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CDFAI
DISPATCH: WINTER 2007 (VOLUME V, ISSUE IV)
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Promoting new understanding and improvement of Canadian foreign and
defence policy.
Canadian
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
Phone: (403) 231-7624
Fax: (403) 231-7647
E-mail: subscribe@cdfai.org
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WELCOME
FROM THE PRESIDENT
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Welcome to the Winter 2007 issue of “The Dispatch”. As usual the
articles are diverse and thought provoking.
In this
newsletter there are nine articles:
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Quebec and Security: Beyond Stereotypes - Dany Deschênes. Quebec
is often stereotyped as being anti-American and anti-military. Dany
argues that Quebeckers are actually anti-imperialistic, preferring a
multi-lateral approach to defence, and have, in reality, made
significant contributions towards North American security.
-
Time
to Create a Northwest Passage Authority - Brian Flemming. Brian
argues that with the faster-than-expected melting of the Northwest
Passage and the Northeast Passage, Stephen Harper needs to take the
initiative to propose and create a Northwest Passage Authority with
the United States. This, he says, would require both sides to put
aside their opposing claims but would result in a
mutually-beneficial policy.
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Managing an Interdependent World - Gordon Smith. Now is the time
for Canada to lead the way in refashioning the G8 Summits into G13
Summits and create a network of think tanks to support them. This,
contends Gordon, is the best way to break global deadlocks on a
number of issues.
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Some
Historical Reflections on The Boom and Bust Cycle of Canadian Naval
Procurement - Richard Gimblett. Since the late 19th Century, the
Canadian Navy has gone through a boom and bust cycle about every
twenty years. In 2009, however, Richard foresees the first ever
failure of the Navy to meet the upswing of the boom and produce an
operationally viable naval task group.
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A
Note to American Friends: What Lies Behind the Border, and How it
Shapes our Relationship - George Haynal. George delves into the
relationship between Canada and the United States, a unique mix of
comity and asymmetry, he says. After 9/11, the relationship has
changed and is moving towards a new equilibrium but Canadians,
George says, will not be as complacent in this new relationship and
policy will reflect a growing independence from the United States.
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Contemplating the Future of the Afghan Mission - Scot Robertson.
Scot proposes that Canadians rethink some of the measures by which
they judge the success or failure of the counter-insurgency and
nation-building operations in Afghanistan. He outlines ten ideas for
how to re-evaluate the mission and the Canadian commitment to it.
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Helping Hands and Loaded Arms? Navigating the Military and
Humanitarian Space - Sarah Jane Meharg. Sarah examines the
overlapping roles of humanitarian organizations and military forces
following the Three Block War concept. She argues that humanitarian
organizations see this overlap as detrimental and that both parties
need to resolve their emerging roles, behaviours, and identities.
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Where’s the Transparency? - Sharon Hobson. Restrictions on the
military’s ability to answer media questions, argues Sharon, ensures
that neither the government nor the military can provide the public
with their interpretation of events, alternate views to those of
their critics, and the rational behind their decisions. Sharon
predicts the unwillingness to share information will only get worse
in the future.
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Canada and Afghanistan: The Second Fog of War - Denis Stairs.
Canada’s role in Afghanistan is being obscured by the second fog of
war that has enveloped people in Canada, making it nearly impossible
for them to understand what the Canadian Forces are doing and how
well they are doing it. Denis urges Canadian politicians to do what
they can to elevate the debate over Canada’s participation in the
Afghan mission above this second fog so Canada can follow sound
policy in regards to this issue.
Enjoy
this issue and let us know what you think about the articles.
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CDFAI 2007 Annual
Ottawa Conference Report
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Canada as the “Emerging Energy Superpower”: Testing the Case
Canada as the “Emerging Energy Superpower”: Testing the Case was
the theme. The Honourable Gary Lunn, Minister of Natural Resources,
was the keynote speaker ending a full day of interesting panel
presentations. Annette Hester wrote the conference paper of the same
name. Greg Lyle conducted the pre-conference poll. Colin Robertson was
MC and there were four panels:
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Panel 1: Life as an Energy Superpower – Chair David Pratt with Annette
Hester, Mike Cleland and Albert Legault;
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Panel 2: Implications for US-Canada Relations - Chairs David Biette
and Mark Entwistle with Debra Yedlin, Dave Pumphrey and Matthew
McManus;
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Panel 3: Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection – Chair Bob Booth
with Dave Redman, Felix Kwamena and James Young; and
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Panel 4: Energy, Environment and the Arctic – Chairs Stéphane Rousel
and Charles Pentland with Rob Huebert, Samantha Arnold and Frédéric
Lasserre. Stéphane Rousel provided closing remarks.
CDFAI wishes to thank all attendees, partners and presenters. Without
the support of sponsors for the conference, the program would not have
been as interesting or extensive and to them we offer our gratitude
and special thanks. Once we have sorted out the technical challenge
the panel commentaries will be posted on CDFAI’s website.
The CDFAI 2007 Annual Confernce Sponsors were:
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Premiere Sponsor
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Distinguished Sponsors
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Eminent Sponsors
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CDFAI Major Research Paper
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“CFIS: A Foreign Intelligence Service for Canada” by Barry
Cooper, to be released on December 12, 2007
Currently Canada is the only G8 country without the ability to collect
foreign intelligence using human agents. While Canada does collect
intelligence on immediate domestic security concerns as well as
signals intelligence, these types of intelligence are of limited
value, as they do not provide information on the capabilities or
intent of foreign states or non-state actors. Unless the Canadian
government begins using spies to collect foreign intelligence, Canada
will continue to have to rely on its allies for intelligence that may
be misleading or biased and is in any case collected by them for their
own reasons, not Canada’s. This risks undermining Canadian
sovereignty, helps ensure that Canadian foreign policy remains
reactive, and that Canada remains a soft target for espionage and
terrorist activity. This report details the history of Canadian
intelligence capabilities, current Canadian capabilities and their
limitations, the arguments and issues around the creation of a CFIS,
and how CFIS, as a separate entity from the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS), could overcome the current Canadian
intelligence deficit.
To download the PDF file, please click
here.
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Article:
Quebec and Security: Beyond Stereotypes
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by Dany Deschênes
New security threats arising since 9/11, and to a lesser degree, since
the end of the Cold War, have reminded democratic societies of their
vulnerability. As a result, the Canadian
government has been compelled to reaffirm its principal mission of
ensuring the security of its citizens. Canada’s first National
Security Policy, presented in April 2004 by Paul Martin’s Liberal
government, reinforced that purpose.
Despite its name, the policy entitled
Securing an
Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy
is as much a public security policy as it is a traditional national
security policy, that is, a policy centered on the state and the role
of the armed forces in responding to outside threats. It states that
security issues have changed and describes how they can no longer be
reduced exclusively to an interior-external dichotomy.
Without necessarily intending to, the national security policy
underlines the fact that Canadian provinces (and even municipalities)
have an increasingly larger role to play, particularly as primary
participants, on many issues concerning the post-Cold War security
framework. Security is clearly the basis of the amicable relationship
between Canada and the United States, which goes back specifically to
the 1938 Kingston Dispensation – a historic exchange between American
President Franklin Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie
King. Addressing Roosevelt, who had vowed to defend Canada in case of
a threat to Canadian security, Prime Minister Mackenzie King responded
that Canada would seek to ensure that Canadian territory would never
be a source of threat against its neighbour to the south. A normative
basis for the ensuing United States-Canadian relationship, the
Kingston Dispensation has traditionally been supported by federal
measures. However, the provinces are now assuming a greater role in
upholding that vow. This is explained, among other factors, by the
federalist nature of the Canadian government. For all six sectors
identified by the 2004 National Security Policy, at least three –
emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, and
transportation security – fall under provincial jurisdiction, but the
provinces, Quebec among them, are also responding to issues within
their competency in sectors like intelligence and border security,
despite the fact that these are traditionally under federal
jurisdiction.
In terms of security, Quebec has generally received bad press. This
image is largely based on the false premise that security is a
strictly military domain, a recent example being Canada's intervention
in Afghanistan. The weak support of the Quebec population for that
intervention, as has been documented by multiple surveys, tends to be
interpreted as a traditional anti-militarist stance. However, as my
colleague Stéphane Roussel effectively demonstrated, Quebec’s
strategic culture has evolved significantly towards multilateralism
over the past fifty years. From that perspective, Quebec’s position is
not so much a question of anti-militarism or anti-Americanism, but
rather of anti-imperialism – the nuance of which is a matter of scope.
One may argue that the anti-imperialism that has taken shape since the
Henri Bourassa era stems from, among other factors, the minority
status of francophones within Canada as a whole. Thus, when
international politics is interpreted as being imperialistic – based
on examples such as British rule at the turn of the twentieth century
(e.g., the Boer war) or American policies that justified the 2003
invasion of Iraq – public opinion in Quebec becomes divided.
That perspective offers an interesting explanation for understanding
Quebec public opinion in regard to Afghanistan: even though the Afghan
mission is multilateral, it is part of a larger, imperialistic
US-American campaign similar to the one in Iraq. Since the
Conservatives took power, anti-conservative parties (Bloc Québécois,
Liberal, and NDP) have propagated the view that the Canadian mission
has substantially changed into an imperialist mission by and for the
“American Empire.”
That having been said, to what degree is anti-militarism or
anti-Americanism a pronounced sentiment in Quebec society? First of
all, the Quebec population is not anti-American. During the debate on
the US-American intervention in Iraq 2003, former American ambassador
to Canada Paul Celluci stated that the province did not reflect an
anti- American position. Quebec’s position is, however, against the
foreign policy of the current Republican administration – a
fundamental difference. Aptly illustrating this point is Quebec’s
support for free-trade, support which contributed substantially to
finalizing the free trade agreement. Moreover, Quebec’s tendency to
distance itself from particular American values is not unique to that
province. As for the military, for some years, the image of the
Canadian Forces has been strengthened thanks to its interventions at
natural disaster sites, including the 1996 Saguenay flood and the 1998
ice storm. The recruitment of Quebeckers into the Canadian Forces is
also going very well. The latest data confirm that most Quebec
recruiting centres have met their objectives. Finally, the support of
Quebeckers for the 1999 Kosovo intervention, for example, illustrates
that military interventions can receive positive support from
Quebeckers when executed in a framework they consider to be legitimate
and multilateral. This should serve to correct the distorted image of
a monolithic Quebec in matters concerning defence and security. What
ultimately remains deeply embedded is anti-imperialism.
In addition to the aforementioned arguments, it is also important to
consider the measures taken by Quebec political authorities since
2001. From that perspective, it quickly becomes evident that these
were major initiatives meant to maintain and reinforce the confidence
of the United States since 9/11. More specifically, these efforts
overlap with an overall reinforcement of Quebec’s capacities to
respond to the new global stakes in regard to security and to targeted
measures with its partner American Border States. A description of the
most important of these measures follows.
First, let us recall that Quebec first implemented a Centre de veille
en sécurité civile (public security watch centre), which it then
transformed into the Centre des opérations gouvernementales (centre
for government operations) in order to maximize the intervention of
different government stakeholders in the case of emergencies. Quebec
also revised its regulations concerning the authentication of
documents, particularly those used to obtain a Canadian passport, in
order to more effectively combat identity theft and related frauds.
Such measures of a more general nature aim to respond to the new
security challenges. However, they also serve to demonstrate that
Quebec participates seriously in security matters.
At meetings with various American authorities, the intervention
capabilities of police services such as the Service de police de la
ville de Montréal or Sûreté du Québec were demonstrated. Some concrete
examples are the deployment of the Sûreté du Québec forces for the
August 2004 Northeast Regional Homeland Security Directors
meeting or for the October 2005 Double Impact simulation
which, conjointly with Vermont, evaluated procedures for managing
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risks in the case of a
terrorist attack.
Moreover, the Vermont-Quebec agreement concerning the exchange of
intelligence data for law enforcement, signed on 4 December 2003, is
another significant example. The objective of that agreement is to
facilitate the exchange of information allowing for law enforcement
between Vermont and Quebec police authorities to protect against
terrorist attacks or organized crime. It derives directly from the
many measures resulting from 9/11 and the necessity to combat
terrorism more efficiently by sharing information. Also, geographic
ties led the parties to protect the common border between Quebec and
Vermont in order to ensure their respective internal security. In
addition to Vermont, the states of Maine,
New York, and New Hampshire have
also signed bilateral co-operation agreements addressing security and
the exchange of information.
Another concrete example is the exchange of information between
various police forces and the direct and efficient relations between
American states and Canadian provinces for the Northeast Regional
Homeland Security Directors meeting. The characteristics of security
intelligence have thus changed since the Cold War. Considering the
measures mentioned, we could argue that the Quebec government
qualifies as a serious partner in security matters. As well, Quebec’s
latest international policy indicates that North American security is
a foremost priority for Quebec.
The importance of that
mandate is particularly indicated by the Centre de gestion de
l’information de sécurité of the Direction de la Sécurité de l’État of
the Ministère de la Sécurité publique du Québec.
At a presentation of
that policy, newspapers such as Le Devoir portrayed it as a
mini CIA. Nevertheless, the policy is proof of the seriousness of
Quebec authorities, even if the resources accorded to the Centre de
gestion de l’information de sécurité are limited.
These cases demonstrate that Quebec political authorities have a sound
understanding of the foundations of Canadian-American friendship and
prove that North American security is a central priority for Quebec.
Also, the explanation of Quebeckers’ disapproval of the Afghan mission
allows us to look beyond the stereotype of the inherently
antimilitaristic Quebec. Although anti-Americanism surely exists to
some degree, it seems more appropriate to put the emphasis on
anti-imperialism. That perspective allows us to understand the
evolution of Quebec’s positions favouring multilateralism as well as
its current position on Afghanistan. This analytic outline of security
issues thus offers a more nuanced perspective than do the perpetual
stereotypes that obscure the debate and cultivate prejudices.
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ARTICLE: Time to Create a Northwest Passage Authority
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by Brian Flemming
Despite being surrounded on three sides by the Atlantic, Pacific and
Arctic Oceans, Canada has never regarded itself as a maritime power
except for a brief, shining, moment after World War Two.
But the faster-than-expected melting of the Northwest Passage, and a
similar thawing of the often overlooked-by-North Americans Northeast
Passage above Russia, may soon change all that. Witness Prime
Minister Stephen Harper’s new policies for Canada north of 60.
The prospect of ocean-going ships transiting the northwest passage in
a decade or so opens the door to Canada proposing a joint
American-Canadian institution, one sorely needed when post-9/11
American security initiatives along the world’s “longest undefended
border” have eroded the gains made by the increased NAFTA-driven
porosity of our southern border.
It’s been a long time since border initiatives such as the
International Joint Commission (IJC) for waterways along the
U.S.-Canada border, or the Saint Lawrence Seaway project, were
hammered out between Canada and America. The opening of the waterways
between the Arctic islands north of 60 presents a unique opportunity
for North America’s neighbours to rebuild their historic borderlands
relationship.
To do this will require both countries to climb down from their
current policy pedestals. The United States will have to stop claiming
that the Northwest Passage is an international strait under
international law, one capable of being transited by any ship making
an “innocent passage”. Canada, for its part, must set aside its claim
to every square centimetre of territory in its Arctic archipelago.
Instead, Canada and the United States should create a Northwest
Passage Authority (NPA) through which both countries can manage the
opening of, and the rules covering transits of, the Northwest Passage.
It is in the American interest to cede its claim to this new authority
because the United States does not want improperly strengthened or
underinsured commercial vessels flying flags of convenience transiting
its own portion of the passage that passes through Alaskan waters. It
may also want to ensure that American ships, properly certified by the
NPA, can go through the passage without having a diplomatic punch-up
with Canada. Paul Celucci, former American ambassador to Canada,
recently said he believed the Northwest Passage belonged to Canada and
that America should support Canada’s claim in return for the kind of
guaranteed access it gets to the Seaway and the Canadian side of the
Great Lakes.
Canada’s interest lies in putting aside its long quarrel with America
over the passage and using its governmental and diplomatic energy to
develop the scientific and technological capacity to help the NPA
effectively manage the northwest passage. This is particularly urgent
because the Russians today are far ahead of Canada and the United
States in developing the tools needed to open and regulate the
Northeast Passage which has the geographic advantage of making Europe
closer to Asia than the Northwest Passage does.
In recent months, there has been a debate in Washington over whether
to ratify the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOSIII). The issue driving the pro-ratification forces in Congress
is making sure the undersea borders between Alaska, Canada and Russia
can be drawn to America’s advantage. Anti-ratificationists worry about
American loss of the broadest possible claim to make “innocent
passages” through the Arctic.
A Harper proposal to the Bush administration to create an NPA might
paper over some of these divisions in Congress and allow Bush to offer
considerable consolation to the anti-ratification forces by claiming
America would be better off with the combination of the NPA and
UNCLOSIII ratification.
The commercial pluses for both countries would be that they could
agree that the Canada Shipping Act and the American Jones Act were to
apply to the Northwest Passage, thereby assuring the potential
“coasting trade” in the north would not be captured by flag of
convenience countries. Both countries should also encourage their
insurance companies to acquire as soon as possible an ability to
insure ships in the northern trade, not only in the North American
north but in the Russian north too.
Prime Minister Harper deserves credit for putting Canada’s Arctic
Ocean squarely on the policy radar screen in Ottawa. The baby steps
he’s taken so far have been encouraging. But it’s now time for him and
his government to seize the imagination initiative and to give an
embattled Bush administration an opening way to show how it can
cooperate with Canada in a creative and mutually-beneficial policy
initiative. Canada might even suggest Celucci be named the first chair
of the NPA.
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Article: Managing
an Interdependent World
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by Gordon Smith
That the
world is becoming increasingly interdependent is a well known fact.
That the world’s institutions have not kept up to date with this
interdependence is also well known. It has proven very difficult to
reform global institutions because in any new proposed arrangement
there are always people who feel they will come off less well.
Nonetheless there are a large number of global deadlocks that need to
be broken – think of climate change and energy security. The price of
not doing so could be considerable. What should be done about this
state of affairs?
It is time to refashion the G8 Summits. Summits of key leaders are the
most obvious way of showing leadership and a sense of direction. It is
the best way to catalyze action. Their joint commitments can trigger
action in their own countries and by international organizations. Note
that this is not the same as binding global decisions and enforcement.
When the first Summit took place it was of the G5 (United States,
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan). Italy immediately insisted
it must be a member and the United States replied that then Canada
should also be a member. Nobody elected the G7. The idea was that the
G7 were the major industrialized and trading countries of the world.
They could benefit from closer coordination.
In the 1990s Russia was first invited to attend for a few hours. In
1998 Russia became a full time member. Russia was invited in to this
essentially self appointed club as an inducement to become a
constructive member of the international community. While Russia has
not developed as a liberal democracy and some argue Russia should be
dropped because of its illiberal governance, on balance it is better
to have Russia inside the tent.
For the last three Summits, China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South
Africa have been invited, as Russia first was, to participate for a
few hours. It is not surprising that these five countries are becoming
increasingly restive at their second class participation. Indeed the
five are now caucusing among themselves. If left to fester, this could
create a developed/developing divide that would have negative
repercussions for the functioning of the Summit.
It is time now to transform the Summit into a G13. President Sarkozy
of France is the only current leader in a G8 country to advocate such
a change. Former Prime Minister Paul Martin proposed a G or L(for
leaders)20, and that may be the eventual membership. While there is a
certain momentum and logic to the 13, some would question whether a
transformed Summit should not include an Islamic country, perhaps
Egypt coming from the critical Middle Eastern region.
Of course it is true China is not by any stretch a democracy. But nor
is Russia, and they are in. And India is the world’s largest
democracy. With China’s economic size and population, China must be
part of the group providing global leadership. It is important to the
world and the evolution of future governance that China must be on the
inside. China must certainly not feel excluded.
Some have advocated that membership in Summits should vary according
to the subject being discussed – “a variable geometry”. The major
downside of this approach is that it undermines one of the key
purposes of leaders’ Summits – leaders getting to know each other and
developing empathy. Variable geometry is not the way to go.
Preparation for Summits is now done by government officials,
coordinated by that of the host state. This should continue. There
should not be an international secretariat; such bodies tend to take
on a life of their own.
Where improvement could be made is in the creation of a network of
think tanks to support the Summits. Initially this should include
institutions in the 13 countries, ensuring the 5 are on a level
playing field with the 8. Eventually, the Summit think tank network
should be open to participation from non-members, above all in the
South. This should be coupled with an initiative to strengthen
Southern think tanks, something already underway in the International
Development Research Centre.
Canada has historically had a deep commitment to multilateralism,
international law and international institutions. Canada has also both
benefited from and provided leadership in G7 and G8 Summits. Now is
the time for Canada to show leadership in enlarging the Summit and
ensuring it is better supported.
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Article: Some Historical Reflections on The ‘Boom and Bust’ Cycle of
Canadian Naval Procurement
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by Richard H. Gimblett
No one is
condemned to repeat their past, but when similar circumstances seem to
arise, a good appreciation of what has happened before – and the
context within which it transpired – can prepare us to better
understand the present. A case in point emerges from a collection of
documents that I am editing pertaining to Canadian naval force
development over the last century.
It lays out a staggering trend – every
20
years or so we go through a boom and bust cycle roughly along the
following lines:
some sudden change in the global security environment demands we build
up a workable little fleet from which we get a couple of very good
operational cycles, but within just a few years we begin to starve it
by having not bought enough spares to keep it fit, then penny-pinch
till finally it fritters away into the rust-bucket butt of media
jokes.
My own short life has already seen the better part of two such cycles
– I joined the Navy in 1975 when the Iroquois class DDG-280s
were the brand-spanking new “Sisters of the Space Age”, then spent the
1980s at sea in obsolete old steamers of the St Laurent class
(laid down in the 1950s), kept the aging tanker
Protecteur sailing through the First Gulf War literally with
duct tape (I note she is still in service today), then saw the
inspired design of the Halifax
class and the upgraded 280s really transform us through the 1990s into
a “Medium Global Force Projection Navy”, as described in
Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020.1
That was the fleet that made Canada a world leader for Operation
Apollo (the Second Gulf War), when we commanded the Coalition naval
effort in the Arabian Sea for the better part of two years after the
9/11 attacks. But now we seem to be in the “frittering away” stage
yet again.
Presented broad brush, it seems to suggest there is some truth in
Santayana’s maxim about being condemned to repeat one’s past – except
that in the details, each of those times, every 20 years, has been
very different. This newsletter format does not allow the fuller
analysis the subject deserves, but even a superficial telling is
illuminating. In the process, I beg the forgiveness of readers as I
introduce a new sub-theme: that each case has hinged upon an element
of rather radical Canadian technological innovation that would shape
our Navy’s destiny, generally for the better.
The first case is one that has been so well buried in the dim recesses
of our past, that it is generally unknown even amongst naval
historians. In 1888 a chap named Andrew Gordon, then Commander of the
newly established Fisheries Protection Service, put together a
proposal to create a Canadian Naval Militia composed of a new ship
type just then being developed – the torpedo-boat destroyer. His plan
never came to pass, for a variety of reasons all too familiar to
modern readers: the Macdonald government, preoccupied with scandal,
found itself with competing fiscal priorities, and did not believe the
Franco-Russian cruiser threat was credible. The really radical
thinking here was Gordon’s suggestion that, contrary to evolving Royal
Navy doctrine, the destroyers should act not as integral screening
elements of the Grand Fleet but rather as independent spoilers against
a larger battle force, a concept that would be codified by the
Jeune École over the next decade.
Importantly, the small ship concept would plant itself indelibly on
what would become the Canadian Navy. Twenty years later, in 1909,
when the first Director of the Canadian Naval Service, Admiral Charles
Kingsmill, went to Britain to work out the establishment of a Canadian
Naval Militia, First Sea Lord Admiral Jacky Fisher instead boldly
suggested Canada should establish a proper navy structured around a
battlecruiser fleet unit supported by protected cruisers, destroyers
and submarines. Fisher was able to push the idea through against the
better judgement of Kingsmill, who at least was able to scale it down
to just cruisers and destroyers. Even that compromise fell through
when the Laurier government was defeated in 1911, but it did lead to
the establishment of the Vickers yard in Montreal, which in a great
display of irony ended up building a large number of submarines for
the Royal Navy during the First World War (which as an aside puts paid
to the chestnut that we cannot build submarines in this country).
The Great War of 1914-1918 was not especially noteworthy for ship
procurement, so our story can remain in-synch by zipping ahead to 1929
for the next, even shorter, episode, when the Mackenzie King
government finally found its way to embark upon a fleet renewal
program, and fortunately had paid for the first two ships before the
Depression hit. In this way we acquired the destroyers Saguenay
and Skeena, the first two warships built to RCN specifications,
although in UK yards. The great technical revolution here was the
“Canadianization” package, which introduced the radical concepts of
steam heating and showers for the messdecks.
The Second World War came along only a decade later, ostensibly
throwing the 20-year cycle out of synch. Indeed, there are only a
couple of observations worth making on ship production during the war,
and neither of them are very positive: for a start, the supposed mass
production of corvettes and frigates really demonstrated the limited
technical capacity of Canadian yards, as they were quite
unsophisticated types, and we built them in numbers proportionally far
below the truly industrious American effort; moreover, our one attempt
to build a complex design was the Tribal class destroyers, and
those were not completed until well after the war, arguably with an
overall negative impact in drawing away scarce refit resources from
the fleet. If nothing else, the Second World War underscored the
absolute necessity to nurture the shipbuilding industry in peacetime
in order to have it viable in time of war.2
We don’t need to pretend the Second World War just never happened, but
it is interesting that the next cycle came along in 1949, when the
threatened onset of the Cold War led the St Laurent government to
undertake a planned mobilization of the economy. His ministry is one
of the better in our past, and his shipbuilding strategy provides
further proof.3
Here we see in the afore-mentioned “steamers” of the St Laurent
class (for the record, the lead ship was named after the river, not
the prime minister) a truly revolutionary indigenous ASW design, that
would see 24 hulls produced over the next 16 years – a pretty good
model for a continuous-build program, although the work was probably
spread over too many yards. That design in turn spawned a variety of
further Canadian technical innovations: variable-depth sonar, the
hydrofoil, marriage of the big helicopter onto a little deck, and the
innovative but often overlooked DATAR automatic datalink system.
But by the mid-1960s, this nascent national maritime strategy was
beginning to fall apart. Historians have yet to properly analyse the
period, but my sense is that blaming it all on unification is
simplistic. In a certain way, the country lost its nerve in the Cuban
Missile Crisis, and that was reflected in the fracturing of the Navy
into various communities or “advocates” of specific ship types as one
author has set it out in a recent issue of the Canadian Naval Review.4
To make a long story very short, the Navy in the 1960s looked
variously at getting a second carrier, or switching to an amphibious
flat top, or even an all-nuclear submarine force.
The hope had been to obtain an equivalent capability replacement of
that found in the already aging “steamers”; instead the 1969 variant
of the boom cycle produced the four 280s – leading-edge technology and
the envy of other fleets in many respects though they were – but only
four of them. A modest effort to gap the steamer fleet saw four of
them converted to “Improved Restigouche Escorts”, but the rest had to
wait another decade for the DELEX (DEstroyer Life EXtension) package,
dryly described by those of serving in them as “grave-robbing”. DELEX
did nothing much to protect the steamers patrolling off Kamchatka and
in the GIUK Gap from the coordinated Soviet nuclear submarine and
Badger bomber attacks we constantly exercised against, but in making
the “Link-11” computer-to-computer datalink a standard fit throughout
the fleet (communications systems generally are cheaper to buy than
weapons fits) it at least gave the entire Navy a window into the
information age revolution that was about to dawn.
The next boom in the procurement cycle would come along right on cue
with the floating-up of the first Halifax class Canadian Patrol
Frigate in 1989, but the technical promise of those ships had already
sparked the greatest doctrinal revolution in our Navy’s history. The
towed array sonar – or more specifically, its powerful
Canadian-engineered shipboard processor – broke our Navy from the
mould of close-in convoy escort that had typified its later Cold War
employment, expanding the horizons of the fleet for the success we see
today. Efficient employment of towed array ships meant they had to be
stationed independently, sometimes hundreds of miles apart, which
meant in turn that every ship had to have satellite communications for
reliable datalink information exchange, as well as an integrated
combat suite for self-defence (it is not commonly known that ours is
the only navy in the world that got Harpoon anti-ship missiles for
self-defence) – the combination of all these capabilities meant that
suddenly the USN looked to us as real contributing partners in
strategic ASW, hunting for Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic
missile-firing submarines in the North Atlantic depths. Suddenly
“interoperability” was not just a faddy buzzword, but something
uniquely ours.
The result was that, even though the present fleet does not conduct
much ASW any more, it has developed a very respectable capacity in the
network-enabled capabilities that are essential to command and control
of dispersed naval formations typical of the 21st century – as we have
demonstrated, for example, in the Arabian Sea.
We should be poised for success, but are we really? By any reckoning,
2009 is only a little over a year away, and it looks like we are going
to be adrift for the next boom in the cycle. The need for a destroyer
replacement programme – to replace the 280s built two cycles (nearly
40 years) ago – is long past urgent. For a ship to be launched in
2009, steel cutting would have to begin today, which means a project
management office should have been stood up at least five years ago.
Instead, in 2002 DND shelved the Navy’s CADRE (Command and Control
Area Air Defence Replacement) project, and only now are defence
planers beginning to turn their attention back to the idea. The
strategic consequences are enormous – just as a new era of uncertainty
in global security deepens, Canada will be without the naval capacity
to assist our allies in its risk-management. Because it is becoming
unaffordable to maintain the older ships, the 280s will be
progressively withdrawn over the next five years, just as our frigates
are being put into refit under the recently announced Halifax
class modernization programme. The ability to deploy an operationally
viable naval task group will be extremely limited through 2012-2018.
If only it were as simple as buying someone else’s ships
“off-the-shelf”. There is very little immediate excess capacity in
the global shipbuilding industry, even assuming a suitable hull type
could be identified in time. Some days it is possible to see light on
the horizon, in that the idea of a continuous build program as in the
1950s, which makes sense in so many ways, seems to be gaining
traction. But then on other days such hopes seem doomed, because
while naval types recognize that it takes decades to recapitalize a
fleet, politicians and joint capabilities boards work in electoral and
procurement cycles measured in months or a couple of years at best.
Unless someone comes up with a radical new technology to deliver an
innovative “just-in-time” solution, future historians will record our
generation as the first to fail to meet the 20-year upside “boom” in
our national warship acquisition cycle.
Endnotes
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Article: A Note to American Friends: What Lies Behind the Border, and
How it Shapes our Relationship
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by George Haynal
The essence of the
United States/Canada relationship is a unique mix
of asymmetry and comity
This
short paper is an attempt to sketch how these two apparently
incompatible qualities, asymmetry and comity, are reconciled and how
they create a dynamic partnership. It also notes the delicacy of the
balance in this relationship and the stress that reaction to 9/11
continues to place upon it.
The
asymmetry in the economic power, military reach, and cultural
influence of Canada and the United States is self-evident and needs no
iteration but there is, however, another less obvious aspect of
asymmetry that is key to understanding the relationship - the degree
to which each partner is present in the national life of the other.
The United States is present in Canadian affairs in a way that is
probably more potent and direct than anywhere else in the world: the
Canadian economy relies fundamentally on access to the United States;
Canadians measure themselves constantly against the United States in
social, economic, and international spheres (sometimes to the
exclusion of benchmarks that are arguably more appropriate); Canadian
social discourse is therefore conditioned (perhaps too much) by that
of the United States; Canadian history is, in a very real sense, one
of reaction to the United States given that Canada was created in the
immediate aftermath of the Civil War and in reaction to it; and
Canadian territorial integrity and military security rely on American
forbearance and guarantees against external threat.
For
Canadians, in short, the United States is so all encompassing a
presence that it shapes their view not just of the world but also of
themselves. The relationship is therefore a matter of constant
national discourse and preoccupation. Americans’ view of Canadians, in
contrast, is partial and vague. The relationship is peripheral to the
American national life. It comes into focus only in moments of
difficulty; even then, it is almost always the domain of particular
constituencies rather than the nation as a whole. Yet while Americans
do not obsess about Canadians as Canadians do about Americans, Canada
cannot ever be entirely absent from their thinking. Canada is one of
the United States’ only two immediate neighbours, its economy is
deeply integrated into the American economy, it is a uniquely reliable
source of natural resources and a useful international ally, and it
has been the United States’ deep border – an integral component of
their continental defences against superpower rivals. But more
interesting is the fact that Canada is the only society with which
Americans have been able to take a positive, quasi-domestic
relationship for granted.
This is
because Canadians are “North American,” very much (if not entirely)
like Americans as they both share the DNA of British North America.
Canada evolved over 400 years from a colonial, to a post colonial, to
a North Atlantic, to a North American society and although the country
adapted French and British institutions to its needs, France has been
absent from Canadian national life for almost 250 years. Britain’s
influence on Canada’s domestic and international politics, though it
declined more gradually, evaporated in the latter half of the last
century. The American Declaration of Independence came much earlier,
was more abrupt, and was as much an expression of ideas as of
pragmatism but that does not change the fact that both countries are
successor states to British (and French) North America. Their
political values, legal institutions, and social structures all have
roots in a common heritage. The result is that there are now two
models within the North American system that are distinct, yet also
uniquely compatible. That compatibility and distinctiveness is
expressed in their respective statements of constitutional values – in
the BNA Act (Peace, Order, and Good Government) and the Declaration of
Independence (Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness). They
create compatible and complimentary approaches to both national and
international affairs, they can generate great synergy when both
countries share general objectives, and they can spur a useful
dialectic when they differ on goals and means.
Asymmetric comity, then, is the heart of the relationship and each
country manages their affairs on the assumption that they are in
“harmony,” that at the very least, their policies, regulations, and
modes of conducting public and private business are compatible and do
not cause conflict across the border. Each society has become
comfortable in the notion that its future is, in many respects, a
shared one. Over the years, Canada and the United States have codified
both the security and economic dimensions of that expectation. The
security bargain was most clearly articulated in the Ogdensburg
Declaration, an understanding reached during World War II that became
the basis of the shared defence of North American air space in the
Cold War. This bargain was straightforward. The United States relied
on Canada to defend itself and, hence, to be America’s deep northern
border. If Canada could not do so, and if this inability became a
threat to the security of North America, the United States was
committed to defending Canada and Canada was committed to allowing the
United States to do so. The defence bargain has assumed a common
perimeter because the military threats to the security of either
country lie beyond the continent and come only from shared and
identifiable enemies. This has created a paradox at the heart of
Canadian defence policy that is that Canada must defend itself
ultimately only against “help.” The security bargain, however, is now
being reworked. Currently, threats to North America also come from
anonymous quarters: from terrorists who could live among us and who
are capable of creating mass destruction. Suddenly, it seems, the
assumption that both countries share a common responsibility to defend
North America is no longer the basis of American policy. The border
between Canada and the United States is no longer seen as a shared
checkpoint but rather as a last line for asserting American
sovereignty, with Canada no longer being seen as a full partner within
a shared security space.
The
economic bargain is also changing. The shared comfort in economic
interdependence was most compellingly expressed in the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement of 1988 but the economic relationship has been
evolving in the direction of free trade with or without the benefit of
treaty protection for over 140 years (indeed, earlier efforts to
provide it were sometimes failures). The understanding that underpins
both countries’ mutual economic dependence has been clear. The United
States relies on Canada to manage the Canadian economy in a way that
is compatible with American economic interests, and in return, the
United States implicitly guarantees that the border will not stand
unreasonably in the way of Canadian access to the American economy,
the world’s largest and most advanced. Now the economic bargain, like
the security pact, is also coming under severe pressure as the border
hardens in the face, ironically, of shared threats.
Canadians are finding it profoundly difficult to accept that the
historic relationship between the two countries is suddenly being
redefined. This stems from a misunderstanding of how Americans
perceive them. Most Canadians live within about 150 miles of the
border and hence, have a personal sense of community with America and
Americans. “The Border” is a familiar part of every Canadian’s life,
one that had been experienced largely as a formality in interactions
involving their daily routine with family, social groups, sport
activities, shopping, and recreation. Canadians have come, perhaps
naively, to believe that they personally have an inalienable
entitlement to ignore the border, a belief that has been reinforced by
the exceptional access that the United States had, until recently,
extended to Canadians. The Canadian economy has also benefited from
exceptionally open access to the American market. While the nature of
the dependency that this has engendered in the Canadian business
community is too large a subject to explore here, it may be sufficient
to observe that well over half of the Canadian economy is in one way
or another accounted for by flows to, through, and from the United
States. This level of commitment to one market speaks, if not to
complacency, then to an extremely high level of confidence in the
immutability of access.
This
high level of trust in, and dependence on, fair and open access is why
any deviation from that norm quickly becomes a national issue in
Canada. This familial view of the relationship is not mirrored in the
United States, however. Relations with Canada almost never create
national ripples. The reasons are simple and are rooted in asymmetry.
First, Americans have two borders, and comparatively few Americans
live close to either. In relative terms, far fewer Americans than
Canadians cross or trade across the shared border. Also, while
Canadian content is welcome, it does not dominate American popular
culture. Additionally, only a small percentage of the American economy
is tied up with flows across the border, and while many American firms
have integrated Canadian operations and almost all assume open access
to Canada, that access is simply not seen as “contingent.” If it is
restricted, American companies are confident, though not always with
reason, that they can generate the leverage to restore it. Finally,
Canada is useful to American national defence but it does not have the
capacity to impinge upon American sovereignty.
This
asymmetry in what is at stake is reflected in the way the
relationship, writ large, has been managed, or actually, not managed.
It is too pervasive of a relationship to allow for detailed, top down
direction but once in a while aspects of the relationship are
expressed in treaty form. Management of issues is, however, frequently
necessary. It follows an almost unvarying template: Canadian
governments monitor threats to Canadian interests in American policy
and practice; they then engage in intense and proactive diplomacy to
head off those threats; and the American government then responds by
accommodating or rejecting Canadian initiatives. The only variance in
this pattern occurs in those relatively rare cases in which the United
States has taken the initiative on issues of international diplomacy,
continental defence, or when they cannot be resisted, in the service
of special interests. Active management of the relationship,
therefore, is left largely to Canada. That is why so many Canadian
resources are dedicated to it.
Given
the intensity Canada brings to the relationship, one would presume
that Canada’s approach to management would be systematic, deep, and
steady but this has not been the case. The approach has always been
intensely political, sometimes ideological, and often deeply partisan.
Canadian governments have been inconsistent in their objectives over
the years. Some have sought alternatives to Canada’s growing
dependence (though often unable to deny the imperatives of geography
and familiarity), while others have pursued formalized guarantees of
access. Compounding federal inconsistency has been the fact that
provinces also play a role. Under the Canadian Constitution, many
issues that cross the border are in their jurisdiction and their
interests, being regionally defined, are often not aligned across the
country.
There
are two pillars of constancy in the Canadian management structure,
however: the embassy in Washington and the prime minister. The embassy
– properly, Canada’s largest – is “Ottawa on the Potomac,” and every
major federal department is represented. Now, with provincial
participation, it is a physical expression of the hybrid,
multi-layered nature of the relationship. The ambassador has often had
quasi-Cabinet standing and he has always been a prime, though
sometimes not the dominant, source of advice to the Cabinet and the
prime minister. Prime ministers have always been the ultimate
decision-makers in managing the relationship, always directly involved
personally or through their office – sometimes more, sometimes less,
but always aware. They have at various times been energetic or
passive, sympathetic or distant, strategic or tactical in their
approach to the relationship, and they have always set the tone. Other
than these two constants, the Canadian system is fluid and adapts
quickly to changing circumstances.
Within
this management system, DFAIT is nominally in charge, but the reality
is that a myriad of Canadian policy-makers and regulators conduct
business with their counterparts across the border. Various actors
take on prominence as their issues come to the centre of the
relationship and move on when those issues are resolved. At its best,
this diversity of involvement has meant that Canadians are quick to
anticipate problems, innovative in advancing agendas, and effective in
defending both Canadian interests and the integrity of the
relationship. At its weakest, as during the period of complacency that
succeeded the conclusion of NAFTA, the lack of constant central
leadership saps the relationship of energy and a sense of direction.
In moments of crisis, such as North America has been in since 11
September 2001, the system is always mobilized and the looseness of
the structures temporarily stiffens to ensure coordination.
With the
changing nature of the relationship between Canada and the United
States comes a danger of alienation. Canadians assumed that the
relationship of comity would continue after 9/11, that each country
would co-operate and do the right thing to protect each other and
themselves against international terrorism, each in their own
jurisdiction. It took time, but Canadians have accepted that they must
now deal with an adjusted reality. The border, rather than a bridge,
seems if not yet an impermeable wall, an alienating reality, and it is
the border, not the myriad of other positive aspects of the
relationship, that is driving much of the domestic discourse on the
relationship between both countries. The Canadian system has been
deployed to meet the challenge for a border-centered relationship and
Canadian governments have changed laws and regulations as well as
increased security expenditures to ensure compatibility with American
border policies and expectations in the fight against terrorism. Prime
ministers have taken a personal role in managing the dialogue on the
security relationship and Canadian business groups have engaged their
American counterparts in the cause of a fluid border.
The
relationship has steadied, but it is now moving into a new
equilibrium. What should that be? Canadians, for their part, know what
must be done to ensure the desired relationship: to continue to be the
United States’ most trusted and transparent trading and investment
partner; to continue to build their own defences against international
terrorism; to continue to seek common objectives in the world; to
continue to cherish the relationship; and to work to make the border a
shared instrument for mutual protection.
But
Canadians will now be asking themselves what they had not asked before
– how should the relationship evolve? And just asking that question
will make Canadian management of the relationship more systematic,
more focused, and less complacent than it has been thus far. It will
also create a genuine new dynamic in Canadian policy – a substantive
effort to define options to diminish Canada’s dependence on the United
States.
Endnotes
1 Mexico is, of course, the third
“North American” society, but I use the term in a narrow sense in this
context, referring specifically to the successor states to British
North America.
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Article: Contemplating the Future of the Afghan Mission: Some Thoughts
for the Manley Review
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by Scot Robertson
The debate over the future and duration of Canada’s commitment to the
mission in Afghanistan continues to ebb and flow. The essence of the
debate still seems to turn primarily on the question of casualties,
whether the progress made over the past few years has been worth the
cost, and finally, on the future prospects for Afghanistan.
Presumably, these and other matters are being contemplated by the
special blue-ribbon panel headed up by former Foreign Minister John
Manley. This committee, which was announced with some fanfare, has
receded onto the background, although but it should, in due course,
release a series of recommendations concerning the future of Canada's
mission to that troubled region -- whether we stay and finish the job,
whether we leave at the end of the "mandate" or whether we abandon
Afghanistan and return forthwith.
It may, therefore, be time to step back and consider the entire
question from a different perspective. Rather than focus on
day-to-day operations, with the inevitable casualties -- Canadian,
NATO and Afghan -- it is more important to keep the overall objective
of the mission in mind. NATO’s stated mission is “to help establish
the conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy – after decades of
conflict, destruction, and poverty – a representative government and
self-sustaining peace and security”. Most informed observers and
commentators would agree that this is a worthy objective. Yet,
earlier this year, when Gordon Smith undertook a stock-taking of the
situation in Afghanistan, he concluded, more or less, that the odds
against NATO’s success were daunting, that time was not on NATO’s
side, and that the consequences of failure would be profoundly
troubling. While Smith’s assessment of the situation was
disconcerting, he did not, however, conclude that the situation was
hopeless. Rather, he was of the view that prompt and effective action
was necessary across a number of fronts.
As part of the discussion over the future of the Canadian
mission in Afghanistan, we perhaps need to fundamentally re-think some
of the measures by which we judge the success and / or failure of the
counter-insurgency and nation-building operations that lie at the
heart of the Afghan mission. What follows then, are a number of ideas
that might cause us to re-consider how we view the operation, and by
extension, how we evaluate our continued commitment to it. Hopefully,
the Manley review panel is adopting a wide-ranging and broad
perspective, and not just focusing on Canadian concerns. To that end,
the following ten propositions are offered for consideration:
-
Try not to confuse short-term tactical imperatives and processes with
longer-term goals. It is important to bear in mind, although many do
not, that there is a real and meaningful difference between the tools
being employed in the operation (military, media, diplomatic,
governance, and development) and the overall objective, which involves
political accommodation.
-
While a major component of the larger enterprise involves providing
humanitarian assistance to the long-suffering people of Afghanistan,
this is but a short-term objective. The longer-term object is to
foster sustainable economic growth. Hence, it is critical to focus on
the constraints to economic growth, and over time ensure that these
constraints are eliminated such that a functioning economy is allowed
to develop. Therefore, it is imperative that the military and other
development agencies consider what the basis of growth in a particular
region might be. What are the constraints to growth? How might they be
removed? Remember, the overall objective is not just to conduct a
counter-insurgency campaign to separate the people from the insurgents
and war-lords, but to give the people a viable economic foundation
upon which to build a future.
-
A third consideration is that in identifying areas for spending on
development projects, it is of fundamental importance to reinforce
success. This will require that development agencies spend their
resources in areas of Afghanistan where there is already successful
economic activity. In other words, reinforce success. Conversely, do
not attempt to foster growth in areas where it cannot succeed. This is
a wasteful use of scarce resources, and can only fail.
-
A fourth idea to keep in mind as one views the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan concerns the sometimes confused discussion over the
asymmetric nature of the conflict. This requires that we step back and
consider what is meant by asymmetry. There is a basic difference
between asymmetric means and asymmetric ends. Most conflicts in
history involve some asymmetry in means, where one side attempts to
use its opponent's weakness against it. That is a truism. What we need
to think about in Afghanistan is whether there is in fact an asymmetry
in ends. In this case, there may be an underlying assumption that both
sides in the conflict want the fighting to end. Perhaps this is not
the case. It may be that the Taliban, and al-Qaeda in particular, want
the conflict to continue.
-
A fifth, and perhaps very difficult set of issues to consider,
concerns the general approach to development assistance. This requires
that the international community accept that the Afghan way may not
necessarily meet the expectations or standards of the aid-granting
agencies. In other words, the international community needs to accept
that local solutions to local problems might be preferable to
large-scale projects imposed from outside. In addition, it may be
important to recognize that international (Western) principles such as
multiculturalism may not transfer easily, and as such, should not be
made an absolute condition. Moreover, there are limits to the local
Afghan capacity to undertake large scale political and development
projects. These limits, while frustrating, need to be accepted,
otherwise development will fail on a broad front. Ultimately, success
will depend on Afghan's taking control and responsibility for
development and re-construction.
-
A sixth consideration is to recognize the fatigue from war, and both
physical and economic insecurity, and the overall and rising sense of
frustration with the ongoing insurgency that grips Afghanistan. This
is the centre of gravity of the entire undertaking. In order to
undermine the appeal of the Taliban, it will be important to point to
some signature successes that have widespread appeal across
Afghanistan and contribute to a more secure and stable future.
-
From the Western perspective, it is critical not to confuse numbers
with effects. There has been a tendency in the past -- perhaps
somewhat understandably -- to focus on the body count. There has also
been an over-emphasis on the gap between aid commitments on the one
hand, and actual aid expenditures on the other. Finally, in terms of
numbers, there has been an ongoing concern with the publicly stated
numbers of Afghan troops and police and the numbers that are actually
available for operations. In this latter instance, the problem is very
real, but it also very complex. It is by no means an easy undertaking
to recruit, equip and train troops and police for counter-insurgency
operations. To compound the problem, in Afghanistan, there is the
persistent problem of what has been called the "ghost-payroll" where
the nominal number is much greater than the actual number of either
troops or police available for operations. Over time, this will be
addressed as the effort to build or re-build the Afghan National Army
and Afghan National Police takes hold. But, one must recognize that
this is a long-term proposition.
-
As Canadians and other non-Afghan partners contemplate the medium to
long-term future of the operation, it is vital to understand the basis
of local power in Afghanistan. To some extent, the challenge is to
develop an understanding of the complexities and intricacies of the
local and national level power-structures and the individuals
involved. To that end, it is important that there be some continuity
of approach and continuity of personnel. Regular rotations of NATO
personnel, while understandable from our perspective, are confusing
from the Afghan perspective, and may even be counter-productive.
-
Yet another issue concerning future economic and social development in
Afghanistan stems from the tendency for high-powered aid agencies and
consultants to swoop in with grand designs that bear no relationship
to local capacity. These plans may seem to provide the answer to all
Afghanistan's ills, but as we know from decades of frustration with
aid projects, success depends more on local capacity to integrate
outside aid, than on grand visions that will never be translated into
reality. In that sense, development is not top-down, but bottom-up. It
is measured in small steps, not great leaps. Frustrating as this may
be, that is the reality.
-
Finally, we need to understand that not everything can be done at
once. While this is exasperating too, there is only so much that can
be done with the forces and resources available. The challenge is to
match tasks to resources. Hence, the military should focus on an
oil-spot, or clear, hold, build and engage approach to providing
security and facilitating development. This, of course, means that
some areas will not receive immediate attention, and as a consequence
the insurgency may find sanctuary there. However, with the forces and
resources available today, it is just not possible to make progress
everywhere.
As the Manley committee, and Canadians in general, | | |
