitor all of these ongoing developments in the new year.  A happy 2007 to all.    In this newsletter there are seven fascinating articles:  

  1. The Challenges of Governing – Derek Burney. “The policy challenges of any Canadian government tend to centre around three basic issues: unity, where the pressures are essentially internal; prosperity and security, both of which have external as well as internal dimensions.”

  2. Canadian Naval Operations in Southeast Asia, 1990-2006 – Richard Gimblett. This is an encapsulated commentary on 15 years of significant Canadian navy activity.

  3. Canada’s Homeland Security Dilemma – Frank Harvey. Looking at recent trends in Canadians’ perception of the possibility of a terrorist attack in Canada, “…the most interesting percentages are those compiled following the arrest of 17 terrorist suspects in the Toronto area in June, 2006. 71% of those polled believed an attack on Canadian soil was now likely.” His comment is “the numbers should depress any security official in Ottawa who expected a more balanced public assessment of the government’s overall security performance.”

  4. Festina Lente – Nelson Michaud. “On the one hand, in the first nine months of his tenure as prime minister, Stephen Harper was swift to act on several foreign policy fronts, most of them related to security. On the other hand, he is slow to deliver the framework from which Canada will act in the world under a Conservative mandate.”

  5. Nicaragua Turns Left – Stephen Randall. “….regional security is not really the critical issue for Nicaragua.  The country is desperate for development, political and economic stability.  Decades of civil war prior to 1990, followed by a series of either ineffective or corrupt governments, have done little good for what could be a prosperous society.  It is difficult to imagine that an FSLN government under Daniel Ortega could perform less well than his corrupt predecessors.”

  6. The Offensive against “Quebecistan” is on! And the “collateral damages” may be heavier than expected Stéphane Roussel & Jean-Christophe Boucher. “In summary, contrary to the popular clichés, it can be said that francophone Quebeckers and English-speaking Canadians share in large measure the same “strategic culture”.”

  7. Terrorism in Politics – Denis Stairs. “We are engaged instead in a war against unconventional warriors using readily accessible instruments of violence on a transnational basis in the pursuit of political objectives.  These objectives may be ill-advised, and they may have been selected by untutored minds engaged in relatively primitive intellectual processes. They may vary widely, moreover, from group to group and from the top to the bottom of the pertinent organizational hierarchy (however loosely and eclectically structured it may be). But the political objectives are still there, and they are real.  The behaviour that results is thus considered and purposeful.  It is far from ‘mad’.”  

The Liberal Party of Canada has chosen a new leader. It is likely an election will happen sometime in 2007. It is incumbent on all parties to provide Canadians with a vision of international action that Canadians can understand and buy into.

 

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CONGRATULATIONS



 

Graduate Student Symposium – Paper Award Winners

October 28 – The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) 9th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, Security and Defence: National and International Issues, held in collaboration with CDFAI, was once again a successful and well-received event.

Listed below are this year’s winners:

 

First Place

(David Scott-GD Canada prize) - Andrea Charron, RMC 
"3Ts of Canada's Sanction Employment", "Canadian Sactions Annex"

 

Second Place

Lawren Guldemond, RMC
"Between two millstones"


Third Place

Capt Nils French, American Military University
"Our Seven Wars in Afghanistan"

 

Fourth Place

Chantal Lavallée, UQÀM
"Repenser la gestion de la sécurité: le cas de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) de l'UE"

 

2006 Ross Munro Media Award Recipient – Christie Blatchford

November 17 - the Award was presented at the CDA Institute’s Vimy Award Dinner in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Gatineau, Quebec. 

 

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CDFAI 2006 Annual Ottawa Conference

Foreign Policy Under a Conservative Government:  An Interim Report Card
October 30 2006

 

Event Summary

The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute’s (CDFAI) 2006 Annual Conference on October 30, 2006 was held at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Ottawa, Ontario. The conference, "Foreign Policy Under a Conservative Government: An Interim Report Card” looked at the Harper government's record on foreign policy, defence, and development.

Conference partners included the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University's Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, the Institut québécois des hautes études internationales at Université Laval, Queen's University's Centre for International Relations, the Chaire de recherche du Canada en politiques étrangère et de defense canadiennes at the Université du Québec à Montréal, the Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale/Research Group in International Security, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) and the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Canada Institute.

In conjunction with the conference, CDFAI commissioned Innovative Research Group Inc. to conduct an online national survey of the views of Canadians on the performance of the Conservative government so far and on some of the major challenges before the government, such as Canada's role in Afghanistan, Canada-U.S. relations, and the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of the summer of 2006. The poll results can be accessed at: www.cdfai.org.

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Article: The Challenges of Governing

by Derek Burney

(Speech given to the Deloitte National Public Sector Industry Conference – Museum of Civilization, Gatineau, QC – November 15, 2006) 

When Sal invited me to speak to you this evening he explained what the main topic was but added that I could really use that to say anything I wanted.  A pretty “liberal” opening Sal.

I had thought of something like “Trust Your Income Trust” but Jim Flaherty eliminated that as an option on Halloween.  (Scary, eh!  A government that takes tough decisions.)

Let me turn to the topic – what I would call the “The Challenges of Governing” in today’s environment in the hope that what I say will not diminish your appetite and may instead stimulate some questions and discussion to accompany dinner.

When I served on the Transition team, I was struck most by the peaceful and orderly manner in which political power is transferred in Canada.  May well be something we take for granted – doesn’t happen very often after all – and it is certainly an opportunity not all citizens in our global village enjoy.  And yet, it is the essence of democracy, a reflection, too, of the ultimate civility of our own brand of political theatre.  (Not what you might say if you watched the House of Commons on a daily basis which is why I say “ultimate.”)

I believe that a periodic change in political power is refreshing in itself, and not for partisan reasons (really!), but because it allows healthy change both in the direction and the implementation of public policy.

The fact that we may disagree over the changes as they evolve is also what democracy is all about.

Leadership in government flows first from clear political direction.  Focus, a sense of purpose, a short list of priorities and the stamina to stay the course.    There will always be – as Harold MacMillan once observed – “events, dear boy” that interrupt and divert attention and compel a prudent change of direction or emphasis; (Does anything come to mind?) but, if leaders operate from a platform of defined goals and conviction, they will have a rudder of sorts to navigate even the unexpected shoals of governance and remain more or less on course.

Mr. Harper probably would have preferred to ignore action on Income Trusts but “events” gave him little choice.

I remember that, when Prime Minister Mulroney invited me to become his Chief of Staff, I balked, initially, saying that I was, after all, a bureaucrat, not a political strategist.  “Derek”, he explained “I am the political strategist.  I want you to organize my office…”  As I subsequently learned, there is a big difference between the two jobs.

Having a clear agenda and a sense of priorities in government can be as powerful as a good idea.  And when elected politicians operate from a consistent set of principles, they will earn respect, even from some who disagree with the decisions they take.  Ronald Reagan epitomized that example.  Many Americans disagreed with some of the things he did but they were never in doubt about his conviction (and optimism) and they respected him for both.  It helps, too, when leaders reflect confidence and clarity in articulating their positions.

Attempting to be all things to all people – saying what  your audience may like to hear rather than what they need to know - is not the way to gain credibility or respect.   Because, if everything is a priority, nothing really is.

A new Prime Minister begins with a reservoir of political capital and a limited amount of time.  The manner in which he spends both will ultimately determine the success or fate of his leadership.  With a minority government, the amount of available capital is circumscribed and the time available for action is even more uncertain. 

Not only is there the need for collegiality in cabinet, and for consistent support from caucus (the Prime Minister’s “first constituents”), but also for reasonable compromise with opponents, where appropriate, provided, of course, that there is a mutual appetite for compromise and assuming, as well, that the government’s objective is survival, not re-election.

Majority governments provide not only more capital but also more time for tough prescriptions.  (The decision on Income Trusts was certainly tough and it remains to be seen how much political capital it consumed.)

The degree to which the Tories are able to demonstrate competence in implementing their agenda, and establish credibility as a government, will determine whether their fundamental political challenge is met, namely re-election, preferably with a majority – one that would enhance both their capital and their time for policy implementation.

The policy challenges for any Canadian government tend to centre around three basic issues:  unity, where the pressures are essentially internal; prosperity and security, both of which have external as well as internal dimensions. 

As very much a country of regions in search of a binding identity, Canada can, on occasion, be obsessed with the issue of national unity.  Quebecers debate persistently whether they will remain in Canada.  Their governments push the limits on provincial jurisdiction often obliging other provinces into a ‘me too’ routine of demands.  This issue is relatively quiet these days but, if Mr. Igantieff wins the Liberal leadership, or we see a change of government in Quebec, the constitutional debate is likely to be reignited in some fashion.

There is much talk about a “fiscal imbalance” but that is actually more than a Canada/Quebec issue.  Increasingly, there is concern about the burgeoning imbalance between Alberta and all the others.  Think of this. One-third of all the new jobs created in Canada last year were in one province, Alberta.  That is a real imbalance, with profound consequences that are just beginning.

In any case, talk about “fiscal imbalance” tends essentially to be a debate about money because we have a situation in which the federal government taxes more than it spends while the provinces spend more than they tax.  Any solution will likely involve a decision on how much more the federal government will pay and for what.

What would be better is some clarification or realignment of roles between levels of government.  There is too much overlap today and, as a result, a chronic avoidance of direct responsibility.  Genuine accountability will only come from clearer lines of responsibility. Here I am explaining accountability to accountants.  But take health care as an example.  (Someone, take it please!)

 

Part of the problem with debates on things like the fiscal imbalance or health care, is that we have difficulty at times distinguishing between myths and reality.  The myths tend to frustrate national debate and objective decision-making.  As you know better than most, the blurred lines of accountability are the worst defect of today’s shared cost programs.  They simply add fuel to the prevailing myths.

In Australia, GST revenues go exclusively to the States while income taxes go to the Federal government.  That would be too radical, I am sure, for Canada but it has the advantage of simplicity and clarity for the payees, the taxpayers.

Beyond the perennial concerns about Quebec’s future, and the somewhat dubious debate about a fiscal “imbalance”, I suspect that the underlying national unity issue which cannot be ignored too much longer is the plight of our aboriginal people.  Here again, the talk (and many of the half-baked solutions) is mainly about money.  And yet, as with health care, the more we spend, the worse the situation seems to get.  More money is not an effective answer to either challenge.  Expediency over principle.

The solution to the aboriginal question involves harder issues of jurisdiction, and contemporary, versus traditional approaches to administration and accountability.  The major obstacles are an unwillingness to exert political capital at one level of government and a reluctance to relinquish any at another.  Regrettably, there is not much evidence of change coming soon on either front. 

But, if anyone thinks we can engage in another debate on constitutional reform without addressing the aboriginal dimension, I have some land for sale in Northern Ontario.

I am not sure whether our somewhat complacent approach to federalism will provide real answers to this issue or to the broader issue of role realignment.  Some suggest a Royal Commission to provide wisdom and spine for the changes needed – to shatter some of the myths in the debate.  But studies or commissions are not ends in themselves and, in the absence of follow through, they simply provide more process without purpose.  The only answer is leadership.  Using political capital selectively but firmly.

Governments do have a responsibility to lead and shape public opinion – to move beyond the whim or myth of the moment and exercise political will in a deliberate fashion that will inspire more efficiency and more accountability at all levels of government.  But, in a federation such as ours, this requires commitments on which several political leaders, not just one, are prepared to take a stand and make common cause.  I am encouraged that Ottawa seems more ready to respect provincial powers while focusing primarily on its own areas of jurisdiction.  The quid pro quo, however, would be long overdue undertakings by the provinces to enhance our economic union.

Canada’s fiscal situation is sound and the short term economic prospects are positive so the prosperity dimension of the policy trinity appears to be in good shape, at least for now.   The global economy is humming along at a level of 4% growth for 11  consecutive quarters – the strongest upturn in 30 years.  Inflation is at an historic low, despite unprecedented prices for oil and oil products. 

As always with the dismal science, the underlying question is how long will it last?  The U.S. fiscal situation is anything but sound and there are already signs that the economy on our southern border is slowing down.  We all know what that will eventually mean for Canada. 

There may well be more to Canada’s prosperity agenda than the U.S. market but getting things right with our neighbour is a critical starting point.  On that, I think the government has earned good marks.  Now that softwood lumber has been settled, however, we need to inspire a more positive focus on, and adherence to, NAFTA, using the strength and the substantially integrated nature of our North American economies to bolster market access elsewhere.  Regrettably, the elections last week are not likely to help on this or on trade more generally.

With the collapse of the Doha multilateral round of trade negotiations now almost certain, Canada needs a clearer, more concentrated and results-oriented trade agenda, specifically targeting the emerging giants in Asia that are rapidly becoming the new economic centre of gravity in the world.  

Think about this.  In the past six years, the United States has concluded Free Trade Agreements with more than a dozen countries.  Canada’s score is zero in the same time frame.  Drift is not a practical option for a country highly dependent on trade.

Australia does not have the luxury of immediate proximity to its major market and so works diligently at maintaining a pragmatic relationship with the United States while, at the same time, cultivating closer economic ties with China, Japan, India and Korea.  A coherent, focused effort linking all levels of government with the private sector, generating real dividends for Australia’s economy.  It is a model Canada should consider.

Beyond trade, our government should be preparing the ground for an increasingly competitive global economy when natural resources will not be sufficient and when times will not be as good. 

The exceptional strength of our fiscal situation should enable some sensible adjustments to corporate and income tax policies designed to spur investment and innovation.  Decisions with objectives that go beyond short term, political expedience. 

We would benefit, too, from more tax harmonization and from tangible reductions of both internal barriers to trade and impediments to mobility of labour between provinces.  What Alberta and B.C. have done together should be extended on a truly national basis.  Imagine that.  Free Trade within Canada!

We require actions across the board that will make us more competitive in an increasingly competitive global society.  Many also suggest that Canadian business leaders need to be less cautious, less risk averse and more entrepreneurial.  Roger Martin of the University of Toronto has observed that our executives and Canadian capital markets “overestimate the risk of going global and underestimate the risk of staying local.”  (Now I am talking to accountants about more risk-taking!  Dangerous ground.)

In short however, if we continue to rest exclusively on our admittedly abundant natural resources, don’t be surprised if sclerosis sets in!

Our productivity challenge is exacerbated by demographic changes.  With one-third of our population expected to retire by 2020, there will be much greater pressure on our tax system to support already stretched budgets for health-care and age-related benefits.  Something will have to give when we have more and more retirees paying less and less income tax.  (Younger members in the audience should take note.)

Some see increased immigration as an answer and yet, if we simply expand the volume of immigrants, using the current system, we will, I suspect, increase the social burden without improving the productive capacity of our economy.

The security (and stability) of our nation is any government’s over-riding responsibility and is actually where the policy trinity comes together.  Unity or stability bolsters prosperity and a more prosperous Canada is likely to be a more united Canada.  But, security, in its most fundamental sense, faces entirely new challenges in this young century, both internal (as we have recently learned) and external.

We are vulnerable to a new kind of war.  Irrational terrorist acts which strike without warning, are aimed at innocent bystanders and cannot be contained  by traditional military or security defences.

The enduring myth of Canada as a peace-keeper is somewhat at odds with tasks in places like Afghanistan that go well-beyond the blue beret model.  That image and the comfort or softness of our affluence seems to be engendering an aversion to war-fighting as well as a false sense of immunity among Canadians about the global terrorist threat.  We need to ensure that our strength as an open democracy, and the justifiable pride we have for tolerance and diversity in this country do not become sources of weakness, easily exploited by those with the intent and the means to undermine the stability, the unity and the potential that Canada enjoys.

Central to any leader’s challenge of governing and to all three basic policy pillars is the manner in which we choose to manage relations with the United States.  It is never easy, even in relatively good times.  After all, the Americans are #1 and they know it.  And there is no longer a real #2 in the world, one reason why, I believe, anti-Americanism is flourishing almost everywhere.  The Americans can play hardball and not just in baseball.  Their system of government is different and can be difficult to fathom – even for Americans.  And, after last week’s elections, governance in Washington is likely to be even more difficult all around. 

“All politics” as they say “is local” and Canadians, as I was often reminded, do not vote in the United States.  The attention span in Washington on issues of concern to Canada is spasmodic at best.  Difficult to gain, even more difficult to sustain.  Besides, any “dividends” on the home front derived from a constructive approach can be elusive.  Ask Brian Mulroney.  Ask Tony Blair.

As a former diplomat, I am often asked whether leaders can really make a difference in managing this all pervasive relationship.  The diplomatic answer is that countries have interests that transcend the personal influence – good or bad – of individuals.  The more candid answer, based on direct experience, is that leaders can make a decisive difference … when they choose to.  I can tell you one thing for certain.  We would not have secured a Free Trade Agreement without the firm, mutual commitment of Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan.  But the importance of the relationship extends beyond personalities of the moment and should not be measured by simplistic standards of who is liked or disliked at any given time.

The real challenge for any Canadian leader is to try to reconcile the practical need for persistent engagement with Washington in order to articulate, promote and defend our substantial security, commercial and environmental interests while also responding to legitimate aspirations in Canada that we act, and be seen to act, as a distinct entity in North America.  The first part of this equation requires vigilance and perseverance; the second calls for creativity, finding ways in which Canada can make a difference or a significant contribution.  It is what some see as the “Canadian conundrum” in foreign policy even though it is a conundrum that many countries envy. 

I also believe that, if we can establish a mature, constructive partnership on this continent with the United States and manage it in a coherent, manner (with minimal emotion), we will also be better able to address and influence other global objectives.

Canada’s security on this continent is guaranteed by the United States, as we are wont to say, “whether we like it or not.”  But, consider this and I quote:  “Canadians want to benefit from the United States nuclear umbrella but they do not want to hold onto the handle.”  Do you know who said that?  Pierre Trudeau in 1983 when he explained to the public his decision to allow Cruise Missile testing in Canada.  We could use some of that candour in today’s North American security debate. 

As the Nuclear non-Proliferation regime becomes less certain, with the antics of North Korea, among others, are we too smug to reconsider the merits of missile defence?  Does anyone seriously think that a missile fired from North Korea or Iran will distinguish between Seattle and Vancouver or between Toronto and Buffalo? 

And yet, with all three Opposition parties firmly opposed to reconsider the issue of missile defence, the myth will prevail.  Does that make any of you feel more secure?  When you live next door to someone ten times your size who has unprecedented military fire power, you have a tendency to niggle or whinge about their behaviour almost as a birthright.  But, the luxury of our “virtual dependence” should not prevent us from adopting a realistic outlook about our own security nor should it relieve us of the responsibility for contributing at home and globally as an ally, as well as a neighbour. 

            The best way to move beyond mythology, whether on security, or health care, or fiscal imbalance, or similar challenges is leadership, unfettered leadership based on conviction and a determination to make good use of the political capital and the time available.   That is what I see as the essential challenge for any Canadian government.

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ARTICLE: BACKGROUNDER: CANADIAN NAVAL OPS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, 1990-2006

by Richard Gimblett

With all the attention on land operations in Afghanistan, the other ways in which the Canadian Forces are engaged in the Southwest Asia theatre of operations are often overlooked.  On Sunday 10 September 2006, the eve of the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship Ottawa sailed from Esquimalt harbour on her third six-month deployment to the region within the last decade, in this case attached to the USS Boxer Expeditionary Strike Group.

 

Before the summer of 1990, the region was not a typical theatre of operations for the Canadian Navy.  The first RCN vessels in the area were the cruisers Uganda and Ontario en route operations in the Far East with the British Pacific Fleet in the last year of the Second World War.  Similarly, in the postwar period, destroyers would occasionally transit the area en route operations off Korea.  When the carrier Magnificent transported UNEF I to Sinai in 1956 it did not pass through the Suez Canal; neither did Bonaventure when transporting the initial UNFICYP contingent in 1966.  In the ensuing decades, no Canadian warships entered the region.

 

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the initial assumption was that Canadian participation would be limited to a post-hostilities peacekeeping contingent.  Instead, with the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq (UNSCRs 661 and 665), a naval task group was dispatched to join the Multinational Interception Force (MIF) embargo, under the codename Operation FRICTION.[1]  The aging destroyers Athabaskan and Terra Nova, and the supply ship Protecteur were hastily upgraded with new weapon and C2 systems obtained from the CPF and TRUMP projects, and took up station on the frontlines in the Central Gulf to board and inspect transiting vessels.  An air task group of CF-18s was subsequently dispatched to provide Combat Air Patrol of the coalition naval forces under the coordination of the USN.  The emphasis on the seaborne sanction enforcement allowed the Mulroney government to maintain the distinction that it was operating under UN auspices vice those of the American invasion forces.  Indeed, during the war phase of Operation DESERT STORM the Canadian task group commander was delegated TACON of the Coalition Logistics Force in the Gulf, the only non-USN officer accorded the status of an independent Warfare Commander.

 

As one of the ceasefire conditions, the MIF mandate was formalized under UNSCR 687.  The Canadian government wished to maintain a presence in this situation, but the state of the fleet (in transition from the old steam destroyers to the new frigates) limited the effort, and only Operations FLAG (northern Gulf) and BARRIER (in the Red Sea) were undertaken before the deployments were discontinued.

 

When the supply ship Preserver was dispatched in 1992-93 to Somalia in support of Operation DELIVERANCE, it was initially under UNSCR 794 (Chapter VI mandate), acting as an afloat Joint Headquarters (JHQ) to the mission commander and more general support to Canadian Forces ashore (the Airborne Regiment Battle Group).  This logistics support broadened to include other coalition naval forces as the mandate changed to UNSCR 814 (Chapter VII).

 

The introduction to the fleet in the mid-1990s of the highly capable new Halifax-class frigates suggested opportunities to renew deployments to the region.  Operation PROMENADE was purely an effort to assist in the promotion of Canadian technology at various locations in the Gulf States.  With Operation TRANQUILITY, Canada rejoined the MIF after a three-year absence, as much again to showcase the new hi-tech frigate as to support the embargo.  However, with the ongoing transition of the fleet, it was two years before another frigate could participate, under Operation PREVENTION.

 

The continuing non-compliance of Saddam Hussein with UN inspection requirements soon led to a more forceful and sustained Canadian presence.  A flurry of UNSCRs in 1997-98 culminated in the coalition (primarily US-UK) Operation DESERT THUNDER, for which the Canadian frigate assigned to STANAVFORLANT was diverted to the Gulf in support of the MIF (Canadian codename Op DETERMINATION).

 

Saddam’s compliance was short-lived, so the Chretien government undertook to bolster its commitment to the MIF, beginning with Operation MERCATOR, which saw the first of the frigates to be fully integrated into a USN carrier battle group (CVBG).  The difference from previous deployments was that by now the level of Canadian technical and communications interoperability with the USN (especially on the classified SIPRNET system) was sufficiently high that the Canadian ships could replace Americans one-for-one in the order of battle.[2]  The success of that effort led to the practice being regularized.  Operation AUGMENTATION saw annual deployments of a frigate (for a six-month period) integrated in a USN CVBG.  Saddam’s intransigence towards the UN increased such that HMCS Winnipeg (the last frigate so deployed) had to perform several con-compliant boardings through the spring and summer of 2001.

 

In the aftermath of the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of its Charter and the UNSCR passed a series of resolutions authorizing collective action against terrorists.  Within hours of the Chretien government approving Operation APOLLO, the frigate with STANAVFORLANT was detached to join a USN CVBG in the Arabian Sea, and within the month, the frigate preparing to deploy under Op AUGMENTATION sailed to join another CVBG.  The main effort was the dispatch of a three-ship task group from Halifax, which upon arrival in the Arabian Sea in November 2001 was assigned responsibility for the close escort of the USN amphibious ready groups, a rare signal of USN trust in an ally.  By January 2002, there were six Canadian warships in the region (one-third of the entire surface fleet), and their role in the expanding war against terrorism soon included the command of all other coalition warships in the Arabian Sea, culminating in the prestigious multinational task force command appointment of CTF 151.  For Operation Apollo, the Canadian Navy kept a task group deployed at probably the most extreme distance from Canada, with minimal direct shore support, for the better part of two years.  It was the largest sustained Canadian naval operation since the Korean War, and the CTF 151 appointment was the first operational-level command exercised by a senior Canadian officer in an active theatre since the Second World War.[3]

 

After the end of Operation APOLLO in December 2003, the Canadian Navy took an operational pause to re-group.  Within the year, however, it resumed a regular presence in the region, participating in lower-scale but on-going counter-terror ops.  To date, three frigates have deployed under Operation ALTAIR, the latest being HMCS Ottawa.

 

Continued engagement in the region under Operation ALTAIR accomplishes a number of objectives.  For one, these deployments achieve national political objectives by demonstrating an enduring interest and engagement in a strategically important region, a region where we need awareness and knowledge to ensure that we can influence and shape events when required to do so.  In addition, it considerably strengthens our ties at the strategic, operational and tactical level with our Allies that also operate in that region, allowing us to promote military cooperation with regional states and to develop key regional knowledge that will be important for dealing with any future crises in the area.  Finally, working with a US Navy Expeditionary Strike Group increases our experience base of manoeuvre operations in the littoral, as the CF explores new transformational concepts of operation for the 21st century battlespace.

 

There is no question that Southwest Asia is of interest to Canada, given the strategic importance of the region’s energy supply, the global war on terrorism, the proximity of events in Afghanistan, and the regional instability generated by Iran’s nuclear program.  Our Navy deploys to regions of the world like this because Canada’s national interests are directly affected by what goes on there.  Having a navy capable of independent action on the world stage significantly enhances the range of options open to government in responding to overseas crises at the time and place of its choosing.
 

 

Operation

Date

Ship(s)

UNSCR

Mission

Friction

1990-1991

Athabaskan

Terra Nova

Protecteur

661, 665, 678

Coalition eviction of Iraq from Kuwait

Flag

1991

Huron

661, 687

UN sanctions against Iraq

Barrier

1992

Restigouche

661, 687

UN sanctions against Iraq

Cordon / Deliverance

1992-1993

Preserver

794, 814

UN / Coalition Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I / UNITAF)

Promenade

1995

Fredericton

Nil

Cdn High-tech Trade Mission

Tranquility

1995

Calgary

661, 687

UN sanctions against Iraq

Prevention

1997

Regina

661, 687

UN sanctions against Iraq

Determination

1998

Toronto

687, 1115, 1137, 1154, and 1194

UNSCOM Observer access support

Mercator

1998

Ottawa

661, 687

UN sanctions against Iraq

Augmentation

1999
2000
2001
2001

Regina
Calgary
Charlottetown
Winnipeg

661, 687

UN sanctions against Iraq

Apollo

2001-2003

15 of 17 major surface vessels[4]

1368, 1373, 1377

NATO Article 5 &

UN efforts to combat terrorism

Altair

2004
2005
2006

Toronto
Winnipeg

Ottawa

1368, 1373, 1377

UN efforts to combat terrorism

 


 

Endnotes

[1] The official DND account is Major Jean Morin & Lieutenant-Commander Richard Gimblett, Operation FRICTION: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 (Toronto: Dundurn, 1997).
[2] On the appreciation of the USN for the frigate deployments, see Captain (USN) Jim Stavridis, “They Got Game”, USNI Proceedings, vol 125/6/1156 (June 1999), pp. 51-54.
[3] See Richard Gimblett, Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War Against Terrorism (Ottawa: Magic Light, 2004).

[4] Both supply ships, and all destroyers and frigates except Athabaskan & Ville de Québec, which were in extended maintenance routines (note that Iroquois deployed twice).  Gimblett, Operation Apollo, p. 80, shows the deployment schedule. 

 

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ARTICLE: CANADA’S HOMELAND SECURITY DILEMMA

by Frank Harvey