“Telling like it is.” That’s how an acute follower of events describes this piece:
The Lost Alliance: NATO in Chicago
A ship is adrift in a foggy sea. The crew are in their bunks, the officers argue about their mortgages, and the captain has left.
The captain has left because the United States no longer believes NATO can contribute significantly against any serious global strategic challenges. An occasional bit player, yes: a partner with the will and capability to contribute significantly, no.
The officers don’t care because this generation of European leaders no longer thinks strategically. They are lulled by a cloudy security environment, divided by national priorities, and buried under the stream of short term concerns. (Of which the pending meltdown of the eurozone admittedly is an existential challenge.)
And the crew are in their bunks because European NATO cannot deploy more than 5 percent of the 1.7 million European troops costing over $260 billion annually. Even Europe’s limited Libyan operation only happened because the United States provided the electronic jamming, air defense suppression, 80 percent of the fuel, and most of the crucial surveillance, airborne refuelling and precision bombs [more here].
NATO–or more specifically European NATO–has been overwhelmed by globalization. The problem is not external challenges but the inability of the European allies to adapt coherently to a globalizing security environment. The result is a lost alliance: unable to orient itself, unable to look forward, unable to specify vital strategic interests beyond basic platitudes, unable to agree which future threats to focus on, and unable to generate military forces capable of addressing them. Instead, NATO has gone into denial and fiddles with details.
…[There] are countries that could be strategic partners but are too important for NATO. Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand can make noticeable global contributions [New Zealand?], but as long as NATO has no clear global strategy their potential in NATO is hobbled. Nor does the US — which has a global vision — need NATO to partner with them, as the bilateral basing and cooperation agreements with Australia illustrate. Nor is it clear why the US would want to burden its global arrangements by involving bickering NATO…
Tomas Ries is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Advisors Group, and is a senior lecturer at the National Defence College Sweden. This piece is part of a series of New Atlanticist pieces on NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit.
No mention of NATO’s needing more Canada. Related:
Whither (Whether) Nato, Part…
J.L. Granatstein - Does Canada Still Need NATO?
Shipwreck or Lifeboat? NATO in a Stormy Century
NATO: Cooperation to Cut Costs, Keep or Increase Capabilities
Mark Collins is a prolific Ottawa blogger
